P. v. Long
Filed 1/9/07 P. v. Long CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL LONG, Defendant and Appellant. | D048532, D048737, D048738, D048739 (Super. Ct. Nos. SCD192153, SCD194554, SCD195976, SCD196683) |
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Roger W. Krauel and David J. Danielsen, Judges. Affirmed.
Michael Long appeals judgments entered after he pleaded guilty to 17 counts alleged in four separate informations. On appeal, he contends his convictions must be reversed because the trial court erred by denying his Penal Code section 1538.5[1] motion to suppress evidence.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
From February through July 2005, Long registered and paid for rooms at various San Diego area hotels and resorts using false driver's licenses and credit card numbers of other persons.[2]
On September 21, an information was filed against Long in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD192153 alleging 28 counts, one prior " strike" conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On October 28, 2005, Long filed a section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence seized during searches conducted on April 6 and June 30.
On November 9, an information was filed against Long in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD194554 alleging five counts, one prior " strike" conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On January 4, 2006, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on and denied Long's section 1538.5 motion.
On January 19, an information was filed against Long in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD195976 alleging five counts, one prior " strike" conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On February 17, an information was filed against Long in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD196683 alleging 43 counts, one prior " strike" conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On February 21, Long pleaded guilty to seven counts in case number SCD192153, one count in case number SCD194554, one count in case number SCD195976, and eight counts in case number SCD196683.[3]
On April 4, the trial court dismissed the prior strike conviction allegations and prior prison term allegations in case numbers SCD192153, SCD194554 and SCD195976, and sentenced Long to an aggregate term of 14 years in prison.
Long timely filed notices of appeal from the judgments in all four cases.
On August 31, we granted Long's motion to consolidate his appeals in case numbers D048737 (SCD194554), D048738 (SCD195976), and D048739 (SCD196683) with case number D048532 (SCD192153).
DISCUSSION
I
Section 1538.5 Motions to Suppress Generally
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125.) The Fourth Amendment applies to California through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution's due process clause and guarantees individuals the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182-183.) " If the challenged police conduct is shown to be violative of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule requires that all evidence obtained as a result of such conduct be suppressed. [Citations.]" (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1299.) Section 1538.5 provides the procedures for a defendant to move to suppress evidence unlawfully obtained:
" (a)(1) A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on either of the following grounds: [¶] (A) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable."
In People v. Mays (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 969, we summarized the appellate standard of review regarding trial court rulings on section 1538.5 motions to suppress:
" In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact, whether express or implied, if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. We independently determine the relevant legal principles and apply those principles in evaluating the reasonableness of the search based on the facts as found by the trial court. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 972.)
People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668 described the applicable standard of review as follows:
" As the finder of fact in a proceeding to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), the superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable. [Citation.] Accordingly, in reviewing the instant suppression order, we consider the record in the light most favorable to . . . [respondent] since 'all factual conflicts must be resolved in the manner most favorable to the [superior] court's disposition on the [suppression] motion.' [Citation.] But while we defer to the superior court's express and implied factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, we exercise our independent judgment in determining the legality of a search on the facts so found. [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 673-674, italics added.)
Alternatively stated, " [i]n reviewing the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion, we uphold any factual finding, express or implied, that is supported by substantial evidence, but we independently assess, as a matter of law, whether the challenged search or seizure conforms to constitutional standards of reasonableness. [Citation.]" (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327.)
II
Trial Court's Denial of Long's Section 1538.5 Motion to Suppress
Long contends the trial court erred by denying his section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence seized during searches on April 6, 2005, and June 30, 2005.
A
At the hearing on Long's section 1538.5 motion to suppress, the trial court heard the testimonies of police officers involved in the challenged searches.
Carlsbad Police Officer Michael Kidd testified that at about 7:00 p.m. on April 6, 2005, he and Officer Seale heard music coming from a white BMW about 100 feet from their patrol car. Believing the driver of that car had violated Vehicle Code section 27007 prohibition against playing loud music, they stopped the car. Long was the car's driver and identified himself. When they asked Long for his driver's license, he said he did not have it with him. Long told them he was on parole, and the officers confirmed it. They asked Long whether they could search him and his car. Long consented to the search. In Long's car, the officers found two small black address books containing names of individuals and credit card information. The officers' attempts to contact two of the listed individuals were unsuccessful, but they left messages for those individuals. The officers then released Long. Two days later, one of the listed individuals called Kidd and confirmed three of the credit card numbers in Long's address books were hers. She also told him no one had permission to use her credit card information.
