Filed 6/1/17 P. v. Taddei CA5



NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL ROBERT TADDEI,

Defendant and Appellant.

F071162

(Super. Ct. No. MCR042335)


OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Ernest J. LiCalsi, Judge.
Robert J. Beles, Paul McCarthy, and Joseph L. Ryan, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A. Martinez, and Charity S. Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Daniel Robert Taddei was convicted of rape, forcible oral copulation, and incest, as a result of sexually assaulting his 17-year-old half sister, C.M. He was also convicted of domestic violence and felony witness intimidation for, respectively, hitting his wife, Ashley Taddei (Ashley), and impelling her to give a false statement to the police. On appeal, Taddei raises three claims of prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct as well as a related claim of cumulative error, all of which we reject. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Taddei was charged with, and found guilty by a jury of, incest, rape, forcible oral copulation, willful infliction of corporal injury, and felony witness intimidation. (Pen. Code, §§ 285, 261, subd. (a)(2), 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A), 273.5, subd (a), and 136.1, subd. (c)(1).) He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 24 years in prison.
The Prosecution Case
In 2011, Taddei, his wife Ashley, and their three young children lived in a house in Chowchilla. Taddei’s younger half sister, C.M., who was 17 and a senior in high school, lived with them. In the early morning hours of November 10, 2011, Taddei and Ashley were “hanging out, having a couple drinks in [their] home.” C.M. and the children were asleep. At some point, Taddei and Ashley got into an argument, and when Ashley went to bed, Taddei hit her across the mouth, busting her lip and causing it to bleed. Shortly thereafter, at about 2:30 or 3:00 a.m., Ashley left the house and drove to the Chowchilla Police Department, where she reported the abuse. The police photographed the injury to her lip (the photograph was admitted into evidence at trial). Ashley remained at the police department until the police went to her house and arrested Taddei for domestic violence.
Rape of C.M. and Taddei’s Initial Arrest
Right around the time that Ashley left for the police department, Taddei knocked on the door of C.M.’s bedroom. C.M. was asleep and her door was locked. Awakened by the knocking, C.M. glanced at her bedside clock and noted it was 3:00 a.m. As she opened the door, Taddei pushed her inside and shoved her backwards onto the bed. C.M. tried to push Taddei away but he overpowered her, got on top of her, and held her down on the bed. He began to pull off her shorts and underwear; C.M. tried in vain to hold them up. She also kicked and struggled to get Taddei off of her. Finally, Taddei punched C.M. in her side, stunning her. He then raped her, forcing “his [erect] penis into [her] vagina” and “going in and out.” C.M. testified: “He also told me he was going to do it every time Ashley left for work or when she fell asleep.” C.M. was “terrified.”
At one point, Taddei put his mouth over C.M.’s vagina, telling her to just “relax” and “enjoy it.” Thereafter, he got back on top of her and vaginally penetrated her again. He told her that she was “a woman now” and that adults “can do these kinds of things.” Taddei eventually stopped and left the room, leaving his boxers behind. C.M. got up, locked the door, sat on the floor, and cried. The entire incident lasted about 30 to 40 minutes.
At around 5:00 or 5:30 a.m., Chowchilla police officers arrived at the Taddei residence, in response to Ashley’s report of domestic violence. Taddei, who had answered the door, was taken into custody. The officers did not have any contact with C.M. on this occasion. However, when Ashley returned home shortly thereafter, C.M. told her that Taddei had raped her. Ashley told C.M. that she had been sitting outside the Chowchilla Police Department, waiting for the police to arrest Taddei because he had hit her in the mouth; Ashley’s lip was “bleeding and cracked open.” Ashley called Taddei’s father, and after talking to him, decided to take C.M. to Madera Community Hospital.
Events at Madera Community Hospital
Ashley and C.M. went to Madera Community Hospital and reported C.M.’s rape. The hospital notified Chowchilla police. Consequently, Detective Charles Scott, who had just transported Taddei from a local holding facility to the Department of Justice’s jail in Madera, was dispatched to the hospital. He arrived at the hospital around 7:30 a.m. and contacted Ashley and C.M. Scott took a brief statement from Ashley and C.M. at the hospital. C.M. was “upset, crying, emotionally upset.” For her part, Ashley told Scott that her husband had hit her on the mouth, prompting her to leave the house at approximately 3:00 a.m. to report the abuse to the police. Ashley said that the sexual assault on C.M. must have happened while she was away at the police department. C.M. interjected, “That’s when it happened[!]” Scott referred C.M. for an examination by a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) nurse in Fresno.
