Filed 9/29/17 P. v. Stobaugh CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

Defendant Richard Thomas Stobaugh appeals from his commitment to the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) after a jury found he was a sexually violent predator. Defendant contends the trial court’s commitment order violated his due process rights because no substantial evidence supported a finding of current dangerousness due to a mental disorder or serious difficulty controlling his behavior. He also contends the commitment order is not supported by sufficient evidence because the experts relied on hearsay statements not independently proven in formulating their opinions. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On February 22, 2012, the Humboldt County District Attorney filed a petition to commit defendant as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA; Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] § 6600 et seq.). Defendant waived his right to a probable cause hearing and the matter proceeded to trial. In August 2012, the court ordered defendant be housed at Coalinga State Hospital (the hospital). Defendant spent three years at the hospital before trial.

The parties stipulated defendant had been convicted of, and served prison terms for, five sexually violent offenses: (1) rape, by force and/or fear of Susan H. on October 30, 1981 (Pen. Code, former § 261(2)); (2) rape, by force and/or fear of Paula K. on or about November 18, 1987 (Pen. Code, former § 261(2)); (3) kidnapping with force of Paula K. on or about November 18, 1987 (Pen. Code, § 207); (4) rape, by force and/or fear of Susan W. on January 27, 1988 (Pen. Code, former § 261(2)); (5) rape, by force and/or fear of Leona S. on February 20, 1988 (Pen. Code, former § 261(2)).

Defendant filed a motion in limine before trial and a motion for directed verdict at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, both seeking to exclude expert testimony based solely on the facts of defendant’s qualifying offenses.[2] The trial court denied both motions.

The jury found by unanimous verdict defendant was an SVP within the meaning of the SVPA. In March 2016, the court committed defendant to the DSH for an indeterminate term.

B. Criteria for SVP

An SVP is “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).) As the parties stipulated to defendant’s convictions for sexually violent offenses, the prosecution experts’ testimony focused on two elements: (1) whether defendant had a diagnosed mental disorder and (2) whether it is likely he would engage in violent sex offenses if released. Both elements “require a link between a finding of future dangerousness and ‘a currently diagnosed mental disorder characterized by the inability to control dangerous sexual behavior.’ ” (People v. White (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 433, 448.) “A person is likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if ‘the person charged as a sexually violent predator poses a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk, of committing a sexually violent predatory crime if released from custody.’ ” (Ibid.)

C. Prosecution Evidence

1. Dr. Mary Jane Alumbaugh

Dr. Mary Jane Alumbaugh is a licensed clinical psychologist who contracts with DSH to do independent SVP evaluations. Alumbaugh interviewed defendant twice—once in January 2012, and again in May 2015. Alumbaugh also reviewed a packet provided by the DSH[3] and defendant’s “C file,” a record kept by the prison. Both times she evaluated him, Alumbaugh concluded defendant met the criteria for an SVP.

At trial, Alumbaugh testified to the following facts regarding defendant’s qualifying offenses. The first offense, his rape of 18-year-old Susan H., occurred in 1981. Defendant climbed in a window of a college dormitory, went up to the second floor, and entered Susan H.’s room. Defendant had a knife. He woke Susan H. up, made her get on the floor, and raped her. Defendant was convicted of the rape and sent to prison.

Defendant spent five years in prison and was paroled in the fall of 1987. Approximately two months after he was released from prison, defendant committed his second qualifying offense. Around 2:30 in the morning, defendant entered a local hotel wearing a ski mask and carrying a gun. He encountered two women inside, who he took down some stairs to a lower level of the hotel. Defendant stopped the women on the stairs and had them remove their clothing, one piece at a time, and throw it to him. He had one of the women, Paula K., come sit by him and asked her, “Have you ever eaten pussy?” She said yes. Defendant then had the other woman lay on her back and had Paula perform cunnilingus on the second woman. Defendant then positioned himself behind Paula and began to have sex with her. Both women said defendant kept saying things like, “Isn’t that great, Doesn’t that feel good, Isn’t this the best you’ve ever had.” At one point, defendant was grabbing the breasts of the woman laying down.

The rape continued until the phone rang. Defendant sent the other woman upstairs to answer the phone. He grabbed Paula by the hair and dragged her, running through the streets. He took her behind some houses. He raped her vaginally, then sodomized her, and finally had her orally copulate him. After the assault, defendant told Paula, “You are so good. Maybe I’ll take you home with me.” Paula managed to escape, but defendant was not apprehended.

