Pedroza v. Pedroza
Filed 5/20/13 Pedroza v. Pedroza CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
CHRISTOPHER D. PEDROZA, a
Minor, etc., et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
ANGELA PEDROZA, as Executor,
etc.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D060263
(Super. Ct.
No. 37-2009-00082385-CU-PA-CTL)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Linda B. Quinn, Judge.
Affirmed.
Neil,
Dymott, Frank, McFall & Trexler, David P. Burke and Andrea P. Bayly for
Defendant and Appellant.
James E.
Friedhofer; Law Offices of Robert Ryan and Robert Ryan for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
Angela
Pedroza, as the executor of the Estate of John P. Pedroza, Sr., (the
Estate) appeals from a jury verdict in a
death lawsuit against the Estate by the surviving passengers of an
automobile accident in which John P. Pedroza, Sr. (Pedroza, Sr.) was
the driver. The Estate contends that the
verdict against it should be reversed because of purportedly erroneous
evidentiary rulings and because substantial
evidence did not support the verdict.
We conclude that the Estate's arguments lack merit, and we affirm the
judgment.
I
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the
morning of January 9, 2009,
members of the Pedroza family were on a long-distance drive through Mexico
on their way home to San Diego. In their van were the mother and father, Rosa
Garcia and Raymond Pedroza, Sr.; the 10- and 13-year-old sons, Raymond M.
Pedroza, Jr., and Christopher D. Pedroza; and the paternal grandfather,
Pedroza, Sr. The family had been
driving since the previous morning, stopping only for short breaks to buy gas,
to eat or to use the restroom. The
father and grandfather (Raymond Pedroza, Sr., and Pedroza, Sr.) were
taking turns driving, with each having driven twice by the time they reached Altar,
Mexico, near the city of Hermosillo,
at approximately 6:00 a.m. While Pedroza, Sr., was driving, the van
crashed into the side of a large tractor-trailer truck that was parked on the
side of the highway near the entrance to a convenience store and gas station in
Altar. Only the children (Raymond and
Christopher) survived the crash, with both of them sustaining injuries that
required hospitalization.
Raymond and
Christopher, through their guardian ad litem Maria Refugio Garcia
(collectively, plaintiffs), filed a lawsuit against the Estate alleging that
Pedroza, Sr., negligently operated a motor vehicle. They sought to recover for the wrongful death
of their parents and for their own injuries.
The original complaint also included claims against the owners and
operators of the truck involved in the collision, but those defendants were
dropped from the amended complaint.
No witness
testified at trial who saw the collision occur.
However, plaintiffs presented details of the accident through the
testimony of (1) a convenience store worker, Maria del Socorro Portillo
Rodriguez (Portillo), who heard the crash and saw its immediate aftermath; and
(2) a journalist, Rafael Leon Pineda (Pineda), who arrived shortly after the
collision and took photographs of the scene, some of which were displayed to
the jury.
Both
Portillo and Pineda, referring to photographs and to their recollection, testified
that the truck involved in the collision was parked in a shoulder area of the
highway that was separated from the four lanes of traffic by a dotted white
line. Portillo and Pineda both explained
that under Mexican traffic law, a dotted white line next to the highway
indicates a rest area where vehicles can park, and trucks regularly park where
the truck was parked during the collision.
The photographs and Portillo's and Pineda's testimony established that during
the collision, the truck was parked completely within the area indicated by the
dotted white line and was not protruding into the lane of traffic. The photographs showed that the van crossed
over the dotted white line and hit the side of the parked truck at an angle and
at a high enough speed to cause major damage to the van and to kill three of
the van's five occupants. There was no
evidence of a tire blowing out, screeching brakes, skid marks on the road or
the sound of a car horn that would have indicated an attempt to stop or take evasive
action. Portillo testified that the area
in which the truck was parked was illuminated by the lighting of the
convenience store, and the truck also had on small lights around the trailer
and its rear. According to witness
testimony, no rain or clouds were present on the morning of the collision.
In a
special verdict, the jury found that Pedroza, Sr., was negligent,
and judgment against the Estate was entered in the amount of $2,061,581.60, inclusive of costs.
II
DISCUSSION
A.
that Testimony About the Location of Truck Was Improperly Admitted Lay Opinion
The Estate
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) admitting testimony
from Portillo and Pineda that the area in which the truck was parked was a
designated parking and rest area under Mexican traffic law, and (2) allowing
Pineda to state that the van driven by Pedroza, Sr., "invaded" the
area in which the truck was parked.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] According to the Estate, the testimony
consisted of improper lay witness opinion testimony because it concerned
matters "sufficiently beyond the competence of common persons" and
should have been presented through an expert witness.
