P. v. Mendez
Filed
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER COLLIN MENDEZ, Defendant and Appellant. | D047903 (Super. |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Allan J. Preckel, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher Mendez struck Marc Vidrio with the palm of his hand, causing Vidrio to lose consciousness and suffer several facial fractures and a concussion. Based on this incident, the jury found Mendez guilty of battery with serious bodily injury, and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 243, subd. (d), § 245, subd. (a)(1).) With respect to each count, the jury also found true that Mendez personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.7.)
In addition to the current offenses, Mendez was charged with a prior voluntary manslaughter conviction committed in 1991, alleged as a violent felony prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (a)), a serious felony prior (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668), and a strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Mendez admitted these allegations after the jury returned its verdict. The court denied Mendez's new trial motion and his motion to strike the strike prior.
The court sentenced Mendez to nine years on the assault count, consisting of the two-year lower base term, doubled because of the strike, plus five years for Mendez's admission of the prior serious felony allegation (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The court exercised its discretion to strike the great bodily injury enhancement on the assault count. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The court stayed the sentence on the battery count under section 654.
Mendez appeals, contending the court abused its discretion in refusing to strike the prior strike, and the court erred in refusing to grant a new trial based on jury misconduct and/or to grant his motion for juror information. We determine these contentions are without merit and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
At about
Dr. Richard Chen examined Vidrio several hours later. Vidrio had several fractures in his face near the eye socket and cheek bone. At trial, Dr. Chen opined that given the extent of these injuries it is unlikely they were caused by Vidrio hitting his head on a chair or on the floor. Vidrio also suffered a concussion, but there was no permanent damage. Vidrio is approximately five feet and six inches, and weighs approximately 160 pounds. Mendez is approximately six feet and two inches, and weighs approximately 275 pounds.
Under the defense version, Vidrio was highly intoxicated and knocked a chair into the wife of Mendez's brother (Todd) when Vidrio walked by Mendez's table. Vidrio then sat down and began staring at Todd. Mendez told Todd to " [l]eave it alone. . . . " But when Vidrio began to rise out of his chair, Mendez stood up and hit Vidrio with an open hand, intending to push him away to prevent a confrontation. Defense counsel argued that under these facts Mendez did not have an intent to commit the charged offenses and/or the hit was justified under a self-defense or defense of others theory.
After less than three hours of deliberations, the jury found Mendez guilty of battery with serious bodily injury and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and found that Mendez personally inflicted great bodily injury on Vidrio. The jury rejected the lesser included charged offenses of battery and assault.
DISCUSSION
I. No Abuse of Discretion in Refusing to Strike the Strike
Mendez contends the court erred in refusing to strike his first strike (the voluntary manslaughter) when imposing the nine-year sentence.
A. Relevant Background Information
The first strike arose from a 1991 incident in which Mendez and his companions had a fight with a group of individuals at a party. Mendez was 20 years old at the time. When Mendez and his companions left the party, they went to a different location where Mendez supplied his companions with firearms. Mendez and the others then drove back to confront the individuals. As they were driving by the party, two of Mendez's companions fired at the men, killing one man and injuring three others. Mendez was convicted as an accomplice in the voluntary manslaughter charge.
Mendez served six years in state prison, and was paroled in 1997. He was discharged from parole in March 2000. Since his prison release in 1997, Mendez led a completely crime-free life. He had no parole violations or returns to custody, and became a positive and productive member of society. He was consistently employed as a truck driver. Mendez also married and had two children, with whom he is very close. He and his wife bought their own home, and he put his wife through college, which enabled her to obtain a nursing degree. At the time of the current crime, he was employed to deliver heavy equipment and was working six days a week.
Thirty-two people wrote letters supporting Mendez at the sentencing hearing, including immediate family members, neighbors, coworkers, current employers, and former employers. The letters show strong support for Mendez and reflect that he has a reputation in the community as a kind, generous, and gentle person. The letters further indicate that Mendez is a hard-working family man who takes his responsibilities and relationships seriously. In one letter, his employer describes Mendez as " one of [his] best employees," who is always early, able to communicate with customers and resolve their problems, and always willing to work late nights or weekends. Mendez additionally has a strong extended family support system, including several siblings and parents.