Defendant’s third qualifying rape occurred on January 27, 1988. On that occasion, Susan W., who was seven months pregnant, returned home from running errands and being busy with her baby, left her keys in the door. At midnight she awakened to a noise and went to her living room where she found defendant. He said, “Don’t you want your keys?” When she asked him what he was doing in her house, he put on a ski mask.

Susan W. had been wearing a robe and nightgown. Defendant told her to take off her clothes and she removed her robe. Defendant retrieved a knife from the kitchen and cut her nightgown off. They went into the bedroom where defendant asked for nylons. Defendant used the nylons to tie her hands in front of her. Defendant had her lie on the floor where he had vaginal sex with her and attempted anal sex. Defendant asked Susan W. if she had any baby oil, and when she responded no, took her into the kitchen. Defendant got some cooking oil, poured it on his penis, sodomized her, and then forced her to orally copulate him. He ejaculated in Susan W.’s mouth and forced her to swallow it. He said things to her like, “You like this, Isn’t this good, You are enjoying this.” After the assault, defendant left.

On February 20, 1988, defendant went into the home of 71-year-old Leona S. Defendant woke Leona, who had been sleeping. He had a knife. He put a pillow over her face, but did not try to smother her. She said, “You are hurting me,” and “I’m bleeding.” She had started bleeding, at which point defendant stopped and tried to put shoes on her feet. Defendant fled after that.

Alumbaugh also testified to several other incidents in addition to the qualifying offenses. Six days after the rape of Paula K., defendant entered the house of a woman who had company that evening. The woman walked her friend out to her car, and when she returned to her home, she found defendant in her house holding a gun. She screamed, ran out, and got a friend. When they returned to her home, they found the phone off the hook and a gun had been taken.

On January 3, 1988, Katherine C. was sleeping when defendant entered her home wearing a ski mask and gloves. He woke her up and attempted to rape her on her waterbed. Unable to do so, he then dragged her into a guest bedroom where he proceeded to vaginally rape and sodomize her. After the assault, he told her he wanted her to get rid of the evidence and took her into the bathroom. She expelled the ejaculate and then defecated three times. Defendant told her she was beautiful. The assault was never investigated or charged. Katherine later committed suicide.

About two weeks after the assault of Susan W., defendant went into a house of a woman with a young child. When she woke up defendant was standing over her. She either had an extreme anxiety attack or feigned a heart attack and defendant left.

Alumbaugh also testified to details of defendant’s early life. Defendant never knew his biological father. His biological mother did a lot of drugs, “never parented” him, and was involved in criminal activities. He also had a biological half brother, to whom he was very attached. Around age eight, his mother took him to live with his grandmother. Defendant and his half brother then went to a foster home, and then to live with his aunt and uncle. His half brother was later taken to Oklahoma by his father, but the father did not take defendant.

Defendant’s uncle, who eventually became his adopted father, started molesting him at age 10. Defendant said the molestation consisted of oral sex, anal sex, orgies, and group sex with other children and the uncle. The abuse continued until defendant was approximately 15. Around age 15 or 16, defendant began abusing drugs.

Defendant met a girl in high school, who would eventually become his wife. He entered the Air Force and did well there, until he got in trouble for exhibiting himself. Defendant had shown his penis to a woman on the Air Force base. When he was examined by the Air Force doctor after the incident, he reported he engaged in bondage sex with his wife.

a. Mental disorder

Alumbaugh diagnosed defendant with sexual sadism. Sadism is a psychosexual disorder in which an individual derives pleasure, usually sexual, from the pain and suffering of others. Alumbaugh based her diagnosis on a number of factors. First, she noted the anal sex and bondage, some of which was nonconsensual. Further, Alumbaugh explained, all of defendant’s acts were accompanied by sexual arousal with ejaculation. She specifically noted the fact the two women in the hotel were forced to perform, which had elements of ritualism. She also identified a “theme” of shoes, including with Leona S., which suggested fetishism.

