Filed 4/27/17 P. v. Poole CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO


THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHADWICK POOLE,
Defendant and Appellant.

A146865

(Del Norte County
Super. Ct. No. CRF13-9505)


This appeal follows the entry of a guilty plea. A request for a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5) was denied by the superior court but the certificate is unnecessary because the grounds for the appeal arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the validity of the plea. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8. 304(b)(4)(B).)
Appellant Chadwick Poole was on May 1, 2015, charged by the Del Norte County District Attorney with four counts of lewd acts upon a child with a 10-year age difference. (§ 288, subd. (c)(1).) The information contained allegations of one prior strike (§§ 1170.12; 667, subd. (b)), one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and with respect to one of the counts, the infliction of great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7.)
About a month later, after negotiation of a plea agreement, the district attorney amended count 1 to charge unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 18, with a three-year age difference (§ 261.5, subd. (c)), and moved to dismiss the strike allegation, and the court granted the motion. The plea agreement provided that the court would rule on whether the offense was a registerable sex offense (§ 290) at the time of sentencing, and that the plea was open to the court with respect to whether appellant would be sentenced to state prison, with a two-year lid, or to county jail.
Several weeks later, the parties realized that if appellant was sentenced to state prison he would be required to register as a sex offender, and due to his prior conviction would be ineligible for imprisonment in county jail. (§ 1170, subd. (h).) The district attorney therefore proposed that in return for appellant’s plea of guilty to violation of section 261.5, subdivision (c), the People would agree that appellant would not be immediately sentenced to state prison but granted probation after one year in county jail, and the court would determine whether appellant would be subject to registration as a sex offender at the time of sentencing. Appellant accepted this offer.
At sentencing on September 17, 2015, the court dismissed the remaining counts, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed appellant on probation for five years after serving one year in county jail. The trial court also ordered appellant to register as sex offender. A $300 restitution fund fine was imposed, as were various other fines, totaling $5,085.
The sole issue presented is whether the order requiring appellant to register as a sex offender without making the findings required by section 290.006 denied him due process of law under the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
At the hearing at which appellant initially entered a plea, the parties stipulated that the factual basis for the plea was provided by transcript of the preliminary hearing. Crescent City Police Officer Jennifer Owen testified at that hearing that in May 2011, she was told by the victim, who was referred to as “Jane Doe,” that she met appellant in 2007, at which time he was her boxing coach at the Life Fitness Gym in Crescent City. Between August and November in that year, when she was 15 years old, she engaged in a sexual relationship with appellant, who was then approximately 33 years old. As a result of the relationship, Jane Doe became pregnant and delivered a child. Jane Doe stated that she initially told appellant she was 18, but he checked her records at the gym and discovered she was then only 15. During that period, Jane Doe and appellant engaged in sexual intercourse approximately 30 times. He used a condom the first time, but not afterward. The relationship ended in November 2007, when Jane Doe informed appellant that she was pregnant with his child, he denied the child was his, and told her not to tell anyone else about their sexual relationship. A subsequent paternity test indicated with 99.99 percent certainty that appellant was the father of the child.
Four months after the birth of her daughter, Jane Doe went to appellant’s house, apparently to discuss their child. Appellant, who had been drinking alcohol, forced himself on her sexually, by pinning her down on a bed by her wrists, removing her pants, and penetrating her vagina with his penis without use of a condom despite her “screaming, no.” The next day he purchased a “Plan B pill” for her to take so she would not get pregnant.
Psychologist Michael Ramirez, who was appointed by the court to evaluate appellant for purposes of sentencing, opined that, “[c]onsidering Chad’s lack of sexually-related criminal history he appears to present a minimal risk to reoffend sexually in the community. A grant of probation as indicated per a conditional plea appears appropriate at this time. However, the discrepancy between the victim and defendant’s accounts of their relationship and the nature of the criminal offense is disconcerting and suggests defendant may present a higher risk to the community than can be anticipated by clinical judgment and actuarial risk assessment. Treatment at this time decreases probability for recidivism while increasing prognosis for favorable outcomes, assuming Chad becomes invested in treatment.”