In his letter to the court, Mendez said he knew he made a mistake and apologized to Vidrio, stating that he never meant to hurt him and that he was " only trying to prevent a serious altercation." Mendez asked the court to give him leniency for his mistake in light of his " nine and a half years of hard working and doing everything right in life."
In ruling on the motion to strike, the court considered all of the evidence, including the facts of the current and prior crimes, Mendez's rehabilitation, and Mendez's strong support in the community. But the court ultimately denied Mendez's motion to strike the strike. At the hearing, the court provided a detailed explanation for this ruling:
" I've given this case serious and lengthy consideration, not just in preparing for this morning's hearing, but in the time from trial to today's date. I've often reflected on it . . . .
" I've been on the bench for a number of years and before taking the bench I took a very solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitutions . . . . It didn't have conditions attached to it such as . . . you can apply the law only when you feel that it's a good idea to do so . . . . So personally, my likes and dislikes, my preferences [are] altogether irrelevant to this proceeding . . . .
[¶] . . . [¶]
" [T]he court's decision as to whether [it can strike] the [prior strike allegation] is not unfettered. The court has limited discretion. The court needs to look to the circumstances and evidence in the present case, it needs to consider Mr. Mendez as an individual with respect to the totality of his history, personally and criminally. And the court cannot grant the relief sought just because, gee, golly, whiz, I want to be a nice guy this morning . . . . Those reasons need to be substantial and substantive.
" And the court, in making that decision, must consider not only the interest of Mr. Mendez, but also must consider the interests of the community at large. . . . [T]he court needs to consider the welfare and safety of the community as compared a[nd] contrasted with the acts of the individual who is before the court . . . . The court needs to consider the nature of the prior offense that gives rise to the strike allegation . . . . . . . Mr. Mendez's prior conviction is factually and legally one of the most serious: loss of human life caused by him, directly or indirectly, and providing the firearms to his accomplices who used those firearms and with Mr. Mendez present, killed another human being and shot and injured three additional individuals. The court cannot and must not legally overlook the nature of that prior offense.
" The court also must consider the present offenses, and that includes the significance of the injuries suffered by Mr. Vidrio. [Even if] [t]hose injuries . . . were unintentional, nonetheless, [Mendez's] conduct . . . resulted directly in those substantial injuries to Mr. Vidrio. And the nature of the injuries is also illuminative of the amount of force exerted by Mr. Mendez, a very large individual, against Mr. Vidrio, a much smaller individual.
[¶] . . . [¶]
" There were, of course, conflicts in the evidence. . . . [B]ut [the most credible witness was another customer who was seated nearby,] [a]nd in sum, that witness . . . testified under oath that Mr. Vidrio was still rising from his chair with his . . . hands on the chair when struck by Mr. Mendez. [¶] This is not a circumstance anywhere close to defense of self or defense of others. The victim was in a vulnerable position . . . . Mr. Vidrio was wide open for the very unfortunate decision that Mr. Mendez made to suddenly get up from his chair, wheel and strike Mr. Vidrio with great force in his face.
" Now, in reaching my ultimate sentencing decision in this case, I also consider the context of what went down that night at the Brigantine the fact that this case involves a single blow [which is] corroborative of Mr. Mendez's contention that he didn't intend to injure Mr. Vidrio. Because had he had that intent, Mr. Vidrio, having gone to the ground like a sack of flour upon being struck was altogether vulnerable and indeed, at least briefly, unconscious such that had Mr. Mendez wanted to further beat or damage Mr. Vidrio, Mr. Mendez was certainly in a position and had the ability to do just that. And the fact that he didn't, as bad as this case is in terms of Mr. Mendez's conduct, the fact that was limited to a single blow is a circumstance that, in a relative sense, inures to the benefit of Mr. Mendez in the court's review and consideration of this case.