The
argument fails because counsel for the Estate did not preserve the objection in
the trial court.
"
to be reversed because of erroneous admission of evidence
only if an objection to the evidence or a motion to
strike it was 'timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground
of the objection.' Pursuant to this
statute, ' ". . . 'defendant's
failure to make a timely and specific objection' on the ground asserted on
appeal makes that ground not cognizable," ' "
and the defendant forfeits his appellate arguments based on the erroneous
admission of the evidence. (People v.
Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 20-21.)
" 'The
reason for the requirement is manifest:
a specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence serves
to prevent error. It allows the trial
judge to consider excluding the evidence or limiting its admission to avoid
possible prejudice. It also allows the
proponent of the evidence to lay additional foundation, modify the offer of
proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the prospect of reversal.' " (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th
428, 434.) "What is important is
that the objection fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering
the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the
evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond
appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling." (Id.
at p. 435.) Even when counsel
raises an objection at some point in the proceedings but fails to obtain a
ruling on the objection, "counsel's failure to obtain a ruling is fatal to
defendant's appellate contention, for a party objecting to the admission of
evidence must press for an actual ruling or the point is not preserved for
appeal." (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 619.)
Here, it is
undisputed that, during Pineda's and Portillo's testimony, counsel for the
Estate made no objection to the admission of the evidence that it now claims
should have been excluded.
The Estate
contends that although it did not object during Portillo's and Pineda's
testimony, it preserved the objection during pretrial discussions of jury
instructions and motions in limine.
Specifically, the Estate points to discussions of a proposed jury instruction
on opinion testimony of lay witnesses.
While discussing that jury instruction, the trial court asked whether
the parties would be presenting lay witness opinion testimony. Plaintiffs' counsel indicated, "We may
have some." Counsel for the Estate
stated, "Your Honor, I think that if anything tries to come in, you'll
hear objections." Plaintiffs'
counsel agreed, explaining that "[o]n both sides you're going to hear
objections, but it may — both sides may try to introduce some opinion testimony
of lay witnesses." When Plaintiffs'
counsel stated that he did not currently know what kind of lay witness opinion
testimony might be presented, counsel for the Estate stated, "Your Honor,
I don't think that there is any lay opinion testimony in a case like this
that's proper." The trial court
ended the discussion by stating "We'll reserve on that." The record reflects no further discussion
about the admissibility of lay witness opinion testimony.
Indeed, at no point did counsel for the Estate ever
indicate that he objected to a lay witness testifying about the proper
designation, under Mexican traffic law, of the area in which the truck was
parked. On the contrary, during a
pretrial hearing the next day, when discussing whether plaintiffs had made a judicial
admission in the original complaint about the location of the truck,
plaintiffs' counsel stated that, during Pineda's testimony, he would inquire
about how to characterize the lane where the truck was parked. Counsel for the Estate expressed no objection
to such a line of questioning. Further,
as we have discussed, counsel for the Estate made no objection whatsoever
during Portillo's and Pineda's testimony as to the admission of the evidence
that the Estate now contends should not have been admitted.
The Estate contends that it would
have been futile for counsel to make an objection during Portillo's and
Pineda's testimony because the trial court had already indicated it would admit
the testimony. (See People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 350 fn. 5 [argument
that admission of witness's prior statements violated defendant's
appeal, despite lack of objection in trial court, when an objection would have
been futile due to the current state of the case law on the issue].) The record does not support such an
assertion. As we have explained, when
the parties raised the issue of lay opinion testimony during a pretrial
hearing, the trial court expressed no view at all and simply reserved the
issue, with an implicit understanding that, as counsel both indicated, they
would object during trial if opposing counsel attempted to introduce
objectionable testimony. Further, when
counsel for the Estate did make a
specific objection at trial to the admission of lay witness opinion testimony
on Mexican traffic law, the trial court was receptive to the objection and
sustained it. Specifically, plaintiffs'
counsel asked Pineda whether a sign with an "E" is required if the
shoulder of a highway is intended to be used as a parking or rest area. Counsel for the Estate objected on the basis
that the question "calls for expert testimony." The trial court sustained the objection, and
it sustained a further objection when plaintiffs' counsel reworded the question
by basing it on Pineda's personal driving experience. In light of this ruling, and the trial
court's specific reservation on the general issue of the admissibility of lay
opinion testimony, the Estate cannot establish that it would have been futile
to make a similar objection to admission of other lay opinion testimony about
Mexican traffic law.