Defense counsel and the prosecutor each submitted sentencing memoranda addressing the issue whether the court should or should not require appellant to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290. The memorandum submitted by the prosecutor described reports of the Del Norte County Sheriff describing two prior involvements of appellant with underage female victims. The prosecutor’s memorandum describes the first report, dated August 13, 2000, as stating that “about 10:00 p.m. on that night, the defendant, age twenty-five, ‘banged’ on the victim’s door and then entered when the victim, age fourteen, was babysitting other children. The victim’s parents were not home. The defendant was intoxicated, and stumbled around little children who were sleeping on the floor, while the victim ran over to the couch. He lay down on the couch and put his head in the victim’s lap. She was wearing pajamas, and the defendant started kissing her leg with his mouth on the bare part of her upper, inner thigh. He started saying, ‘Come on little pussy.’ She told him that he had to get out and asked what he was doing there. She got up, went to another room and called the police. . . . The victim had been previously molested, and knew that the defendant knew her molest history because he was friends with her parents.”
The second sheriff’s report discussed in the prosecutor’s memorandum describes the events that took place on October 31, 2000. On that date, “a correctional officer who was going through the defendant’s jail inmate property, found several photographs of a young female and an infant. The young female was in various stages of undress in the photographs and the infant had been ‘posed’ in the same positions as the mother. When the mother was contacted and asked why she and the baby were posed, she reported, ‘I guess he wanted it that way.’ Then she became nervous and said the baby was lying ‘like that cause she just had a bath and she had rolled over.’ [¶] When the officer asked her more questions about her baby, the young mother stated that the defendant was the baby’s father. She stated that she and the defendant started having sexual intercourse when she was sixteen years old. He was twenty-three years old at the time, she thought. She had become pregnant with his baby when she was seventeen years old. She said they had intercourse continually as part of their relationship.”
The prosecution’s memorandum argued that the prior reports support a court order directing appellant to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290 because in both “the defendant was an adult who was attracted to underage girls and either attempted to or did engage in sexual acts with girls ages fourteen and sixteen. Therefore it is very unlikely that his current offense happened under a misconception about the victim’s age because he has a history of sexual offenses with young girls. It is for this very reason that 290 registration is appropriate in this case.”
The sentencing memorandum filed by the defense argued that section 290 registration should not be required because (1) appellant “never forcibly raped the complaining party; nor did he demand that she go to the store and buy the ‘Plan B pill,’ (2) he was never a coach at the gym Jane Doe attended, but a janitor, and therefore could not have ascertained her true age by accessing membership information; (3) appellant had sexual relations with Jane Doe on only two occasions, and never after learning she was only fifteen years old, and (4) Dr. Ramirez found that appellant is in the “lower risk group for reoffending.” As to the final factor, which the defense memorandum relied upon most heavily, the memorandum emphasized Dr. Ramirez’s statement that appellant’s score on the AASI-3 “should be deemed a mitigating factor when adjudging the issue of 290 PC [sic] registration.”