Physical Evidence Presented at Trial
The SART nurse who examined C.M. documented erythema or redness in her genital area. The nurse testified that the erythema could have been caused by a range of factors. The nurse did not find any lacerations or tears to C.M.’s vagina. She also swabbed C.M.’s cervix, vagina, and fingernails in order to collect potential DNA evidence. The vaginal swabs prepared by the SART nurse were eventually tested by the Department of Justice’s laboratory in Richmond. Laboratory analysis revealed the presence of sperm on the swabs. The laboratory then generated a DNA profile from the sperm. The DNA profile generated from the sperm was compared to a profile of Taddei’s DNA, also generated by the same laboratory. Taddei’s DNA profile “matched [the] major male profile” obtained from the sperm on the vaginal swabs.
Testimony of Detective Charles Scott
Detective Scott interviewed C.M. after her SART examination was completed. C.M. was upset and cried at various points during the interview. Scott also inspected C.M.’s bedroom and collected evidence, including Taddei’s boxers.
A few days later, Ashley requested a meeting with Detective Scott. She came to his office and presented an entirely different story from her statement at Madera Community Hospital. This time she said that Taddei had not deliberately hit her in the mouth on November 10. Rather, he hit her by accident while they were playing a Wii game. Ashley also said that after they finished playing the game, she went out to get food from a Jack in the Box but had to circle back to the house to collect her purse. Upon entering the house to retrieve her purse, Ashley saw Taddei and C.M. having consensual sex in C.M.’s bedroom, the door to which was open.
After Ashley provided this new, dramatically different statement, Detective Scott obtained and listened to audio recordings of the numerous phone calls that Taddei had made to Ashley from jail. He concluded Taddei and Ashley’s phone conversations undermined the reliability of Ashley’s latest statement that she had seen Taddei and C.M. having consensual sex. Scott further learned that Ashley had bailed Taddei out of jail before she came to meet with him.
Thereafter, on November 14th or 15th, Detective Scott had another meeting with C.M. and Ashley, but talked to each one separately. He told C.M. that Ashley had reported that she saw C.M. and Taddei having consensual sex; C.M. “immediately started crying.” Scott next confronted Ashley about the inconsistent statements she had made to him, and pointed out that her recorded phone calls with Taddei, when he was in jail, undermined the veracity of her latest story. Scott told Ashley that in light of the information in the recorded phone calls, he simply did not believe her story about going to the Jack in the Box and returning to find C.M. and Taddei having consensual sex. Scott explained: “I believed [Ashley] was interfering with my investigation. She was violating the law.” Scott further testified he was prepared to take her into custody unless she retracted the concocted Jack in the Box story. Eventually, Ashley admitted that Taddei had told her “to come in and talk to [Scott]” to tell Scott, falsely, that she had seen Taddei and C.M. “having consensual sex.”
After Ashley admitted that Taddei had persuaded her to tell Detective Scott the concocted story, Scott set up a consensually-recorded pretext phone call between Ashley and Taddei. The pretext phone call captured an incriminating conversation between Ashley and Taddei. Scott then drove to Madera, located Taddei, and arrested him “for dissuading or intimidating a witness.”
Ashley’s Trial Testimony
Ashley testified at trial under a grant of immunity. She testified that on November 10 she and Taddei were hanging out and drinking late at night, after their children and C.M. were in bed. They played a video game involving physical movements, during which Taddei accidentally hit her in the mouth and injured her lip. Later, Ashley went to a Jack in the Box to get food because they were hungry. She realized she had forgotten to bring her purse and returned to the house, where she saw C.M. and Taddei having sex in C.M.’s room, the door to which was open. C.M.’s leg was in a triangle, knee bent and pointing up, with her foot flat on the bed. Ashley believed the sex was consensual because C.M. was not struggling or pushing Taddei away. Ashley left the house again and went to the Chowchilla Police Department, where she made a false report of domestic violence because she was angry at what she had seen and wanted Taddei out of the house.