In sum,
counsel for the Estate simply never indicated any objection to Portillo's and
Pineda's testimony about the proper designation, under Mexican traffic law, of
the area in which the truck was parked and did not object to Pineda's testimony
that the van "invaded" a lane where it was not supposed to be
driving. The trial court had no
opportunity to pass on the admissibility of such evidence, and the Estate
therefore may not complain on appeal that the evidence was improperly admitted.
B.
in Rejecting the Estate's Contention that the Original Complaint Contained a
Judicial Admission as to the Location of the Truck
During pretrial
motions, the Estate argued that the trial court should treat a statement in the
original complaint about the location of the truck at the time of the collision
as a binding judicial admission by plaintiffs on that subject. Counsel for the Estate explained, "If
they're going to try to put on evidence during this trial that is contrary to
their admission that the vehicle was stopped in a lane of traffic,
. . . I'm going to be objecting to it, because it's an issue that
should already be conclusively proved."
At issue is
a statement in plaintiffs' original complaint relevant to the claims against
the owners and operators of the truck involved in the collision. The original complaint alleged, "An
18-wheel truck owned by defendant A. Perez Alba and 'Transportes Refrigerados
"Peral" '
operated by defendant Eduardo Perez Garcia, is believed to have been parked on
the side of the highway to Santa Ana Sonora, Mexico, with a portion of it
sticking onto the lane of traffic."
Along with removing the owners and operators of the truck as defendants,
the amended complaint deleted that allegation, pleading instead that the truck
"is believed to have been parked on the side of the highway." The trial court rejected the Estate's
argument that plaintiffs should be bound to their pleading that the truck was
"sticking onto the lane of traffic" and barred from presenting
evidence to the contrary, but it allowed the Estate to introduce evidence of
the original complaint's allegation to the jury.
"The
admission of fact in a pleading is a 'judicial admission.' " (Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271.)
" ' "A judicial
admission in a pleading . . . is not merely evidence of a fact; it is
a conclusive concession of the truth of a matter which has the effect of
removing it from the issues . . . ." ' "
(Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 218.)
complaint are binding on the plaintiff at the trial." (4 Witkin Proc., Pleading, § 455,
p. 587.) "[T]he trial court
may not ignore a judicial admission in a pleading, but must conclusively deem
it true as against the pleader." (
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1156.)
However,
"[a] judicial admission is a party's unequivocal
concession of the truth of a matter . . . ." (Gelfo
v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 48, italics
added.) "An unclear or equivocal
statement does not create a binding judicial admission." (Stroud v. Tunzi (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 377, 385.) Thus, for
example, a party's testimony that an event " 'probably' " occurred on a certain date, was too
equivocal to constitute a judicial admission.
(Howard v. American Nat. Fire Ins.
Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 498, 515-516 (Howard); see also Kirby v.
Albert D. Seeno Construction Co. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1066 [judicial
admission was not created by "an ambiguous statement in an unverified
complaint"]; Mabie v. Hyatt
(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 581, 596 [observing in dicta that "[m]aking a
statement on information and belief . . . might
avoid a judicial admission].)
We apply an
abuse of discretion standard of review
to the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs did not make a binding judicial
admission about the location of the truck.
(Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853, 871.)
Here, the
original complaint did not make an unequivocal statement admitting that the
truck was sticking into the lane of traffic.
Instead, the original complaint expressly stated a belief about the location of the truck. As plaintiffs' counsel explained to the trial
court during motions in limine, and as witness testimony established during
trial, that allegation was amended because the belief was disproved when the parties obtained more evidence about the
circumstances surrounding the collision.
When applying the doctrine of judicial admissions, "[a] court may
disregard fragmentary and equivocal statements, especially when contradicted by
other credible evidence." (
discretion — in light of the equivocal nature of the original complaint's
allegation and the clear photographic evidence showing that the truck was not
sticking into the lane of traffic — to conclude that plaintiffs did not
make a judicial admission about the location of the truck.
C.
in Sustaining an Objection to Questions About the Status of a Witness's Visa
The Estate
contends that the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion in sustaining
an objection when counsel attempted to elicit testimony about the status of
Pineda's visa to be in the United States.
According to the Estate, the excluded testimony was relevant because it
could have called into question Pineda's credibility.
During
direct examination of Pineda on March 29, 2011, plaintiffs' counsel engaged
Pineda in the following line of questioning:
"Q. Mr. Pineda, when did you come to San
Diego to give testimony in this case?"
"A. March 4th.
"Q. And was there any reason you came March 4th?
"A. Because my visa was going to expire right after.
"Q. And have you since reapplied to reinstate
your visa so it's going to be effective since you came here?
"A. No, I just applied for an extension.
"Q. You applied for an extension, and that's in process; is that
right?
"A. Yes."