The report of the probation department commences by stating that the department “is absolutely baffled as to the motivation behind the plea agreement in this matter.[ ] There is no reason [the] defendant should be afforded any relief. There is one indisputable fact and that [is] that the defendant had sex with a 15-year-old minor which produced a child. It does not matter that the minor lied about her age, what does matter, according to the police reports, is that the defendant continued to have a sexual relationship with this minor after discovering she was under age. [¶] The defendant continues to deny that he continued to have sex with the victim after he discovered her age. . . . [¶] It is easy to forget how young the victim was at the time these crimes were committed because she is now an adult. While the victim’s deception may hold some weight as far as a factor in mitigation, it is not a defense nor should it be used to take a serious sexual crime against a minor and wash it nearly clean. While the defendant has taken responsibility for impregnating the minor, admitting his guilt only in the face of overwhelming evidence, he continues to blame the victim and minimize his behavior at every turn.” The probation report takes the position that the plea agreement “is not in the interest of justice,” and recommends that the plea not be accepted.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court expressed its disappointment “how old this case is and that it’s finally going to be resolved at this late stage.” Acknowledging the “criticism by the probation office,” the court indicated it was “not sure” whether that office understands “the nuances of prosecuting a case and the difficulty of proving to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt this type of offense.” The court made clear it was not going to reject the plea bargain, emphasizing that “[i]t is an agreed plea bargain. I want the public to understand that. The defendant entered a plea. And he was given a range of sentencing, a cap on his sentence. And the government is bound to honor its deals. We don’t make deals—neither the prosecution nor the court, we don’t make deals and then shy away from them if there’s any criticism of them. [¶] So I’ll take ownership of this case. And I’m going to go forward. So I just wanted to say that to kind of clear the air.”
After stating that it had read the sentencing memoranda prepared by defense counsel and the Attorney General, the evaluation of appellant by Dr. Ramirez, and the probation report, the court read the detailed order it had prepared. The material provisions of the sentence were that appellant would be placed on formal probation for five years, and ordered to (1) “serve 365 days in the Del Norte County Jail with credit for zero time served,” (2) “report to the probation officer between the 1st and 10th of each and every month as directed by the probation officer,” (3) “cooperate with the probation officer in a plan for psychological, psychiatric or substance abuse treatment or any other things that are required in the reasonable judgment of the probation officer,” (4) “maintain a residence and employment as approved by the probation officer once his jail time is served,” (5) pay all fines ordered by the court, (6) “refrain from associating with persons known to be engaged in criminal activities” or “anyone under the years of 18 years of age,” and—most significant for purposes of this appeal—(7) “register with the sheriff or chief of police pursuant to section 290 of the California Penal Code, pursuant to term 20 of the probation order.”
DISCUSSION
As we have said, the sole claim presented in this appeal is that the trial court erred in imposing a registration requirement under section 290.006, a provision of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Act), which allows discretionary sex offender registration for defendants convicted of, among other offenses, unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor.
Section 261.5, subdivision (a) provides: Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor. For the purposes of this section, a ‘minor’ is a person under the age of 18 years and an ‘adult’ is a person who is at least 18 years of age.”
Subdivision (c) of section 290 specifies the statutory offenses for which registration shall be required. Unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator, in violation of section 261.5, subd. (c), the offense of which appellant was convicted, is not among the specified offenses for which registration shall be required. However, section 290.006 provides: “Any person ordered by any court to register pursuant to the [Act] for any offense not included specifically in Section 290, shall so register, if the court finds at the time of conviction or sentencing that the person committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification. The court shall state on the record the reasons for its findings and the reasons for requiring registration.” Here, despite the requirement that the court state its reasons on the record, the trial court did not do so, and appellant did not object to this omission at the sentencing hearing.
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant points out that though the sex offender registration law has been in effect since 1947, and over the years the number of specified offenses for which registration must be required has expanded, the Legislature has never expressly included the offense of “statutory rape” criminalized by section 261.5. Appellant argues that this was not likely an oversight, “but represents a considered decision that, given the imperfection of human nature, sexual intercourse between people over and under 18 years of age is a common occurrence and that the parties to such behavior are not likely to pose the threat to the community at large that perpetrators of other sex offenses pose. It represents a legislative judgment that, even in the unusual case in which a person is prosecuted and convicted for such behavior, there is no need for the person to be ‘readily available for police surveillance at all times because the Legislature deemed [him or her] likely to commit similar offenses in the future.’ (Barrows v. Municipal Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 821, 825-826; Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527.)”