Alumbaugh testified to the importance of total control over one’s victim in a sadism diagnosis and opined defendant exercised a lot of control in his assaults. Alumbaugh noted some researchers have found the sequence of anal rape followed by oral copulation especially demeaning, and expressed her own opinion that being forced to swallow ejaculate when being raped is an example of extreme control, domination, and humiliation. She emphasized the fact defendant’s victims experienced pain and were humiliated “at almost every turn.” Alumbaugh found the sequence of events with Susan W., the pregnant victim, particularly demeaning. Additionally, she noted forcing victims to say they enjoy the rape is another way of asserting dominance, control, and humiliation.

Alumbaugh distinguished defendant’s crimes from “ordinary” criminal rape, which she acknowledged is a violent, sexual crime. While rapists use force, she explained, a sadist will use gratuitous violence, above and beyond what is needed to get a victim to cooperate.

Alumbaugh opined defendant began exhibiting disordered sexuality early in life and it continued until he was captured. Recalling the separation from his brother and being dropped off by a mother who never reappeared, Alumbaugh explained defendant suffered broken attachments in childhood. Defendant told her he thought his aunt and uncle would save him, but instead he was subjected to horrible, ongoing, continual sexual abuse and was socialized into a lifestyle of perverse, intrusive, violent sex.

Alumbaugh testified sexual sadism it is a rare disorder—of the approximately 600 SVP evaluations she has done, she has only diagnosed it one other time.

b. Likelihood of reoffending

In addressing whether defendant was likely to commit sex offenses in the future, Alumbaugh relied on two tools—the Static-99 Revised (Static-99R) and the Hare Psychopathy checklist (PCL-R). Defendant scored a 4 on the Static-99R, reflecting a moderate-high score and an 11 percent risk of recidivism in five years. She scored him 23 on the PCL-R, in the moderate range. Alumbaugh opined his behavior was “predatory” within the meaning of the SVPA because his victims were strangers. She evaluated his discharge plan, dynamic (or changeable) factors, and considered his years of stability and good behavior in prison for almost 25 years and at the state hospital for three years.

Despite his relatively moderate scores on the Static-99R and PCL-R, Alumbaugh concluded defendant fell outside the actuarial scales. She explained defendant has “unique factors” that present a far greater risk than reflected in the recidivism rates and testified “his disorder and his makeup and everything about him, what I guess I would call my formulation, is not captured in here by simply looking at the recidivism rates and the STATIC-99R.” Alumbaugh explained defendant’s sexual sadism diagnosis “results in sexual drives and sexual motivations that become dysregulated in that he really cannot control [them].” She also testified “[t]he really early damage that was done to this man” prevents him from “attaching at any serious level” and leads to empathy deficits. She opined sexual sadism is not a disease that goes away with time, that defendant needs treatment, and without treatment, he presents a danger. Nonetheless, defendant refused to obtain treatment because he does not believe he has a mental illness and attributes his problems to drug abuse. Alumbaugh strongly disagreed defendant’s drug abuse was the cause of his sexual assaults.

2. Dr. Bruce Yanofsky

Dr. Bruce Yanofsky is a clinical and forensic psychologist who also contracts with DSH to do SVP evaluations. Yanofsky has performed over 650 SVP evaluations. Yanofsky met with defendant in July 2015. In completing his evaluation of defendant, Yanofsky relied on his interview with defendant, his review of documents provided by DSH (including court documents, probation officer reports, abstract of judgment, police records, a criminal history, and prior SVP evaluations of defendant), records from the hospital, and conversations with the unit psychologist and a behavior specialist at the hospital.

a. Mental disorder

In his evaluation, Yanofsky gave defendant four named diagnoses: unspecified paraphilic disorder, amphetamine use disorder, marijuana use disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. Yanofsky opined defendant’s unspecified paraphilic disorder predisposes him to commit sexual crimes. He testified the unspecified paraphilic disorder was the most relevant to his evaluation, and was based on “years and years of information suggesting arousal and interest in deviant sexual behavior involving nonconsenting partners, force, threatening, hurting people.” Yanofsky found it significant that in spite of being incarcerated for his conduct, defendant was undeterred and did not exhibit any form of control until he was placed in custody. In addition to the extensive criminal history, information from defendant’s wife regarding bondage and behavior similar to rape and force in his marriage reinforced the diagnosis.

