Filed 4/11/17 P. v. Robles CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VICTOR CHRISTIAN ROBLES,

Defendant and Appellant.


E064850

(Super.Ct.No. FWV1303932)

O P I N I O N


APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Colin J. Bilash, Judge. Affirmed.
Gravitas Law Group APC and David Joseph Scharf for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra and Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles C. Ragland, Kathryn Kirschbaum, and Teresa Torreblanca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, Victor Christian Robles, pled no contest to five firearm-related felonies after the superior court denied his renewed motion to suppress evidence that numerous firearms were seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd (i).) The search warrant authorized the seizure of both legal and illegal firearms, namely, “all dangerous weapons and firearms possessed/maintained by [defendant]. Ammunition, firearm magazines, receipts for firearms, dealer record of sale (DROS) documents or other documents relating to firearm ownership or prohibitions” located at defendant’s residence, on his person, and on his mobile phone.
In this appeal from the judgment of conviction following his no contest plea, defendant challenges the denial of his renewed suppression motion based solely on the contents of the warrant and supporting affidavit. (§ 1538.5, subd. (m).) He claims: (1) the warrant was unsupported by a sufficient showing in the affidavit of probable cause to seize legal, as opposed to illegal, firearms; (2) the affidavit did not show that any illegal firearms were likely to be found at his residence; and (3) the good faith exception to the warrant requirement, articulated in United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 (Leon), does not apply, because a well-trained officer would have known the warrant was overbroad to the extent it called for the seizure of legal firearms. As indicated, the warrant called for the seizure of all firearms, and did not distinguish between legal and illegal firearms or firearms lawfully or unlawfully possessed by defendant.
On February 24, 2015, we issued an order denying defendant’s writ petition in case No. E062584 for an order directing the trial court to grant his renewed suppression motion. In that order, we explained: “Although arguably the affidavit in support of the search warrant states no probable cause for the seizure of any but visibly illegal assault weapons—that is, no probable cause to believe that [defendant] possessed legal weapons without proper documentation—the rule of [Leon, supra,] 468 U.S. 897 [the good faith exception to the warrant requirement] applies here.”
For the reasons we explain, we reaffirm our conclusion that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement applies. It is therefore unnecessary to determine whether, as defendant also claims, the warrant was in fact unsupported by a sufficient showing of probable cause to seize legal firearms, as opposed to illegal firearms, or that the affidavit failed to show that any illegal firearms were likely to be found at defendant’s residence.
II
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Search Warrant and Supporting Affidavit
On November 7, 2013, Special Agent Michael Burke of the California Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Firearms (BOF), signed and filed an affidavit of probable cause in support of a search warrant on defendant’s person, home, and vehicle. Both the affidavit and search warrant—which were issued and served on defendant on November 7—described the “[p]roperty to be seized” as: “Any and all dangerous weapons and firearms possessed/maintained by [defendant]. Ammunition, firearm magazines, receipts for firearms, dealer record of sale (DROS) documents or other documents relating to firearm ownership or prohibitions.” On November 14, a return was filed listing the items seized pursuant to the search warrant.
In his affidavit, Agent Burke explained that Special Agent Scot Hunter of the BOF was working undercover in October 2013 when he was introduced to defendant in Ontario. During their initial meeting in October 2013, defendant sold two assault rifles to Agent Hunter for $1,800, and Agent Hunter obtained defendant’s mobile telephone number. In subsequent phone conversations and texts, defendant offered to sell Agent Hunter a “Galil assault rifle,” an “illegal firearm” under section 30510. Defendant told Agent Hunter that the Galil belonged to “an unidentified third party.” Defendant and Agent Hunter agreed to meet in Ontario during the afternoon of November 7 to complete the sale of the Galil. Earlier, Agent Hunter ran defendant’s name through the DOJ’s automated firearms system and discovered that defendant had purchased more than 50 handguns over the previous 10 years. Defendant had sold several of those handguns, but at least nine handguns were still registered to defendant.
Based on his training and experience, which included conducting “more than 200 investigations into individuals who were prohibited from possessing firearms,” Agent


