P. v. Venegas
Filed 6/14/06 P. v. Venegas CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NATHAN R. VENEGAS, Defendant and Appellant. | G035103 (Super. Ct. No. 03NF1414) O P I N I O N |
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gregg L. Prickett, Judge. Affirmed.
Lynelle K. Hee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Foster and James D. Dutton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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A jury convicted Nathan Venegas of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); all statutory citations to this code unless noted), felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851), and recklessly evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2). The jury also found he used a gun during the carjacking. (§ 12022.53, subd. (a).) Venegas admitted he had previously suffered two serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a) and the Three Strikes law, and that he previously served a prison term. The trial court imposed a sentence of 53 years to life. Venegas contends the court should have stayed a 16-month consecutive term for felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to section 654 because he possessed the gun solely to facilitate the crime of carjacking. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's sentencing choice. Consequently, we affirm the judgment.
I
On the morning of April 18, 2003, Carrie Mock, three months pregnant, drove her SUV into a store parking lot in the City of Brea. Defendant approached, pulled out a white-handled revolver wrapped in a sock, pointed it at Mock's stomach, and demanded her keys. He permitted her to remove her 15-month-old daughter before he decamped in the vehicle. Police officers arrested Venegas driving Mock's SUV 10 days later. No weapon was recovered.
II
Defendant asserts section 654 prohibits punishing him both for using a firearm during the carjacking and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on the facts of this case, we disagree.
Section 654 bars multiple punishment for acts comprising a course of conduct violating more than one criminal statute but constituting an indivisible transaction. (People v. Saffle (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 434, 438.) In other words, a defendant may be punished only once if he or she harbored a single intent and all the crimes were incidental to one objective. (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) But consecutive sentences may be imposed when a defendant entertains consecutive criminal goals or pursues different objectives simultaneously. (People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944, 952.) In sum, â€