When Ashley returned to the house, Taddei had already been taken into custody by the police, on her complaint of domestic violence. Ashley went to check on her children and C.M. C.M. told her that Taddei had raped her. C.M. was crying. Ashley woke her children up, dropped them at her sister’s house in Madera, and took C.M. to Madera Community Hospital and thereafter to Fresno for her SART examination. Ashley testified that she felt “lost” after she returned to her sister’s house in Madera, upon completion of C.M.’s SART examination.
Ashley repeatedly testified that she had lied to police officers at the Chowchilla Police Department as well as to Detective Scott during the investigation. She said she lied to the officers at Chowchilla Police Department when she went there on November 10 and reported that Taddei had hit her across the mouth. She also said she had lied when she told Scott that Taddei made her tell Scott that she had seen C.M. and Taddei having consensual sex.
Ashley could not remember whether she and Taddei discussed his conduct with C.M. when she bailed him out of jail. Nor could she remember whether Taddei had ever tried to explain what happened between him and C.M. or apologized for his conduct. Indeed, Ashley could not remember anything Taddei had said about his conduct that night; nor could she remember her reaction to anything he said about his conduct. Ashley also did not remember discussing the incident with C.M. or any of her own friends. Ashley acknowledged, however, that in 2006, Taddei was arrested for slapping and shoving her.
The Defense Case
The defense called a single witness, Richard Trevino, Taddei’s brother-in-law. Trevino testified he had lived with Taddei and Ashley for about six months and never saw Taddei strike Ashley.
DISCUSSION
I. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Taddei raises three claims of prosecutorial misconduct as well as a related claim of cumulative error. He first contends the prosecutor improperly questioned Ashley as to whether Detective Scott had asked her if she would pass a polygraph examination, in regard to her claim of witnessing Taddei and C.M. having consensual sex. Taddei next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by playing an unredacted recording of Taddei’s police interrogation—despite having agreed previously to redact it—in which Scott suggested that Ashley suffered from battered spouse syndrome. Finally, Taddei contends the prosecutor impermissibly argued, in closing, that Ashley’s testimony was “pathetic,” and that her “most honest testimony” was her admission that she felt “lost” in the aftermath of the instant events. Assuming Taddei’s claims were properly preserved for review, none of these claims, nor his related claim of cumulative error, requires reversal of the judgment.
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor uses deceptive or reprehensible methods in attempting to persuade either the trial court or the jury. (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 298.) However, “[a] defendant’s conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct … unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the misconduct.” (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839 (Crew).)
“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970 (Frye), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 (Doolin).) “In conducting this inquiry, we ‘do not lightly infer’ that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.” (Frye, supra, at p. 970.)
Prosecutorial misconduct can violate the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects the trial with a level of unfairness that renders the resulting conviction a denial of due process. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.)
A. References to Polygraph Examination
Taddei argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting inadmissible testimony from Ashley about her discussion with Detective Scott, regarding whether she would pass a polygraph test on her latest story, i.e., that she saw Taddei and C.M. having consensual sex. Taddei contends the prosecutor’s questions regarding the polygraph examination were prejudicial and require reversal. We disagree.
Background
Detective Scott testified that Ashley initially told him that Taddei had hit her in the mouth and, at around 3:00 a.m., she left the house to go to the Chowchilla Police Department to report the abuse. She said the sexual assault on C.M. must have occurred while she was away. Later, after Taddei had bailed out of jail, Ashley changed her story. She told Scott that she had run out to a Jack in the Box, and on circling back to the house to pick up her purse, she saw Taddei and C.M. having consensual sex; the discovery enraged her and she went to the police and falsely reported that Taddei had hit her. On this occasion, Ashley also said that the injury to her lip had occurred earlier, when Taddei had accidentally hit her while playing a video game. After Ashley dramatically changed her story, Scott investigated further and, in a subsequent meeting, told Ashley he did not believe her new account.
The prosecutor questioned Ashley about that specific exchange with Detective Scott:
“Q [the prosecutor]: Did Detective Scott ask you about taking a polygraph test?
