P. v. Rojas

Filed 3/11/10 P. v. Rojas CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert J. Perry, Judge. Affirmed.

A. William Bartz, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Yun K. Lee and Laura J. Hartquist, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________

Appellant Michael Jairo Rojas appeals from his convictions of insurance fraud (Pen. Code, 550, subd. (a)(1)),[1]second degree commercial burglary ( 459), and filing a false report of a criminal offense ( 148.5, subd. (a)). Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.

We disagree, and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

The evidence at trial showed that in 2005, a Cadillac Escalade was stolen five days after it was purchased. The owner made a police report of the theft, and provided police with the Escalades vehicle identification number (VIN). The car was not returned.

In early 2007, Los Angeles Police Department Detective Andy Aguayo received information from another police agency about a 2005 Cadillac Escalade with a VIN that did not conform to manufacturer standards, indicating it had been changed. Detective Aguayo obtained that vehicles license plate number and determined that it was registered to a post office box under the name of Fabian Almendarez. On February 14, 2007, Detective Aguayo located the Escalade at an address associated with that name. He knocked on the front door of the residence, and asked the woman who answered for Fabian Almendarez. She responded that Almendarez did not live there, and said that she did not know anything about the vehicle. Appellant then came out of the house and said the car belonged to him. He told Detective Aguayo that he purchased the Escalade three or four months earlier for $12,500 from a client of the law firm where he worked as a paralegal. Appellant said Almendarez was his brother, and he registered the car in Almendarezs name. Detective Aguayo told appellant that he had purchased a stolen vehicle, and that the vehicle was going to be impounded. Detective Aguayo explained to appellant that appellants insurance company might assist him because he did not know the vehicle was stolen when he purchased it. Appellant removed his personal property from the Escalade before it was impounded. Detective Aguayo recovered no computers, other electronics, or personal items from the vehicle. At the tow yard, Detective Aguayo removed the false VIN and updated a police computer system regarding the Escalades recovery.

At approximately noon the same day, appellant filed a stolen vehicle report with the Los Angeles Police Department. He reported that the Escalade was stolen at 10:45 a.m., and gave the false VIN to the police. That afternoon, he called Progressive Insurance Company and spoke with claims adjustor Daniel Cochran. The conversation was recorded. Appellant told Cochran that he spent the night at his mothers house, giving the address where Detective Aguayo found the Escalade. Appellant said that when he left for work the following morning, the car was gone. Appellant said that a laptop computer was in the car. The next day appellant and his brother met with Cochran at the Progressive Insurance Company office. Appellant completed and signed an affidavit of theft form. He told Cochran he was unsure how much he paid for the Escalade. About a week after his meeting with Cochran, Progressive Insurance Company paid appellant approximately $46,000, the standard market value, for the loss of the car.

Some months later, Detective Aguayo learned that appellant had reported the Escalade stolen using the false VIN. Appellant was arrested. Appellant told detectives that he contacted his insurance company, as suggested by Detective Aguayo, and pretended to be someone else. The company told him they would not cover a loss based on the unknowing purchase of a stolen vehicle. Appellant then decided to report the vehicle stolen even though he knew it was the police who had taken it.

Appellant was charged by information with insurance fraud (count 1), second degree commercial burglary (count 2), and filing a false report of a criminal offense (count 3). As to all counts it was alleged that appellant had suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony. ( 667, subds. (b)-(i).) Appellant pled not guilty and denied the special allegations.

A jury found appellant guilty of all three counts. Appellant admitted the truth of his prior offense, and the trial court granted his motion to strike the prior offense enhancements. He was sentenced to the low term of two years as to count 1, and sentence as to counts 2 and 3 was stayed pursuant to section 654. Appellant timely appeals from the judgment.

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his convictions. It is the prosecutions burden in a criminal case to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] To determine whether the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence to meet this burden, courts apply the substantial evidence test. Under this standard, the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidencethat is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuesuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 260.)We resolve all conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility in favor of the verdict, and indulge every reasonable inference the jury could draw from the evidence. (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) Reversal for insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)

Appellant was convicted under section 550, subdivision (a)(1), which provides that it is a felony to [k]nowingly present or cause to be presented any false or fraudulent claim for the payment of a loss or injury, including payment of a loss or injury under a contract of insurance. He also was convicted under section 459, which provides that it is unlawful to enter a building with the intent to commit a felony, and section 148.5, which provides that it is unlawful to knowingly make a false report to a peace officer that a felony had been committed.

At trial, appellant offered an alternate version of the events, putting forward evidence that showed he was not present when the Escalade was impounded. Several witnesses testified that they saw him elsewhere that morning. He argues that this evidence establishes that he did not have the requisite knowledge to support his convictions. But the record contains ample evidence that appellant was present when the Escalade was impounded, and knew it was not stolen when he made the police report and made his insurance claim.

Three detectives and a police officer who were at the scene testified that appellant emerged from the house where the Escalade was located. Appellant handed Detective Aguayo the vehicles keys, and removed his personal items. Appellant admitted after he was arrested that he had called Progressive Insurance Company and pretended to be someone else to find out if it would cover his loss based on the purchase of a stolen vehicle. After he learned it would not, he decided to report the vehicle as stolen even though he knew it had been impounded.

Appellant claims that there were credibility problems with many of the witnesses who testified for the prosecution. He offers no support for this argument and we do not consider it. (People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 196; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(B), 8.360(a).) Despite appellants recitation of the evidence he presented in his defense, the record contains substantial evidence that appellant knew the vehicle was impounded rather than stolen when he filed the false police report and used it to present a false claim to the insurance company. We do not weigh evidence or determine credibility, but look to whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 260; People v. Autry, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.) Because there was substantial evidence supporting the convictions, we affirm the judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EPSTEIN, P. J.

We concur:

MANELLA, J.

SUZUKAWA, J.

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[1] All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.