“Fueling or aiding [defendant’s] diagnoss of unspecified paraphilic disorder is a presence of antisocial personality,” Yanofsky elaborated. “Personality disorders are enduring ways in which people behave, think, [and] perceive the world.” Yanofsky explained antisocial personality disorder is characterized by “individuals who routinely, historically throughout their life violate the rights of others, commit crime. They lie, they cheat, they lack in empathy. They don’t seem to learn from their mistakes and they essentially engage in . . . criminal behaviors typically beginning in adolescen[ce] and sometimes even showing indications of this earlier in childhood and then continuing throughout their adult life.” Due to defendant’s antisocial personality disorder, Yanofsky concluded “his sexual behavior became infused with crime and his perception of the crime and not respecting people at all or the rules of society led to either fueling the paraphilia or permitting the paraphilia to be acted out the way it was acted out . . . , supporting the idea that he lacks that volitional and emotional ability to control his behavior.” Yanofsky also characterized defendant’s amphetamine and marijuana use disorders as “severe.”

D. [i]Defense Evidence

1. Dr. Dale Arnold

Dr. Dale Arnold is a forensic psychologist, currently employed full-time by DSH to do SVP evaluations. In 2012, when he was working as an independent contractor before being hired by DSH, Arnold performed an SVP evaluation of defendant. At the time, Arnold concluded defendant was an SVP. Arnold diagnosed defendant with paraphilia not otherwise specified, substance use disorders described as polysubstance abuse, and antisocial personality disorder.

Arnold scored defendant on the Static-99R and Static-2002R and rated him on a “Structured Risk Assessment-Forensic Version,” a scale that considers other factors not captured by the actuarial tools. Arnold placed defendant in the high risk/needs group based on several factors, including his criminal history, the fact he began to reoffend within two months of being released from prison after serving a prison term for his first rape, the high number of his victims, and the violence associated with his crimes. Arnold testified he also considered defendant’s self-reported rape fantasies. During the 2012 interview, defendant told Arnold 25 percent of the time he masturbated to fantasies that involved finding a woman in a home that he was burglarizing, but claimed he stopped having those fantasies in 2007. Based on his analysis, Arnold concluded defendant would likely commit another sexually violent predatory offense if released to the community.

In 2015, Arnold evaluated defendant again for DSH. On his second evaluation, Arnold again concluded defendant had a current mental disorder. Arnold testified he retained the paraphilia diagnosis and eliminated the antisocial personality disorder diagnosis. Arnold characterized defendant’s paraphilia diagnosis as “a chronic condition, a lifelong condition,” stating, “He will always have some interest in that, but I think the sexual intensity goes down over time.”

Arnold did not find, however, defendant was at risk of committing another sexually violent offense if released. Arnold changed his opinion with regard to risk of reoffense based on several factors, including the impact of defendant’s age on his risk estimates, his participation in psychoeducational groups relevant to risk reduction,[6] and his efforts to reconnect with family members and build social supports.

2. Dr. Brian Abbott

Dr. Brian Abbott is a forensic psychologist in private practice who has done around 210 SVP evaluations, primarily for defense counsel. In connection with his SVP evaluation in this case, Abbott interviewed defendant three times, once in 2013, once in 2015, and again the day before Abbott testified, and reviewed law enforcement reports, military records, prison records, SVP evaluations, and defendant’s hospital records. Abbott concluded defendant had suffered from three substance use disorders in the past, but that he no longer has any substance use disorder. Next, Abbott considered possible diagnoses of posttraumatic stress disorder, antisocial personality disorder, paraphilic coercive disorder, and sexual sadism, concluding defendant did not have any of those disorders, or any other current mental disorder. Abbott opined defendant’s behavior was the result of chronic methamphetamine use and testified his “clinical picture better fit kind of a callous, indifferent individual who committed rapes during the course of burglaries as opposed to someone who was motivated by sexual deviance such as sexual sadism.” Because he found defendant did not suffer from a current mental disorder, Abbott did not analyze whether defendant had serious difficulty controlling his behavior.

3. Keri de Alba

Keri de Alba, a behavior specialist at the hospital, also testified on behalf of the defense. De Alba stated defendant had participated regularly in substance abuse groups and had never tested positive on the random drug tests. De Alba shared that defendant is always polite, respectful, has good boundaries, communicates well, and is a very supportive group member. On two separate occasions at the hospital, she found herself alone with defendant and felt safe.