Carlsbad Police Officer David Perkins testified that at about 1:10 a.m. on June 30, 2005, he entered a convenience store and saw Long, whom he recognized as a man he had arrested before.[4] Perkins left the store and went to his patrol car. He called his partner by radio and told him he was going to contact an individual in the store's parking lot. As Long left the store and walked by Perkins, Perkins asked Long whether he would mind talking to him, and Long agreed to talk to him. Perkins told Long he looked familiar and asked him whether he (Long) had been in contact with him before. Long replied he believed he had. When Perkins asked Long whether he was on probation or parole, Long stated he was on probation for one more month.
Perkins asked Long for his driver's license and then initiated a records check by using his portable radio. While Perkins waited for a response from the dispatcher, he asked Long whether he had anything illegal on him or in his vehicle. Long replied, " No." Perkins then asked him: " Do you mind if I take a look?" In so doing, Perkins was referring to both Long and his car. Long replied, " No." Perkins's partner then arrived (about two to three minutes after Perkins initiated his conversation with Long). Perkins began searching Long and found a small plastic baggie that appeared to have a residue inside it.[5] Perkins also found a small razor in Long's possession. Perkins's demeanor up to and during the search was friendly and nonconfrontational.[6] Long was cooperative and friendly. After the search, Perkins placed handcuffs on Long and placed him in his patrol car.
Perkins then received a response from the dispatcher regarding the records check he had requested about three to five minutes earlier.[7] The dispatcher informed Perkins that Long was on active parole. Long confirmed he was on parole. Based on Perkins's familiarity with parole procedures, he knew that parole conditions usually include a parolee's consent to search. Perkins then searched Long's car and found in its trunk a business card holder inside a piece of luggage. That business card holder contained several credit cards, driver's licenses, and carbon copies of credit cards. Although some of the credit cards were in Long's name, most were in the names of other individuals. Also, some of the driver's licenses had Long's photograph, but the names of other individuals. Perkins arrested Long for possession of stolen property, identity theft, and possession of access cards with intent to defraud.
After the evidentiary portion of the hearing on Long's section 1538.5 motion, the trial court heard arguments of counsel. The court then denied the section 1538.5 motion, stating:
" Concerning the April 6th incident, the initial stop and temporary detention was lawful. There was a reasonable suspicion by the officer that there was a Vehicle Code violation occurring of Vehicle Code section 27007[.] [¶] The officer testified that at least at one point . . . [Long] was approximately 100 feet ahead of him on a public street and the officer could still hear the music at that point.
" During the initial detention there was information developed that [Long] did not have a driver's license at least with him. And there was an issue of whether he was on parole or not. This provided enough information. So the further detention was lawful. [¶] To investigate this new information with the information that he was on parole, the officer conducted a search of [Long's] person and vehicle.
" The search was lawful. It was done pursuant to a parole condition, [Fourth Amendment] waiver, and there was consent according to the officer. [¶] As to the items seized, as a result of that search, they were lawfully seized. There was then a further detention where the officer was involved in checking the information and the identification that came from the books that were found in [Long's] car and on his person.
" The time there, I don't find to be unreasonable in length. As to the June 30th, 2005 incident[,] the initial contact was consensual. As [Long] came out of the store the officer asked to speak to him. [Long] was speaking to him and didn't object and didn't try to move away. [¶] The officer engaged him in a conversation, and during this conversation he asked [Long] whether he was on probation or parole. [¶] [Long] stated that he believed he was on probation for another month. At that point there was a consensual giving up of the license to Officer Perkins, who went about the process of checking the record.
" Officer Perkins then asked for consent to search his person and the vehicle. We're into the contact approximately two to three minutes. According to the officer at that point there was a search of [Long's] person which could be seen as a consensual search in that [there] was consent given by [Long] for that search. [¶] At that juncture there is no information that [Long] is on probation. Being on probation does not carry with it a [Fourth Amendment] waiver.
" During that consensual search of [Long's] person there was evidence of possession of drugs that was developed while discovering the baggie with the white residue in it. That provided a basis for further detaining [Long]. He was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car.