[¶] . . . [¶]
" [After explaining that probation is not warranted in the case,] [t]he court is then left having made the decision that Mr. Mendez, legally and otherwise, is to be committed to state prison in this case, is then left with further decisions as to the exact length of that sentence. There are a number of permutations and discreet number of years that are available to the court. The outer limit in this case is 16 years in state prison. In the court's view, to impose that absolute maximum sentence would not be commensurate with the sentencing objectives that apply to this and every other felony case that comes before this court. Neither do I believe that the absolute minimum is warranted in this case considering its factual and legal underpinnings and considering the history of Mr. Mendez, and I've outlined that criminal history, but I'm not overlooking the subsequent personal history.
" As this court is fully aware, based upon its experience, that the recidivism rate of individuals released on parole from state prison is extraordinarily high, unbelievably high. And it is to Mr. Mendez's credit that he has, in the years since his release, pulled himself up by his boot straps and has done well, and the court does not overlook or forget that for a moment. And all of that information is fully before the court and irrefutable in the court's view. And that is to Mr. Mendez's definite personal credit."
The court then ruled that it would not strike the strike, based on the " circumstances of this offense and the seriousness factually and legally of the earlier offense." But the court selected the lower term (two years) as the base term, based on the community support for Mendez and " the very positive steps he has taken in the years from his release on parole to the inception of the present case." The court further exercised its discretion to strike the great bodily injury enhancement, stating that striking this enhancement was " consistent with the sentencing objectives." [2] The court imposed the consecutive five-year sentence under section 667, subdivision (a) for the serious felony prior , explaining that it had no discretion to strike this sentence enhancement.
B. Analysis
A trial court has the discretion to strike a prior strike only if the defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158-161; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530.) In exercising this discretion, the court " must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161; see People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 500.) The trial court's refusal to strike " is subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.)
In examining a defendant's argument that the court abused its discretion, we are " guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ' " [t]he burden is on [the defendant] to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review." ' [Citations.] Second, a ' " decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. 'An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.' " ' [Citations.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.) " Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court's ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance." (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310; People v. Bishop (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1249-1250.)
Under these principles, we find no abuse of discretion. The court carefully examined all the relevant factors. The court expressly considered numerous facts supporting the striking of the strike, including that Mendez had not committed any crimes since he was released from prison in 1997, Mendez's strong family and community support, the fact that Mendez did not intend the severe injuries that resulted, and Mendez's excellent employment history and positive future prospects. The court also discussed the numerous facts weighing against granting Mendez's motion, including the force of the hit on Vidrio, the severe injuries to Vidrio's face, the fact that the violence was senseless and unprovoked, Vidrio was in a vulnerable position, and the severity of Mendez's prior crime which was an intentional crime resulting in a death of one man and the injury of several other men. Weighing these factors, the court found that the prior strike did not result in an unjust sentence and that Mendez did not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The court's comments also indicate that it believed community safety concerns made it appropriate that Mendez be in prison for a lengthy sentence.
This record shows that the court was affirmatively aware of its discretion and found it was not appropriate to strike the strike under the particular circumstances of the case. The court gave the case serious and lengthy consideration. The court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the applicable legal principles. On this record, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion.
II. Motion for New Trial and Juror Identification
A. Factual Background
Mendez moved for a new trial based on: (1) assertions that he may have been previously acquainted with one of the jurors (Juror No. 9), and (2) declarations showing the jurors complained about being bored, tired, and impatient during the trial. Mendez alternatively requested that his counsel be given access to juror information to allow him to further investigate misconduct allegations.[3]
With respect to Juror No. 9, Mendez submitted his declaration stating that near the end of the jury trial, he realized that he was " acquainted" with this juror through his employment. Mendez stated: " Juror No. 9 was employed at a job site that I delivered equipment to and I am positive that I am acquainted with him through this work. I do not independently recall his name. [¶] I did not bring this fact during my trial to the attention of my lawyer or the court as I did not consider it of any importance. However, I now realize that Juror No. 9 should have disclosed to the court that he was acquainted with me."
