P. v. Stoll
Filed 10/23/06 P. v. Stoll CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM HENRY STOLL, Defendant and Appellant. | D048252 (Super. Ct. No. SCE251454) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Herbert J. Exarhos, Judge. Affirmed.
William Henry Stoll pleaded guilty to elder abuse and was placed on probation. Roughly eight months later Stoll's probation was revoked when he admitted testing positive for marijuana and methamphetamine. The court denied Stoll's request for a diagnostic evaluation by the Department of Corrections under Penal Code section 1203.03 and sentenced him to three years in state prison. Stoll appeals, contending the trial court erroneously failed to order a diagnostic evaluation to determine whether to send him to prison before his sentencing. He also contends the trial court erred in failing to assess his eligibility for commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC). We conclude that the trial court correctly denied the request for diagnostic evaluation and that Stoll waived the commitment issue by not raising it with the sentencing court. Consequently we affirm the judgment.
Factual Background
A felony criminal complaint charged Stoll with two counts each of elder abuse and attempted criminal threats arising out of an incident in which Stoll grabbed his octogenarian mother by the ears while yelling at her and threw things around the house after she told a telephone caller he was home. Immediately after this outburst, Stoll's mother went to a neighbor and asked for help with contacting the police. A few hours later, Stoll confronted the neighbor, threatening to kill his mother and burn down her home. Stoll's mother obtained temporary restraining order against him and asked another neighbor to serve Stoll with the order. Stoll contacted this neighbor by phone and left a message in which he again threatened to burn down his mother's home, shoot his mother and harm himself if the neighbor failed to inform Stoll of his mother's whereabouts -- she was staying at a hotel out of fear.
Stoll pleaded guilty to one count of elder abuse. Under the plea agreement, the court dismissed the balance of the complaint. As a result of his plea, the trial court revoked Stoll's summary probation in two misdemeanor cases and placed him on formal probation with specified terms and conditions, including 240 days in county jail and random drug testing.
About six months later, Stoll admitted violating the terms of his probation by testing positive for marijuana and methamphetamine. Stoll's probation officer recommended that the court refer Stoll for a diagnostic evaluation. The court refused to order a diagnostic evaluation, revoked Stoll's probation and sentenced him to three years in prison.
Discussion
I
Penal Code section 1203.03 provides, in pertinent part, that the trial court may order a diagnostic evaluation of a defendant if it concludes that diagnosis and treatment services are essential to the just disposition of the case. (Pen. Code, § 1203.03, subd. (a); People v. Harris (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 76, 85.) Diagnostic reports are used to help the trial court determine whether to sentence a defendant to prison or place him on probation. (See People v. Tang (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 669, 676.) Whether to order a diagnostic study is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court abuses this discretion only where its ruling is beyond the bounds of reason. (People v. Harris, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 85.)
Stoll contends that the court erred in not ordering a diagnostic study because it could have used more information about the extent of his drug use and his mental condition when sentencing him. This contention is unavailing.
The court received ample information regarding Stoll's mental condition and did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to obtain further information in the form of a diagnostic report. Stoll's criminal record clearly demonstrated an escalating pattern of force and violence, a problem with anger management and a continuing failure to recognize the court's efforts to deal with his behavior. Stoll's first criminal offenses stemmed from violations of restraining orders granted to previous girlfriends. Next, Stoll was charged with misdemeanor battery and elder abuse for pouring soup on his mother's head, smashing her finger in a drawer and yelling at her. While on summary probation for these offenses, Stoll committed the underlying offense.
When Stoll was placed on probation in this case, the judge acknowledged his continued violent and threatening acts and his failure to abide by court orders. The court warned Stoll that a failure to comply with the conditions of his probation would ultimately result in a state prison term. Yet, the record shows Stoll was unwilling to comply with the law and continued his pattern of violent behavior. Just five months after being granted probation for elder abuse, upon returning home one evening, Stoll bit his roommate and struck a female visitor in the side with a metal pipe. There was also ample evidence Stoll continued to consume alcohol and use illicit substances.
The court reviewed a probation report which discussed Stoll's emotional problems, specifically his issues with managing his anger, and included references to his drug use and alcohol consumption. After considering the report, the court determined a diagnostic evaluation would not aid in making an appropriate sentencing determination noting "when you are on probation for roughing up your 80-year-old mother, and then you take a [metal] pipe to somebody, it's not the thing of which [probation] reinstatement is made." The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in concluding a diagnostic report was unnecessary to fairly sentence Stoll after his third probation violation.
II
Stoll also contends the court abused its discretion by not referring him for CRC evaluation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051. Welfare and Institutions Code, section 3051 provides that "if it appears to the judge" that a defendant is a narcotics addict, the judge "shall suspend the execution of the sentence" and order the "commitment of the defendant . . . for confinement in the narcotic detention, treatment, and rehabilitation facility unless, in the opinion of the judge" there is a "pattern of criminality" rendering the defendant unfit for commitment. However, a criminal defendant must request placement with the CRC to preserve the issue for appeal. (People v. Planavsky (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1300.)
Stoll waived this issue by not requesting the court consider ordering a CRC evaluation or otherwise inquiring into the applicability of Welfare and Institutions Code, section 3051 at sentencing. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 [complaints about sentencing cannot be raised for first time on appeal]; see also People v. Planavsky, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1311-1312 [failure to request CRC evaluation waived error].) If Stoll was concerned that the court failed to assess his fitness for CRC evaluation, he could and should have brought it to the sentencing court's attention and had it resolved.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
HALLER, J.
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