Filed 4/6/22 P. v. Springer CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

Defendant Travis Springer pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a minor and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. In a prior appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). We agreed, and we therefore conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded for the trial court to hold such a hearing. (People v. Springer (Aug. 21, 2020, A158263) (Springer I) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the court held the hearing and denied the Marsden motion.

Springer appealed again, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to continue the hearing and by denying the Marsden motion. We disagree and accordingly affirm.

I.
Factual and Procedural
Background

A. The Proceedings Leading to Springer’s First Appeal

The following summary is quoted from Springer I:

“Felony charges were brought against Springer for allegedly having sexually abused a minor friend of his 13-year-old daughter. In April 2019, before the preliminary hearing took place, Springer asked the trial court to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney for him. The court held a brief Marsden hearing and denied the request. The preliminary hearing ensued, and Springer was subsequently charged by felony information with nine sex crimes.

“In June 2019, Springer pleaded guilty to one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a)), and the remaining charges were dismissed. When sentencing was to take place, Springer again indicated that he was dissatisfied with his attorney and wanted substitute counsel appointed. This time, the trial court did not hold a Marsden hearing, and it proceeded to sentence Springer to the negotiated term of 12 years in prison.”

The trial court’s failure to hold a Marsden hearing led to the first appeal. In Springer I, we agreed with Springer and conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded for the trial court to hold a Marsden hearing.

B. The Proceedings Leading to this Appeal

After our remand, the trial court set a readiness conference and Marsden hearing for December 2020. Springer could not be transferred from his prison facility to attend the hearing, and the court asked Springer’s counsel to see if Springer would agree to appear remotely by Zoom. The Marsden hearing was continued to mid-January 2021. A few days before the hearing, the court was informed that Springer agreed to appear by Zoom, and the hearing was then re-set for February 17.

During a February 10 readiness conference, Springer’s counsel told the trial court that Springer wanted to continue the hearing until June. Counsel reported that Springer claimed he could not research the Marsden motion because he was unable to access the prison law library due to restrictions related to COVID-19. The People opposed the continuance. The court confirmed the Marsden hearing for February 17 and indicated that Springer could articulate his reasons for seeking the continuance at the hearing.

The Marsden hearing was held on February 17, and Springer appeared remotely. He again requested a continuance until June so he could “get down to the law library and get more information.” Springer reported that the law library was physically closed. But he also reported that he had learned that inmates could obtain library materials by submitting a written request. Having only recently learned of this option, he had not yet submitted any such requests. Springer also said he had poor reading comprehension skills and needed someone to help him.

The trial court denied the request for a continuance. It found that Springer had been dilatory because, even though he had known about the Marsden hearing for months, he only recently discovered that library materials could be obtained by a written request and had not submitted any such requests.

During the Marsden hearing, Springer raised various complaints about his counsel, including that counsel allegedly had failed to locate and interview some witnesses and failed to pursue a more favorable plea agreement. He also complained that when he asked if counsel was capable of “defending his constitutional . . . or . . . sovereign rights,” counsel retorted by asking Springer if he wanted to represent himself. And he complained that counsel did not “keep [his] confidence from the very beginning.”

The trial court also heard from Springer’s counsel. As to the issue involving the witnesses, counsel explained that the witnesses were not used because their testimony would not have helped, and might have harmed, Springer. As to the plea deal, counsel explained that before the preliminary hearing Springer was offered the low term of six years, and he urged Springer to accept it. Springer rejected the offer, believing he could get a better deal. After the preliminary hearing, the prosecution withdrew the initial offer, and counsel was unsuccessful in trying to get the prosecution to renew it. According to counsel, the best deal he could get for Springer after the preliminary hearing was a midterm sentence of 12 years.

The trial court denied the Marsden motion, finding there was no irrevocable breakdown of communication or irreconcilable conflict between Springer and his counsel. The court found it “abundantly clear” that Springer had made several false statements and that his counsel had provided effective assistance regarding the witnesses. The court found that the remaining issues involved appropriate legal tactics and strategies, and it found that Springer’s complaint that he lacked confidence in counsel had no legitimate basis. Accordingly, the court reinstated the judgment.

II.
Discussion

A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining to Continue the Marsden Hearing.

In challenging the trial court’s denial of his request for a continuance, Springer first raises a constitutional claim. He contends that the denial violated his right to access the courts, protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which he claims requires prison authorities to provide prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. (See Bounds v. Smith (1977) 430 U.S. 817, 828.) According to him, this right was not satisfied by having the opportunity to submit written requests for library materials. But little evidence was presented on the nature and scope of this opportunity. We agree with the Attorney General that Springer forfeited the claim by failing to present it to the trial court. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880; People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1196, fn. 6.)