He also produced a declaration of Chris Bixby, who worked previously with Mendez. Bixby stated that when he attended the last day of Mendez's trial, he recognized Juror No. 9 " as a man that worked at a job site that I delivered equipment and/or materials to as he was employed by a company that did underground construction work. I do not recall his name. [¶] I now know that Juror No. 9's name is [B.C.], . . . a name familiar to me. [¶] . . . [¶] I am one hundred percent positive that Juror No. 9 was employed at a job site that I delivered equipment and/or materials to and I am positive that I am acquainted with him through this work."
Mendez also submitted declarations from several friends and relatives regarding juror statements overheard during trial about their boredom and impatience with the trial.
First, Lori Reed, one of Mendez's employers, said that while in the bathroom, she overheard a conversation between two women, who she believed were jurors in Mendez's trial. One of these women stated, " 'This trial is boring. I hope we don't have to come back tomorrow.' "
Second, Mendez's father stated that while he was holding open the courtroom door for the jurors, he overheard one male juror state to another male juror: " 'I hope this is the last day. I want to get out of here.' "
Third, Mendez's wife said that on the last day of trial during a break before the prosecutor's closing argument, she went into the women's restroom on the same floor as the trial. While she was in a bathroom stall, she heard two women who she believed were jurors speaking to each other. The first woman said, " 'Gosh, I'm falling asleep.' " The second woman said, " Did you see the bailiff? He was falling asleep." The first woman then said, " 'Yeah, I'm so tired, I can't even listen to that Williams [defense counsel] guy.' " The second juror then said, " 'I'm not coming back next week.' " The first juror then replied, after laughing, " 'Yeah, this will be over today.' "
After considering these declarations, the court denied the new trial motion, finding there were " no meritorious grounds, legally or factually, warranting a new trial . . . ." The court also denied the request for access to, and disclosure of, the personal identifying information of the jurors, including Juror No. 9. The court stated, " the defense has not established a prima facie showing that disclosure of that private information is merited under the totality of the record in this case . . . . "
B. Alleged Juror Misconduct
Jury misconduct may constitute grounds for a new trial. (People v. Garcia (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1338.) To prevail on the new trial motion, the moving party has the burden to establish a factual basis for jury misconduct. Decisions concerning the weight and sufficiency of the misconduct allegations are for the trial court, and must be affirmed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 951; People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 582.) The trial court's credibility determinations are upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 582.) " Whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct is a mixed question of law and fact subject to an appellate court's independent determination." (Ibid.; accord People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 417.)
In evaluating a new trial motion based on juror misconduct, " [t]he standard is a pragmatic one, mindful of the 'day-to-day realities of courtroom life' [citation] and of society's strong competing interest in the stability of criminal verdicts [citations]." (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296.) The courts recognize that jurors are " 'imbued with human frailties' " and that a certain level of imperfection must be tolerated, unless there is actual bias shown. (Ibid.) " 'To demand theoretical perfection from every juror during the course of a trial is unrealistic.' " (People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 304.)
We apply these standards in reviewing Mendez's challenges to the court's denial of his new trial motion based on the two categories of alleged juror misconduct.
1. Alleged Statements of Juror Boredom and Impatience with Trial
Mendez contends the court erred in denying his new trial motion because the declarations of his father, wife and employer established the " jurors were bored and could not listen to defense counsel" and " indicate a collective desire to get things over with as quickly as possible, rather than a desire to weigh the evidence carefully and ensure that Mr. Mendez was given a fair trial." We reject this contention.
First, the court had an ample evidentiary basis to find the jurors did not make the statements attributed to them. The declarations were submitted by Mendez's family members and an employer who strongly supported Mendez at trial. The court could thus legitimately find that in their desire to help Mendez, these individuals may have misheard the statements or been mistaken that the individuals making the statements were jurors at Mendez's trial.