“A [Ashley]: Yes.
“Q: Did Detective Scott ask you about whether or not you would pass that polygraph test in regard to seeing consensual sex between the defendant and his half sister?”
“A: Yes.”
After an objection by defense counsel on grounds of relevance and speculation, the trial court excused the jury and reprimanded the prosecutor, explaining that Evidence Code section 351.1 barred the admission of evidence related to polygraph examinations. The court denied defense counsel’s request for a mistrial but noted that a mistrial would have been warranted “had the witness gotten any farther with the testimony.” The court decided, in view of the limited testimony on the issue, that any prejudice to Taddei would be cured by striking Ashley’s answers and admonishing the jury that it could not consider the exchange “for any purpose, including on testing the witness’ credibility.” The court also ruled that the polygraph reference “can’t be in any transcript” admitted at trial. After the jury returned, the court instructed:
“Ladies and gentlemen, under California law, there can be no evidence of whether a witness or anyone was … offered to take a polygraph or was asked to take a polygraph, and so all of that’s stricken. You are to disregard it. You are not to consider it for any purpose, especially in assessing this witness’ credibility. Do you understand?”
The jurors nodded in assent.
Analysis
Taddei argues the prosecutor’s questions about the polygraph-related discussion between Scott and Ashley constitute prejudicial misconduct. While we are troubled by the prosecutor’s questions, we need not resolve whether these questions constitute misconduct because, as discussed below, Taddei was not prejudiced by this line of questioning and, therefore, reversal is not warranted. (See Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 839 [“A defendant’s conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct … unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the misconduct.”].) More specifically here, “[i]n the context of erroneously offered polygraph evidence, [our Supreme Court has] held that a trial court’s timely admonition, which the jury is presumed to have followed, cures prejudice resulting from the admission of such evidence.” (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 953 (Cox), disapproved on another point in Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)
Here, the prosecutor questioned Ashley as to whether Detective Scott had asked her about taking a polygraph test on her claim that she saw Taddei and C.M. having consensual sex. Taddei specifically contends the prosecutor’s reference to a polygraph examination undermined Ashley’s credibility by creating the inferences (1) that Scott was skeptical about Ashley’s claim of seeing consensual sex between Taddei and C.M.; and (2) that Ashley had in fact taken a polygraph test and failed it. Taddei argues the prosecutor’s line of questioning prejudiced his defense, which was premised on Ashley’s trial testimony, and in turn, her credibility.
Taddei’s argument is unpersuasive because Ashley’s credibility was damaged to a far greater degree by factors other than the prosecutor’s polygraph references. For instance, Ashley repeatedly testified at trial that she had lied to the police and lied to Detective Scott. Ashley also could not remember critical details relevant to her claims, such as how Taddei had explained his conduct to her and how she reacted to his explanation. The record also persuasively demonstrated that Ashley’s version of events dramatically changed over the course of the investigation and that she was being manipulated by Taddei. In addition, the prosecutor impeached Ashley with her prior statements. These factors severely damaged Ashley’s credibility, rendering inconsequential the prosecutor’s references to a polygraph examination.
Taddei’s suggestion that the polygraph references were prejudicial because they revealed that Detective Scott doubted Ashley’s veracity is also unavailing. Scott’s own testimony made clear he did not believe Ashley’s story about going to the Jack in the Box and returning home to find Taddei and C.M. having consensual sex. He testified he was prepared to put Ashley in jail for hindering his investigation by concocting this story. He also testified that Ashley eventually admitted the story was false and that Taddei had directed her to adopt it and present it to Scott. Indeed, a recording of Ashley’s statement to this effect was played for the jury.
Furthermore, Taddei’s contention that the inadmissible polygraph evidence would invite the jury to speculate that Ashley had taken and failed a polygraph test is foreclosed by the court’s curative admonition to the jury. The court promptly instructed the jury that any evidence regarding an offer to take a polygraph test was stricken and the jury was required to disregard it. The court emphasized the jury could not consider the stricken evidence to assess Ashley’s credibility. We conclude the court’s actions were sufficient to offset any potential prejudicial impact in terms of speculation by the jury about Ashley’s credibility on this basis. (See, e.g., People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 728 [on appeal we assume the jury followed the court’s instructions and admonitions]; People v. Cahan (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 891, 904 [same]; Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 953 disapproved on another point in Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)
On the record presented by this case, there is no reasonable probability that, had the prosecutor not asked Ashley about Detective Scott’s references to a polygraph test, the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to Taddei. Accordingly, we reject Taddei’s contention that the prosecutor’s line of questioning was prejudicial and requires reversal of his convictions.