" At that juncture the information from dispatch came back and the officer was now aware there was a [Fourth Amendment] waiver. As part of the parole [Long] was on, and finding out that [Long] was on parole. [¶] In the trunk of [Long's] car they found other items which were seized. The examination of the car's contents . . . it appears that the whole event took approximately two hours.
" I find that [Long] has not demonstrated nor have any of defense counsel's arguments demonstrated that either of these searches was arbitrary or capricious [or] for purposes of harassment.
" I find the officer acted reasonably in each case with legal justification." (Italics added.)
Accordingly, the trial court denied Long's section 1538.5 motion to suppress the evidence seized during the searches on April 6, 2005, and June 30, 2005.
Long contends the trial court erred by denying his section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence seized during the April 6, 2005 searches because the police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop his car and detain him for a violation of Vehicle Code section 27007. Long argues that because his car's radio or other sound system did not constitute a " sound amplification system" within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 27007, the officers could have had no reasonable suspicion to stop his car for violation of that statute.
A temporary detention of an individual during a traffic stop by police constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Whren v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809-810.) " [A]n officer may stop and detain a motorist on reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the law. [Citations.] The guiding principle in determining the propriety of an investigatory detention is 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.' [Citations.] In making our determination, we examine 'the totality of the circumstances' in each case. [Citations.] [¶] Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause, and can arise from less reliable information than required for probable cause . . . . [Citation.] But to be reasonable, the officer's suspicion must be supported by some specific articulable facts that are 'reasonably " consistent with criminal activity." ' [Citation.] The officer's subjective suspicion must be objectively reasonable, and 'an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]' [Citation.] But where a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, 'the public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances " in the proper exercise of the officer's duties." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082-1083.)
Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude the police officers had an objectively reasonable suspicion that the driver of the BMW (i.e., Long) had violated Vehicle Code section 27007, which provides:
" No driver of a vehicle shall operate, or permit the operation of, any sound amplification system which can be heard outside the vehicle from 50 or more feet when the vehicle is being operated upon a highway, unless that system is being operated to request assistance or warn of a hazardous situation.
" This section does not apply to authorized emergency vehicles or vehicles operated by gas, electric, communications, or water utilities. This section does not apply to the sound systems of vehicles used for advertising, or in parades, political or other special events, except that the use of sound systems on those vehicles may be prohibited by a local authority by ordinance or resolution." [8]
The parties do not cite, and our independent research has not found, any case interpreting the meaning of the term " sound amplification system," as used in Vehicle Code section 27007. Nevertheless, construing the usual and ordinary meaning of that term (People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1063), we conclude a car's radio or other sound system necessarily constitutes a " sound amplification system" within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 27007.[9] A radio or other sound system cannot function in its intended manner without amplification of its sound. Without amplification, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to hear sound emitted from a radio or other sound system. A car radio receives electromagnetic waves of a frequency the human ear cannot hear; it converts those waves to a frequency the human ear can hear, and amplifies them with the radio speaker so the car's occupants can hear them (sound) (Concise Oxford English Dict. (8th ed. 1990) p. 987). Furthermore, Long does not argue his car radio or other sound system did not, or could not, amplify sound. In any event, the police officers had an objective, reasonable suspicion that a sound amplification system was causing the emission of loud music from Long's car, thereby justifying their stop of the car and temporary detention of Long to conduct an investigation into whether Long had violated Vehicle Code section 27007. Officer Kidd testified that he heard music coming from Long's car at a distance of about 100 feet (well in excess of 50 feet) and stopped Long's car for violation of Vehicle Code section 27007. We conclude the trial court properly found the police officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop Long's car and temporarily detain him to investigate a suspected violation of Vehicle Code section 27007. (People v. Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1082-1083.) Therefore, the trial court properly denied Long's section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence seized during the April 6, 2005 searches.
C
Long contends the trial court also erred by denying his section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence seized during the June 30, 2005 search of his car because he did not voluntarily consent to that search.[10] He argues he did not consent to the search of his car until after he was handcuffed and unlawfully arrested. He also argues that because the police officer took, and unreasonably continued to hold, his driver's license, he was unlawfully detained at the time he consented to the search of his car. Long also argues the search of his car cannot alternatively be justified based on his parole status because the police officer merely assumed, and did not have information, that his parole conditions included a Fourth Amendment waiver.
