Filed 1/5/18 P. v. Robinson CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JAINICE ROBINSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

A148230

(Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FCR312345)


Jainice Robinson was convicted by a jury of assault and vandalism, both as felonies. She contends a probation condition that bars her use of social media is not reasonably related to her crimes or possible future criminality and is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The episode that led to the charges against Robinson started with a confrontation between two groups of young women on the Solano Community College campus that ended when one of the women, K.S., struck Robinson and possibly one or two of her companions. After the altercation K.S. and her friends drove off, met up with D.B. at a nail salon and told her what had happened. While they were talking, Robinson’s mother called D.B. and spoke with D.B.’s cousin. Robinson’s mother said “whoever hit her daughter is going to [fight fair].”
The women drove to a mall and parked. While they were sitting in the car D.B. received a text that said “ ‘where you at? We’re trying to meet up.’ ” She did not know who the text was from and did not reply. There followed a flurry of phone calls between the two groups, and D.B.’s cousin “was [DAM]ing Ajanee on Twitter, talking about where to meet up and stuff, and then K.S. was on the phone with Ajanee.” The outcome of the calls was a plan for the two factions to meet at Allan Witt Park to fight.
When D.B. and her friends arrived at the park, Robinson and six other women were already there. Some of them were holding baseball bats. D.B. was dragged out of the car, beaten and kicked and her car was damaged in the melee.
Kellie W. was one of Robinson’s friends and teammates. She was not with Robinson and the other women during the altercation on campus, but joined up with them afterward and was involved in the fight at the park. She eventually told her coach and police what happened that night after reading what she thought were exaggerated accounts of the fight that D.B. had posted on social media.
Robinson, her sister Justice, and their mother were charged with assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. Robinson was also charged with vandalism resulting in more than $400 in damage. Justice was charged with battery. Robinson was convicted of both charges and sentenced to 120 days in county jail with two years on formal probation.
As a condition of probation, Robinson was ordered “not to engage in social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snap Chat or any other of the 3,000 mediums of social media that exist out there.” The court explained, “[t]his does not mean that you do not have the ability to have a cell phone. You still have a right to have a cell phone, and you . . . still have the right to text people. Use that wisely. [¶] Also, and this will be true for Justice Robinson, too, she will authorize, because this case did involve, and I think was through the use of social media and the use of texts which there was . . . credible testimony regarding the use of texts to communicate and organize this fight at Allan Witt Park.” Robinson’s attorney objected to the probation condition and filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Robinson asserts the probation condition prohibiting her from using social media must be stricken because it is not reasonably related to her crime or preventing future criminality. We disagree. “In granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) “We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] Generally, ‘[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. [Citations.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379–380.)
The social media prohibition at issue here is reasonably related to the circumstances of the assault and to preventing Robinson’s future criminality. The events culminating in the assault on D.B. started with an angry confrontation between two groups of women and escalated to a planned, violent altercation between the two factions later the same evening. There was evidence that at least one member of each group used Twitter, as well as texts and phone calls, to plan and coordinate the second encounter. There was also evidence that after the fight one of Robinson’s faction reviewed inflammatory descriptions of the events the victim posted on social media. The trial court made plain its concern about the potential effects of the use of social media in this context: “I’m very, very concerned about everyone’s use of social media. I just thought this morning as I was coming to work, I’m so grateful I grew up when I was a kid and there was not social media. I’m so glad I didn’t have to go through that crazy phrase where girls are so mean to each other. It was social media. Girls could be mean. Girls could be really mean.” At the same time, the court ordered both Robinson and Justice to stay away from the victim. On this record and in this social context, the proscription against using social media was reasonably related to preventing future escalations of the tensions between the two factions and, thus, to minimize the chance that their animosities would again erupt in violence. There was also evidence that Twitter posts were involved in escalating the initial altercation to the fight at the park, so the condition is reasonably related to the crime itself.
We also reject Robinson’s claim that the social media prohibition is unconstitutionally vague because “ ‘social media’ is a popular term with no set definition or application.” “A restriction is unconstitutionally vague if it is not “ ‘sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.” ’ [Citation.] A restriction failing this test does not give adequate notice—‘fair warning’—of the conduct proscribed. [Citations.]” ( In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.) “ ‘In deciding the adequacy of any notice afforded those bound by a legal restriction, we are guided by the principles that “abstract legal commands must be applied in a specific context,” and that, although not admitting of “mathematical certainty,” the language used must have “ ‘reasonable specificity.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1144, italics omitted.) Here, the court apparently prohibited Robinson from using social media in response to concerns that she might do so in such a way as to reignite the animosity between the two groups of women. The court listed Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Snap Chat as examples of the prohibited media. It is reasonably clear that the condition applies to similar social networking platforms, and is sufficiently specific to pass constitutional muster.
Robinson argues the probation condition is overbroad because it does not closely tailor the limitations imposed on her constitutional free speech rights. Here, too, we disagree. “A restriction is unconstitutionally overbroad . . . if it (1) ‘impinge[s] on constitutional rights,’ and (2) is not ‘tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation.’ [Citations.] The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1153; In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 902.) The court prohibited Robinson from using social media during her two-year probation period, but specified that she “still [had] the right to have a cell phone, and [she had] the right to text people.” The court’s prohibition was a reasonably tailored compromise between its interests in preventing hostilities between the two factions and allowing Robinson a reasonable means to communicate with others via phone calls and texts. Accordingly, the condition is not overbroad.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.






_________________________
Siggins, J.


We concur:


_________________________
McGuiness, P.J.


_________________________
Pollak, J.