B. Detective Scott’s Reference to Battered Spouse Syndrome
Taddei next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by playing an unredacted audio recording of Detective Scott’s interrogation of Taddei, in which Scott suggested that Ashley suffered from battered spouse syndrome. Taddei has not included the challenged recording, or a transcription, in the record lodged with this court. In any event, his argument fails.
Background
After Ashley admitted to Detective Scott that Taddei had put her up to lying about seeing Taddei and C.M. having consensual sex, Scott arrested Taddei and booked him into jail for intimidating a witness. Scott also interrogated Taddei at that time. The prosecutor played an audio recording of the interrogation for the jury. In the course of the interrogation, the detective stated: “I’ll even talk to the DA and say [Ashley] probably has battered spouse syndrome ... and that’s why she did what she did.” Defense counsel objected (without specifying the grounds for his objection) and asked for a mistrial. The prosecutor acknowledged she had previously agreed to defense counsel’s request to redact the reference to battered spouse syndrome but had inadvertently marked the unredacted CD for admission into evidence.
After the unredacted recording was played, the court immediately admonished the jury:
“And I just want to remind you that Detective Scott’s statements are not evidence. You shall not consider them as evidence. It’s just kind of like what I told you about the attorneys. What they say is not evidence. It’s only to help understand the answers. So you should disregard that completely. You’ve heard the evidence and you will decide based upon that, but you should disregard anything that Officer Scott says in this entire conversation because it’s not evidence. I mean, we talked about – he told the defendant about what Ashley told him. Well, that’s all just to get so you can understand the answers of the defendant, and only that. So you’re to disregard anything else.”
The court then denied defense counsel’s request for a mistrial. In denying the mistrial motion, the court noted that other evidence of domestic violence had been admitted at trial, which diminished the impact of Detective Scott’s reference to battered spouse syndrome.
Analysis
Taddei argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by playing the unredacted CD of Taddei’s police interrogation for the jury. He contends that Detective Scott’s suggestion, in the unredacted recording, that Ashley suffered from battered spouse syndrome was prejudicial because it (1) amounted to “an unsubstantiated attack on [Taddei’s] character” by casting him as a serial abuser, and (2) undermined Ashley’s credibility by creating an inference that she was “psychologically predisposed to lie to protect” Taddei. Again, we are troubled by the prosecutor’s conduct but need not resolve whether the prosecutor committed misconduct because Taddei was not prejudiced by the unredacted recording, and, accordingly, reversal is not warranted. (See Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 839 [“A defendant’s conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct … unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the misconduct.”].)
As the trial court observed, the impact of Detective Scott’s reference to battered spouse syndrome was diminished by other evidence in the record revealing that Taddei had a history of abusing Ashley. Indeed, the trial court noted that Taddei had acknowledged abusing Ashley in the course of the same interrogation. In addition, Ashley testified that Taddei was arrested in 2006 for slapping and shoving her. C.M. also testified that Taddei and Ashley had a volatile relationship and that Taddei treated Ashley in an abusive manner. Finally, Taddei’s mother testified Taddei had slapped Ashley so hard on one occasion that his hand left an imprint on Ashley’s face. Since other, more specific, evidence in the record demonstrated a history of physically abusive behavior by Taddei towards Ashley, Scott’s reference to battered spouse syndrome contained in the unredacted recording that was played for the jury was not appreciably prejudicial.
Taddei’s contention that the reference to battered spouse syndrome was prejudicial because it undermined Ashley’s credibility is also unavailing. As discussed above, Ashley’s credibility was damaged to a far greater extent by other factors such as her inconsistent statements, her admissions that she had lied to the police, and her admission that Taddei was manipulating her into giving false statements to the police.
