Filed 5/11/17 P. v. Langner CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHELSEA JORDAN LANGNER,
Defendant and Appellant.
D071086
(Super. Ct. No. SCD266594)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Polly H.
Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Meagan Beale
and Mary Katherine Strickland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2
The superior court granted Chelsea Langner probation for a term of three years
after she pleaded guilty to one count of sexual penetration of a minor with a foreign
object (Pen. Code,1 §289, subd. (h)). Langner argues the superior court abused its
discretion by imposing certain probation conditions that prohibit legal conduct that is not
reasonably related to the offense or Langner's future criminality under the test established
by People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). These conditions fall into three main
categories: (1) conditions requiring Langner to refrain from using alcohol and drugs;
(2) conditions requiring Langner to undergo therapy; and (3) restrictions typically applied
to perpetrators of sexual offenses against minors. We conclude the conditions are valid
under Lent and the court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed them, and affirm
the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Langner met the victim (Doe) on a social media application around 2011. After
developing a relationship by communicating online for several months, they began
meeting in person. During their second in-person meeting, Langner digitally penetrated
Doe. At the time, Doe was approximately 14 and Langner was 18. Throughout the
following year, Langner and Doe continued to communicate online and often met in

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 As Langner pleaded guilty, the facts are derived primarily from the charges, plea
agreement, and probation report.
3
semi-public places, such as parks and stairwells. Each time they met, Langner digitally
penetrated Doe. At one point, they attended "Pride Prom" together and Langner wore a
different colored wristband than Doe, indicating she was over the age of 18 and Doe was
not. During the prom, Doe followed Langner into a bathroom stall and digitally
penetrated her. More than once, Langner told Doe she was concerned she would get into
trouble because of their age difference, and Doe agreed that if they were ever caught, she
would claim she told Langner she was 18.
In early 2013, Doe began seeing someone else and stopped talking to Langner.
Several months later, Langner contacted Doe via text message and asked to see her. Doe
agreed, but said they could only be friends. They planned to watch a movie at Doe's
house, but instead Doe alleges Langner pinned her to the bed, choked her and penetrated
her vagina with her fist, causing Doe to bleed, pass out from the pain, and suffer
permanent nerve damage. Langner left after Doe passed out and did not contact Doe for
some time thereafter. Doe was scared to tell her mother what had happened and did not
report the incident.
About a year later, Langner sent Doe another text message asking to see her and
Doe agreed, thinking they could discuss what had happened. They met at the beach and
then went to Doe's house so Langner could rinse her feet. When they arrived, Langner
followed Doe into the bedroom and, according to Doe, engaged in unwanted sexual
contact including choking Doe, orally copulating Doe, and penetrating Doe's vagina with
her fist. Langner sent Doe a text message approximately three months later and asked to
4
see her again, but Doe refused and said she did not want to have any further contact with
Langner.
The police became involved, and in December 2015, Doe called Langner on a
recorded line. Langner admitted engaging in sexual activity with Doe despite knowing
Doe was underage and further admitted to "fisting and choking" Doe. On a second
recorded call about a month later, Langner said she thought Doe was okay with what had
happened, wished Doe had told her to stop, and that the "consent thing" had bothered her
over the previous three years.
Langner was arrested and charged with two counts of sexual penetration of a
minor with a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (h)) and one count of oral copulation of a
person under 18 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)). She pleaded guilty to one count of sexual
penetration with a foreign object and the prosecutor agreed to request dismissal of the
remaining charges. On the plea agreement form, Langner initialed a Harvey waiver3
whereby she agreed the judge could consider the entire factual background of the case,
including any unfiled or stricken charges or allegations, when granting probation or
imposing a sentence. The probation officer recommended probation for a term of three
years, along with various probation conditions.
Langner asked the court to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor; requested
probation, but objected to a number of the recommended probation conditions; and
provided a psychological evaluation in support of her requests. The evaluation indicated

3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (Harvey).
5
Langner drank alcohol somewhat regularly starting in college, smoked marijuana
regularly for about a year around the age of 18, and had used text messaging and social
media applications to send sexually explicit photos of herself to females with whom she
was romantically involved. The psychologist noted Langner had a tendency to act
impulsively and, although she admitted it was " 'stupid' " to have continued the
relationship with Doe, she also denied or minimized the severity of her actions with
regard to Doe. The psychologist concluded Langner was not at high risk for reoffending,
but found there were certain risk factors such as Langner's poor judgment and propensity
to act impulsively that contributed to the offense and, if left unaddressed, could cause
Langner to harm others in the future. She recommended Langner participate in outpatient
therapy to address those risk factors, among other issues.
After reviewing the probation report and the materials submitted by Langner, the
court granted Langner probation for a term of three years and imposed all of the
probation conditions recommended by the probation officer.4 The court explained why
each of the disputed conditions was necessary in this particular case. The court noted
Langner had used the Internet to meet and pursue a relationship with Doe despite
knowing Doe was only 14 years old, had admitted using marijuana and alcohol around
the time she had improper sexual contact with Doe, and had inflicted permanent physical
injuries on Doe. Before signing the probation order, the court asked Langner if she

4 The court also imposed a suspended sentence of 365 days, with credit for 276 days
of time served.