Burke stated in his affidavit that, “subjects who traffic in firearms will also keep additional firearms” in or near their homes, in their vehicles, and on their persons. Agent Burke thus requested that the places to be searched include defendant’s person, home, vehicle, and “all such areas in which firearms can be stored and/or maintained.” The items to be searched were requested to include “transfer receipts, storage receipts and keys for storage lockers/facilities that could be used to store firearms” along with “documents/indicia of past transactions, such as . . . invoices, bill of sales, receipts of purchases of firearms and ownership documents,” because such records would “often show ownership and control” of such firearms. Agent Burke stated that, based on the foregoing, he believed defendant was in possession of “illegal firearms,” and there was sufficient probable cause for a search warrant “in order to collect the listed firearm(s) and any additional unlisted firearms unknown to [Agent Burke] that may be in [defendant’s] dominion and control.”
B. Initial Proceedings, and Defendant’s Initial Suppression Motion (§ 1538.5, subd. (f))
On November 27, 2013, a felony complaint was filed charging defendant in five counts with firearm-related offenses. On June 17, 2014, the second day of the preliminary hearing, a first amended felony complaint was filed charging defendant in 42 counts with firearm-related offenses.
On June 9, 2014, before the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to quash the search warrant, traverse the affidavit, and suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the


search warrant. (§ 1538.5, subd. (f).) On June 16, 2014, before proceeding to take evidence at the preliminary hearing, the magistrate (Judge Ferguson) denied the motion to traverse on the ground defendant made an insufficient offer of proof that there were any misrepresentations in the affidavit.
Regarding the motion to quash, defendant argued, as he does on this appeal, that (1) the warrant was “entirely overbroad” in that it called for the seizure of “all dangerous weapons and firearms” possessed by defendant, including firearms lawfully possessed by defendant, (2) the warrant was not supported by a sufficient showing of probable cause to seize firearms lawfully possessed by defendant, (3) there was no nexus between defendant’s “alleged sale or offer to sell an assault rifle” and whether any unlawfully possessed firearms or other evidence of a crime would be found at defendant’s residence, and (4) the good faith exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.
Following argument, the court denied the motion to quash the search warrant based solely on the “four corners” or contents of the affidavit and search warrant. In denying the motion to quash, the court explained, in part, that: “The reference to the number of guns that [defendant] had legally purchased in the last ten years and the fact that they were registered to him [at] . . . his address . . . goes more to the likelihood that illegal weapons could be obtained at the location of the search, which is the residence. [¶] I guess the concern I have is whether the overbreadth, if no particular criminal charges arise from legally own[ed] and possess[ed] guns if the warrant included that. I’m not sure that affects the entire [warrant]. And in the Court’s view, there is certainly probable cause based on the . . . buys of two guns [in October 2013]. And then the third party, I believe, . . . certainly would suggest [defendant] has other registered guns, and . . . there may be other guns at that house . . . [that] may be illegal.”
The court noted that even if the warrant was overbroad, in that it called for the seizure of lawful as well as unlawful firearms, the good faith exception to the warrant requirement applied. The court explained: “[W]e expect officers to go to the magistrate, lay out the facts, seek a warrant. That’s what was done. And I’m sure they reviewed the warrant, authored it, and certainly it’s objectively reasonable to rely on that warrant as well. I don’t think it’s so obviously defective that it would be objectively unreasonable to rely on it. So for all those [reasons], I will deny the motion to quash.”
C. Evidence Taken at the Preliminary Hearing
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing on July 1, 2014, defendant was held to answer on all 42 firearm-related counts alleged in the amended felony complaint. A 42-count information was filed on July 14, 2014. The evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing showed that approximately 235 firearms were seized from defendant’s home pursuant to the search warrant, including a machine gun, three short-barreled rifles or shotguns, 35 illegal assault rifles, a rocket launcher, and 36 grams of “C-4” explosive material, “more powerful than a hand grenade.” Special Agent Blake Graham of the BOF testified as an expert on firearms, including assault weapons and their defining features. Agent Graham met with Agent Burke “to evaluate the weapons that were seized” from defendant’s home, and determined that some of the weapons which were initially thought to be assault weapons were not assault weapons.
Regarding Agent Burke’s affidavit and the search warrant, Agent Hunter testified that around 1:30 p.m. on November 7, 2013, he met defendant in a parking lot in San Bernardino County to complete the purchase and sale of the Galil assault rifle, which Agent Hunter and defendant had discussed in phone calls and in text messages. Before the meeting, defendant told Agent Hunter the Galil belonged to a third party, namely, a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputy who lived in West Covina, and that defendant had to get the Galil from the sheriff’s deputy. At the meeting, defendant showed Agent Hunter the Galil and described its features, including that it had a detachable magazine, a pistol grip, and a folding stock. Defendant then placed the Galil in Agent Hunter’s car and Agent Hunter paid defendant $3,500. Using his phone, defendant showed Agent Hunter pictures of two other guns defendant indicated were for sale: a shotgun and a Thompson submachine gun. Agent Hunter then signaled to other agents that the sale of the Galil was complete and defendant could be arrested.