Under section 290.006, the test is not the offense of which the defendant was convicted but the circumstances in which he or she committed the offense; that is, whether the person “committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification” and if so whether there is a likelihood appellant will reoffend. (People v. Thompson (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1431, disapproved on other grounds in Johnson v. Dept. of Justice (2016) 60 Cal.4th 871, 888.) We therefore could not, as appellant urges, categorically declare that a person convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with “a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator” can never be subjected to a section 290 registration requirement.
That is not appellant’s only problem. We reject his claim for the more fundamental reason that he has waived it.
Because Appellant Did Not Claim Below That the Trial Court Erred in Failing to State
the Reasons it Required Registration, He Cannot Raise that Issue for the First Time
Here
Relying on People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 (Scott), the Attorney General maintains appellant waived his claim that the trial court failed to state reasons for its findings and imposition of a registration requirement by not making that objection at the time of sentencing. We agree.
The defendant in Scott was convicted of 14 counts of lewd acts with a child. (§ 288.) Although the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, it declined to even address the defendant’s claims of sentencing error, finding he had waived those claims by failing to object at the sentencing hearing. As to that issue, the Supreme Court held a defendant waives any error in the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices by failing to object at the time of sentencing.
The rule announced in Scott applied to sentencing under the Determinate Sentencing Act, which prescribes the punishment to be imposed in most noncapital felony cases. As the court observed, although many of the act’s provisions are mandatory, “the trial court often has broad discretion to tailor the sentence to the particular case. The choices available commonly include the decision to order probation rather than imprisonment, to impose the lower or upper term instead of the middle term of imprisonment, to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences under certain discretionary provisions, and to strike or stay certain enhancements or waive a restitution fine. [Citation.] As directed by the Legislature, the Judicial Council has promulgated rules to guide these choices. [Citations.] [¶] The statutes and sentencing rules generally require the court to state ‘reasons’ for its discretionary choices on the record at the time of sentencing. [Citations.] Such reasons must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the record and must ‘reasonably relat[e]’ to the particular sentencing determination. [Citation.] No particular wording is required, but courts typically rely on applicable sentencing factors set forth in the statutory scheme and the rules. [Citations.]” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 349-350.)
As Scott says, under the scheme prescribed by the Determinate Sentence Act, the parties have ample opportunity to influence to court’s sentencing choices because, “as a practical matter, both sides often know before the hearing what sentence is likely to be imposed and the reasons therefor. Such information is contained in the probation report, which is required in every felony case and generally provided to the court and parties before sentencing. [Citations.] In anticipation of the hearing, the defense may file, among other things, a statement in mitigation, urging specific sentencing choices and challenging the information and recommendations contained in the probation report. [Citation.] Relevant argument and evidence also may be presented before sentencing. [Citation.] Under existing law, a defense attorney who fails to adequately understand the available sentencing alternatives, promote their proper application, or pursue the most advantageous disposition for his client may be found incompetent. [Citations.]” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 350-351.)
Scott acknowledges that requiring the trial court to state its reasoning at sentencing has value, as it “encourages the careful exercise of discretion and decreases the risk of error,” allows the parties to immediately seek clarification or change in ambiguous or erroneous rulings, and facilitates judicial review; nevertheless, the court added, the right to challenge a criminal sentence for the first time on appeal is not unrestricted. “In order to encourage prompt detection and correction of error, and to reduce the number of unnecessary appellate claims, appellate courts have required parties to raise certain issues at the time of sentencing. In such cases, lack of a timely and meaningful objection forfeits or waives the claim.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 351.) “Thus, under our cases, a criminal defendant cannot argue for the first time on appeal that the court ordered probation under unreasonable conditions [citation], imposed a restitution fine following a guilty plea without proper advisements [citation], or aggravated a sentence based on items contained in a probation report that were erroneous or otherwise flawed. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 351-352.)