" 'For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, there are basically three different categories or levels of police " contacts" or " interactions" with individuals, ranging from the least to the most intrusive. First, there are . . . " consensual encounters" . . . , which are those police-individual interactions which result in no restraint of an individual's liberty whatsoever--i.e., no " seizure," however minimal--and which may properly be initiated by police officers even if they lack any " objective justification." [Citation.] Second, there are what are commonly termed " detentions," seizures of an individual which are strictly limited in duration, scope and purpose, and which may be undertaken by the police " if there is an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime." [Citation.] Third, and finally, there are those seizures of an individual which exceed the permissible limits of a detention, seizures which include formal arrests and restraints on an individual's liberty which are comparable to an arrest, and which are constitutionally permissible only if the police have probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re James D. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 903, 911-912.) Regarding the first category of police contacts with individuals (i.e., consensual encounters), the United States Supreme Court stated:
" [L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. [Citations.] Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification. [Citation.] The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. [Citations.] He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds. [Citation.] If there is no detention--no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment --then no constitutional rights have been infringed." (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497-498.)
Furthermore, in determining whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances of the encounter to decide whether the conduct by the law enforcement officer would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. (Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439.) If a reasonable person in certain circumstances would have felt free to leave (i.e., an individual's liberty is not restrained in some manner), the encounter is consensual and therefore an individual's Fourth Amendment rights are not implicated. (Id. at p. 434; Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 789-790.) " Circumstances establishing a seizure might include any of the following: the presence of several officers, an officer's display of a weapon, some physical touching of the person, or the use of language or a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. [Citations.]" (People v. Terrell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) However, " [t]he Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures; it does not proscribe voluntary cooperation." (Florida v. Bostick, at p. 439.) Voluntary consent to a search given during a consensual encounter does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. (Florida v. Bostick, at p. 439; People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 106 [voluntary consent to search is an exception to Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement]; cf. Kaplan v. Superior Court (1971) 6 Cal.3d 150, 155 [consent induced by illegal detention or arrest is not voluntary], superseded by constitutional amendment on another ground as noted in People v. Johnson (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1008.) " The voluntariness of the consent is in every case 'a question of fact to be determined in the light of all the circumstances.' [Citations.]" (People v. James, at p. 106.) " The trial court's findings, on the issue of consent, whether express or implied, will be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]" (People v. Aguilar (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 632, 639-640.)
In this case, the trial court made express findings of fact that Officer Perkins's initial contact with Long was consensual and Long consensually gave Perkins his driver's license. The court also expressly found Perkins then asked Long for his consent to search his person and his car. The court expressly found Perkins's subsequent search of Long's person was consensual. By so finding, the court implicitly found Long had voluntarily consented to that search. Furthermore, making all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the court's ruling, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the court's implied finding that Long also voluntarily consented to a search of his car at the same time he voluntarily consented to the search of his person. Perkins testified at the section 1538.5 hearing that while he waited for a response from the dispatcher on his records check, he asked Long whether he had anything illegal on him or in his vehicle. Long replied, " No." Perkins then asked him: " Do you mind if I take a look?" In so doing, Perkins testified he was referring to both Long's person and his car. Long replied, " No." Construing the evidence, and making all reasonable inferences therefrom, favorably to support the court's ruling, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support a finding Long voluntarily consented to the search of his car while Perkins awaited a response from the dispatcher on his records check. Contrary to Long's assertion, the record does not necessarily show Perkins first requested and received Long's consent to search his car only after Perkins handcuffed and arrested him.[11]
Furthermore, to the extent Long argues his consent to the search of his car was not voluntary because he was unlawfully detained because of Perkins's continued holding of his driver's license, we conclude that, based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, Long was not for that reason detained at the time he voluntarily consented to the search of his car. Based on Perkins's testimony, it can reasonably be inferred that Long's encounter with Perkins was wholly consensual, at least up until the time Long consented to the searches of his person and his car. Perkins initially asked Long whether he would like to talk to him. Long agreed to talk to him. Perkins asked Long if he could see his driver's license. Long handed it to him. While Perkins awaited a response from the dispatcher on his records check, he asked Long whether he could search his person and his car. Long consented to both of those searches. The record shows that within two to three minutes of Perkins's initial contact of Long, Long consented to searches of his person and his car. During that entire two-to-three minute period from Perkins's initial contact until Long's consent to those searches (and presumably for some time thereafter), Perkins was nonconfrontational and acted in a friendly manner toward Long. At no time did Perkins tell Long, by words or conduct, that he was not free to leave. Based on our application of the law to the express and implied findings of fact by the trial court, we conclude Long was not detained at the time he consented to the search of his car.
Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, Perkins's continued holding of Long's driver's license during the records check did not show he was detained or that his consent to the search of his car was involuntary. Long consensually handed his driver's license to Perkins, who then apparently held it as he requested (by portable radio) a records check by the dispatcher. (People v. Cartwright (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1370 [" a mere request for identification does not transmogrify a contact into a Fourth Amendment seizure" ].) Perkins had held Long's driver's license for less than two to three minutes at the time Long consented to Perkins's search of his person and his car. (Cf. People v. Terrell, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1251, 1254 [holding of defendant's driver's license for three minutes did not make encounter a detention rather than a consensual encounter].)[12] Furthermore, at no point did Long ask Perkins to return his driver's license. (People v. Terrell, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1254.) We conclude the trial court properly found Perkins's search of Long's car did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and properly denied his section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence seized during the June 30, 2005 search of his car.[13]
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
McDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.
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[1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
[2] Because the underlying facts are not pertinent to the issues on appeal, we summarize Long's offenses as described in the probation report in case number D048739.
[3] In case number SCD192153, Long pleaded guilty to three counts of unlawfully obtaining personal identifying information of another and using it for an unlawful purpose (§ 530.5, subd. (a)), two counts of unlawfully acquiring and possessing access card account information (§ 484e, subd. (d)), one count of false personation (§ 529, subd. 3), and one count of forging a driver's license (§ 470a). In case number SCD194554, Long pleaded guilty to one count of unlawfully obtaining personal identifying information of another and using it for an unlawful purpose (§ 530.5, subd. (a)). In case number SCD195976, Long pleaded guilty to one count of unlawfully obtaining personal identifying information of another and using it for an unlawful purpose (§ 530.5, subd. (a)). In case number SCD196683, Long pleaded guilty to seven counts of grand theft of personal property (§ 487, subd. (a)) and one count of unlawfully acquiring and possessing access card account information (§ 484e, subd. (d)).
[4] During that prior incident, Perkins searched Long and found a suspected controlled substance on him.
[5] Perkins denied that his search of Long was for any harassment purpose.
[6] Perkins did not draw his weapon or threaten Long in any way.
[7] Perkins continued to hold Long's driver's license while the dispatcher performed the records check.
[8] Vehicle Code section 360 defines " highway" as " a way or place of whatever nature, publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. Highway includes street." (Italics added.) Accordingly, Long does not dispute that the street on which he was driving constituted a " highway" for purposes of Vehicle Code section 27007.
[9] We reject Long's obtuse argument that the second paragraph of Vehicle Code section 27007, as quoted ante, shows the term " sound amplification system," as used in its first paragraph, is intended to apply only to sound systems " of vehicles used for advertising, or in parades, political or other special events . . . ." (Veh. Code, § 27007.) Reading the language of Vehicle Code section 27007 as a whole, the term " sound amplification system" is intended to apply to all vehicles and their uses, except as specifically provided in the second paragraph's provisions. Accordingly, that second paragraph cannot reasonably be interpreted as narrowing the plain, unambiguous scope of the term " sound amplification system."
[10] Long apparently does not contend the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the June 30, 2005 search of his person.
[11] Although there may be some ambiguity or contradictions in Perkins's testimony on when Long consented to the search of his car, we construe the evidence, and make all reasonable inferences therefrom, favorably to support the trial court's ruling. By arguing the record would have supported a contrary finding (i.e., that he first consented to a search of his car after he was arrested), Long misconstrues and/or misapplies the applicable substantial evidence standard of review on appeal. (People v. Mays, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 972; People v. Aguilar, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 639-640; People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 673-674; People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 327.)
[12] People v. Castaneda (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1222, which arguably is to the contrary, is factually inapposite and, in any event, we are unpersuaded that any continued holding, however short, of an individual's driver's license necessarily constitutes a detention under the Fourth Amendment.
[13] Because we dispose of this issue on the basis of Long's voluntary consent to the search of his car, we do not address the potential alternative ground that Perkins's knowledge of Long's parole status (and his assumption that Long had a parole condition waiving his Fourth Amendment rights) justified that search.
