P. v. Moats
Filed 7/29/13 P. v. Moats CA1/2
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MATTHEW C.
MOATS,
Defendant and Appellant.
A138327
(Sonoma
County
Super. Ct.
No. SCR567689)
In
2009, appellant, then age 20, pled guilty to one count of
sentence and placed appellant on probation.
After two violations of probation, but subsequent reinstatement thereof
in 2011 and 2012, earlier this year appellant was found to have violated
probation for the third time. The trial
court then revoked probation and sentenced appellant to the six-year maximum
term provided under the 2009 plea agreement.
Pursuant to
(Wende), appellant appeals from the
sentence imposed or from other matters occurring after his entry of his guilty
plea. Finding no error in that or any
other regard, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, including the sentence
imposed.
Early
in the morning of August 27, 2009,
Luke and Benita Crawford, residents of a home on Surrey
Drive in Sonoma
County were awakened by the
presence in their home of appellant, apparently intoxicated and bleeding from
his face. The Crawfords called the
police who, when they arrived at their residence, found appellant hiding in a
utility truck parked nearby. He had
lacerations below both of his eyes, both of which appeared bloodshot and
watery, was emanating alcoholic odor and slurring his words. He was unable to explain to the officers why
he had been inside the Crawford residence or how he had been injured. The
officers also found a keychain containing three keys and belonging to Mrs.
Crawford on appellant’s person. The
officers arrested appellant.
Four
days later on August 31, 2009,
a felony complaint was filed charging appellant with one count of
of Penal Code section 459. The complaint
also included two special allegations, i.e., that in committing the burglary,
appellant had violated Penal Code sections 462, subdivision (a) and 667.5,
subdivision (c).
On
October 1, 2009, appellant
pled guilty to that charge, admitted both of the charged special allegations,
factual basis for the plea; his trial counsel joined in that stipulation, and
the court found to the same effect. The
plea agreement agreed to by appellant provided for a maximum prison term of six
(6) years.
On
November 13, 2009, the
trial court suspended imposition of any sentence and placed appellant on
probation for a period of 36 months.
On
March 28, 2011, the
district attorney filed an allegation that appellant had violated
probation. A hearing was held on this
charge on April 1, 2011;
appellant waived his right to a hearing and admitted the alleged probation
violation; the trial court reinstated probation on April 22, 2011.
On
August 17, 2012, the trial
court summarily revoked probation and, again, appellant both waived his right
to a hearing and admitted the violation of probation charged.
On
November 7, 2012, the court
imposed, pursuant to a stipulation agreed to by both appellant and his counsel,
an upper term of six years in prison; however, it then suspended execution of
that sentence and again reinstated appellant on probation, on the understanding
that appellant would be immediately enrolling in the Delancey
Street program to address his drug problems.
However,
once again, on January 15, 2013,
probation was summarily revoked. At a
hearing ten days later, appellant admitted the alleged probation violation and
waived his right to a hearing; the court found appellant to be, once again, in violation
of probation.
On
March 22, 2013, the Sonoma County Public Defender filed a brief on appellant’s
behalf asking the court to consider allowing appellant to continue his
“participation in treatment and behavior modification†for his long-standing drug
abuse problems. Appellant also submitted
a hand-written letter to the court.
On
March 26, 2013, appellant
appeared before the trial court for sentencing.
He was allowed to personally address the court regarding his
problems. Nonetheless, the court found
that appellant had “squandered†three separate alternative programs, including
Turning Point, Starting Point, and Delancey Street—especially regarding the
latter, which—per the trial court—he apparently left “[a]fter two days.†The court thus sentenced appellant to the
previously agreed-to six-year term in state prison, awarding him a total of 486
days of sentence credit.
On
April 2, 2013, appellant
filed a timely notice of appeal,
stating that his appeal was based on the sentence imposed or on other matters
occurring after the entry of his plea that did not effect the validity of the
plea.
Where,
as here, an appellant has pled guilty or no contest to an offense, the scope of
reviewable issues is restricted to matters based on constitutional,
jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings
leading to the plea; guilt or innocence are not included. (People
v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896.)
Accordingly,
our review of the record discloses no reviewable issues in connection with: (1)
appellant’s initial plea of guilty to the charge of first degree residential
burglary, (2) his admission to the two charged special allegations, or (3) the
trial court’s findings that he had violated the terms and conditions of
probation three times in the 2011-2013 period.
The
admonitions given appellant at the time he entered his plea fully conformed
with the requirements of Boykin v.
Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re
Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, and nothing in the record before us indicates
appellant was mentally incompetent to stand trial or to understand the
admonitions he received from the court.
Appellant was at all times represented by competent counsel who
protected his rights and interests.
The
record provides a factual basis for appellant’s knowing and voluntary plea and
our independent review has disclosed no arguable issues that require further
briefing. Finally, we conclude the
sentence imposed by the trial court was authorized by law.
The
trial court’s judgment, including the sentence imposed, is affirmed.
_________________________
Haerle,
J.
We concur:
_________________________
Kline, P.J.
_________________________
Lambden, J.