Noting that the Courts of Appeal have applied the waiver doctrine to a variety of issues relating to the manner in which sentence is imposed, the Scott court endorsed the minority view holding that a defendant cannot complain for the first time on appeal about the court’s failure to state reasons for a sentencing choice. The high court concluded “that the waiver doctrine should apply to claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices. Included in this category are cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353, italics added.) The court justified this conclusion on the ground that “counsel is charged with understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the hearing. Routine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention. As in other waiver cases, we hope to reduce the number of errors committed in the first instance and preserve the judicial resources otherwise used to correct them.” (Ibid.)
Despite the Attorney General’s reliance on Scott, appellant never mentions the case. Instead, appellant relies almost entirely on cases involving the failure of a trial court to state reasons for dismissing an action, or dismissing or striking an enhancement, “in furtherance of justice” pursuant to section 1385. (People v. Bonnetta (2009) 46 Cal.4th 143, 152-153 (Bonnetta); People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 532; People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 943-944; People v. Bradley (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 386, 391.)
Similar to section 290.006, section 1385 requires that “[t]he reasons for the dismissal shall be stated orally on the record” and that “[t]he court shall also set forth the reasons in an order entered upon the minutes if requested by either party or in any case in which the proceedings are not being recorded electronically or reported by a court reporter.” However, as Bonnetta, supra, 46 Cal.4th 143, explains, the judicial dismissal of an action “in furtherance of justice” is functionally different from a discretionary sentencing choice, such as that authorized by section 290.006, and the requirement that the reasons for dismissal be stated orally and placed in the minutes is calculated to protect the public, not the defendant.
The two defendants in Bonnetta entered guilty pleas to drug charges and admitted all of the enhancements alleged against them. The trial court then entered orders striking additional terms of imprisonment required or authorized by the alleged enhancements, but without stating its reasons for striking the enhancement terms in an order entered upon the minutes, as required by subdivision (a) of section 1385, even though the trial court’s reasons appeared in the transcript of oral proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal reversing the orders of dismissal and remanding the matter to the trial court to correct the defect by setting forth its reasons in a written order entered upon the minutes.
The court explained that “sections 1385 and 1386,[ ] enacted in 1872, codify California’s rejection of the English rule of nolle prosequi, under which the prosecutor alone had authority to discontinue prosecution, in favor of granting sole authority to the courts to dismiss actions in furtherance of justice. [Citation.] ‘The court, for the purposes of the order of dismissal, takes charge of the prosecution, and acts for the people. It holds the power to dismiss, as the attorney-general in England holds the power to enter a nolle prosequi, by virtue of the office and the law; and it is exercised upon official responsibility.’ [Citation.] But in granting authority to a court to dismiss ‘in furtherance of justice,’ the Legislature ‘required the court to spread upon the minutes for public reference the reason for its action in dismissing a felony prosecution.’ [Citation.] ‘From the standpoint of the public welfare, potent arguments suggest themselves as to the wisdom of such a requirement. Indeed, the legislature has gone so far as to guard against the likelihood of the court doing violence to the interest of justice by providing that such order can be made only “in furtherance of justice.” The obvious function of section 1385 of the Penal Code is to impose a duty on the court, but with certain limitations and conditions: the “limitation” that such dismissal must be in furtherance of justice, and the “condition” that the reasons for the dismissal must be entered upon the minutes.’ [Citation.]” (Bonnetta, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 148-149, fn. omitted.) Bonnetta cites numerous cases “emphasizing that the public declaration inherent in a written order is a purposeful restraint, that Penal Code section 1385’s requirements are not directory and may not be disregarded, and that a reporter’s transcript showing the trial court’s motivation is not enough; the minutes must reflect the reason. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 149-150; accord, Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 531; People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 159.)