6
accepted probation on the conditions set forth, and she said "I do." The court also denied
Langner's request to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor and ordered Langner to register
as a sex offender pursuant to section 290.
On appeal, Langner argues a number of the probation conditions were invalid.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Probation is not a right, but an act of leniency that allows a defendant to avoid
imprisonment. (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402 (Moran).) When a defendant
chooses probation over incarceration, the trial court has a great deal of discretion in
imposing conditions on the probation to further the dual goals of rehabilitating the
defendant and protecting the public. (Id. at pp. 402-403.) If the defendant finds these
conditions to be too onerous, he or she may forgo probation and accept the alternative
sentence. (Id. at p. 403.)
We review the specific conditions imposed by the sentencing court for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).) Under the test set
forth in Lent, a probation condition is valid—and the court does not abuse its discretion in
imposing it—unless it " '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was
convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids
conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.' " (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at
p. 486.) The Lent test is conjunctive, such that a condition is only invalid if it meets all
three prongs of the test. (Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 402; Olguin, at p. 379.) Likewise,
7
as the probation officer is responsible for ensuring the probationer refrains from criminal
activity and obeys all laws during the probationary period, the court does not abuse its
discretion when it imposes conditions intended to aid the probation officer in supervising
the probationer and promoting his or her rehabilitation. (Olguin, at pp. 380-381; People
v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 68 (Balestra).)
B. Conditions Related to Alcohol and Drug Use
The first category of probations Langner disputes are 7(d), 8(b), 8(f), 8(h), and
14(a).5 These conditions require Langner to refrain from using marijuana; submit to
blood alcohol testing when requested by her probation officer; avoid places where she is
informed or knows alcohol is the main item for sale; and, if directed by her probation
officer, attend substance abuse counseling and not knowingly use or possess alcohol.
Langner asserts these conditions were improper under Lent because there was no nexus
between her use of alcohol or marijuana and the crime at issue, no evidence she had a
history of alcohol abuse, and no relationship to future criminality. We disagree.
Langner admitted using marijuana on a regular basis, starting around the age of
18, and using alcohol on a regular basis before the legal age of 21, drinking four to six
beers per week from the time she started college. Around the same time she was using
marijuana and alcohol, she admittedly displayed poor judgment when she chose to
continue a relationship with Doe despite knowing Doe was underage and to engage in

5 Although Langner does not consistently identify the probation conditions she is
referring to by number in her briefing, we address all conditions that she objected to in
the trial court and addresses through substantive argument on appeal.
8
increasingly improper sexual contact with Doe. Further, the psychologist determined
Langner was emotionally immature and had a tendency to act impulsively. While there is
no indication Langner was under the influence at the time she committed the crime at
issue here, the use of either alcohol or marijuana lessens self-control and impairs
reasoning, issues that Langner already struggled with and that contributed to her illegal
conduct, and there is a well-established nexus between alcohol consumption and drug
use. (See People v. Beal (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 84, 87; People v. Smith (1983) 145
Cal.App.3d 1032, 1034 ["Drinking at any time, even for the social, controlled drinker
who can stop at will, can lead to a temporary relaxation of judgment, discretion, and
control."].) Thus, it was reasonable for the court to conclude as it did here that there was
a sufficient nexus between the crime and Langner's use of alcohol and marijuana, and that
the continued use of marijuana or alcohol could be a precursor to further poor judgment
and criminal activity.
Langner also asserts the prohibition on the use of marijuana was improper because
it restricted the legal use of marijuana pursuant to a prescription. However, she presented
no evidence that she has ever had a prescription or medical need for marijuana use, or
that she expects to have such a need during the term of her probation. As Langner
instead had a history of illegal marijuana use without a prescription, the condition was
presumptively valid as related to illegal conduct. (See Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
pp. 379-380 [condition cannot be invalid unless it involves conduct that is not criminal];
Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 68 [court has broad discretion to impose conditions
that aid probation officer in ensuring probationer obeys all laws]; People v. Ross (1985)
9
165 Cal.App.3d 368, 375 [standard obey-all-laws condition deters future criminality].)
Moreover, as any marijuana use could potentially exacerbate Langner's propensity to
make poor and impulsive decisions, the court was within its discretion to subject any
future recommendation or prescription for Langner to use marijuana to increased
scrutiny.
As the drug and alcohol conditions relate to past and future criminality under Lent,
we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing them. (See People v.
Malago (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1301, 1307-1308 (Malago) [similar alcohol and drug
conditions adequately related to rehabilitation and future criminality under Lent where
defendant had a history of drug and alcohol use but was not under the influence during
commission of crime].)
C. Conditions Related to Therapy and Counseling
The next category of conditions Langner disputes are 7(b), 8(c) and 9(a), which
require her to participate in therapy as suggested by validated assessment tests and, if
directed by her probation officer, to attend self-help meetings and complete a residential
treatment program.
