P. v. Salazar
Filed 7/18/13 P. v. Salazar CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE
PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
NORMAN
THOMAS SALAZAR,
Defendant and Appellant.
2d Crim. No. B246076
(Super. Ct. No. 2012000428)
(Ventura
County)
Norman Thomas Salazar
appeals from a 32-month state prison sentence entered after he pled guilty to
felony evading an officer with willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2., subd.
(a)), admitted a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c)(1)
& (e)(1); 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1)),
and admitted two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying a Romero motion (People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) to strike his prior strike conviction for
Facts and Procedural History
On January 5,
2012,
a Ventura police officer saw
appellant drive erratically at a high rate of speed through a residential
neighborhood. The officer activated his
lights and siren and tried to stop the vehicle, but appellant failed to
yield. Appellant drove through red
lights and stop signs, reaching speeds up to 85 to 90 miles per hour on the
surface streets and Highway 101. When
appellant reached Camarillo, the officer rammed
appellant's vehicle, causing the vehicle to spin out and stop.
Appellant was arrested for felony evading an
officer with willful disregard. (Veh.
Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a).) A records
check revealed that appellant had an outstanding warrant, was on parole, and
was driving with a license that had been suspended due to a prior driving under
the influence related offense.
After appellant was arraigned, the trial
court found appellant not competent to stand trial and suspended criminal
proceedings. (§ 1368.) On June 14,
2012,
Patton State Hospital reported that appellant was
feigning mental illness.
Appellant was found competent to
strike his 2001 conviction for attempted carjacking. Denying the
motion, the trial court found:
"There's a significant criminal history. . . including a carjacking
offense in [appellant's] past a little over ten years ago. [Appellant] has not maintained a law-abiding
[life] since the commission of that offense, and the Court views what occurred
in this matter as also a public safety threat and for those reasons . . .
find[s] him within the scope of the [Three Strikes] law."
Appellant entered a change of plea and
admitted the prior strike and prior prison term enhancements. The trial court sentenced him to 16 months
prison for felony evading an officer with willful disregard (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.2, subd. (a)), doubled the sentence based on the prior strike conviction,
and struck the prior prison term enhancements.
Discussion
Section 1385, subdivision (a) vests a trial
court with the discretion to strike a prior serious or violent felony
conviction "in furtherance of justice . . . ." (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 530.) In ruling on a Romero motion,
the trial court considers the nature and circumstances of the present felony
offense, defendant's prior serious or violent felony convictions, and
defendant's background, character and prospects. (People
v. Williams (1998) 17
Cal.4th 148, 161.) Only under
extraordinary circumstances will a career criminal fall outside the spirit of
the Three Strikes law. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
378.)
The current felony offense strikes at the
heart of public safety. Appellant had an
outstanding warrant, was on parole, and led the police on a 10-mile chase,
endangering the lives of motorists, bystanders, and law enforcement. Driving at speeds up to 85 or 90 miles per
hour, appellant ran red lights, failed to yield to police sirens and lights,
and swerved into oncoming traffic. The
officer had to ram appellant's vehicle in order to stop it. It was a miracle that appellant did not kill or
seriously injure someone.
Appellant
argues that he was receiving mental health services which is a mitigating
factor. Patton State Hospital reported that appellant was
"exaggerating and fabricating a large number of psychiatric and cognitive
symptoms in an unsophisticated attempt to appear impaired and psychiatrically
in distress." Appellant said that
he had received outpatient treatment but could not name a clinic, doctor, or
when he was treated. The hospital
reported that appellant suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and
substance abuse, and "admits to chronically using methamphetamine and
cannabis and has a history of alcohol-related convictions."
The trial court read and considered the
report before reinstating criminal proceedings.
The report states that appellant has a long history of substance abuse and
has never addressed the problem. It is
not a mitigating factor under the Three Strikes law. (See e.g., People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163
[defendant's failure to address substance abuse problem]; People v. Gaston (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 310; 322 [same].) We
reject the argument that appellant's mental health problems were not considered
or justify striking the 2001 conviction for attempted carjacking.