Equally important, the overheard statements do not reflect prejudicial misconduct. It is not uncommon for jurors to be impatient or bored during a trial, and statements to that effect do not establish that the jurors could not be fair and impartial in their deliberations and factual determinations. Although jurors should not discuss any aspect of the case before deliberations, and the jurors here were so instructed, the cited comments about the pace of the trial did not involve anything related to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and did not show a likelihood of bias or an unwillingness to perform juror duties. Likewise, the brief exchange in which two jurors expressed hope or expectation that the case would be completed that day did not reasonably reflect the jurors set deadlines for deliberation and/or would not deliberate after the weekend if this was necessary.
The court presided over the trial and had the full opportunity to observe the jurors and the extent to which they paid attention to the evidence and showed a willingness to perform their responsibilities. Based on these observations, the court could reasonably conclude that even if the jurors made the claimed comments, the comments did not reflect the jurors' unwillingness to listen to the evidence and deliberate in a fair and objective manner. After reviewing the record, we agree there was no prejudicial misconduct.
2. Contentions of Misconduct Regarding Juror No. 9
Mendez additionally contends the declarations show that Juror No. 9 committed misconduct because he breached a duty to disclose a prior relationship with Mendez and instead affirmatively concealed this information.
The court had a substantial basis to conclude the factual predicate of this argument was missing--that Juror No. 9 had a prior acquaintance or contact with Mendez. Mendez asserted in his posttrial declaration that he was acquainted with Juror No. 9 because he delivered equipment to a construction site at which Juror No. 9 was working. However, the trial court had a reasonable basis to find this assertion was not credible because Mendez did not raise the issue during trial. In any event, Mendez did not present any facts showing it was likely Juror No. 9 would have remembered Mendez as one of the many truck drivers who delivered materials to the construction site. In this regard, the fact that Mendez's former coworker (Bixby) recognized Juror No. 9 is unhelpful because it is unclear whether Bixby's dealings with Juror No. 9 occurred when Bixby was Mendez's coworker. In his declaration, Bixby acknowledged that he has operated his own business for the past three years, and thus did not work for Mendez's employer during that time.
In attempting to establish a factual basis for the misconduct, Mendez argues that Juror No. 9's request to be dismissed on the first day of trial must have been motivated by the fact that Juror No. 9 " realized he knew [the defendant]." The argument is unpersuasive. Juror No. 9 asked to be excused based on his statement that he manages a construction group for fiber optic lines and was needed at work. Without any objection from defense counsel, the court refused to grant this request, explaining that Juror No. 9 was needed because his departure would leave the trial with no juror alternates. There is nothing in this exchange that suggests that Juror No. 9 knew Mendez. To the contrary, given the juror's obvious preference not to serve on the jury, it is reasonable to assume he would have disclosed any prior contacts as a basis for obtaining his removal from the jury panel.
Moreover, the fact that Mendez may have delivered some items to a construction site at which Juror No. 9 was working does not mean there was any actual or potential bias. Mendez argues that Juror No. 9 " may have had stereotypes regarding construction workers or truck drivers that affected his verdict in this case." However, during voir dire, Juror No. 9 disclosed that he performed construction-type work. Thus, if Mendez had believed that Juror No. 9 could not be impartial because of his occupation or prejudice against truck drivers, he could have explored this issue during voir dire. Mendez cannot now premise a claim of juror misconduct on facts that were disclosed during voir dire.
C. Motion for Identifying Juror Information
Mendez alternatively contends the court erred in refusing to disclose juror identifying information to permit defense counsel to further investigate juror misconduct allegations.