Langner asserts these provisions are invalid under Lent because the psychologist
that evaluated her determined she did not meet the criteria for pedophilia and did not
need any therapy related to her criminal conduct. To the contrary, the psychologist
concluded that there were risk factors present that "greatly affected" Langner's decisions
and behaviors with respect to the instant offense and that could cause Langner to harm
others in the future if not addressed. Thus, the psychologist recommended outpatient
10
therapy with a court-approved licensed treatment provider. Further, the psychologist
noted that, although Langner pleaded guilty to sexual penetration of a minor, a serious
crime, she did not seem to understand the gravity of her actions and minimized what had
occurred; and the court concluded that Langner continued to lie about her knowledge of
Doe's age and that her contemporaneous use of marijuana and alcohol may have
contributed to her poor decisionmaking with respect to Doe. As such, the therapy
conditions related to the crime Langner committed as well as to specifically identified
risks for future criminality. The court did not abuse its discretion by imposing them.
Langner also argues the self-help and residential treatment conditions were too
vague because the probation officer had discretion to impose them. The provisions are
clear, though, as to what types of treatment programs the probation officer may direct
Langner to complete, and it is within a probation officer's authority to ensure compliance
with the terms of probation, including discretionary terms such as these. (See People v.
Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240-1241 [a court may give a probation officer
discretion to ensure compliance with specific probation conditions].) Based on Langner's
documented need for therapy to address outstanding risk factors, it was reasonable for the
court to impose conditions requiring some form of therapy and providing the probation
officer with discretion to require additional therapy based on Langner's demonstrated
progress throughout the probationary period. (See Malago, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1307-1308 [finding condition requiring completion of residential treatment program
if directed by probation officer appropriate].) As in any case, if the probation officer acts
arbitrarily or capriciously, Langner can seek recourse with the court to modify or strike
11
the provision. (See §§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1), 1203.3, subd. (a); Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th
at pp. 382-383 [condition requiring probationer to notify probation officer of the presence
of pets does not permit officer to irrationally or capriciously exclude any such pets].)
D. Restrictions Related to Sexual Offenses Against Minors
The final category of conditions Langner asserts were improper includes 10(n),
10(o), 10(p), 10(r) and 11(a), conditions typically imposed on perpetrators of sex-based
crimes against minors and a requirement that Langner wear a global positioning system
(GPS) monitoring device if directed by her probation officer. The sex offender
conditions preclude Langner from possessing photographic equipment, possessing toys or
similar items known to attract children, possessing pornographic material, and using an
Internet-enabled device without prior approval of her probation officer.
Langner asserts these conditions do not satisfy the Lent test because the
psychologist determined she did not meet the criteria for a pedophile and the connection
to the Internet was limited to her initial contact with Doe. To the contrary, Langner not
only initiated contact with Doe online, she also developed the relationship primarily
online for several months before the two met in person, at which point she almost
immediately engaged in improper sexual contact. She also admitted using similar social
media applications to send sexually explicit photographs of herself to females with whom
she had a romantic interest. Further, while Langner only pleaded guilty to one count of
sexual penetration of a minor, the improper sexual contact between Langner and Doe
continued for over a year, and escalated to the point that Langner permanently injured
Doe. As Langner agreed to a Harvey waiver, the court could consider this entire history.
12
Further still, Langner's own psychologist determined Langner not only exercised poor
judgment in pursuing a sexual relationship with Doe, but also continued to demonstrate
risk factors that could result in harm to others, including a propensity to act impulsively.
As these additional restrictions reduced the likelihood Langner would interact with
minors in an improper and potentially illegal manner during the term of her probation and
allowed the probation officer to monitor her location if necessary to ensure compliance,
the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing them.
Langner also argues a complete prohibition on owning or using Internet-enabled
devices is overbroad. But the condition did not preclude all uses of Internet-enabled
devices; instead, it only required Langner to get prior approval from her probation officer
before possessing or using such devices. (See In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th
902, 923-925 [discussing various cases and concluding courts more frequently uphold
conditions with clauses allowing Internet access with prior approval].) As with the other
discretionary conditions, the condition did not permit the probation officer to withhold
approval arbitrarily or capriciously, and Langner has recourse if the officer were to do so.
(See §§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1), 1203.3, subd. (a); Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 382-283.)
Finally, Langner argues the pornography restriction was invalid because there was
no evidence indicating the crime she pleaded guilty to involved pornography. However,
Langner admitted to viewing pornography and to sharing sexually explicit photos of
herself with her romantic interests, and she repeatedly engaged in inappropriate sexual
contact with a minor, demonstrating an attraction to adolescent girls. Based on these
facts, it was reasonable for the court to infer there was an increased risk Langner would
13
seek out child pornography or share pornography with a minor. The restriction therefore
related to future criminality, and the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing it.
(See In re George F. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 734, 740.)
Because the sex offender restrictions and the GPS monitoring provision are related
to Langner's illegal sexual contact with a minor, as well as established risk factors for
future criminality, we conclude they are valid and were within the court's discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
AARON, J.