Filed 9/6/18 P. v. Menchaca CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIE DAVID MENCHACA, Defendant and Appellant.

H044313 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1507364)

Defendant Willie David Menchaca appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw his no contest plea to the charge of committing assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision and will therefore affirm the judgment.

• I. background

After a man was stabbed in the back with a screwdriver outside an apartment complex in San Jose, defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); unspecified statutory references are to this code). Enhancements were alleged for the infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), use of a dangerous and deadly weapon (§ 1192.7), and for defendant’s criminal history: two strike priors (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), a prior serious felony (§§ 667, subds. (a)–(i), 1192.7), and a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

At the preliminary hearing, witnesses gave conflicting accounts of the stabbing. The victim testified he was trying to break up a fight between defendant and another man when defendant stabbed him from behind. A resident of the apartment complex who saw the incident from his window testified it was the victim and defendant who were the combatants, and each pulled out a knife and “took slashes at each other.” He did not see the victim get stabbed.

Defendant agreed to waive trial and resolve the case with a negotiated disposition: He would plead no contest to an amended charge of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), and would be sentenced to two years in prison followed by post release community supervision. Because he had been in custody awaiting trial for over a year, his accrued custody credits would allow him to be released once he entered the no contest plea. The trial court recited the terms of the disposition and asked defendant whether he understood them. Defendant answered, “Yes, sir.”

Defendant signed an Advisement of Rights, Waiver, and Plea Form, stating he understood the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea. He initialed the box on the form next to the statement, “I am thinking clearly[.] [¶] I have not recently used any medication, alcohol, or drug that is affecting my ability to understand this form or the consequences of my plea.” The court asked defendant whether he read and understood the form, and he said, “Yes, sir.” Defendant also responded affirmatively to questions from the court about whether he understood each of the rights he was giving up by pleading no contest, and responded, “No, sir,” when asked if he had any questions. Defense counsel affirmed she had discussed the plea with defendant and was satisfied he understood the consequences of the plea and was “in a good frame of mind to change his plea.” The court asked defendant how he wished to plead to the amended charge, and defendant answered, “No contest.”

Three months later, defendant moved to withdraw his plea. (In the moving papers, defense counsel explained that defendant first expressed his desire to withdraw the plea the day after entering it.) Defendant asserted he had taken prescription medication before the change of plea hearing which altered his mental state and made him unable to understand the consequences of his decision. He supported the motion with his declaration stating that he takes numerous medications that alter his ability to think and he was impaired by several of those medications which “clouded” his mind. Had he been thinking clearly, defendant stated, he would not have accepted the plea agreement and would have instead insisted on a trial. Defendant submitted documentation of known side effects associated with the drugs he was taking (including confusion, decreased concentration, and false beliefs), and medical records from the jail purportedly showing he had been administered those drugs on the date in question.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court––the same judge who had taken the no contest plea––denied defendant’s motion. In the court’s view, it was not clear from the medical records that all of the relevant medications had been administered to defendant the day of the plea. The judge also found, based on personal observations of defendant’s behavior, that he did not seem impaired at the time he entered the plea. The court then imposed sentence consistent with the negotiated disposition.

• II. discussion

Penal Code section 1018 allows a defendant to withdraw a plea “for a good cause shown.” “ ‘Good cause’ means mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress or any other factor that overcomes the exercise of free judgment.” (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 917.) The defendant has the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plea was not the product of the exercise of free judgment. (Ibid.) “Guilty pleas resulting from a bargain should not be set aside lightly and finality of proceedings should be encouraged.” (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 103.)

Our review of the trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea is deferential. Since the decision to grant or deny such a motion is within the trial court’s discretion, we will affirm it unless the defendant shows a clear abuse of that discretion. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254 (Fairbank).) An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is outside what is allowed by the applicable law, or has no basis in reason. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.) To the extent the challenged ruling rests on a factual finding made by the trial court, we must adopt that finding so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. (Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1254.) Substantial evidence is reasonable and credible evidence, even if contradicted by other evidence in the record. (People v. Ortiz (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1362–1363.)

The trial court’s decision to deny the motion rested on the factual finding that defendant was able to understand the consequences of his decision to plead no contest because he was not significantly impaired by medication. That finding is supported by substantial evidence, including the judge’s own impressions regarding defendant’s demeanor at the time of the plea. The court’s personal observations can support an inference defendant was not impaired. (Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1254 [“Here, substantial evidence, including the trial court’s own observations of defendant, supports the court’s factual determination that defendant was not intoxicated at the time he entered his guilty plea and that his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”]; see also People v. Ravaux, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 918 [“It is entirely within the trial court’s discretion to consider its own observations of the defendant in ruling on such a motion.”].) Further, defendant initialed and signed a waiver form stating he was thinking clearly and had not used any substance affecting his ability to understand the plea, and defense counsel did not raise any concern regarding defendant’s mental condition at the time of the plea––to the contrary, she affirmed that defendant appeared to understand his rights and was “in a good frame of mind to change his plea.” The reporter’s transcript of the proceedings is consistent with the trial court’s finding, as defendant responded appropriately to the questions directed to him and did not indicate any confusion.

The presence of conflicting evidence––records showing defendant had been administered medications potentially affecting his mental state, and his own statement that he was too impaired to understand the proceedings––did not compel the court to grant the motion, particularly given defendant’s burden and the applicable clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. (See People v. Ravaux, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 918 [“The sole evidence that his judgment was affected by medication is defendant’s own assertions in support of his motion to withdraw the plea. These assertions were contrary to the position he took under oath at the time the guilty plea was given. They were also at odds with what the trial judge, who presided over both hearings, recalled about the demeanor and performance of Defendant at the plea hearing.”].) This record shows a reasonable basis for the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to withdraw the plea and therefore it was not an abuse of discretion.

Defendant argues that “the shocking weakness of the [] case” against him supports the assertion that he would have insisted on a trial had he been thinking clearly. [1] But the terms of the plea bargain, which were relatively favorable to defendant, accounted for weaknesses in the prosecution’s case: the charge of assault with a deadly weapon was amended to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, defendant was sentenced to the low term for that offense, and the prior strikes and prior prison term enhancements were dismissed. Because of his presentence custody credits, accepting that bargain and pleading no contest meant defendant would be released from jail immediately. Given those circumstances, the proposition that the reason he did not insist on a trial is because he was impaired by medication is dubious.

Defendant cites In re Matthew N. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1421, which reversed the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea in a juvenile delinquency matter because of a lack of evidence that the minor understood the proceedings. Matthew N. is factually inapposite because the issue in that case was whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the minor’s “unusual immaturity” and its effect on his ability to comprehend legal concepts. (Id. at p. 1420.) Here, the trial court expressly considered evidence of the condition which defendant asserted caused his inability to understand, but simply concluded the condition was not present.

Defendant also cites three federal cases from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in support of his argument that the evidence of impairment required a finding his plea was involuntary. None of those cases is persuasive in this setting because in each of them the Ninth Circuit was deciding whether evidence of a defendant’s intoxication required the trial court to conduct a hearing inquiring into the voluntariness of the plea; it was not confronting the question presented here: whether it was an abuse of discretion to determine after a hearing that defendant failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, good cause to withdraw his plea. (United States v. Howard (9th Cir. 2004) 381 F.3d 873, 877; Lopez v. United States (9th Cir. 1971) 439 F.2d 997, 999–1000; Miles v. Stainer (9th Cir. 1997) 108 F.3d 1109, 1113, fn. 3.) For the reasons discussed, we find the trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his no contest plea.

• III. disposition

The judgment is affirmed.