E. Defendant’s Statements

As noted above, defendant spoke at length with each of the prosecution and defense evaluators, some on more than one occasion. In his interviews, defendant corroborated many of the underlying facts related to his qualifying offenses and other aspects of his personal, social, and criminal history, as we will discuss further below.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the prosecution’s case rested entirely on the testimony of two experts, each of whom relied solely on his past criminal conduct to determine whether he meets the criteria for an SVP. Defendant asserts in the absence of any recent, objective evidence that he has a current mental disorder or serious difficulty controlling sexually violent urges, the commitment order is based on insufficient evidence and violates his due process rights. Citing People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), defendant also argues the commitment order is based on insufficient evidence because the facts used by the experts in formulating their opinions were not independently proven.

A. Substantial Evidence

On appeal, we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 466.) We do not reassess the credibility of the witnesses, nor reweigh the strengths of expert opinions, but draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all conflicts in the evidence, in favor of the judgment. (People v. Sumahit (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 347, 352.) Though the evidence must be “ ‘ “reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value,” ’ ” we reverse only if no “ ‘rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Mercer, at p. 466; People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 269.)

1. Mental Disorder

Defendant contends the prosecution failed to produce any evidence defendant has a current mental condition that makes him dangerous, noting the experts relied only on evidence of crimes committed 28 years ago. We disagree.

It is well established a civil commitment under the SVPA requires recent objective evidence of a current mental disorder that renders the individual likely to reoffend. (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1162.) In this case, three of the four expert witnesses (Alumbaugh, Yanofsky, and Arnold), including one of defendant’s own experts (Arnold), testified defendant currently has a mental condition that predisposes him to commit sexually violent offenses. While each expert relied in part on the facts of defendant’s prior offenses in formulating their opinions, they also conducted interviews with defendant, and used the results of recently completed assessments and other dynamic factors in their evaluations.

Crucially, Yanofsky and Arnold both testified defendant’s diagnoses were lifelong, chronic conditions, and Alumbaugh opined sadism is not a disorder that goes away with time. Yanofsky and Alumbaugh both concluded defendant needs sex offender treatment to manage his conditions, but he refuses to undergo treatment because he does not believe he has a problem. In light of the chronic nature of his disorder, his refusal to seek treatment is substantial evidence he currently suffers a mental disorder. (See People v. Sumahit, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 354.)

Yanofsky noted defendant had admitted to another evaluator harboring rape fantasies, and when Yanofsky asked defendant why he committed his crimes, defendant said it was for sexual gratification. Yanofsky opined defendant’s current understanding of his past behavior showed the paraphilic disorder is still present.

It is not our role to reweigh the evidence or reassess the strength of the experts’ opinions. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, substantial evidence supports the finding defendant has a current mental disorder that makes him a danger to the health and safety of others.

2. Serious Difficulty Controlling Behavior

Defendant claims there is no evidence he has serious difficultly controlling his dangerous sexual behavior. He contends because he has demonstrated exemplary conduct in prison and the hospital over the past 28 years, he has shown he harbors no more deviant urges, fantasies, or tendencies, and to the extent he does have any such urges, he is able to control them. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the record contains substantial evidence he presently has serious difficulty controlling his behavior.

Alumbaugh opined defendant’s early disordered sexuality and the damage done to him at a young age prevents him from forming healthy attachments and results in an inability to regulate his behavior to this day. She explained he was “so horribly abused that sex and sexual matters are so problematic for him that I don’t think he’s able to control them at this point, . . . even when you factor in age.”

According to Yanofsky, defendant’s serious difficultly controlling his behavior is shown by several other factors, including, critically, the speed with which he reoffended, even after serving a lengthy prison sentence for his first rape. In addition, Yanofsky explained, defendant reoffended many times within a short period after being released from prison, and escalated his behavior in terms of its intensity, number of victims, and incorporation of additional elements of his desires. Yanofsky also opined defendant’s inability to control his behavior was evidenced by his history of serious drug abuse which he has managed to control only when institutionalized.

Defendant emphasizes criminal behavior and violence can still occur in controlled environments such as prisons and state hospitals, and maintains his good behavior demonstrates he can properly regulate his conduct. As defendant acknowledges, however, a finding of dangerousness sufficient to sustain a civil commitment does not require proof of a recent “overt act.” (§ 6600, subd. (d); see People v. Felix (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 607, 620; People v. Sumahit, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 353 [lack of violence while institutionalized does not prove defendant no longer suffers dangerous mental disorder].) Moreover, the experts did not agree defendant’s record in prison and the hospital reflected a reduced risk of reoffending. Both Alumbaugh and Yanofsky concluded defendant was able to control his behavior only because he was in a controlled environment. Yanofsky explained defendant had developed a particular “M.O.” (modus operandi) for his crimes he was not able to execute while in prison, and thus he has not had the opportunity to reoffend.[7] Both experts likewise opined defendant is highly intelligent, wants to get out of custody, and thus would not risk reoffending in prison or the hospital.

