P. v. Nijjar
Filed 8/7/06 P. v. Nijjar CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PARVAN SINGH NIJJAR, Defendant and Appellant. | H029153 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. BB411124) |
I. Introduction
Defendant Parvan Singh Nijjar left a party one night in 2004. As he drove away he aimed his car toward a group of people standing by the road. He struck a woman who had been sitting on the curb, ran over her body, put the car in reverse and ran over her again, and then resumed his forward progress running over the woman a third time. Several bystanders shouted out for defendant to stop and one man jumped on the hood of the car and banged on the driver's side window but defendant drove on without stopping. The victim suffered great bodily injury but survived.
The jury found defendant guilty of one count of felony hit and run. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(1) (section 20001).) Defendant admitted an alleged great bodily injury enhancement. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to 16 months in prison for the section 20001 violation plus three years for the enhancement. Defendant has timely appealed. He argues that the Legislature did not intend Penal Code section 12022.7 to apply to violation of section 20001. We reject the argument and affirm the judgment.
II. Discussion
The sole issue on appeal concerns the application of what is known as the special-over-general rule. (People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 502.) We must decide whether the Legislature intended the special statute (§ 20001) to take precedence over and preclude application of the generally applicable great bodily injury enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.7). The issue is one of statutory interpretation, a judicial function involving only questions of law to which we apply the independent standard of review. (Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 307, 313.) Given the purely legal question before us further description of the factual and procedural background of the case is unnecessary. We begin with an overview of the special-over-general rule.
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