Finally, we are satisfied that the court’s prompt admonition to the jury limited any potential for prejudice arising from the jury’s exposure to the unredacted recording. The court instructed the jury to consider Detective Scott’s statements solely for purposes of understanding Taddei’s answers and to otherwise disregard them. Taddei has not persuaded us that this admonition was ineffective.
On the instant record, there is no reasonable probability that, had the prosecutor not played the unredacted recording of Detective Scott’s interrogation of Taddei, the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to Taddei. Accordingly, we reject Taddei’s contention that the jury’s exposure to this recording was prejudicial and requires reversal of his convictions.
C. The Prosecutor’s Closing Comments
Taddei further contends that the prosecutor improperly commented on Ashley’s veracity in her closing argument. Specifically, he asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing that Ashley’s testimony was “really pathetic” and that “some of [Ashley’s] most honest testimony” was her statement that she was “lost” after the instant events unfolded. Taddei alleges that in making these comments, the prosecutor improperly expressed her personal opinion and implied she had extra-record information that undercut Ashley’s credibility. We reject these contentions.
Ashley’s trial testimony contradicted statements she made in reporting domestic violence at the Chowchilla Police Department, the statement she gave to Detective Scott at Madera Community Hospital, as well as her admission to Scott that Taddei made her tell Scott, falsely, that she had seen Taddei and C.M. having consensual sex. Furthermore, Ashley was impeached with recordings of phone conversations she had with Taddei while he was in jail, as well as with recordings of her prior statements to Scott. Ashley also testified at trial that she loved Taddei and had felt lost after the instant events unfolded.
The closing comments that Taddei now challenges were based squarely on the evidence presented at trial. Specifically, the prosecutor argued:
“Now, Ashley testified that she saw consensual sex. Ashley’s testimony – well, there was a litany of ‘I don’t remembers.’ And Ashley’s testimony was really pathetic. But she loves the defendant, and she came in here and stood by her man the way she’s supposed to. Ashley did not see any sex. Ashley was in the Chowchilla Police Department, deciding whether or not to file a police report against her husband for him hitting her again.”
The prosecutor further pointed out that Ashley’s testimony that she had stood by and silently watched her husband and his half sister having consensual sex made no sense, especially when Ashley could not remember many details about what she had seen. The prosecutor continued:
“[Ashley] didn’t see [any sex]. She was in the Chowchilla Police Department parking lot.
“And Ashley, she has multiple motives to lie. That doesn’t mean her complete testimony is fabricated. It’s not. She did take [C.M.] to the hospital. She did take [C.M.] to the sexual assault nurse in Fresno. And I think some of her most honest moments on the stand [were] that brief amount of time where she talked about being lost.”
We detect nothing improper in the prosecutor’s argument. Her comments were based on, and interpreted, the evidence presented in the case, and, accordingly, do not constitute misconduct. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 522 [a prosecutor enjoys wide latitude “to discuss and draw inferences from the evidence at trial,” including arguing “that a witness’s testimony is unsound, unbelievable, or even a patent lie”]; People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 958 [a prosecutor can comment on the credibility of witnesses based on facts in the record but not based on personal belief or by referring to evidence outside the record].)
Moreover, Ashley was not a strong witness by any measure, given her inconsistent statements as the case ran its course, the strong impeachment evidence presented by the prosecution, her own admissions that she had lied to the authorities, as well as the fact that she frequently answered questions by stating, “I don’t know” or “I don’t remember.” Accordingly, even assuming the prosecutor’s closing comments were improper, they were not prejudicial, as there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been more favorable to Taddei had the prosecutor not made the specific statements he complains of here.
We conclude that Taddei was not prejudiced by any of the alleged prosecutorial lapses he challenges in this appeal. We further reject his claim that these alleged errors cumulatively prejudiced him, rendering his trial fundamentally unfair. In two of the instances at issue, the trial court promptly and appropriately admonished the jury, thereby offsetting any potential for prejudice. As to the closing comments that Taddei challenges, both comments were proper, and even assuming otherwise, they did not affect the outcome at trial.


DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.


SMITH, J.
WE CONCUR:


______________________
FRANSON, Acting P.J.



PEÑA, J.