P. v. Sarabia
Filed 7/26/06 P. v. Sarabia CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GUILLERMO LOPEZ SARABIA, Defendant and Appellant. | B185531 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA062288) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer L. Peabody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Marilee Marshall & Associates, Inc., for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ana R. Duarte, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Susan Sullivan Pithey, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Guillermo Sarabia appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to possession of cocaine. He contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) under Penal Code section 1000 et seq. (Further section references are to the Penal Code.) We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with having possessed cocaine on July 24, 2005. The People advised the court that defendant was not eligible for DEJ because he had been granted a two-year diversion on April 1, 1996, diversion was terminated and criminal proceedings were reinstated the following April 24, and the diversion termination remained in effect until defendant's arrest in 2005.[1] Thus, argued the People, defendant failed to meet the DEJ criterion of section 1000, subdivision (a)(5), that any previous diversion or DEJ program have been successfully completed or terminated at least five years before the current offense.[2]
As the case went forward, the People declared that they were unable to proceed on the 1996 offense, and it was dismissed under section 1385. In view of the dismissal, defendant noted that although the DEJ program requires a defendant to enter a guilty plea, the diversion statute applicable to the 1996 case did not. Defendant further noted that he had not been convicted in the 1996 case and that upon termination of diversion in 1996 he had been entitled to take the matter to trial. Defendant argued that because the dismissal in 2005 of the 1996 case rendered that matter a nullity, his diversion program was completed in 1996, rendering him eligible for DEJ in 2005 under section 1000, subdivision (a)(5).
Defendant's argument was rejected. The trial court concluded it was immaterial that the law was different in 1996 with respect to the requirement of a conviction because the underlying policy of diversion and DEJ is the same. The court held that the 1996 â€
