Filed 4/27/17 P. v. Ronquillo CA5



NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

REGINAL WAYNE RONQUILLO,

Defendant and Appellant.

F072519

(Super. Ct. No. 13CM4815HTA)


OPINION

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Donna L. Tarter, Judge.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Kari Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
On August 3, 2015, defendant Reginal Wayne Ronquillo pled no contest to one count each of abusing or endangering the health of a child (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)), inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and making criminal threats (§ 422), in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining 16 counts, including numerous sexual offenses, which were agreed to be transactionally related to the pled counts. Defendant also admitted he had one prior strike conviction (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 667, subds. (b)–(i)).
On September 9, 2015, the trial court denied defendant’s motions to withdraw his plea and dismiss the prior strike. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 15 years four months, and ordered defendant to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290.006.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Marsden hearing based on statements made by him and defense counsel in connection with his motion to withdraw his plea. We conclude defendant did not clearly indicate he wanted substitute counsel and, therefore, the court was not obligated to conduct a Marsden hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS
On a number of occasions around December 2013, defendant physically abused and beat A. and R., both minors, and abused A., specifically, with an electrical phone cord. A. and R. suffered excessive corporal punishment that caused unjustifiable physical pain and mental suffering. In addition, A. told an interviewer “defendant had placed his finger in her private area in her bottom, and also touched her what she referred to as her chi-chi’s, which was her breasts.”
During the same timeframe, defendant hit, struck, slapped, and strangled his wife, H., resulting in visible bruising. H. further reported defendant had threatened to kill her more times than she could count. In late 2013, just before defendant’s arrest, H. woke up to find defendant standing over her. When she asked what he was doing, defendant said, “trying to decide whether or not to kill you.” As a result, H. was in sustained fear for her life.
DISCUSSION
If a defendant requests substitute counsel, the trial court is obligated, pursuant to Marsden, to give the defendant an opportunity to state any grounds for dissatisfaction with the current appointed attorney. (People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 90.) If the defendant makes a showing during the Marsden hearing that his right to counsel has been substantially impaired, substitute counsel must be appointed as attorney of record for all purposes. (Sanchez, at pp. 89–90.) But a trial court is obligated to conduct a Marsden hearing only when there is “ ‘at least some clear indication by defendant,’ ” either personally or through his current counsel, that he “ ‘wants a substitute attorney.’ ” (Sanchez, at pp. 89–90.)
Contrary to his contention on appeal, defendant did not clearly indicate that he wanted a substitute attorney at the sentencing hearing on September 9, 2015. The only thing he clearly indicated was that he wanted to withdraw his plea. After the trial court asked defendant why he wanted to withdraw his plea, defendant claimed that, at the time he entered the plea on August 3, 2015, he had not understood that he was agreeing to a maximum sentence of 15 years four months, or that he was agreeing to register as a sex offender. Defendant claimed his alleged lack of understanding arose during the plea hearing itself due to defense counsel conversing with him at the same time the court was going over the terms of the plea agreement with him, resulting in defendant becoming confused and not understanding the terms to which he was agreeing.
The trial court judge, who was the same judge who entered defendant’s plea, strongly repudiated defendant’s claim stating: “Sir, that is not correct. When I am taking a plea, attorneys do not talk with their counsel [sic], and if they do, I interrupt—I stop talking. [¶] … [¶] I just stop because it is important that you talk with your attorney.” In addition, the judge reviewed the entire transcript of the plea hearing and pointed out to defendant where it contradicted his claim that he had not understood what he was agreeing to at the time he entered his plea. Among other things, the transcript of the plea hearing reviewed by the trial court reflected that defense counsel was the first to recite the terms of the plea agreement (with some clarifications by the prosecutor) including the sentence and sex offender registration requirement ultimately imposed on defendant. After counsel recited the plea agreement terms, defendant answered in the affirmative when the court asked him whether he had heard what the attorneys had just said and whether this was what he intended on doing. The court then went over everything defendant would “be pleading to, the consequences of entering that plea, and the rights [he would] be giving up in order to do so” but not until first advising defendant, “If you have any questions please interrupt me, I’ll go over it more in detail, all right?”
As the trial court noted at the September 9, 2015 sentencing hearing, defendant’s responses during the August 3, 2015 plea hearing indicated he understood all of the terms of the plea agreement, including that he was agreeing to a potential prison term of 15 years four months, as well as agreeing to register as a sex offender. Defendant’s exchanges with the court during the plea hearing indicated he was actively engaged in listening to the court’s advisements and belied his claim at the sentencing hearing that he was “continuously having a conversation” with defense counsel while the court was reviewing the consequences of the plea with him. Aside from defendant’s dubious claim that he had become confused during the plea hearing by the court and defense counsel simultaneously speaking with him, defendant raised no other specific complaints against defense counsel and gave no clear indication he wanted substitute counsel such as to trigger the court’s duty to conduct a Marsden hearing.
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the brief comment by defense counsel, made immediately after the trial court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, which defendant now claims constituted a clear indication that he wanted substitute counsel. Specifically, after the court asked if there was any legal cause why judgment could not be imposed, defense counsel replied: “Yes, the defendant and his mother were seeking to retain counsel to file a motion to withdraw the plea on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.” However, when the court addressed defendant directly, defendant’s responses indicated it was not defendant but defendant’s mother who desired to retain new counsel for defendant. Defendant did not offer any specific reasons for why his mother wanted to get him a new attorney nor did he dispute the court’s characterization of his own motion to withdraw his plea as based solely on his already rejected claim that he had not understood the terms of the plea agreement at the time he entered this plea.
Because there was never a clear indication by defendant that he wanted substitute counsel, the trial court had no obligation to conduct a Marsden hearing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.