P. v. McDonald
Filed
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH HILTON McDONALD, Defendant and Appellant. | D046881 (Super. |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Louis R. Hanoian, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Joseph Hilton McDonald was convicted by a jury of three counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 459, 460); attempted first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, 664), petty theft with a prior (§§ 484, 666), possession of stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). True findings were also made that McDonald had served a separate prison term (§ 667.5, subds. (a), (b)) and had been convicted of serious/violent felonies within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668). He was sentenced to a total term of 22 years and 4 months.
On appeal, McDonald contends reversal is required because a photographic line-up was impermissibly suggestive; the court erred in admitting impeachment evidence or his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the evidence; an enhancement should have been stricken rather than stayed; and the abstract of judgment needs to be corrected. We find merit to the last two contentions and therefore order the judgment modified. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
McDonald's Living Situation
In late August 2003, McDonald, a California Youth Authority parolee, was given approval to live at a sober living home, One Day At A Time, on
On
On October 17, McDonald's parole officer made a random home visit to One Day At A Time. The parole officer saw only two pairs of pants in the closet in McDonald's room, no linens on the bed, and no toiletries and came to the conclusion McDonald was not staying there on a regular basis.
Beginning in middle to late October, a clerk who worked in a produce store saw McDonald and
On the evening of
On November 5, the police conducted surveillance on the
On November 6, the police executed a search warrant on the
October 9, 2003 -- Burglary of Havern Residence
On
On November 6, The JVC camcorder, cables and soft-sided cooler were found in the
Jolene had dated Washington a year or two earlier. Over a four month period, he had visited her home several nights a week. After they stopped dating, he continued to call her occasionally.
October 15, 2003 - Borrego Burglary
On
The license plate number was traced to McDonald's car.
October 23, 2003 - Meza Burglary
On
When the Mezas returned home, they found their bedroom had been ransacked. Among the items taken from the home were a palm pilot, jewelry, a digital video camera and bag, the children's bicycles, and two guns, one of which had been recently issued to Peter Meza who is a deputy sheriff.
Around this time McDonald and a man went to the produce market across from the
Both Terina and Elias positively identified McDonald in a photo array as the man who had asked for water. They also identified him at trial.
The Mezas' guns, palm pilot, and digital video camera were found in the
October 23, 2003 - Morgan Attempted Burglary
The Meza residence had a rental unit on the ground floor occupied by Dennis Morgan and his wife. When Morgan arrived home about
November 3, 2003 - Petty Theft at E & L Therapy
On
About 30 minutes before Porras discovered the theft, at about
Another E & L Therapy employee, Nicholas Brecht, saw McDonald in the back office rummaging through the cabinets under the sink. He thought McDonald might be a plumber. When Brecht walked into the front area of E & L Therapy where most of the people worked, he asked if anybody knew about the man who was working on the sink. Nobody knew anything. Brecht waited for McDonald to come out of the back area. When McDonald emerged, he asked Brecht, " Do you know where the bathroom is?" McDonald was about a foot away. Brecht pointed to some glass doors and directed McDonald to go out the doors and to his right. After McDonald left, Brecht suggested his coworkers go to the back office to check if anything was missing. Porras discovered her wallet was missing.
Other people in the building also saw McDonald. An administrative assistant for Remedy Staffing, Annayette Esquer, worked on the first floor of the building. Remedy Staffing had a door from its lobby to the restrooms. These restrooms also had an entrance from the building's lobby. Around lunchtime, McDonald came out of the restroom door into Remedy Staffing and asked Esquer if any jobs were available. When she said no, McDonald started to go out Remedy Staffing's main entrance but then asked if he could use the bathroom. She said yes. He was in the bathroom for a short period of time and then left by the business's main entrance.
Elena Martinez was working as a receptionist at Capital Funding on the second floor of the building. Between
At trial, Porras, Brecht, Esquer and Martinez identified McDonald as the man they had seen on November 3. Porras and Brecht had been earlier shown a photographic lineup. Porras had identified McDonald and Brecht had selected two photos, one of which was of McDonald. Brecht and Martinez had attended a live line-up where they both selected two persons, one of whom was McDonald.
On November 6, Porras's Nordstrom credit card, gym membership card and Movie Watcher's card were found under the front passenger seat of McDonald's car.
Defense
Burton testified McDonald was not living with her, but at One Day At A Time. McDonald let her use his car when her car was not working. She would often pick him up at One Day At A Time and he would always return to the facility in the evening to sleep because it had a curfew.
Burton specifically remembered what occurred on
She also specifically recalled November 3, the day of the E & L Therapy petty theft. She went with McDonald to One Day At A Time to pick up his food voucher between
In 2003, Burton and McDonald had been just friends. However, they had since fallen in love. She visited him twice a week in jail. She had deposited money in his jail account.
McDonald denied being involved in any of the burglaries. He testified he was not living in Burton's apartment. He let Burton and
Rebuttal
When
McDonald, when he was interviewed by the police, denied any involvement in the crimes, but after being asked if his fingerprints would be on the guns taken in the Meza burglary, admitted he had handled them at one point.