Appellant's argues that the 2001 attempted
carjacking conviction was a simple assault and remote in time. The probation memorandum states that
appellant and two men drove up in a stolen vehicle and accosted a female
employee in a restaurant parking lot. David Hartman, the victim's co-worker, asked
appellant to leave. Appellant threw a
beer bottle at Hartman and wrestled him as appellant's companions kicked
Hartman in the face and ribs. Appellant
then grabbed a female customer by the arms and tried to take her car keys and
flee in her car. Appellant tore the
woman's sweater and injured her arms as the woman screamed, "No get away
from me."
The trial court reasonably concluded that the
attempted carjacking was not an isolated incident or remote in time for
58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [20-year old felony conviction not remote given
defendant's criminal recidivism].) The
probation memorandum states that appellant "has a significant criminal
record dating back over 20 years. His
propensity for violence and disregard for authority is evident, as well as his
history of drug abuse and non-compliance."
Appellant's criminal history dates back to
1995 and includes two felony and 16 misdemeanor convictions. In 1995 he was convicted of battery on his
girlfriend. (§ 242.) Appellant was
convicted of a second battery four months later after he struck the victim on
the head with a handgun and fired a shot as the victim fled.
Between 1996 and 2007, defendant was
convicted five times for using or being under the influence of a controlled
substance. (Health & Saf. Code, §
11550, subd. (a).)
In 1998, appellant was convicted of reckless
driving (Veh. Code, § 23103, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1), and vehicular hit and run (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)) after
he forced a male driver and his family to the side of the road. Appellant backed his up truck almost running
over the driver, and rammed the car. Two
children were in the car.
In 1998, appellant was convicted of corporal
injury on his girlfriend. (§ 273.5,
subd. (a).) Appellant followed her into
a hospital, struck her in the chest, grabbed her hair, and threatened her. Three months later, appellant threw a heavy
set of keys in the girlfriend's face, cutting her face. Appellant fled, returned that evening, and
punched the victim in the chest, arms, and, mouth. When a witness tried to intervene, appellant
punched him in the face.
In 2001, appellant was convicted of attempted
carjacking. Like the prior offense, it
involved multiple victims and acts of violence. It was appellant's first strike
and resulted in a four year six month state prison sentence. After appellant was paroled, he continued his
life of crime.
In 2008, appellant caused a domestic disturbance
and was observed getting out of a stolen vehicle. The police ordered appellant at gun point to
lie on the ground. Appellant tried to
charge the officer, kicked an officer, and was taken to the ground. Appellant smelled of alcohol, was laughing and
saying "Fuck you," and tried to kick the officer as he was put in the
patrol car. Appellant was convicted of
possession of stolen property and resisting an officer. (§§ 496d, subd. (a); 148, subd..
(a)(1).)
In 2009, appellant was convicted of battery
after he punched the victim in the head, threw the victim to the ground, and
punched the victim repeatedly on the head and upper back. When officers responded to the 911 call,
appellant said "Yeah, I kicked his ass" and admitted drinking 10
beers.
Appellant's criminal history, marked by
violent assaults, disregard for authority and long term substance abuse, puts
him squarely within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. (See e.g., People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 338-339.) Based on appellant's age (39), his
unrelenting history of violence and substance/alcohol abuse, his prior
commitments to jail and prison, the failed attempts at parole and probation,
and the life-threatening nature of the current felony offense, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the Romero motion and sentencing
appellant to 32 months state prison.
(See e..g, People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 162-164; People v. Humphrey, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp.
812-813.) Appellant is the kind of revolving-door
career criminal for whom the Three Strikes law was devised. (People v. Gaston, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 320.)
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN,
J.
We concur:
GILBERT,
P.J.
PERREN,
J.
Kevin J. McGee, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
California Appellate Project , under
appointment by the Court of Appeal,
Jonathan B. Steiner, Executive Director and Richard B. Lennon, Staff
Attorney, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R.
Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Connie H. Kan, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All statutory references
are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
