P. v. Medina
Filed 8/14/07 P. v. Medina CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NARCISCO MEDINA, Defendant and Appellant. | E040967 (Super.Ct.No. ICR23937) OPINION |
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John J. Ryan, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND PLEA
This is defendants second appeal in this matter. In an information filed by the Riverside County District Attorneys Office on September 25, 1997, defendant was charged with six counts of residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459), three counts of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496), and one count of evading an officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, 2800.2). It was also alleged that defendant had served two prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)), had suffered four prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (c)-(e), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), and four prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (a)). Defendant was convicted on all charges, was sentenced to 200 years to life plus 22 years, and filed an appeal. Defendants conviction was reversed on the ground that the trial court erred by failing to grant substitute counsel a continuance in order to prepare for trial. The matter was remanded for retrial. (See People v. Medina (Mar. 12, 2002, E027383) [nonpub. opn., pp. 1, 5].)
On July 15, 2002, counsel was appointed to represent defendant, and the court granted counsels request to have defendant evaluated by a doctor under Evidence Code section 1017. On January 15, 2003, the trial court suspended the proceedings pending a competency evaluation pursuant to Penal Code section 1368. Defendant was found mentally incompetent to stand trial within the meaning of Penal Code section 1368 and was committed to the Vista Rehabilitation Center pending restoration of competency.
Defendant apparently escaped from the Vista Rehabilitation Center and was arrested. On June 18, 2003, defendant reappeared in front of the court and was placed at Patton State Hospital pending restoration of competency for a period not to exceed 275 years to life. Due the length of the commitment to Patton State Hospital, on July 9, 2003, the court ordered that conservatorship proceedings pursuant to Penal Code section 1370 be initiated for defendant. A doctor was appointed to evaluate defendant for the conservatorship proceedings.[1] On May 21, 2004, defendant brought a Marsden[2]motion, which was denied.
On December 2, 2004, the trial court noted that the case had been trailing for some time and asked the parties to address the issues in the case. The People provided a recitation of the events that had transpired in the case up to that time, including that the last event was the appointment of a doctor to evaluate defendant for conservatorship proceedings. The People informed the trial court that the doctor who was appointed to determine conservatorship actually conducted a competency evaluation and found defendant competent. Testimony was presented by several doctors in order for the trial court to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial.
On December 3, 2004, after hearing the testimony and argument of both counsel, the trial court found defendant was mentally competent to stand trial within the meaning of Penal Code section 1368.[3] The case was set for trial.
On December 17, 2004, defendants request to substitute counsel was denied. Defendants Faretta[4]motion was granted, and he was allowed to represent himself. Defendants propria persona request to have an investigator appointed was granted.
On February 10, 2005, defendant sent a letter to the court stating that he might not be able to represent himself due to his mental illness. On March 16, 2005, counsel who had represented defendant at the previous trial was appointed to represent him. New counsel asked for an evaluation of defendant pursuant to Evidence Code section 1017. On May 20, 2005, counsel for defendant requested that the plea to the charges be changed to not guilty by reason of insanity and asked that a competency determination be made pursuant to Penal Code section 1368. Counsel believed defendant was hearing voices and was unwilling or unable to assist in the defense of his case. Counsel believed that defendant was mentally ill but that it was debatable whether he was legally incompetent. Although the trial court stated that defendant had mental problems, it did not have a doubt as to his competency. The trial court appointed several doctors to examine defendant to determine whether a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was appropriate pursuant to Penal Code section 1027.
On October 7, 2005, defendant brought another Marsden motion, which was denied by the trial court. On November 4, 2005, counsel made another request for a Penal Code section 1368 determination because defendant was not receiving his medication. Once again, the trial court stated that defendant appeared perfectly competent, understood the proceedings, and appeared able to assist with the defense. The trial court believed that defendant was faking his hallucinations. Again, the trial court noted that it believed defendant did have a mental illness but that he was not incompetent within the meaning of Penal Code section 1368. At the same hearing, defendant first requested that he be allowed to represent himself, and then withdrew his request. On February 24, 2006, yet another doctor was appointed to evaluate defendant pursuant to Evidence Code section 1017.
