Filed 11/16/18 Parker v. Brown CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE COURT:*

The trial court granted the application of Stephen Parker for a civil harassment restraining order against Darla Brown.[1] She appeals. We affirm.

We are handicapped in our effort to make sense of Brown’s appeal by her failure to make even a single citation to the trial court record.[2] Other than advising us that Parker filed a petition seeking a restraining order against her, and that the trial court granted Parker’s petition, she mentions nothing else of the proceedings below and fails to support even these cursory statements with citation to record. Rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) of the California Rules of Court provides in relevant part that all appellate briefs must “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record.” An appellant must also “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” (Id., rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Parker fails to do so. We may deem arguments abandoned due to violations of court rules. (See Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 522, 524–525.)

Brown’s legal argument consists of citation to general legal principles applicable to restraining orders issued pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, but she makes no effort to show the application of those principles to the facts of her case. “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, a temporary restraining order may be issued based “on a declaration that, to the satisfaction of the court, shows reasonable proof of harassment of the petitioner by the respondent, and that great or irreparable harm would result to the petitioner. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (Id., § 527.6, subds. (d), (i).) In a case tried without a jury, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of all evidentiary conflicts the sole judge of witness credibility. (Davis v. Kahn (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 868, 874.) The judge is free to disbelieve witnesses, even those who are uncontradicted, if any rational ground exists for doing so. When sufficiency of evidence is contested on appeal, it is assumed the judge resolved every factual conflict in favor of the prevailing party and drew every reasonable inference in favor of that party. The sole question on appeal is “whether there is any substantial evidence, direct or indirect, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding.” (Ibid.)

In her brief’s conclusion, Brown asserts Parker “failed to meet his burden of proving [she] caused him severe emotional distress.” Her statement, however, is just that—a conclusion. She discusses none of the evidence presented and fails to articulate in what respects the evidence considered by the court was deficient. Appellants who challenge the decision of the trial court based upon the absence of substantial evidence to support it “ ‘ “are required to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed waived.” ’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246, italics omitted.) Brown fails to discuss even her own evidence, much less that presented by Parker. “ ‘The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error.’ ” (Ibid.)

Brown appears unaware of the well-settled rule of appellate review. “ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court. ‘[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented.’ ” (Bennett v. McCall (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 122, 127.)

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140–1141; People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666 [“ ‘ “error must be affirmatively shown” ’ ”].) Brown does not. She fails to meet her burden to present an appropriate record for review, and to make coherent legal arguments establishing error. “ ‘[I]f the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.’ ” (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) Although self-represented, she is entitled to no special treatment and must comply with the same procedural rules as attorneys. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985; Nwosu v. Uba, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p.1246.)

The order is affirmed.