P. v. Mancilla
Filed 4/18/07 P. v. Mancilla CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SANTIAGO OVIEDO MANCILLA, Defendant and Appellant. | D048457 (Super. Ct. No. SCD193801) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Frank A. Brown, Judge. Affirmed.
A jury convicted Santiago Oviedo Mancilla of numerous counts of selling and transporting methamphetamine and possessing methamphetamine for sale. He contends the trial court abused its discretion by discharging a juror for bringing marijuana into the courthouse during the trial.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Various law enforcement agencies coordinated an undercover operation through which they arrested Mancilla for selling methamphetamine.
On the fourth day of Mancilla's jury trial, juror No. 1 (juror 1) was reentering the courthouse following the lunch break when deputies found a film canister containing a small amount of marijuana in his sock. The juror admitted to the deputies that he occasionally smoked marijuana but claimed he found the canister outside the courthouse. The deputies issued juror 1 a citation and contacted jury services. At the request of jury services, deputies escorted juror 1 out of the courthouse.
The court conducted an informal hearing and questioned Deputy Arvizu, who found the marijuana on juror 1. The court noted juror 1's explanation that he found the marijuana outside the courthouse was plausible because "[a] lot of people empty their pockets going into the courthouse." The prosecution argued juror 1 lied during voir dire when prospective jurors were asked, as a group, if anyone had experiences with illegal drugs and juror 1 did not respond. The defense pointed out that "if we really wanted to pry deeply, half of the jury will say they experimented with marijuana in their life." The court declined to call juror 1 back to the courthouse for questioning because it did not want to delay the proceedings. Over the defense's objection, the court discharged juror 1 because he allegedly lied on voir dire and was no longer present in the courthouse, and replaced him with an alternate juror.
DISCUSSION
Under Penal Code section 1089, the court may discharge a juror "found to be unable to perform his or her duty" at any time during the trial for "good cause shown." Good cause may exist to discharge a juror who is biased (People v. Feagin (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1437), refuses to deliberate (People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 474-475), is unwilling to apply the law as instructed by the court (People v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1780), or whose emotional state threatens the juror's ability to consider the evidence or to deliberate (People v. Van Houten (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 280, 285-288).
The court is required to hold a hearing if it possesses information that, if true, would constitute "good cause" to doubt the juror's ability to perform his or her duties and justify removal. (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 343.) The determination of "good cause" to discharge and replace a juror is within the court's discretion, provided the juror's inability to perform appears in the record "as a demonstrable reality." (People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 474; People v. Bowers (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 722, 729.) "The court's discretion in deciding whether to discharge a juror [includes] the discretion to decide what specific procedures to employ[,] including whether to conduct a hearing or detailed inquiry. [Citation.]" (People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 989.) A trial court's "self-directed inquiry, short of a formal hearing" (e.g., a court's observation that jurors were inattentive or sleeping) may be adequate. (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1234.)
When a court finds that a juror concealed information during voir dire, the juror's discharge is not automatic. The court must find some evidence of juror bias before discharge is warranted because "[b]ias in a juror may not be presumed." (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 232.) Only "[c]oncealment of prior criminal charges constitutes good cause for [automatic] discharge of a juror," without requiring a further demonstration of bias. (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 22, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 878-879.)
Here, because juror 1's misconduct was not concealment of criminal charges, the trial court was required to find some evidence of the juror's bias. It is undisputed juror 1 tried to enter the courthouse with an illegal substance. Nonetheless, bias in a juror may not be presumed. Marijuana possession is not per se evidence a juror will be biased, even in a drug case.
Bias, however, does not appear on the record as the court's reason for discharging juror 1. The court's first reason appears to be juror 1's lack of response to the prosecutor's voir dire question regarding experiences with illegal drugs. Withholding information during voir dire can be a proper basis for the removal of a juror. (People v. Farris (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 376, 385 [dismissal of juror who withheld information about his pending criminal charges was proper].) Silence during collective questioning of potential jurors can constitute perjury, and therefore misconduct. (People v. Meza (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1631, 1641-1642.)
Here, the prosecutor asked the jurors on voir dire if anyone had any experiences with illegal drugs. Juror 1 remained silent[1]despite his later alleged admission to Deputy Arvizu that he occasionally smoked marijuana.
The court's second reason for discharging juror 1 appears to be a court efficiency concern. The court stated "[Juror 1] is not here. [] . . . We had repeated delays up to one hour in this case. That is not fair to the other 11 people." Although expeditious proceedings and fairness to jurors are legitimate interests of a trial court, the paramount consideration is that the defendant receives a fair trial. A methodical, thorough inquiry into juror misconduct is important to guarantee a fair trial.
Although the trial court's hearing regarding juror 1's possible bias or untruthfulness before discharging him did not include questioning juror 1, a hearing was held and the extent of the hearing was within the discretion of the trial court. Deputy Arvizu was questioned by the trial court and counsel were permitted to argue. In any event, the failure of the trial court to question juror 1 was not prejudicial. The court replaced juror 1 with an alternate juror, and both the prosecution and the defense had ample opportunity to question that alternate juror. Mancilla has a right "to a fair and impartial jury, not to a jury composed of any particular individuals." (People v. Durrant (1897) 116 Cal. 179, 199.) In addition, the evidence against Mancilla was overwhelming and included video- and audio-taped drug transactions. There is no reasonable probability that, had juror 1 not been discharged, the jury would have reached a conclusion more favorable to Mancilla.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
McDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
McINTYRE, J.
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[1] All the potential jurors remained silent, suggesting a statistical improbability that not one of them had personal or vicarious experience with illegal drugs. Further, if prior experimentation with marijuana were a legitimate indication of bias, the jury pool would be reduced by nearly half. (Stein, The New Politics of Pot, (Nov. 4, 2002) Time, at p. 56 [47 percent of the population has smoked marijuana at least once.].)