By the time of the next hearing, defendant had apparently decided to enter into a plea agreement. On April 10, 2006, defendant signed a written plea agreement. Defendant stated on the form that he would plead guilty to count 1 of the complaint, a violation of Penal Code section 459; that the remaining charges would be dismissed; and, due to the alleged prior convictions, the sentence would be 25 years to life. Defendant initialed that he had not been made any promises as to the plea agreement and had not been threatened to enter into the plea.
At the hearing on the plea, defendant acknowledged that he had read, understood, and signed the written plea agreement. Defendant admitted that he had suffered two prior residential burglary convictions (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (c), (e)(2), 1170.12, subd. (c)). The trial court stated that, We all recognize that you are mentally ill, although thoroughly competent in my opinion at that level that 1368 talks about.
Defendant was thereafter sentenced to 25 years to life, and restitution fines were imposed. The prosecution dismissed the remaining counts and prior conviction allegations.[5]
Defendant filed a notice of appeal, and a certificate of probable cause was granted by the trial court. In his reasons for the certificate of probable cause, defendant stated it was his understanding that he would plead guilty to the charge of evading a police officer, not burglary, and that his attorney coerced him into taking the plea. Defendant also stated that he believed his attorney took advantage of his mental health condition.
II
ANALYSIS
Counsel appointed to represent defendant has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493], setting forth a statement of the case and a potential arguable issue that it violates due process to accept a guilty plea from an accused person while he is legally incompetent. Counsel requested that this court undertake a review of the entire record.[6]
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and he has done so. Defendant filed a one-page letter on April 5, 2007, requesting that this court evaluate his case under Cunningham v. California (2007) ___ U.S. ___ [127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856]. In a three-page supplemental letter brief filed on July 24, 2007, defendant sets forth one purported arguable issue, that his plea was not voluntary because his counsel coerced him into the taking the plea agreement. Defendant claims he did not want to plead to the burglary charge and an indeterminate sentence, and only did so after his trial counsel threatened him. We have reviewed the entire record, the contentions both of counsel and defendant, and have not found any arguable issues.
Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. (Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 748 [90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747], fn. omitted.) The pertinent inquiry in evaluating a plea is whether the record affirmatively shows the admission was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360.)
The record does not support defendants contention that his plea was involuntarily made because he was coerced by his attorney into accepting the agreement. In the written plea agreement, defendant agreed that he had not been threatened to accept the plea agreement. At the time of the taking of the plea, defendant admitted he had read the written plea agreement and understood all of its provisions. The record of the plea agreement does not disclose that the trial court was made aware of any conflict between defendant and counsel regarding the plea agreement. Indeed, at a subsequent hearing, defendant expressed no concerns regarding the plea agreement. Up until the time of the plea, defendant had been very vocal and involved in the trial court proceedings. Certainly, if defendant was displeased with the plea, based on his prior actions, he would have advised the court. The record does not support that defendant made such statements to the court, or disagreed with counsel, and therefore does not support that he was coerced into taking the plea.
Further, presuming defendant seeks to have this court evaluate his sentence based on the findings of Cunningham v. California, supra,127 S.Ct. 856, the claim lacks merit. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life under the three strikes law after he admitted that he had suffered two prior serious felony convictions. Such sentence was based on his recidivism, and recidivism falls outside Cunningham.
This court recognizes that the record does establish that defendant had a history of mental illness. However, the record does not establish that the mental illness rendered defendant unable to understand the proceedings against him or impacted his ability to enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily. (People v. Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 360.) Simply stated, it did not show he was legally incompetent. The trial court stated at the time defendant entered his plea that, although he suffered from a mental illness, he was competent within the meaning of Penal Code section 1368. The trial court maintained throughout the proceedings that defendant was mentally ill but appeared to be faking some of his symptoms and appeared well aware of the proceedings being brought against him. The record before this court supports the lower courts findings.
We have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P.J.
KING
J.
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[1] The doctor who evaluated defendant apparently filed a report that was placed in a confidential envelope, but it was not made part of the record on appeal.
[2]People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123-124 (Marsden).
[3] This determination was made by the previously assigned trial judge.
[4]Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562] (Faretta).
[5] A subsequent hearing was held on April 14, 2006, in order for defendant to withdraw his not guilty by reason of insanity plea, and custody credits were awarded.
[6] This court notes that several doctors evaluated defendant throughout the remand proceedings, but none of the reports submitted by those doctors have been included in the transcripts on appeal.