Springer next argues that, apart from constitutional principles, the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance. Under state law, a defendant must show good cause to continue a criminal proceeding by detailing specific facts showing that a continuance is necessary. (Pen. Code, § 1050, subds. (b) & (e).) We review a trial court’s ruling on a request for a continuance for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Shane (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 196, 203.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered. (People v. Froehlig (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 260, 265.) We will reverse the denial of a continuance only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability that the result would have been more favorable had the court granted a continuance. (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 945.)

Springer contends that the trial court erred because its denial of the continuance left him unable to physically visit the library due the prison’s COVID-19 restrictions. He argues that the court abused its discretion in finding that he was dilatory.

We perceive no abuse of discretion.[1] Although Springer alleged that he was denied complete access to the library, he was not. He admits that he had the opportunity to obtain library materials by a written request. Although he claimed that he learned of this opportunity only recently, he did not explain how long the opportunity was available or the steps, if any, he took to learn about or avail himself of it. The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Springer was dilatory.

Furthermore, Springer failed to explain adequately why he needed physical access to the law library to prepare for the Marsden hearing. The decision to continue a hearing must be based on the reasons presented to the trial court at the time the request is denied. (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1118.) Here, Springer did not point to specific legal issues he needed to research or explain what help he needed. He had the ability, which he exercised, to convey to the court his reasons for believing his counsel was ineffective. He did not, however, explain why he needed physical access to the library to convey these reasons.

Springer failed to demonstrate that had he been granted a continuance, he would have achieved a more favorable outcome. (See People v. Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 945.) He contends that it is reasonably probable that the Marsden motion would have been granted if the trial court had heard a more reasoned, logical presentation of his arguments against his counsel. We disagree with this conclusory assertion, and Springer fails to identify the additional legal research that would have helped him secure a ruling in his favor. Thus, even if the court abused its discretion in denying the continuance, the error was harmless.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Springer’s Marsden Motion.

Springer also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Marsden motion, because his counsel was working against his interests and had an irreconcilable conflict with him. We are not persuaded.

Under Marsden, a trial court must give a criminal defendant a hearing when the defendant seeks to substitute appointed counsel on the ground that counsel has provided ineffective assistance. (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 120.) This requirement protects a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel. (Id. at p. 123.) A Marsden motion should be granted if the record clearly shows that a defendant’s appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation or that the defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result. (Id. at pp. 124–125.)

We review the denial of a Marsden motion for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 876.) The denial of a Marden motion does not constitute an abuse of discretion unless the defendant shows that the failure to replace the appointed attorney substantially impaired the right to effective assistance of counsel. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085.)

Springer claims that his counsel was working against his interests because counsel did not adequately explain the prosecution’s initial settlement offer or that it would be withdrawn if rejected. At the Marsden hearing, however, counsel made clear that he urged Springer to accept the initial offer and that the prosecution withdrew the offer after the evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing. Counsel unsuccessfully tried to get the offer renewed. This record shows that Springer’s ultimate term of 12 years was caused not by counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness but by Springer’s decision to reject the initial offer notwithstanding his counsel’s advice to the contrary, and the prosecution’s decision to withdraw that offer after the preliminary hearing. Springer fails to show that counsel was working against his interests.

Springer further claims that he and counsel fundamentally disagreed about whether to investigate certain defense witnesses. When a defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728–729.) Generally, disagreeing with appointed counsel about trial tactics does not entitle a defendant to substitution of counsel. (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 604.) Here, counsel determined that the witnesses at issue would not have been favorable to Springer’s case. Any disagreement about this determination did not amount to an irreconcilable conflict.

Springer also claims that his distrust of counsel created an irreconcilable conflict that likely resulted in ineffective representation. But if a defendant’s claimed lack of trust in an appointed attorney were sufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel, defendants effectively would have a veto power over any appointment. This is not the law. (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 860.) Here, Springer’s alleged lack of trust stemmed from disagreements about litigation tactics, not inadequate representation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Marsden motion.

III.
Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Margulies, J.

_________________________

Banke, J.

People v. Springer A162099

[1] Accordingly, we reject Springer’s arguments to the extent they advance claims under principles of due process or equal protection that are unrelated to his theory that he was unconstitutionally denied access to the courts. (See People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784, 790–791.)