Agents served the search warrant on defendant, searched defendant’s vehicle, and found five additional magazines for the Galil, along with DOJ paperwork detailing the weapons. On defendant’s person, agents found a loaded Glock handgun holstered on his hip and a loaded revolver in his pants pocket.
Defendant waived his Miranda rights and told the agents he had four safes at his home which contained approximately 200 firearms. Defendant also admitted he made up the story about the sheriff’s deputy owning the Galil so that he would have an excuse not to sell the Galil to Agent Hunter in the event he decided not to proceed with the sale. Defendant then accompanied the agents to his home and opened his safes, showing the agents all of the firearms in defendant’s possession which were seized pursuant to the search warrant.
D. The Renewed Suppression Motion (§ 1538.5, subd. (i))
In October 2014, defendant renewed his motion to quash the warrant, traverse the affidavit, and suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warrant. (§ 1538.5, subd. (i).) The People filed opposition. At the “special hearing” on the renewed suppression motion, held on November 26, 2014, defense counsel pointed out that the renewed motion was based solely on the affidavit and the search warrant and did not “depend in any way” on the preliminary hearing transcript.
The court noted that its task was not to review the magistrate’s (Judge Ferguson’s) ruling on the initial suppression motion. Rather, the court’s inquiry was limited to reviewing the preliminary hearing transcript in order to determine whether the evidence at the preliminary hearing called for a different ruling on the motion than the one made at the preliminary hearing. (§ 1538.5, subd. (i).) Following argument, the court denied the motion.
E. Proceedings Following the Denial of the Renewed Suppression Motion
In December 2014, defendant petitioned this court for a writ of mandate in case No. E062584, directing the trial court to grant his renewed suppression motion. On February 24, 2015, this court issued an order denying the writ petition and stating the following: “Although arguably the affidavit in support of the search warrant states no probable cause for the seizure of any but visibly illegal assault weapons—that is, no probable cause to believe that petitioner possessed legal weapons without proper documentation—the rule of [Leon, supra,] 468 U.S. 897 applies here.”
In June 2014, defendant pled no contest to five felony offenses: offering an assault weapon for sale (§ 30600, subd. (a); count 1); possession of an automatic rifle, a machine gun (§ 32625, subd. (a); count 2); possession of a destructive device at a private habitation (§ 18715, subd. (a)(3); count 3); and two counts of possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a); counts 4-5). Pursuant to defendant’s plea agreement, the court dismissed the other 35 counts alleged in the information: two counts of possessing a short-barreled rifle or shotgun (counts 11 & 13), and 33 counts of possession of an assault weapon (counts 6-10, 12, & 14-41). On September 11, 2015, defendant received a “split sentence” of eight years, with 180 days to be served in local custody and the balance of the eight-year term under mandatory supervised release. This appeal followed. (§ 1538.5, subd. (m).)
III
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1538.5 Procedures and Standards of Review
Section 1538.5 affords criminal defendants “‘a comprehensive and exclusive procedure’” for seeking to suppress illegally seized evidence prior to trial. (People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 940.) A suppression motion may be made, as it was here, at the time of the preliminary hearing before the magistrate. (People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471, 476; § 1538.5, subd. (f).) If the defendant is held to answer at the preliminary hearing, he or she may renew the suppression motion in the superior court at a special de novo hearing. (People v. Brooks, supra, at p. 476; § 1538.5, subd. (i).)
“When a suppression motion is made before a magistrate in conjunction with a preliminary hearing, as in this case, the magistrate tries the facts, resolving credibility issues and conflicts in the evidence, weighing the evidence, and drawing appropriate inferences. (People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1244 . . . ; see § 1538.5, subd. (f)(1).) If the magistrate denies the motion and holds the defendant to answer, the defendant must, as a prerequisite to appellate review, renew his challenge before the trial court by motion to dismiss under section 995 or in a special hearing. (People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 896 . . . ; § 1538.5, subds. (i), (m).) At that stage, the evidence is generally limited to the transcript of the preliminary hearing, testimony by witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing (who may be recalled by the prosecution), and evidence that could not reasonably have been presented at the preliminary hearing. (§ 1538.5, subd. (i).) The factual findings of the magistrate are binding on the [superior] court, except as affected by any additional evidence presented at the special hearing. (Ibid.)” (People v. Romeo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.)
When a motion to suppress is denied by the magistrate and renewed in the superior court upon the preliminary hearing transcript alone, as it was in this case, “we are concerned solely with the findings of the [magistrate].” (People v. Gentry (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1262; People v. Romeo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.) “On review of the superior court ruling by appeal or writ, we in effect disregard the ruling of the superior court and directly review the determination of the magistrate.” (People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1244.) We are bound by the magistrate’s factual findings, whether express or implied, so long as such factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, but we independently determine whether, on such facts, the challenged search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Shafrir, supra, at pp. 1244-1245.)