Further, as discussed above, both Alumbaugh and Yanofsky believe defendant will not be able to control his behavior without treatment. Alumbaugh indicated defendant refused treatment in part because he believed he had “put all of this behind him,” a statement she found “absolutely nonsense.” She opined his “disordered sexuality will once again or has the power to impact the way that he will act and the choices he will make.” Defendant’s resistance to treatment is particularly strong evidence of current dangerousness. (See People v. Sumahit, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 354 [“defendant’s refusal to undergo [sexual offender] treatment constitutes potent evidence that he is not prepared to control his untreated dangerousness by voluntary means”].)

In sum, substantial evidence supports the experts’ conclusions defendant would have serious difficultly controlling his sexually violent behavior and would likely reoffend if released.

B. Sanchez

Finally, we address defendant’s argument the prosecution’s expert opinions do not rise to the dignity of substantial evidence.[8] Citing Sanchez, defendant contends because the prosecution’s evaluators relied on facts never proven, their opinions were irrelevant and did not constitute sufficient evidence.

In Sanchez, which was decided after defendant’s trial, the California Supreme Court changed existing law regarding the use of hearsay by expert witnesses. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 682–683.) Before Sanchez, “the general rule was that ‘out-of-court statements offered to support an expert’s opinion are not hearsay because they are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. . . . [but] for the purpose of assessing the value of the expert’s opinion.’ ” (People v. Burroughs (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 378, 405.) Recognizing the validity of an expert opinion depends on the truth of the facts supporting it, our high court explained, “If the hearsay that the expert relies on and treats as true is not true, an important basis for the opinion is lacking.” (Sanchez, at pp. 682–683.) Sanchez clarified, “Any expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion, and may tell the jury in general terms that he did so. . . . [¶] What an expert cannot do is relate as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” (Id. at pp. 685–686.)

We note defendant does not challenge the admission of any specific evidence, but asserts generally the experts relied on and conveyed to the jury facts never proven. Nonetheless, defendant is correct that Sanchez applies to SVP proceedings, and thus, the prosecution experts could not relate to the jury case-specific hearsay unless the facts were independently proven or subject to a hearsay exception. (See People Burroughs, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 404–407; People v. Roa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 428, 452.)

Our review of the record reveals most of the case-specific facts relied upon by the prosecution experts to support their opinions were admitted by defendant in his eight interviews with prosecution and defense experts. Party admissions are a well-established exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1220; People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1007–1008.) As such, the experts would not be precluded from relying on, or conveying to the jury, facts which defendant admitted. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 685–686.) In addition, to the extent any expert testimony violated Sanchez, “We evaluate prejudice . . . under the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, which requires reversal if ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (People v. Jeffrey G. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 501, 510.)

We begin by observing both of the prosecution experts relied on many of the same facts in rendering their opinions defendant has a current mental disorder. First, they each considered the facts of his crimes. Alumbaugh cited the anal sex, bondage, and the sequence of sodomy followed by oral copulation. Defendant admitted raping, sodomizing, and tying up Susan W., raping and sodomizing Katherine, and raping, sodomizing, and forcing Paula K. to copulate him. Noting most people do not admit to deviant sexual fantasies, Yanofsky said the factual basis for defendant’s paraphilia diagnosis came primarily from defendant’s early exhibitionist behavior in the military followed by the multiple rapes. Defendant admitted exposing his penis to a woman on the Air Force base, and in addition to the rapes above, also admitted raping Leona S. and Susan H.

Alumbaugh and Yanofsky also both relied on the fact defendant was sexually aroused by the rapes and enjoyed torturing, hurting, and humiliating his victims. As examples, Alumbaugh cited the fact defendant made the two women in the hotel “perform,” and Yanofsky referenced defendant’s bondage of Susan W.—defendant admitted both acts. In interviews, defendant also conceded he enjoyed the rapes, telling Yanofsky in 2015 he raped for sexual gratification and he “obviously” enjoyed the rape of Paula K. in the hotel. Indeed, Yanofsky related that defendant “described an enjoyment out of finding an opportunity to have not only one but two victims and really play and humiliate and make these women a part of the sexual fantasy that he, obviously, acted out in great detail . . . and victimizing both women.”

