P. v. Williams
Filed 1/30/07 P. v. Williams CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STEVEN WILLIAMS, Defendant and Respondent. | B190232 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LA043629) |
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Susan Speer, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney, Phyllis Asayama and Shirley S. N. Sun, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Ralph Courtney and Graciela Martinez, Deputy Public Defenders, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury found defendant and respondent Steven Williams guilty of arson of an inhabited structure. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury then found true allegations that Williams had suffered two prior Massachusetts convictions for serious or violent felonies. Williams moved for a new trial on the prior conviction allegations, contending, inter alia, that the court committed instructional and evidentiary errors. The trial court concluded it had erred, and granted Williamss new trial motion. Plaintiff and appellant the People of the State of California appeal the new trial order, contending that any error was harmless. We agree with the People, and accordingly order the new trial order reversed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The charged crimes.
Viewed in accordance with the usual rules governing appellate review (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; People v. Johnston (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1303-1304), the evidence presented at trial established that on July 28, 2003, Williams set fire to his ex-girlfriend Alisha Drakes apartment. Drake and Williams had been dating for approximately nine years, including a period when Drake lived at 5 Emrose Terrace in Massachusetts. In 2003, Drake was living in Van Nuys. When she discovered Williams had been unfaithful to her, she had the locks on the Van Nuys apartment changed. Thereafter, Williams pounded on the door and threatened to burn down the apartment. Drake fled to Boston. Williams broke into the apartment and spread flammable fluid and materials throughout. He set fires in various rooms, and set Drakes bed on fire. The jury found Williams guilty of arson of an inhabited structure (Pen. Code, 451, subd. (b)),[1]and acquitted him of making criminal threats.
2. The trial on the prior conviction allegations.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury was then asked to decide the truth of allegations that Williams had suffered prior convictions in Massachusetts for: (1) breaking and entering 5 Emrose Terrace, Roxbury, Massachusetts, with intent to commit a felony (Mass. Gen. Law 266:017.2); and (2) assault and battery with a handgun on Leandrew Burns (Mass. Gen. Law 265:015A:b). The parties disagreed whether the Peoples documentary evidence demonstrated that the Massachusetts breaking and entering was of a residence, a necessary element to qualify the prior conviction as a strike under California law. Over defense counsels objection, the trial court concluded the People could rely on Drakes testimony in the arson trial that 5 Emrose Terrace was a residence, and instructed accordingly.[2]The trial court further ruled that the jury, not the court, was required to determine whether the Massachusetts convictions were for serious felonies under California law.
The People presented documentary evidence of Williamss two Massachusetts convictions. The prosecutor also referred to Drakes testimony, given in the arson trial, that the Emrose Terrace location was a house.
The defense presented no evidence. However, defense counsel argued that the documentary evidence of the Massachusetts convictions was not trustworthy.
The jury found the allegations that Williams had suffered the two prior Massachusetts convictions true. The trial court concluded Williams was the individual who had suffered the prior felonies.
3. The new trial motion.
Subsequently, Williams moved for a new trial on a variety of grounds. As relevant here,[3]Williams urged that the trial court had erred by allowing the District Attorney to argue testimony by Ms. Drake in the guilt phase regarding the 1997 burglary conviction. The trial court concluded it had erroneously allowed the jury to consider evidence admitted in the arson trial when determining the truth of the prior conviction allegations. It concluded that although the People had properly proved up the assault charge and the assault prior, the jury could have been unduly prejudiced by hearing the testimony as to both counts, and granted the motion. The People appeal the trial courts order granting a new trial.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of review.
A new trial may be granted when the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law or has erred in deciding any question of law during the course of the trial, if the error was prejudicial. ( 1181, subd. (5); People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1262-1263.) When a trial court grants a defendants motion for a new trial, we review the order for abuse of discretion. (People v. Ault, supra, at p. 1255.) We do not substitute our judgment for the trial courts determination that the error was prejudicial. (Id. at p. 1263.)
2. Applicable legal principles.
To qualify as a serious felony for purposes of Three Strikes sentencing, a conviction from another jurisdiction must involve conduct that would qualify as a serious felony in California. (People v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682, 691.) The Three Strikes law defines a strike as, among other things, any offense defined in section 1192.7, subdivision (c). (See 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) Under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18), a burglary is a serious felony if it is of the first degree. Thus, a burglary conviction qualifies as a strike only if it is of a residence. (People v. Kelii (1999) 21 Cal.4th 452, 455.) In order to qualify as a strike under California law, then, Williamss prior conviction for breaking and entering must have been of a residence.