“‘[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness.”’” (Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. ___, ___ [189 L.Ed.2d 430, 439, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482].) And, “‘[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.’” (Ibid.) “Such a warrant ensures that the inferences to support a search are ‘drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” (Ibid., quoting Johnson v. United States (1948) 333 U.S. 10, 14.)
B. The Good Faith Exception to the Warrant Requirement Applies
1. The Good Faith Exception, Overview
In People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1219-1222, our state Supreme Court recently explained the good faith exception to the warrant requirement, articulated in Leon and its progeny, in considerable detail. As much of the court’s discussion of the good faith exception is pertinent here, we quote Macabeo at some length:
“Exclusion of evidence due to a Fourth Amendment violation is not automatic. . . . ‘The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” but it is silent about how this right is to be enforced. To supplement the bare text, [the United States Supreme Court] created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.’ [Citation.] ‘The [exclusionary] rule . . . operates as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”’ ([Leon, supra,] 468 U.S. [at p.] 906 . . . .)
“The high court has recognized that the deterrent purpose of the rule is not served by excluding evidence when an officer reasonably acts in objective good faith. Leon involved an officer’s reliance on a signed search warrant later found deficient. The court held the exclusionary rule should not apply ‘when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope,’ even if the warrant was subsequently invalidated. (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 920.) . . . ‘“If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.”’ (Leon, at p. 919, quoting United States v. Peltier (1975) 422 U.S. 531, 542 . . . .) Leon reasoned that ‘[i]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. “[O]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.” [Citation.] Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.’ (Leon, at p. 921.) [¶] . . . [¶]
“Beginning with Leon, the court made clear that the good faith reliance doctrine was derived from the policies underlying the exclusionary rule itself. It also explained that the doctrine is objective, fact-based, and limited. ‘Accordingly, our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization. In making this determination, all of the circumstances—including whether the warrant application had previously been rejected by a different magistrate—may be considered.’ (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 922-923, fn. 23.) While concluding that the officers could reasonably rely on a facially valid warrant that was later overturned, Leon noted that will not always be the case: ‘the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable, [citation], and it is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.’ (Id. at pp. 922-923, fns. omitted.) Leon noted that an officer could not reasonably rely on a warrant based on an affidavit ‘“so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,”’ or if the warrant was ‘so facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.’ (Id. at p. 923.)” (People v. Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 1219-1222, italics added.)
2. Analysis
Echoing Leon, defendant asserts that a well-trained officer should have known that Agent Burke’s affidavit was “‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in [the] existence [of probable cause] entirely unreasonable.’” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 923.) Specifically, defendant claims, “no well trained officer would believe that intruding into [defendant’s] home in order to search for and seize all weapons and firearms was lawful since no law prohibited the possession of weapons and firearms by [defendant] in his home and the mere possession of legal weapons and firearms does not provide any cause to believe that [defendant] possessed and sold illegal firearms.” We disagree with these assertions.
In Leon, the high court explained that when a search warrant affidavit “provide[s] evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause . . . the officers’ reliance on the magistrate’s determination of probable cause” is objectively reasonable, and the exclusionary rule does not apply. (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 926.) Accordingly, “Leon established that for the good faith exception to apply, the officer’s affidavit must establish at least a colorable argument for probable cause.” (United States v. Luong (9th Cir. 2006) 470 F.3d 898, 903.)
Agent Burke’s affidavit made a colorable argument that there was probable cause to search defendant’s residence for all firearms and dangerous weapons, including legal firearms, because the affidavit indicated defendant was habitually and unlawfully selling both legal and illegal firearms. The affidavit explained that defendant sold two assault weapons to Agent Hunter in October 2013, a violation of section 30600, subdivision (a), and agreed to sell a third assault rifle to Agent Hunter on November 7, 2013, the day the search warrant application and affidavit were submitted to the court for approval. In 2013, it was a felony to sell an assault weapon except through a licensed gun dealer (§§ 30600, subd. (a), 31055) and no evidence was presented in the affidavit, or at the preliminary hearing, that defendant was a licensed gun dealer.
Defendant’s willingness to unlawfully sell three assault weapons to Agent Hunter on two occasions, within an approximate 30-day period, indicated that he was willing to