Both experts relied on the fact defendant chose nonconsenting partners and used force, over and above what was needed to get his victims to cooperate. Defendant admitted using a knife to accomplish his assault on Susan H., Susan W., and Leona S., and a gun in his assault on Paula K. Defendant also told Yanofsky he made Paula K. run down the street naked before raping and sodomizing her. Defendant admitted tying Susan W.’s hands, sticking the point of a knife in her neck, and cutting off her nightgown.

Additional facts supporting the different experts’ opinions were also admitted by defendant. Alumbaugh’s sexual sadism diagnosis relied heavily on defendant’s early disordered sexuality and abandonments, which led to significant empathy deficits. Defendant told the evaluators about the sexual abuse he experienced as a child.

In explaining his diagnoses, Yanofsky relied on defendant’s extensive efforts to prepare, plan, and act out his fantasies and his development of an M.O. consisting of using a mask, dark clothing, and a weapon to subdue his victims. Defendant admitted using his military training and background to plan the rapes, as well as wearing a mask, dark clothing, and using weapons in his crimes. Further, Yanofsky found it significant that unlike most people who talk about feeling impaired by drug use, defendant reported methamphetamine “actually unleashed [his] true self . . . and allowed him to better plan for and execute [the rapes].”

Yanofsky noted defendant’s lack of empathy for his victims and intimacy deficits, as shown for example, by continuing to rape 71-year-old Leona S. after he discovered she was bleeding. When Yanofsky asked defendant why he continued, defendant said he was “horny” and “was just looking to finish.” Defendant also told Yanofsky “sex for him was like stealing something. He was stealing sex as opposed to stealing an object and using the victims as a means to . . . ejaculate in the same way he would masturbate.”

Yanofsky cited additional examples of defendant’s own attitude and assessment of his behavior as evidence of his antisocial personality disorder and paraphilia. Defendant admitted to being a highly sexualized individual not satisfied with consenting sex from a compliant partner, and he admitted raping a pregnant woman and a 71 year old, unusual sexual partners, because he was “horny.” Yanofsky also cited defendant’s impulsivity as reflected by his offense history, substance abuse, and throwing a chair at his daughter, all of which defendant admitted.

Significantly, in concluding defendant was likely to reoffend, both prosecution experts based their opinions on defendant’s statements he had no intention of seeking sex offender treatment. Yanofsky further cited defendant’s comments during his interview that he engaged in the rapes for sexual gratification. In addition, Yanofsky said he read in one evaluator’s report defendant admitted 25 percent of his fantasies still involved rape. In his expert testimony, Arnold confirmed defendant admitted masturbating to fantasies of finding a woman in a house he was burglarizing 25 percent of the time until 2007. And Yanofsky repeatedly emphasized the importance of the speed of defendant’s reoffense after incarceration for his first rape, and the acceleration of his crimes in terms of incorporating additional elements in successive rapes, all facts defendant admitted.

It is true the experts also discussed case-specific facts not clearly admitted by defendant. For example, Alumbaugh mentioned a “shoe theme” in some of defendant’s assaults, discussed drawings depicting bondage allegedly found in defendant’s apartment, and pointed out defendant forced victims to swallow ejaculate, a particularly demeaning act. Yanofsky described defendant’s nonqualifying offenses in which he entered homes and attempted to rape women but was interrupted, related information learned from an interview with defendant’s wife about his sexual behavior in their marriage, and noted defendant forced Katherine C. to defecate, suggesting a possible interest in coprophilia.

We do not reverse, however, unless it is reasonably probable an outcome more favorable to defendant would have resulted had such evidence been excluded. (People v. Jeffrey G., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 510.) In light of the overwhelming admissible evidence supporting the experts’ opinions defendant has a current mental disorder and presents a substantial and well-founded risk of reoffending, we conclude it is not reasonably probable a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had the trial court prevented the experts from testifying to the additional, case-specific facts which defendant did not admit in his interviews. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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Margulies, J.

We concur:

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Humes, P.J.

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Dondero, J.