P. v. Williamson
Filed 10/3/13
P. v. Williamson CA5
IN THE
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
ANGELITO GARIN
WILLIAMSON,
Defendant
and Appellant.
F064010
(Super. Ct. No. 08CM1499)
[No Change in Judgment]
BY THE COURT:
It is ordered that the nonpublished opinion filed in the instant case on
September 23, 2013, be modified as
follows:
“
883, 912;†is deleted from the last paragraph on page 5.
This
modification does not change the judgment.
_________________________
Franson,
J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________
Kane, Acting P.J.
_____________________
Detjen, J.
Filed
9/23/13 (unmodified version)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ANGELITO GARIN WILLIAMSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
F064010
(Super. Ct. No. 08CM1499)
THE COURT
APPEAL from a judgment of the
Superior Court of Kings County. Robert
S. Burns, Judge.
Hayes H. Gable, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General,
Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell,
Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Eric L. Christoffersen,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Following a
bench trial, the court convicted appellant, Angelito Garin Williamson, of oral
copulation or sexual penetration of a child under the age of 10 (count 1/Pen.
Code, § 288.7, subd. (b))
name="_ftnref2" title="">
oral copulation with a child under the age of 14 and more than 10 years younger
than the defendant (count 3/§ 288a, subd. (c)(1)); forcible oral copulation
(count 4/§ 288(a), subd. (c)(2)); and lewd and lascivious conduct by force with
a child under the age of 14 (count 5/§ 288, subd. (b)(1)).
On appeal,
Williamson contends the court violated his federal right to due process by its
failure to question him regarding his rejection of a plea offer. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 17,
2008, Williamson was arrested after his girlfriend’s daughter reported that
Williamson had been molesting her on an ongoing basis.
On February
10, 2009, the district attorney filed an amended information charging
Williamson with the counts he was convicted of and one count of continuous
sexual abuse of a child (count 2/§ 288.5).
On October
29, 2009, the court suspended criminal proceedings and committed Williamson to
Atascadero State Hospital for treatment after finding Williamson incompetent to
stand trial.
On December
14, 2009, the court found Williamson had regained his competency and reinstated
criminal proceedings.
At a
hearing on November 10, 2010, the prosecutor offered a stipulated, determinate
sentence of 12 years for appellant’s plea to one count. Defense counsel asked the court for a few
minutes so Williamson could consider the offer and the court eventually
continued the matter two days.
On November
12, 2010, the court asked defense counsel if there had been a resolution of the
matter and counsel advised the court there had not. The court then set a date for the
pretrial.
On March
25, 2011, the court again suspended criminal proceedings after it again found
Williamson incompetent to stand trial.
On June 22, 2011, the court reinstated criminal proceedings after again
finding Williamson competent to stand trial.
On October
25, 2011, following Williamson’s waiver of his right to a jury trial, a court
trial in this matter began.
On October
28, 2011, the court granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss count 2 and it
convicted Williamson on the remaining counts.
On November
30, 2011, the court sentenced Williamson to an aggregate, indeterminate term of
23 years to life, an eight year term on count 3, an indeterminate term of 15
years to life on count 1, and stayed terms on counts 4 and 5.
DISCUSSION
In
(Padilla), the Supreme Court held
that counsel is required to advise a defendant of the immigration consequences
of his plea. (Id. at p. 359.) In
“as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers
from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be
favorable to the accused.†(
v. Cooper (2012) 132 S.Ct. 1376 (Lafler),
the Supreme Court considered “how to apply Strickland’s[
prejudice test where ineffective assistance results in a rejection of the plea
offer and the defendant is convicted at the ensuing trial.†(Id.
at p. 1384.)
Additionally,
due process requires the trial court to advise a defendant of his rights of
confrontation, to a jury trial and against self-incrimination, and to take an
appropriate waiver of those rights before a defendant may validly enter a
guilty plea. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 242-243 (
Williamson
cites Padilla, Missouri, and Lafler to
contend that because the Supreme Court recently expanded a defendant’s rights
during plea bargaining, the “same reasons†that justify requiring a court to
advise a defendant of his constitutional rights and to take an adequate waiver
of those rights justify “that such an on-the-record inquiry be conducted to
safeguard a defendant’s rejection of a plea offer.†Thus, according to Williamson, the trial
court denied him his federal right to due process by its failure “to question
[him] to ensure that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently understood
the People’s offer and the possible consequences of rejecting such an
offer.†Williamson is wrong.
In
rationale for requiring a court to inquire into the voluntariness of a plea:
“A
plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did
various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment
and determine punishment.
[Citation.] Admissibility of a
confession must be based on a ‘reliable determination on the voluntariness
issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant.’ [Citation.]
The requirement that the prosecution spread on the record the
prerequisites of a valid waiver is no constitutional innovation. In Carnley
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, we dealt with a problem of waiver of the
right to counsel, a Sixth Amendment right.
We held: ‘Presuming waiver from a
silent record is impermissible. The
record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that
an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected
the offer. Anything less is not waiver.’
“We think that the same standard
must be applied to determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made. For, as we have said, a plea of guilty is more
than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction. Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror,
inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of
unconstitutionality. The question of an
effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a proceeding is of course
governed by federal standards.
[Citation.]
“Several federal constitutional
rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is
entered in a state criminal trial.
First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the
Fourteenth. [Citation.] Second, is the right to trial by jury. [Citation].
Third, is the right to confront one’s accusers. [Citation]
We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from
a silent record.
“What is at stake for an accused
facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are
capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he
leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought [citations],
and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky
memories.†(Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 242-244, fns. omitted.)
In
followed Boykin in holding that “each
of the three rights mentioned--self-incrimination, confrontation, and jury
trial--must be specifically and expressly enumerated for the benefit of and
waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea.†(Tahl,
supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 132.)
A
defendant’s rejection of a plea offer is not analogous to a conviction, nor
does it involve a waiver of constitutional rights by a defendant. Therefore there is no merit to Williamson’s
claim that an inquiry into the voluntariness of a defendant rejecting a plea
bargain is required by the “same reasons†that require a court to inquire into
the voluntariness of a defendant’s plea.
Further, we
will not decide theoretical constitutional questions which are based upon
faulty premises. (People v. Fuquay (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 883, 912; People v.
Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1123 [rejecting equal protection argument
based on faulty premise]; People v. Low (2010) 49 Cal.4th 372, 393, fn.
11 [due process claim challenging state’s actions rejected where argument based
upon faulty premise that defendant committed no unlawful act]; Berardi v.
Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 210, 228 [court will not decide
“hypothetical or other questions of constitutional law unnecessary to our
disposition of the caseâ€].) Accordingly,
we reject Williamson’s contention that the court violated his federal right to due
process by its failure to inquire into the voluntariness of his rejection of
the plea offer.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
name="_ftn1" title="">* Before Kane, Acting P.J., Detjen, J. and Franson, J.
name="_ftn2" title="">[1]
All further statutory references
are to the Penal Code.