unlawfully possess and sell multiple firearms and dangerous weapons, whether those firearms or their possession was legal or illegal, and store them in his residence. The affidavit also stated that defendant had purchased more than 50 handguns in the previous 10 years, had sold several of them, and still had at least nine handguns registered to him. As the magistrate pointed out in denying defendant’s initial suppression motion, this “reference to the number of guns that [defendant] had legally purchased in the last ten years” was “significant,” because—coupled with fact defendant unlawfully sold three assault weapons to Agent Hunter, including one defendant claimed was registered to a third party—it indicated that defendant was likely to possess multiple firearms and dangerous weapons, both legal and illegal, for unlawful sale. Additionally, the officers who executed the warrant could have reasonably concluded that it would have been impractical for defendant to store multiple firearms and weapons only in his vehicle, a pickup truck, or on his person, and it was more likely that defendant was storing multiple firearms and weapons at his residence.
Messerschmidt v. Millender (2012) 565 U.S. 535 is instructive. After Jerry Ray Bowen, a known gang member with multiple violent and firearm-related felony convictions, shot at his former girlfriend with “a pistol-gripped sawed-off shotgun,” officers obtained and executed a warrant to search the Millender residence, where Bowen was living, for “[a]ll handguns, rifles, or shotguns of any caliber, or any firearms capable of firing ammunition . . . .” (Id. at pp. 539-541.) The Millenders filed suit against several defendants, including the two officers who obtained and executed the warrant, under title 42 United States Code section 1983, alleging the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights because the warrant and supporting affidavit made an insufficient showing of probable cause to search the Millender home for “all guns simply because [Bowen] owned and had used a sawed-off shotgun . . . .” (Messerschmidt v. Millender, supra, at pp. 539, 544, italics added.)
In an en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court’s denial of qualified immunity for the officers, concluding “the warrant’s authorization was unconstitutionally overbroad because the affidavit and the warrant failed to ‘establish[] probable cause that the broad categories of firearms, firearm-related material, [and other items] described in the warrant were contraband or evidence of a crime.’” (Messerschmidt v. Millender, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 545.) The high court reversed, noting that the validity of the warrant was not before it, and “[t]he question instead” was whether the officers were entitled to immunity from damages, “even assuming that the warrant should not have been issued.” (Id. at p. 546.) The high court concluded that the officers were entitled to immunity because the good faith exception to the warrant requirement applied: “Even if the warrant in this case were invalid, it was not so obviously lacking in probable cause that the officers can be considered ‘plainly incompetent’ for concluding otherwise.” (Id. at p. 556, citing Malley v. Briggs (1986) 475 U.S. 335, 341.)
In Messerschmidt, the Millenders advanced substantially the same argument defendant makes here: “‘[A] reasonably well-trained officer would have readily perceived that there was no probable cause to search the house for all firearms and firearm-related items,’” because “‘the affidavit indicated exactly what item was evidence of a crime—the “black sawed off shotgun with a pistol grip,”’” and “‘[n]o facts [in the affidavit] established that Bowen possessed any other firearms, let alone that such firearms (if they existed) were “contraband or evidence of a crime.”’” (Messerschmidt v. Millender, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 548.) In rejecting this claim, the high court explained that “[e]ven if the scope of the warrant were overbroad,” under the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including Bowen’s known gang membership and possession of one illegal sawed-off shotgun, “it would not have been unreasonable for an officer to conclude that there was a ‘fair probability’ that the sawed-off shotgun was not the only firearm Bowen owned,” and that there would be additional “illegal guns among others that Bowen owned.” (Id. at pp. 548-549, fn. omitted.)
Similarly here, the officers who searched defendant’s residence pursuant to the search warrant could have reasonably concluded, based on the warrant and affidavit, that defendant was habitually and unlawfully selling both legal and illegal firearms and dangerous weapons, and storing them at his residence. Under these circumstances, the warrant did not ostensibly violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights to the extent it called for the seizure of “legal” firearms and dangerous weapons.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON
J.


We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

McKINSTER
J.