McDonald and Washington were placed in the holding cells. Each was alone in a cell. McDonald yelled to
The detective then went to
DISCUSSION
I
Suggestive Identification Procedure
McDonald contends the photo array used by the police was unduly suggestive because he had the darkest complexion of the African American males used in the array.
Four witnesses were shown the photo array: Terina and Elias Noa on
To determine whether a pretrial identification procedure is so unreliable that it violates a defendant's right to due process, a court must look at whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1152.) A pretrial identification procedure is unduly suggestive if it " 'suggests in advance of identification by the witness the identity of the person suspected by the police.' " (People v. Hunt (1977) 19 Cal.3d 888, 894.) It is not necessary in assembling a photo array to surround the defendant's photo with people who are nearly identical in appearance. (People v. Brandon (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1052.) The defendant bears the burden of showing unfairness " as a demonstrable reality, not just speculation." (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1222.)
If the pretrial identification procedure was unduly suggestive, then the courts look at the totality of circumstances to determine whether the procedure was nonetheless reliable. (People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1152; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 125.) In viewing the totality of circumstances, the courts consider " 'such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness's degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.' " (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 412.)
We have independently reviewed the photo array. The six men in the array are generally similar in appearance. All are African American men of a similar age, with similar hairstyles and facial features. While McDonald's complexion is darker than the other men, it is not radically darker, particularly in the black-and-white photo arrays shown to the witnesses. Moreover, the photo array specifically warned the witnesses the photo array might not accurately reflect the individual's complexions. The fact one of the witnesses, Nicholas Brecht, selected two photos also undercuts McDonald's claim the array was unduly suggestive, that is, that it suggested in advance which individual Brecht should select. We conclude the photo array was not unduly suggestive.
Furthermore, even if we were to find the photo array was unduly suggestive, we would not reverse because the totality of the circumstances shows the procedure was nonetheless reliable. The photo arrays were shown to the majority of the witnesses within two weeks of the offenses; Brecht did not see the photo array until several months later. All the witnesses had a good opportunity to view the suspect at close or relatively close range. Each witness personally interacted with the suspect, responding to the suspect's request for water or for directions. There were no issues as to lighting conditions; the suspect was either viewed outside during the day or inside a business during working hours. The witnesses' descriptions of the suspect generally matched McDonald.[5]
Finally, we note this is not a case that relied solely on eyewitness identification. McDonald was linked to the crimes through the license plate of his car and through the property of the victims found in the
II
Impeachment of Burton
McDonald contends the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to examine Burton about letters she had written to McDonald, including in August 2004, detailing her sexual fantasies and love for him. He contends the evidence should have been excluded because they were not timely disclosed. He also contends defense counsel was incompetent by failing to pursue exclusion as a discovery sanction and failing to raise hearsay and relevancy objections.
During direct examination, Burton testified she spent much time with McDonald from August 2003 until he was arrested on
The prosecutor then proceeded to cross-examine Burton on some details of her sexual thoughts and fantasies contained in the letters, and how she had written that she would love him forever. He also asked her if they had ever engaged in oral sex or sexual intercourse, which she denied. Defense counsel did not object to any specific question nor did she raise any further general objections to the evidence.
(A) Discovery Violation
Section 1054 et seq. provides for reciprocal discovery between the prosecution and the defense in criminal trials. " The purpose of section 1054 et seq. is to promote ascertainment of truth by liberal discovery rules which allow parties to obtain information in order to prepare their cases and reduce the chance of surprise at trial." (People v. Jackson (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1201.) A prosecutor is required to disclose to the defense " [a]ll relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of the offenses charged" that is in the prosecutor's possession. (§ 1054.1, subd. (c).) If the prosecutor fails to disclose evidence after an informal or court-ordered discovery request, " a court may make any order necessary to enforce the provisions of [the] chapter, including, but not limited to, immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings, delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a witness or the presentation of real evidence, continuance of the matter, or any other lawful order." (§ 1054.5, subd. (b).)
Here, the letters were written to McDonald and therefore he had knowledge and possession of them. This is not a situation where the defendant was previously unaware of the existence of the evidence. The letters did not involve evidence establishing McDonald's guilt, but went to a collateral issue of a witness's credibility. The court's decision not to excuse the witness following cross-examination and allow defense counsel time to review the letters was a reasonable response to defense counsel's objection.
(B) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
McDonald contends defense counsel was ineffective in failing to further object to the late discovery, and argues counsel should have objected to admission of the evidence under Evidence Code section 352 because the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by a danger of undue prejudice.[6]
" '[A] conviction will not be reversed based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the defendant establishes both of the following: (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, a determination more favorable to defendant would have resulted.' " (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 935-936, italics omitted, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.) " A reviewing court will indulge in a presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel's actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. Defendant thus bears the burden of establishing constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel. [Citations.] If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory explanation." (People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189.) Prejudice is shown when there is a " 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' " (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721; People v. Lai (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1256.)
Here, defense counsel's decision not to raise any further objections to the prosecutor's late disclosure of the letters reasonably could have been based on an assessment that the court had provided her with sufficient time to review the letters and therefore further sanctions were not merited nor would likely be granted by the court.
