P. v. Ward

Filed 7/31/07 P. v. Ward CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yolo)

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Defendant KC Ward was convicted in a court trial of felony possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia used for unlawfully injecting or smoking a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code 11364(a)). Defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting inculpatory statements made to police officers in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694] (Miranda). He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by unfairly shifting the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense, thereby unreasonably allowing defendants statements into evidence. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Narcotics enforcement agents Gary Hallenbeck and Eric Angle arrested a parolee, Roy Orzoco, during a traffic stop. The two agents subsequently conducted a parole search of Orozcos residence, to which the other inhabitants of the residence consented.

While conducting a search of a bedroom, Hallenbeck saw a shotgun, a .22 caliber rifle, and two glass methamphetamine smoking pipes, in plain view in an open closet. Hallenbeck interviewed the defendant, a resident, who admitted that the pipes and firearms belonged to him.

During the preliminary hearing, Angle testified neither he nor Hallenbeck Mirandized defendant. The People filed a motion in limine, seeking to establish defendant was a felon and resolve any Miranda issues before trial.

The Miranda hearing was held pursuant to Evidence Code section 402. At the hearing, the People called Hallenbeck as their sole witness. He testified that he interviewed defendant twice inside the residence, and that he Mirandized defendant during the first interview. He testified that defendant told him he understood and waived those rights, and that Angle was outside during the interview.

Defendant called Angle to testify. (Ibid.) As in his earlier testimony, Angle said that neither agent advised defendant of his rights when they jointly interviewed him. Angle further testified that while he did not recall when defendant was outside, at one point defendant was inside and then he was outside. He did not see Hallenbeck or defendant enter or leave the residence. Nor did he remember if Hallenbeck was alone with the defendant in the residence. He said that he did not see what Hallenbeck was doing, because he was watching parolee Orozco and talking to Orozcos girlfriend, who wanted to speak to him.

Defense counsel argued that Angles testimony showed that defendant was not Mirandized, and that the sequence of events to which Angle testified eliminated the possibility that [defendant] was called into the house twice as Officer Hallenbeck testified. Moreover, Angle was more credible because he kept notes of the arrest as the reporting officer, and his testimony at the preliminary hearing, given two months after the arrest, was more reliable than Hallenbecks testimony, offered nearly one year later. While Hallenbeck thought that he Mirandized defendant, Angles testimony establishes that probably it didnt happen.

The court found that Angle was distracted when speaking to Orozcos girlfriend and could not see what Hallenbeck was doing. Moreover, the court found the discrepancies between the agents testimonies were due to Angles lack of awareness. The court made the following statement:

The issue here, unlike a warrantless arrest or something like that where the burden is on the People is whether the defense has carried its burden on the motion to exclude and the Court is unable to say that it has and that motion is denied. Um, the Court will not be excluding the defendants statement at the scene.

Following the ruling, both parties waived jury trial, and stipulated that the evidence adduced from the Evidence Code section 402 hearing would be used at trial. The court found the charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendant filed a timely appeal.

Discussion

Defendant claims that the trial court erred in improperly shifting the burden of proving a Miranda violation from the People to himself, depriving him of rights to due process and a fair trial guaranteed by federal and state Constitutions. He argues that such error is prejudicial under either the Federal constitutional error (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705]) or per se prejudice standard (People v. Powell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 32, 51-52).

We reject these claims because the procedures of the hearing allocated the burden of proof properly on the People, the trial courts factual finding that defendant was given his Miranda warnings was based on substantial evidence in the form of uncontroverted testimony, and even if trial court applied the wrong burden of proof, the correct application of the burden would have resulted in the same judgment.

To protect the privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecution may not use defendants inculpatory statements made to police officers while in custody, absent a showing of certain procedural safeguards. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 727 (Waidla), quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.)

Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. (Waidla, at p. 727.)

The prosecution bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to show the defendants rights under Miranda v. Arizona were not violated. (Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 489 [30 L.Ed.2d 618, 627]; People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 267; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1033; People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 71.) The trial court misspoke or was in error when it said that the defense had the burden of proof.

The actual procedures of the hearing support the view the trial court simply misspoke. To resolve the Miranda issue, the People filed a motion in limine and called the first witness to establish that defendant was properly Mirandized. In turn, the defense contradicted a witness and argued that the witness disproved the Peoples witness. The burden of proof was properly placed on the People, despite the courts statements and defendants claim to the contrary.

As to the trial courts factual findings, the standard of review for Miranda claims on appeal is settled. We must accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported. [Citations.] However, we must independently determine from the undisputed facts, and those properly found by the trial court, whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained. [Citation.] (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 128.) A finding of fact as to the circumstances of a defendants admission is itself reviewed for substantial evidence as the resolution of a pure question of fact. (Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 731, citing People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 985.)

The court found that Angle was distracted when speaking to Jackson and that he could not see what Hallenbeck was doing. Moreover, any discrepancies between the agents testimonies were, according to the trial court, attributable to Angles lack of awareness. For that reason, Hallenbecks testimony was uncontroverted, and the court found the defendant was Mirandized.

These findings are supported by substantial evidence. Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value, and the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to satisfy the test of the substantial evidence rule. (Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1239.) Hallenbeck testified that he Mirandized defendant while Angle was not present, and that the interview lasted two minutes. Angle did not remember when Hallenbeck first contacted defendant nor if Hallenbeck interviewed defendant in the residence prior to their joint interview. During this time, Angle was watching parolee Orozco, and talking with Orozcos girlfriend and two backup police officers. It was reasonable for the trial court to find Hallenbecks testimony credible and uncontroverted by Angle. Because these findings are supported by substantial evidence, we must accept the trial courts finding that defendant was aware of his Miranda rights prior to making his inculpatory statement.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, thatthe trial court erroneously allocated the burden of proof to the defense, defendant does not prevail by pointing to the mistake and claiming prejudice. [A] judgment correct in law will not be reversed merely because given for the wrong reason; we review the trial court's judgment [for its result], not its reasoning. (National Casualty Co. v. Sovereign General Ins. Services, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 812, 818, fn. 6.)

As noted earlier, the People must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the absence of a Miranda violation. (Lego, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 489; Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 267; Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1033; Markham, supra, 49 Cal.3d 63 at p. 71.) The People offered Hallenbecks testimony, which the trial court found credible. This testimony established that defendant was properly Mirandized.The trial court further found the defense failed to refute this evidence. The correct allocation of the burden of proof to the People would have resulted in the same judgment. Defendant was not prejudiced if the trial court misstated the law.

In short, the trial court did not decide the case on the basis of a mistaken application of the burden of proof. Instead, the People proved the absence of Miranda violation by a preponderance of the evidence, supported by the trial courts finding of no disputed facts, as both agents were credible and their accounts reconciled. There was no abuse of discretion and defendant was not denied his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

MORRISON , J.

We concur:

NICHOLSON , Acting P.J.

ROBIE , J.

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