On
cross-examination of Pineda, counsel for the Estate undertook the following
line of questioning:
"Q: [A]s
I understood it, sir, you came on March 4th because your visa was going to
expire literally within days?"
"A: Yes.
"Q: Okay.
As you're here today, your visa has expired, true?"
Plaintiffs'
counsel objected on relevancy grounds, and the trial court sustained the
objection, rejecting defense counsel's assertion that the question "goes
to credibility."
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3]
The Estate
argues that the trial court should not have sustained the objection to the
question about the expiration of Pineda's visa because the answer would likely
have undermined Pineda's credibility.
According to the Estate, "Given the lengthy process of applying for
and obtaining a ruling on a visa extension, it is highly unlikely
Mr. Pineda actually obtained a visa extension. In turn, any questioning on this matter would
have served to diminish his credibility."
The Estate argues that if the trial court had not sustained the
objection, counsel would have been able "to show the jury Mr. Pineda
had been dishonest regarding the status of his visa."
We
relevance of the evidence in question." (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th
690, 717.)
We conclude
that the trial court was well within its discretion to determine that Pineda's
response to the inquiry about his current visa status would not have been
relevant to attack Pineda's credibility as a witness. Although counsel for the Estate was
attempting to elicit testimony from Pineda that his visa had expired, that
testimony would not have called Pineda's credibility into question because it
would not have contradicted anything that Pineda stated during direct
examination. As we have explained,
Pineda testified on direct examination that because his visa was expiring
"right after" March 4, he came to San Diego on that date, instead of
closer to the March 29 date of his testimony.
The most logical implication from this testimony is that Pineda's visa
Pineda was attempting to extend it.
Further, Pineda did not
testify on direct examination that his application to extend his expired visa
process." In light of that
testimony, Pineda would not have been revealed as untruthful if he had testified
on cross-examination that his visa had expired.
Accordingly, the excluded testimony would not have been relevant to
attack Pineda's credibility, and the trial court was well within its discretion
to sustain the objection on the basis of relevancy.
D. Substantial Evidence
Supports the Verdict
The Estate
contends that insufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict that Pedroza,
Sr., negligently caused the collision.
In a very brief and undeveloped argument, the Estate asserts that
insufficient evidence supports the verdict because "[t]he only established
facts in this case are the occurrence of the accident, the lack of any
eyewitnesses, and the presence of a parked truck." According to the Estate, "[w]ithout any
eyewitnesses and without any experts, the jury's findings are merely inferences
derived from speculation."
"When
a party challenges the jury's findings based on
insufficient evidence to support those findings, we apply the
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1096.)
Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of " ' " ' " 'ponderable legal
significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value
[, and]' " ' . . . ' "relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" '
. . . ." ' " (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
209, 225.) We review the record as a
whole, resolving all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party and indulging
all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's findings. (Western States Petroleum Assn. v.
Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 571.)
If the jury's findings are supported by
uncontradicted, the judgment must be upheld regardless of whether the evidence
is subject to more than one interpretation.
(Ibid.)
Here, the
record contains sufficient evidence to support a finding that
Pedroza, Sr., caused the collision through his negligence. The photographic evidence and witness
testimony supports a finding that the truck was properly parked in plain view
outside of the lane of traffic.
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] Based on the extensive damage to the van, as
shown in the photographs, a juror could reasonably conclude that
Pedroza, Sr., veered out of the normal lane of traffic and slammed into
the side of the truck at a high speed.
Further, because witnesses testified to the favorable weather conditions
and the lack of any skid marks, squealing tires, horn sounds or any other
evidence of an evasive maneuver, a reasonable juror could conclude that it was
Pedroza's own inattention rather than an unexpected obstacle or foul weather
that caused Pedroza to veer into the side of the truck. The fact that the family had been driving for
almost a full day without sleep or extended rest breaks also supports a
reasonable inference that the collision was caused by Pedroza, Sr.'s
tiredness or lack of attention. The
verdict is supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
BENKE,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] In assigning a percentage of responsibility for the harm to
plaintiffs, the special verdict form assigned 80 percent of the
responsibility to Pedroza, Sr., and 20 percent of the responsibility
to "Other."
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Specifically, Pineda gave the following testimony during
questioning by plaintiffs' counsel that the van "invaded" the truck's
area:
"Q: And what was your observation with
respect to the angle, if any, or the position of the van with respect to the
dotted white line?
"A: The one that came into that lane was the
van.
"Q: And what was your observation with
respect to the angle of that, or the position of that van?
"A: It was the one that came in, the one that
invaded, let's say, invaded that place.
"Q: Now, why do you use the word 'invaded'?
"A: Because it shouldn't have been driving
into that lane."
