California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
Robert M. Sweet, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Viewed in accordance with the usual rules on appeal (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053), the evidence adduced at trial established that, on June 24, 2005, Norma Navarro and her brother jointly owned a gold Daiwoo Nubria automobile, license plate number 4HPM495, and were the only people with permission to drive that car. There were just two keys to the car: Navarro kept one and the second was kept in a metal box attached by a magnet underneath the car. Navarro's putative husband of almost 19 years, Jorge Chavez, did not have permission to drive the car but he was allowed to use the second key to gain access to the car. At about 10:00 p.m. that evening, Navarro arrived at the Walnut Inn in West Covina and left her locked car in the hotel parking lot. She then checked-in to the hotel in anticipation of meeting Chavez later that night. Navarro told the clerk who checked her in to room 216 that she was expecting her husband to meet her there. She also had arranged with Chavez that, upon his arrival, he would use the extra key to retrieve his things from her car and honk the car horn to let her know that he was there. When Navarro saw Chavez several hours later, it was obvious that he had been beaten. Navarro went to the parking lot and saw that her car was not there. Navarro never gave defendant permission to drive her car.
When Chavez arrived at the Walnut Inn to meet Navarro some time between 9:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., he saw Navarro's car. Chavez tried honking the horn in accordance with their prearranged plan, but Navarro did not respond immediately and he was told that it was too late to be honking a horn in the hotel parking lot. The hotel clerk would not tell Chavez what room Navarro was in. Because Chavez did not have any identification, he could not rent a room for himself, so he looked for someone that would rent a room for him.[2] Chavez asked defendant, whom Chavez had never seen before, to rent a room on Chavez's behalf. Defendant agreed and Chavez gave him $60 to do so. Chavez watched through the window as defendant registered and when defendant gave Chavez the key to room 116, Chavez gave defendant a tip of between $5 and $20. Defendant then walked away and Chavez went to his room. A little while later, defendant came to the room and asked whether his companion, whom Chavez noticed defendant talking to earlier, could use Chavez's bathroom. Chavez agreed and also allowed defendant to take a shower in the bathroom. In response to defendant's request for some soap, Chavez went to retrieve his knapsack from Navarro's car. Chavez returned to the room with the knapsack and saw a rifle sitting on the window sill. When Chavez turned his back on defendant to take the soap out of the knapsack, someone hit him in the head with a bottle. Chavez lost consciousness for a few moments and his memory of what happened next was unclear but he recalled feeling his pockets being searched. When Chavez regained consciousness, he realized that his wallet and the car keys had been taken. Chavez turned around and saw defendant holding a broken bottle and his companion holding the rifle. Both men shouted, â€
Description
Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of carjacking, robbery, assault with a firearm, assault with a deadly weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and burglary, as well as various enhancements. He contends: (1) the carjacking and burglary convictions were not supported by substantial evidence; (2) there were various sentencing errors; and (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to those sentencing errors. Court reverse and remand for resentencing and otherwise affirm the judgment.
