P. v. Valle
Filed 6/4/13 P. v. Valle CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
KAREN VALLE,
Defendant and
Appellant.
2d Crim. No.
B239524
(Super. Ct. No.
1368264)
(Santa
Barbara County)
Karen Valle (Valle)
appeals her felony conviction for attempted
dissuasion of a witness by force or threat.
We reject her challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the
trial court's instructional and evidentiary rulings. We affirm.
In 2010, Valle's
husband, from whom she had separated for a time, was charged with falsely
imprisoning, forcibly raping and sexually penetrating Tamara N. (Tamara). Nine days after her husband's
Valle went to the grocery store where Tamara worked as a checker. Valle waited patiently to get to the front of
Tamara's check-out line. Once there,
Valle leaned in close and called Tamara a "sick bitch" and a
"fucking bitch." She also told
her, "You're going to die" and "I'm going to kill
you." Tamara believed that Valle
had a knife, but gave different accounts of how Valle held it and no knife
could be seen in the store's video.
The People charged Valle
with attempting to dissuade a witness by force or threat (in violation of Pen.
Code, § 136.1, subd. (c)(1))
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
and making a criminal threat (in violation of § 422). The People also alleged that Valle personally
used a dangerous or deadly weapon (in violation of former § 12022, subd.
(b)(1)). The jury found Valle guilty of
attempted dissuasion of a witness, but found the weapon enhancement not
true. The jury hung on the criminal
threat counts. The trial court placed
Valle on three years' formal probation, including 120 days of county jail.
I. Sufficiency
of the Evidence
Valle argues that her
conviction must be overturned because there is insufficient evidence to support
the jury's finding that she intended to dissuade Tamara not to testify at the
upcoming preliminary hearing. Valle
contends that her threats were generic and reflect, at worst, a
"strong" and "manic" "dislike" of Tamara that
pre-dated (and thus had nothing to do with) the charges against Valle's
husband.
Our review is limited to
whether the jury's verdict is supported by "'. . . substantial
evidence . . . from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . .'" (
187, 194.) We review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and assess solely whether the supporting
evidence is "'. . . reasonable, inherently credible, and of solid value .
. . .'" (Ibid.)
There is substantial
evidence that Valle intended to dissuade Tamara from testifying against Valle's
husband. Valle knew about the
prosecution of her husband and thought it was "very awful" and
"very horrible"; knew Tamara was the key witness; and knew about the
upcoming preliminary hearing. Valle went
to a grocery store she rarely used, and waited in Tamara's check-out line
although other checkers were available in order to tell Tamara—just nine days
after the preliminary hearing date had been rescheduled—that she was a
"sick," "fucking bitch" who was "going to die." Given this evidence, it is of no moment that
Valle's threat did not explicitly reference her husband's ongoing prosecution
or the upcoming preliminary hearing.
(Accord, People v. Ford (1983)
145 Cal.App.3d 984, 988-990 [threat "'You punk motherfucker, we'll get
you, you've got kids'" sufficient to sustain conviction for dissuading a
witness].) It is also of no consequence
that Valle offered a different, innocent version of events. The jury could reasonably reject Valle's
competing account and conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that she spoke with
the intent to dissuade Tamara from testifying.
II. Evidentiary
Challenges
A. Details
of Crimes Charged Against Husband
Valle argues that the
trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to introduce some of the factual
details of her husband's alleged sexual crimes.
Through a series of leading questions, the prosecutor elicited that
Valle's husband used his body weight to hold down Tamara and thereafter
non-consensually penetrated her with his penis and his fingers. Valle asserts that the details of these
offenses are irrelevant and substantially outweighed by the danger of creating
undue prejudice through engendering sympathy for Tamara. We review the trial court's evidentiary
rulings for an abuse of discretion.
(E.g., People v. Lightsey (2012)
54 Cal.4th 668, 714.)
The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the "nature of the charges"
against Valle's husband was "probative" of Valle's motive because she
would have greater incentive to derail serious charges than less significant
charges.
The trial court also did
not abuse its discretion in weighing the probative value of this evidence
against its potential for undue prejudice.
The court was careful to admit only the "nature of the
charges" and to exclude "the details of the incident." Valle argues that the prosecutor transgressed
these limits, but the testimony elicited covers no more than the basic elements
of the offenses with which Valle's husband was charged. The jury consequently heard the evidence
pertinent to Valle's motive, but not the more salacious details that might have
been unduly prejudicial. Valle contends
that the court could have permissibly limited the prosecutor only to eliciting
that Valle's husband was charged with a serious felony with significant jail
time, but the viability of this alternative does not undermine the legality of
what the trial court actually did.
Because we conclude
there was no error, we have no occasion to consider Valle's further argument
that evidentiary error violated her due process rights. (People
v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435-436.)
B.
Valle next contends that
the trial court erred in allowing the investigating officer to offer expert
testimony that victims of violent crimes (such as sexual assault) sometimes
take longer to clearly recount the crime than the victims of other crimes. She claims that this testimony is improper
expert testimony and irrelevant.
Valle has forfeited her
objection to this testimony as improper expert testimony because she only
objected to its relevance. (
211.) The investigator's testimony was
not improper expert testimony in any event.
The speed with which crime victims are able to provide a more detailed
reconstruction of the victimizing incident is "sufficiently beyond common
experience" that expert testimony "would assist the trier of fact . .
. ." (Evid. Code, § 801, subd.
(a).) Valle argues that the
investigator's opinion impermissibly told jurors to believe Tamara over Valle,
but it did no such thing. (Cf.
Cal.4th 1, 82 & fn. 26 [expert opined that particular witness was telling
the truth].) Valle also contends that
this expert opinion should have been excluded because the trial court did not
permit her to elicit an expert
opinion regarding whether people sometimes exaggerate. Even if we accept Valle's dubious premise
that the erroneous exclusion of some evidence warrants the exclusion of other,
otherwise admissible evidence, the opinion Valle sought to elicit regarding
whether people sometimes exaggerate was properly excluded because it is not
"sufficiently beyond" the "common experience" of
jurors. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).)
The investigator's
testimony was also relevant. Indeed, it
was elicited in response to questioning by Valle regarding whether a witness's
memory generally improves or degrades over time. Valle's questions made it relevant to inquire
whether the memories of crime victims, particularly victims of violent crime,
work differently.
III. Instructional
Challenge
Valle asserts that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could "consider her
failure to explain or deny" evidence against her. (Jury Instruction No. 361.) Valle contends that she explained or denied
all evidence against her when she testified, rendering this instruction
improper. We need not consider the
propriety of this instruction because any error was harmless. By its plain terms, the instruction only came
into play if the jury determined Valle failed to explain or deny evidence. Because this instruction only became relevant
if the jury found these factual predicates and would not apply if the jury did
not (as Valle claims is the correct conclusion), the instruction did not
prejudice Valle. (People v. Ballard (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 752, 756-757.)
IV. Cumulative
Error
Because we conclude that
the trial court committed no prejudicial error, there is no error to
cumulate. (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1064.)
DISPOSITION
judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
HOFFSTADT,
J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
PERREN, J.
Jean
M. Dandona, Judge
Superior
Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
The Law Office of John
Derrick, John Derrick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E.
Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
name="_ftn2" title=""> * (Judge
of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to art. 6, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
