P. v. Sanders
Filed 11/14/13 P. v. Sanders CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RICHARD SANDERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
D062588
(Super. Ct.
No. SCN284313)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Runston G. Maino, Judge. Affirmed.
Sheila
Quinlan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood and
Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A court found Richard Sanders
guilty of commercial burglary (Pen.
Code, § 459)
title="">[1]
and check forgery (§ 470, subd. (d)).
Sanders admitted having a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds.
(b)-(i), 1170.12) and the court found true allegations he had three prior
prison commitment convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced him to four years in
prison and awarded him 776 days of presentence
of actual custody credit plus 258 days of conduct credit.
Sanders appeals, contending he is
entitled to an additional 166 days of conduct credit. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
Based on amendments to section
4019, which took effect on October 1, 2011, Sanders contends he is entitled to
additional presentence conduct credit for the time he served from that date to
his sentencing date. He further contends
failure to award him additional presentence conduct credit for this time
deprives him of equal protection of the law.
Section 4019, which specifies the
rate of presentence conduct credit an inmate in local custody may earn, has
undergone numerous revisions in the past several years. (People
v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48-50 (Rajanayagam) [detailing the history of recent amendments];
530, 533-540 [same].) At the time of
Sanders's offenses, section 4019 allowed an inmate in local custody who had a
prior serious or violent felony conviction to earn up to two days of conduct
credit for every four days of actual custody. (Former § 4019, subds. (b)(2), (c)(2), & (f),
Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 28, § 50, eff. Jan. 25, 2010; People v. Garcia, supra, at
pp. 536-537.)
As of October 1, 2011, section 4019 allows an inmate in local
custody to earn up to four days of conduct credit for every two days of actual
custody. (Amended § 4019, subds. (b),
(c), & (f), Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482, eff. Apr. 4, 2011, operative Oct. 1, 2011; Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 53, eff. June 30, 2011, operative Oct. 1, 2011; Stats. 2011-2012, 1st
Ex. Sess., ch. 12, § 35, eff. Sept.
21, 2011, operative Oct.
1, 2011; People v. Ellis
(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1549-1550.)
Unlike the formula under which the court sentenced Sanders, this formula
applies to inmates with prior serious or violent felonies as long as the current
offense is not a violent crime or murder.
(§§ 2933.1, subd. (c), 2933.2, subd. (c).)
Of pertinence here, subdivision (h)
of amended section 4019 states, "The changes to this section . . . shall
apply prospectively and shall apply to prisoners who are confined to a county
jail . . . for a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011. Any days earned by a prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated
at the rate required by the prior law." According to Sanders, the second sentence
creates an ambiguity, which we should interpret to allow him to earn additional
conduct credits for the local time served after October 1, 2011, even though he committed his crime
before then. However, as the
(h)'s first sentence reflects the Legislature intended the enhanced conduct
credit provision to apply only to those defendants who committed their crimes
on or after October 1, 2011. Subdivision
(h)'s second sentence does not extend the enhanced conduct credit provision to
any other group, namely those defendants who committed offenses before October
1, 2011, but are in local custody on or after October 1, 2011. Instead, subdivision (h)'s second sentence
attempts to clarify that those defendant's who committed an offense before
October 1, 2011, are to earn credit under the prior law. However inartful the language of subdivision
(h), we read the second sentence as reaffirming that defendants who committed
their crimes before October 1, 2011, still have the opportunity to earn conduct
credits, just under prior law. [Citation.] To imply the enhanced conduct credit provision
applies to defendants who committed their crimes before the effective date but
served time in local custody after the effective date reads too much into the statute
and ignores the Legislature's clear intent in subdivision (h)'s first sentence."
(Rajanayagam,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 52; see
also, People v. Ellis,
second sentence does not extend the enhanced rate to any other group, but
merely specifies the rate at which all others are to earn conduct credits"];
People v. Garcia,
language of amended section 4019 does not entitle a defendant who was sentenced
after its effective date but whose crimes occurred prior to its effective date
to additional conduct credit].)
This interpretation and its
application to Sanders does not deprive him of equal protection of the law
because, assuming he is similarly situated to inmates who committed their
offenses after the effective date of amended section 4019, the Legislature
nonetheless had a rational basis for treating the latter inmates differently. Amended section 4019 was part of larger
legislation whose purpose was to " 'to reduce recidivism and improve
public safety, while at the same time reducing corrections and related criminal
justice spending.' " (
effective date of [amended section 4019], the Legislature took a measured
approach and balanced the goal of cost savings against public safety. The effective date was a legislative
determination that its stated goal of reducing corrections costs was best
served by granting enhanced conduct credits to those defendants who committed
their offenses on or after October 1, 2011. To be sure, awarding enhanced conduct credits
to everyone in local confinement would have certainly resulted in greater cost
savings than awarding enhanced conduct credits to only those defendants who
commit an offense on or after the amendment's effective date. But that is not the approach the Legislature
chose in balancing public safety against cost savings. [Citation.] Under the very deferential rational
relationship test, we will not second-guess the Legislature and conclude its
stated purpose is better served by increasing the group of defendants who are
entitled to enhanced conduct credits when the Legislature has determined the
fiscal crisis is best ameliorated by awarding enhanced conduct credit to only
those defendants who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011."
(Rajanayagam,
at pp. 55-56.)
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
McCONNELL,
P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
AARON, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
Further statutory references
are also to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
We omit a summary of the
circumstances underlying Sanders's convictions, as they are not relevant to the
issue Sanders raised on appeal.
