Filed 6/29/17 P. v. Jafari CA1/3
Opinion following remand from the Supreme Court.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SARAH SAYAD JAFARI,
Defendant and Appellant.

A139896

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 5-100902-6)


Defendant Sarah Sayad Jafari entered a no contest plea to possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351) and transporting a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). She was sentenced pursuant to her plea agreement to one year in county jail to be served on electronic home detention, followed by three years of mandatory supervision. She contends that the court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence of heroin found in her possession when a car in which she was riding was stopped by the police.
In December 2014 we concluded that the heroin was discovered during a traffic stop that was not unduly lengthy and affirmed the judgment. Our Supreme Court granted review and deferred action in the case pending the consideration and disposition of Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. ____, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (Rodriguez) by the United States Supreme Court. Following announcement of that decision, the court transferred this case back to us with directions that we vacate our earlier decision and reconsider it in light of Rodriguez. We do so and affirm for the following reasons.
BACKGROUND
San Pablo police officer Bowler testified at the hearing on the suppression motion that on the morning of August 23, 2009, she pulled over a vehicle she had seen make a left turn without signaling, into a lane of oncoming traffic. Inside the car were the driver and Jafari. Bowler had prior contacts with Jafari and knew about Jafari’s drug use. Bowler obtained the driver’s license, returned to her car, and checked the status of the license and whether the driver or Jafari had any outstanding warrants. The checks were completed, a cover officer arrived, and Bowler returned to the car with the other officer. Bowler said she had not decided at that point whether to cite the driver for traffic infractions.
Bowler asked the driver whether he had anything on him she should be concerned about, and he said, “No.” She asked for and received the driver’s consent to search him, performed the search, and found nothing. She then asked Jafari one or two times whether she had anything on her. Bowler testified that Jafari “looked up at me and then turned away, completely avoiding my question.” Bowler or the other officer asked Jafari to step outside the vehicle. When Jafari was out of the vehicle, Bowler asked her again if she had anything on her. Jafari nodded her head up and down, and pulled a bag of heroin out of her jacket pocket. Bowler’s questioning of Jafari began about ten minutes after she left her patrol car to get the driver’s license.
Jafari argued among other things that evidence of the heroin had to be suppressed because the traffic stop was unduly prolonged. The court found Bowler’s testimony to be credible, disagreed that the stop was overly prolonged, and denied the suppression motion.
DISCUSSION
We independently review a Fourth Amendment suppression ruling “ ‘measur[ing] the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness.’ ” (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 597.)
When a vehicle has been lawfully stopped for a traffic violation, the detention “must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500.) “A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. [Citation.] An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop. [Citation.]” (Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 333 (Johnson).) “There is no set time limit for a permissible investigative stop; the question is whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.)
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held “that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” (Rodriguez v. United States, supra, 575 U.S. at p. ___; 135 S.Ct. at p. 1612.)
Jafari calls this a bright-line rule that prohibits any detention beyond the time reasonably required for the officer to complete a drivers’ license check, a check for outstanding warrants and inspection of registration and proof of insurance. But the court’s opinion recognizes that officers “may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop” provided they “may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” (Rodriguez v. United States, supra, 575 U.S. at p. ___; 135 S.Ct. at p. 1615.) Determining just when a traffic stop exceeds the time reasonably required for an officer to complete the mission is not so easy or clear as Jafari would have it.
In Rodriguez, the officer had completed all required screening for identification and warrants, issued the driver a ticket and provided a warning before he instructed the driver to turn off the ignition and exit the vehicle to allow narcotics-detecting dogs to search the car. By that time the stop had lasted more than 20 minutes. (Rodriguez v. United States, supra, 575 U.S. at p. ___; 135 S.Ct. at p. 1613.) In the officer’s words, the reasons for the stop were “out of the way” and he “took care of all the business” before commencing the search. (Ibid.) This case is different.
Here, Officer Bowler testified that while she completed the check of driver’s license information for the driver of the vehicle, she had not made a decision whether to cite the driver when she continued her inquiry. Moreover, only 10 minutes had elapsed between the time Officer Bowler made her first contact with the vehicle and when she asked Jafari whether she “had anything on her.” We have no reason to conclude on this record that the stop was unduly prolonged because the tasks tied to the traffic infraction were or should have been completed. (Rodriguez v. United States, supra, 575 U.S. at p. ___; 135 S.Ct. at p. 1614.)
Officer Bowler initiated the stop after the driver made a left turn in the face of oncoming traffic without signaling. She had not yet determined whether she would cite the driver. Some further inquiry does not seem out of line or impermissible in the circumstances. Up to this point, Bowler clearly had not yet completed the purpose of the stop. Moreover, the 10 minutes that elapsed between the beginning of the stop and when Bowler asked Jafari to exit the car does not strike us as an unduly lengthy period of detention. In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the stop was measurably prolonged by the officer’s inquiry.
There is no question that Officer Bowler conducted “unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.” (Rodriguez v. United States, supra, 575 U.S. at p. ___; 135 S. Ct. at p. 16.15.) But neither is there on this record any reason to conclude those checks measurably, unreasonably, or unduly prolonged the mission of issuing a ticket or were unsupported by a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. (See, Johnson, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 333 [“measurably”]; People v. Gallardo (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 238 [“unreasonably”]; People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493. 500 [“unduly”].) The motion to suppress was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.




_________________________
Siggins, J.


We concur:


_________________________
McGuiness, P.J.


_________________________
Pollak, J.