Relying upon Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331, the defendants-respondents in Bonnetta argued that the district attorney waived the error by failing to remind the court of the necessity of a written order and later failing to take corrective action. The Bonnetta majority rejected this argument, noting that “because a minute order is entered by the court only after the hearing, the district attorney cannot easily ensure that it is entered or detect its absence.” (Bonnetta, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 152.) The court also pointed out that “the failure to set forth the reasons for a dismissal in an order entered upon the minutes is not a routine defect in sentencing. It is a violation of a mandatory requirement put in place to benefit the public by assuring that a court through neglect of abuse of discretion has not misused the ‘great power’ of dismissal. (See [Romero], supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 531. ‘A person may waive the advantage of a law intended for his or her benefit [citation], but “a law established for a public reason cannot be waived or circumvented by a private act or agreement” [citations].’ (Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, 1048 . . . .) Even less should a party’s inaction waive a statutory requirement established for the public benefit.” (Bonnetta, at pp. 152-153, fn. omitted.)
Section 290.006’s requirement that the court state on the record the reasons for requiring registration, which is for the benefit of the defendant, is not comparable to the requirement of section 1385 to state the reasons for dismissal orally upon the record and in an order entered upon the minutes, because that requirement is for the benefit of the public.
Nor is the section 290.006 requirement comparable to the requirement that a defendant who desires to enter a plea of guilty or no contest, or his or her counsel, stipulate to a factual basis for the plea, which in People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110 was also held exempt from the waiver rule announced in Scott. As Palmer points out, “[w]aiver and forfeiture principles are appropriately applied to most kinds of trial error” but their application to the factual basis requirement “would be inappropriate, given the prophylactic purpose behind the factual basis requirement, a purpose analogous to that behind the prophylactic advisements of applicable federal constitutional rights given a defendant before his or her guilty plea is taken, which ‘helps ensure that the “constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met.” ’ [Citations.]” (Palmer, at p. 116.)
The requirement that the trial court state reasons for exercising its discretion to impose a section 290 registration requirement does not enforce or relate to the constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence; nor does the failure to state reasons for such a discretionary sentence choice present pure questions of law correctible on appeal without reference to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings. (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849. 852.) It is therefore not the sort of trial error that should be exempt from the waiver rule announced in Scott.
The sentencing requirement imposed by section 290.006 is comparable to the sentencing provisions of the Determinate Sentencing Act discussed in Scott as justifying the waiver rule announced by the court in that case. The parties in this case were well aware that the plea bargain left the issue of registration to the court, and that the dispositive factors were whether appellant committed the offense to which he pled no contest “as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification” (§ 290.006), and if so whether he is likely to reoffend. (People v. Thompson, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431.)
As in the conventional situation in which the trial court is called upon to exercise its discretion to decide whether to impose a registration requirement, defense counsel in this case was familiar with the evidence the court would consider in deciding whether to impose a registration requirement—i.e., the psychological report of Dr. Ramirez, the reports submitted to the Del Norte County Sheriff, and the report and recommendations of the probation department—and was allowed to file a sentencing memorandum urging a specific sentencing choice and challenging information and recommendations contained in the reports submitted to the court. The record provides no reason to think appellant’s trial counsel did not adequately understand the available sentencing alternatives, failed to promote their proper application, or declined to assiduously pursue the most advantageous disposition for appellant, factors the Scott court also considered justification for the waiver rule it announced. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 351.)
Finally, the trial court’s failure to provide the statement of reasons required by section 290.006 is not readily susceptible of correction on appeal, which was also a reason for the waiver rule adopted in Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at page 355.
Appellant presents no reason why the general rule that a defendant cannot complain for the first time on appeal about the court’s failure to state reasons for a discretionary sentencing choice should not apply where a defendant fails to object to a court’s failure to state reasons for exercising its discretion to impose a section 290 registration requirement. Requiring a defendant to raise this issue in the trial court would “reduce the number of errors committed in the first instance and preserve the judicial resources otherwise used to correct them” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353), advance other policies that induced the Scott court to adopt the rule, and present none of the problems that justified the exceptions to that rule allowed in Bonnetta and Palmer.
DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment, including the order imposing a section 290 registration requirement, is affirmed.
 

_________________________
Kline, P.J.


We concur:


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Stewart, J.


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Miller, J.

























People v. Poole (A146865)