Defense counsel's decision not to raise an Evidence Code section 352 objection to the prosecutor's cross-examination was also reasonable.
Evidence Code section 352 authorizes the court to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of undue prejudice. " 'Prejudice' as contemplated by section 352 is not so sweeping as to include any evidence the opponent finds inconvenient. Evidence is not prejudicial, as that term is used in a section 352 context, merely because it undermines the opponent's position or shores up that of the proponent." (Vorse v. Sarasy (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 998, 1008.) The prejudice contemplated by Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence that has very little effect on the issues or that uniquely evokes an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual. (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 842.) Evidence that tends to show a witness is biased or has a motive to lie is generally relevant, admissible evidence. (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 780, subd. (a).) " A trial court's exercise of discretion in admitting or rejecting evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 'will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse of that discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice.' " (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 33.)
Here, the evidence was relevant to establishing the extent of Burton's bias and motive to lie. Further, the evidence was relevant to impeach Burton's testimony that she was not contemplating continuing a relationship with him if he were acquitted. In contrast to her trial testimony, the letters, written only a few months earlier, indicated she wanted to be with him and would love him forever.
Moreover, even if we were to agree with McDonald that defense counsel should have objected, we would not reverse because there is no reasonable probability the verdict would have been different had the evidence been excluded.
Even without the letters, Burton's credibility was severely undermined. She had already admitted that she was in love with McDonald and thus that she had a bias in McDonald's favor and a motive to lie. The excerpts from the letters merely provided additional details about the extent of her bias. Burton's testimony intended to show McDonald was not living in her apartment and to provide McDonald with an alibi for the burglaries was undercut not merely by evidence of her potential bias but by other evidence showing she was lying, including the lack of McDonald's personal belongings at One Day At A Time as of October 17, records contradicting her claim she and McDonald picked up a food voucher at One Day At A Time on November 3, the observations of the produce market clerk about seeing McDonald at the apartment, and by police surveillance of the apartment.
Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence establishing McDonald's guilt. Not only were there multiple eyewitness identifications but also property from the burglaries was found in his car and the
There is no reasonable probability that had the jury not heard about Burton's sexual fantasies, the jury would have acquitted McDonald.
III
Staying Versus Striking Enhancement
The court stayed a one-year section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement and instead imposed a five-year prior serious felony enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a).
In People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1152, the court held it is improper to impose both a section 667, subdivision (a) serious felony enhancement and a section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement based on the same serious felony. The Jones court ordered the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement stricken. (See also People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1021; People v. Gonzales (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1610, but see People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 794, fn. 9.) Accordingly, we order the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement stricken.
IV
Correction of the Abstract of Judgment
As the Attorney General concedes and we agree, there are errors in the abstract of judgment.
First, the abstract erroneously indicates that the burglaries in counts 2 and 3 were imposed as " consecutive 1/3 violent." There is no evidence supporting a finding these burglaries were violent. Accordingly, the abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect " consecutive 1/3 non-violent."
Second, while there is a check mark on the abstract of judgment indicating " Defendant was sentenced pursuant to PC 667 (b)-(i) or PC 1170.12 (two strikes)," the actual individual sentences do not reflect this sentencing, that is, do not reflect, as the court ordered in its oral pronouncement, that the sentences were to be doubled as provided by the three strikes law. When discrepancies exist, the oral pronouncement of judgment generally prevails. (People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 242.) Accordingly, the abstract of judgment should be corrected as follows:
Count 1: a term of eight years rather than four years.
Count 2: a term of two years and eight months rather than one year and four months.
Count 3: a term of two years and eight months rather than one year and four months.
Count 4: a term of one year and four months rather than eight months.
Count 5: a term of one year and four months rather than eight months.
Count 6: a term of one year and four months rather than eight months.
Count 7: a term of one year and four months rather than eight months.
Third, the abstract of judgment fails to indicate the court stayed imposition of sentence on count 6, receiving stolen property.
DISPOSITION
We order the abstract of judgment to be corrected to reflect: the striking of the section 667.5, subdivision (b) one-year enhancement; count 1 has a term of eight years; counts 2 and 3 are nonviolent felonies and each have a term of two years, eight months; counts 4 to 7 each have a term of one year, four months; count 6 is stayed; 5 years for the prison prior allegation, and the total term is 22 years 4 months. A copy of the amended abstract is to be forwarded to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
AARON, J.
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[1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
[2] Burton testified her husband, Clarence Burton, was McDonald's second cousin.
[3] At times we use first names, not out of disrespect, but to distinguish parties with the same last name.
[4] The photo array included the statement: " Also, photographs may not depict the true complexion of a person."
[5] For example, the Noas described the suspect as an African American male, 20 to 25 years old, braided hair, about 6'2" , with a muscular build. The probation report, completed in November 2004, shows McDonald as 25 years old, black, 6'2" , and weighing 204 pounds.
[6] McDonald also asserts the excerpts from the letters constituted inadmissible hearsay but he fails to make any further argument or citation of authority to support his argument and therefore we may deem this argument waived. (See Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979; McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 522-523.)