After a verdict has been recorded, a court must seal all identifying juror information. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(2).) A defendant may petition the court for access to juror names, addresses, and telephone numbers to develop support for a new trial motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 206, subd. (g).) The petition must be supported by a declaration that includes " facts sufficient to establish good cause for the release of the juror's personal identifying information." (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b).) If the petition and supporting declaration " establish a prima facie showing of good cause for the release of the personal juror identifying information," the court must set a hearing, unless a compelling countervailing interest exists to protect " jurors from threats or danger of physical harm." (Ibid.) If the court sets a hearing, the court must notify each former juror of the pending motion. Any affected juror may protest the petition by personal appearance or in writing. (
The statutory disclosure process balances the public's interest in the integrity of the jury system against jurors' privacy rights. (People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 541, 552.) Thus, juror information is not to be disclosed to a defendant merely upon request; rather, a defendant must show good cause before the information is divulged. (People v. Wilson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 839, 852; see People v. Jefflo (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1321, fn. 8.) To demonstrate good cause, a defendant must make a sufficient showing " to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred." (Rhodes, supra, at p. 552.) The alleged misconduct must be " 'of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly.' " (Jefflo, supra, at p. 1322.) Good cause does not exist where the allegations of jury misconduct are speculative, conclusory, vague, or unsupported. (Wilson, supra, at p. 852.) In addition, a trial court can properly consider the extent to which the evidence proffered in support of the petition would be excludable under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), because it reflects the jurors' thought processes. (Jefflo, supra, at p. 1322.) A trial court order denying a request for personal juror identifying information is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 317.)
In this case, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Mendez did not show good cause for release of the information. As discussed above, there was no showing of actual or potential juror misconduct. With respect to the juror statements allegedly overheard by Mendez's supporters, there is no basis to believe that these statements, even if made, resulted in the jurors refusing to properly deliberate and reach a verdict in an impartial and fair manner. Moreover, to the extent the jurors held subjective feelings about the length of the trial or defense counsel's trial tactics, these feelings would not be admissible to impeach the verdict. (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).)
Additionally, Mendez has not shown a reasonable possibility that Juror No. 9 would provide evidence showing misconduct. Even assuming the juror recognized Mendez as someone who had once delivered items to a construction site, Mendez does not cite anything in the record suggesting this would have affected the jury verdict in a manner that was detrimental to Mendez. It is additionally significant that Mendez had other means to contact Juror No. 9. If it is true that Mendez (and/or his former coworker) knew Juror No. 9 and knew his place of employment, Mendez could have contacted him without court intervention.
People v. Phillips (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1307, relied on by Mendez, is distinguishable. Phillips concerned a defendant's right to obtain the names of prospective jurors during voir dire. (Id. at p. 1309.) In ruling that the trial court should have disclosed this information, the Phillips court emphasized that the standard for releasing this information before a verdict differs from the standard for releasing juror information after the verdict. (Id. at p. 1310.) Moreover, to the extent the Phillips court suggested that the defendant could have moved to obtain the information after trial, this statement was dicta and does not support the release of information in this case.
Mendez's reliance on People v. Simms (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 462 is also misplaced. In that case, the court interpreted a former version of Code of Civil Procedure section 206, subdivision (f), and section 237, subdivision (d) and held that these former statutes gave a defendant a right to juror information without a showing of good cause. However, four years later, the same appellate division held that its Simms holding is no longer valid in light of statutory amendments. (People v. Jefflo, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321, fn. 8; see also People v. Granish (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1128 [holding that the defendant must show good cause for the disclosure of juror identifying information and rejecting Simms'sbroader rule as " unwarranted" ]; People v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 [" contrary to the reasoning expressed in Simms, . . . [the statutes]indicate a legislative intent to require the defendant show good cause for disclosure and not engage in merely a fishing expedition" ]; see also Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1096, fn. 4 [disapproving Simms on related grounds].)
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
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[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
[2] In its moving papers below, the prosecutor had agreed that " [t]he three year enhancement . . . can be stayed in recognition of [Mendez] being law abiding between his release from prison and the current offense."
[3] Mendez also asked the court to modify the verdict to find him guilty only of the lesser included offenses of assault and battery. On appeal, he does not challenge the court's denial of this request.