In determining whether a defendant is subject to increased punishment on the basis of a prior conviction, it sometimes is necessary to examine the record of the earlier proceeding to determine whether it involves the type of qualifying prior conviction that authorizes increased punishment under the applicable sentencing statute. (People v. McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 685.) It is well settled that it is the court, not the jury, that determines whether a prior conviction qualifies as a strike under the Three Strikes law. (People v. Kelii, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 454; People v. McGee, supra, at pp. 685, 695.)[4]It is also well settled that, in making such a determination, the trial court may look to the entire record of conviction, but no further. (People v. Kelii, supra, at p. 456; People v. McGee, supra, at pp. 691-692.) Thus, no witnesses testify about the facts of the prior crimes. The trier of fact considers only court documents. (People v. Kelii, supra, at pp. 456-457.) Likewise, the trial court, not the jury, decides whether the defendant is the person who has suffered the conviction. ( 1025, subd. (c); People v. Kelii, supra, at pp. 457-458.) Under the statutory scheme, the jury has little to do except to determine whether [the documents admitted to establish the conviction] are authentic and, if so, are sufficient to establish that the convictions the defendant suffered are indeed the ones alleged. (People v. Kelii, supra, at pp. 458-459; People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 27.)
Applying these principles here, the People concede the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider Drakes testimony that the building at 5 Emrose Terrace was a residence. Further, the trial court erred by putting the question of whether the prior crimes qualified as strikes to the jury, rather than making such a determination itself. As noted, testimony regarding the facts of the prior crimes is improper in a priors trial (People v. Kelii, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 456-457), and the trial court, not the jury, is charged with determining whether the prior qualified as a strike under California law.
Nevertheless, the conclusion that the trial court erred does not end our inquiry. Before a new trial can be granted, the trial courts error must be prejudicial. Before ordering a case retried, the trial court must make its independent determination, under article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, both that error occurred, and that the error prevented the complaining party from receiving a fair trial. [Citation.] Thus, it has been said that the trial court has no discretion to award a new trial where no prejudicial error occurred. [Citations.] (People v. Ault, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1262-1263, italics omitted.)
In the instant case, we are hard pressed to discern how the trial courts errors prejudiced Williams. The only evidence from the arson trial that had any relevance to the jurys determination of the truth of the prior conviction allegations was Drakes testimony that 5 Emrose Terrace was a house. That evidence could have had no bearing whatsoever on the jurys determination that Williams suffered the prior conviction for assault and battery with a handgun. No evidence suggested Drake was involved in the events surrounding that prior conviction, and none of the evidence presented at the arson trial would have had any relevance to the question of whether Williams had been convicted of assault and battery.
The trial courts errors were also harmless in regard to the jurys finding Williams suffered the prior conviction for breaking and entering. The only evidence the jury could have made use of Drakes testimony that 5 Emrose Place was a house was relevant solely to the question of whether the prior conviction qualified as a strike. That question, as we have explained, should not have been an issue for the jury, but should have been decided by the trial court. The jurys only role was to consider whether the documentation of the convictions was authentic and sufficient. (People v. Kelii, supra, at pp. 458-459.) As the People point out, no evidence presented at the arson trial had any tendency to prove or disprove the authenticity and accuracy of the documentary evidence. At the priors trial, Williams presented no evidence casting doubt on the authenticity or validity of the documentary evidence of the prior convictions, and offered no evidence in defense. Where the only evidence erroneously considered related solely to an issue that should not have been delegated to the jury, there cannot have been prejudicial error. There is no possibility the jury would have rendered a different finding had the errors not been made. The errors were necessarily harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Williams argues, in conclusory fashion, that the trial courts errors tainted the jurys determination about the authenticity, accuracy, and sufficiency of the documentary evidence of the alleged prior convictions. However, Williams fails to persuasively explain how the trial courts errors adversely affected the jurys determination on the prior conviction allegations, or what actual prejudice he suffered.
Therefore, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial on the prior conviction allegations. However, as we have discussed, the trial court, not the jury, should have determined whether the prior convictions were serious felonies within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. Instead, the trial court left this determination to the jury. On remand, therefore, the trial court should determine whether the Massachusetts convictions are serious felonies for purposes of the Three Strikes law.
DISPOSITION
The trial courts order granting Williams a new trial on the prior conviction allegations is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinions expressed herein.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ALDRICH, J.
We concur:
CROSKEY, Acting P. J.
KITCHING, J.
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[1] All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
[2] The trial court instructed that the jury was to determine that the prior conviction [met] all of the elements of California first degree residential burglary. It further instructed, In determining the truth of these allegations, you may consider any evidence that was introduced during the trial that may be relevant in all jury instructions given before, during, or after the trial, but youre not to consider any evidence the defendant was allegedly convicted or charged with any other crimes in reaching your decision as to the truth of the allegations. The court also informed the jury that it must not be influenced by the arson conviction upon which the jury had already returned a verdict.
[3] The trial court rejected Williamss other bases for the new trial motion. Those rulings are not at issue here.
[4] Defendants have no constitutional right, under either the state or federal constitutions, to have the jury determine factual issues relating to prior convictions alleged for purposes of sentence enhancement. (People v. Kelii, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 455; People v. McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 686-687 [holding that Apprendi v. New Jersey(2000) 530 U.S. 466, does not give a defendant the right to have a jury determine whether prior convictions are serious].)
