P. v. Ivey
Filed 3/14/06 P. v. Ivey CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARK IVEY, Defendant and Appellant. | B174481 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA058111) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Gary J. Ferrari, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeffrey S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell and Kenneth J. Kao, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Mark Ivey appeals from the judgment entered following his no contest plea to two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child. He obtained a certificate of probable cause. Ivey contends the application of Penal Code section 803, subdivision (g) is an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it revived his time-barred prosecutions.[1] We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2003, Mark Ivey was charged by felony complaint with seven counts of committing a lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subds. (a), (c)(1)). The complaint arose from allegations that Ivey had molested his daughter on and between January 1, 1988 and December 10, 1994, when she was nine to 15-years-old. The daughter did not report the crimes to authorities until June 2003 because she feared Ivey. The complaint specifically alleged the statute of limitations on each count had been extended pursuant to Penal Code section 803, subdivision (g).
Pursuant to a negotiated plea, Ivey pleaded no contest on March 2, 2004 to two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a)). In exchange, he received a sentence of 10 years in state prison.
DISCUSSION
Relying on Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607 [123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544] (Stogner), Ivey contends the application of Penal Code section 803, subdivision (g) (hereinafter section 803(g)) violates state and federal constitutional guarantees against ex post facto laws.[2] As Ivey acknowledges, section 803 (g) became effective with respect to his crimes of conviction before the expiration of the standard statute of limitations period. As a result, we conclude the application of section 803(g) does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law.
The defendant in Stogner had been charged with committing crimes between 1955 and 1973. The standard statute of limitations period â€
