Filed 1/23/18 P. v. Robinson CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Defendant Justice Robinson appeals from the trial court’s post-judgment restitution order. Defendant maintains that the restitution order was improper because there is no factual nexus between the conduct underlying her conviction and the damage to the victim’s vehicle. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assaulting the victim D.B. Defendant’s sister was convicted of vandalism to the same victim’s vehicle during the encounter. The trial court placed defendant on two years’ probation, reserving the right to order restitution as a condition of probation, as recommended by the probation department.

The prosecution proceeded to file a post-judgment motion to modify the conditions of defendant’s probation to include an order of restitution. Defendant opposed the motion on the ground she did not personally cause the damage to the victim’s vehicle. After hearing oral argument, the trial court granted the motion and ordered restitution in the amount of $3,061.70, concluding defendant was “jointly and severally responsible” for the damage because “[t]he evidence in the jury trial [was that] this was a group of girls working in concert.” Defendant timely appeals from this post-judgment restitution order.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues here, as she did in the trial court, that the trial court erred in ordering restitution as a condition of probation because she was not convicted of any crime involving damage to the victim’s vehicle. Based on the record before us, we cannot agree.

“In granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) “We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] Generally, ‘[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.)

Significantly, only a limited record was prepared for this post-judgment appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.320(d).) Defendant did not seek to augment the limited record with the reporter’s transcript of the trial proceedings, which were expressly referenced in the challenged ruling. Nor does defendant’s opening brief contain the requisite citations—or indeed any citations at all—to the appellate record. (Id., rules 8.204(a)(1)(C), 8.360(a).) Given defendant’s failure to perfect the appellate record for our review, we are unable to evaluate the trial court’s order in light of the three factors set forth above, much less conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering restitution as a condition of probation.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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McGuiness, Acting P.J.*

We concur:

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Siggins, J.

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Jenkins, J.