P. v. Reyes
Filed 6/26/08 P. v. Reyes CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTOINETTE MARIE REYES, Defendant and Appellant. | C055610 (Super. Ct. No. 06F09334) |
Codefendants Antoinette Marie Reyes (Reyes) and Dorian McCants (McCants) were convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)). Reyes was also convicted of possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11359). Reyes appeals, claiming there was insufficient evidence at trial to sustain the conviction for possession of methamphetamine. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2006, Reyes, her mother, her daughter, and her niece, were sharing a two-bedroom apartment. Reyes, her daughter Doriana, and her niece Elena, shared the larger of the two bedrooms and Reyess mother Leticia slept on a daybed in the living room. The second, smaller bedroom was used as a storage room with a lock on the outside. Nancy Reyes, who previously lived in the apartment and still visited, had a key to the storage room but sometimes left the room unlocked.
On October 25, 2006, McCants, Dorianas father, spent the morning driving around town with a friend, Rebekah Smith, buying, selling, and using methamphetamine. Eventually, Smith and McCants ended up at Reyess apartment. Shortly after arriving, Smith left the apartment with Doriana to buy cigarettes. When they returned, Smith found McCants and Reyes sitting together on the floor in the storage room. McCants was putting together a bag of methamphetamine for Smith as a thank you for driving him around all day.
As Smith stood in the doorway to the storage room, she heard a knock at the front door and turned to see Doriana open the door to the police. Smith immediately closed the door to the storage room and walked toward the front door. The police entered the apartment, walked down the hall, and opened the door to the storage room.
In the storage room, the police found McCants and Reyes standing in the room empty-handed. The officers removed McCants and Reyes from the storage room and searched the room. On top of a dresser, tucked in between clothes, the officers found a large plastic container, within which were eight clear plastic bags of marijuana. In the same general area, they found a smaller jar containing marijuana, also tucked between clothes. They also found a glass pipe commonly used for smoking methamphetamine lying on the floor amongst some clothes in plain view.
On top of a dresser inside the storage room, the officers also found a digital scale, a box of large freezer bags, a box of smaller baggies, a womans cosmetic pouch full of clear plastic baggies, more marijuana in a plastic baggie, and a hide-a-can. A second digital scale was found inside one of the dresser drawers, and an eyeglass case that contained methamphetamine and a glass pipe was found on the floor near the center of the room.
One of the officers then took Reyes into the bedroom she shared with Doriana and Elena, where Reyes told the officer she lived in the apartment with her two children. A small package of marijuana was also found on the nightstand by the bed in that room as well. When confronted with the marijuana from the nightstand, Reyes did not deny the marijuana was hers, saying only, Oh, what did you find? All told, the officers found roughly a half pound of marijuana and .24 grams of methamphetamine in the apartment.
DISCUSSION
Reyes argues the evidence is insufficient to support the jurys finding that she exercised dominion and control over the methamphetamine found in her apartment. We disagree and for the reasons stated below, affirm the trial courts decision.
In considering this claim of error, we must view the whole record in a light most favorable to the conviction, resolving all conflicts in the evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the judgment. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577.) We must affirm the conviction unless it appears there is insufficient evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find Reyes guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)
The essential elements of unlawful possession of a controlled substance are dominion and control of the substance in a quantity usable for consumption or sale, with knowledge of its presence and of its restricted dangerous drug character. Each of these elements may be established circumstantially. [Citations.] (People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1184.)
The inference of dominion and control is easily made when the contraband is discovered in a place over which the defendant has general dominion and control: her residence (see, e.g., People v. Bagley (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 481, 484-485), her automobile (see, e.g., People v. Newman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 48, 53), or her personal effects (see, e.g., People v. Bass (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 281, 284). [P]ossession may be imputed when the contraband is found in a place which is immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the accused and another. [Citations.] (People v. Jenkins (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 583.)
Here, the methamphetamine was found in Reyess residence. Indeed, in the same room where only moments before the police opened the door, Reyes was seen sitting on the floor with McCants while he put together a bag of methamphetamine for Smith. Reyes does not deny that she knew the methamphetamine was in her home; she does not deny that she knew of its narcotic nature. Based on this evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that, at a minimum, Reyes shared joint possession of the methamphetamine.
Reyes, however, argues that based on the evidence, the only reasonable conclusion for the jury to draw was that the methamphetamine belonged to McCants. In support of her argument, she points to the fact that on the day of the arrest McCants had both methamphetamine and a pipe in his possession, but there was no methamphetamine or pipe found on his person. Thus, she concludes, the methamphetamine and pipe found in the eyeglass case must be his. We disagree that this was the only reasonable conclusion for the jury to reach.
Moreover, [a]lthough it is the duty of the [trier of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the [trier of fact], not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of facts findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124, quoting People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933; see People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139.)
There was no direct evidence that the methamphetamine found in Reyess apartment was left over from that which McCants had been smoking earlier in the day. There was no evidence identifying to whom the eyeglass case containing the narcotics and the pipe belonged. And there was a second pipe found in the storage room, not just the one in the eyeglass case. Thus, even if we agreed it would have been reasonable for the jurors to conclude based on the evidence that the methamphetamine was solely under McCantss dominion and control, their decision that Reyes at least shared the right to control the narcotics is supported by substantial evidence and we will not reverse the jurys decision on appeal.
Defendant also argues in her reply brief that because others had access to the storage room, possession of the narcotics cannot be imputed to her. Defendant is mistaken. Although she lived with several family members, many of whom had access to the storage room, exclusive access to the room where the narcotics were found is not required to sustain her conviction. (See People v. Jenkins, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 583.)
Defendants reliance on People v. Hancock (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 305 (Hancock), is similarly misplaced as the facts are distinguishable. Summarizing the evidence against Crayton, the codefendant in the Hancock case, the Court of Appeal said: Boiled down, the only evidence purporting to show joint control and dominion over the heroin is the fact that [Crayton], an addict, was in the room from which the heroin was thrown and that he changed his story as to seeing something thrown out the window. The mere fact that an addict is in a room from which a narcotic is thrown is not sufficient to prove that he had any dominion or control over it. Mere presence at the scene of the crime standing alone is not sufficient to justify a finding of guilt. [Citations.] (Id. at pp. 309-310.)
Unlike Crayton, Reyes was not simply at the scene of the crime. The narcotics here were found in her home. The evidence established Reyes knew the narcotics were in her home and knew of their narcotic nature. Accordingly, we find no error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NICHOLSON , Acting P.J.
We concur:
ROBIE , J.
BUTZ , J.
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