PEOPLE v. CLEOPHUS PRINCE, JR
Filed 4/30/07
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, )
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, )
) S036105
v. )
)
CLEOPHUS PRINCE, JR., )
) San Diego County
Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. CR130018
__________________________________ )
Story continued from Part VII .
In a capital trial, Eighth Amendment principles ordinarily do not prevent the sentencing authority from considering evidence of the specific harm caused by the crime in question. (Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825.) The high court has explained that the prosecution has a legitimate interest in rebutting the mitigating evidence that the defendant is entitled to introduce by introducing aggravating evidence of the harm caused by the crime, reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family. (Ibid.) [W]e also have found such evidence (and related victim character evidence) admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a). (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 650, and cases cited.) We have cautioned, however, that allowing such evidence under factor (a) does not mean that there are no limits on emotional evidence and argument. (Id. at p. 651, quoting People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 836.)[1] The jury must face its obligation soberly and rationally, and should not be given the impression that emotion may reign over reason. (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 651.)
Defendant contends the tape-recorded interview was emotionally inflammatory, thereby creating a danger that the jury would reach a decision based purely upon emotion. He claims that under constitutional principles and in accordance with Evidence Code section 352, the prosecution should not have been permitted to introduce victim-impact evidence in which an attractive, articulate, and talented young performer with a stage background literally comes back from the dead to share her plans and dreams with the jury. He characterizes the videotape as an extraordinarily emotional presentation.
We have viewed the videotape recording. It comprises a 25-minute interview with the victim, Holly Tarr, conducted at a local television station in the community of Okemos, Michigan. The court also admitted a transcript of the interview, which was provided to defense counsel and members of the jury prior to the playing of the tape. The trial court excluded portions of the videotape depicting Tarrs musical performances, because it determined that this evidence would be cumulative. The interviewer devoted nearly the entire interview to Tarrs training and interest in acting and singing, adding a few questions concerning Tarrs ability to balance school and artistic commitments. The tape recording exhibits a young female interviewer and Tarr, seated in chairs in front of a plain backdrop. There is no music and there are no cuts to other images of Tarr the interview is a calm, even static, discussion of Tarrs accomplishments and interests that takes place entirely in a neutral, bland setting. Under ordinary circumstances, the two young womens discussion would appear unlikely to invite empathy or emotional response.
The jury viewed the videotape near the conclusion of the victim-impact testimony, and the tape was both preceded and succeeded by brief testimony from Tarrs mother. Prior to the playing of the videotape, testimony on the same subject was contributed by her natural father, Paul McKean Tarr, Jr., and her stepfather, Mark Rubin. Mr. Tarr spoke at length about his daughters love for the theatre as well as the drastic effect her murder had had upon his life. Rubin barely spoke his own name before he was reduced to tears, requiring a recess to permit him to compose himself. The jury already had heard testimony from five other family members of victims Schultz, Weinhold, and Keller.
Case law pertaining to the admissibility of videotape recordings of victim interviews in capital sentencing hearings provides us with no bright-line rules by which to determine when such evidence may or may not be used. We consider pertinent cases in light of a general understanding that the prosecution may present evidence for the purpose of reminding the sentencer . . . [that] the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society (Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825), but that the prosecution may not introduce irrelevant or inflammatory material that diverts the jurys attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response. (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 836.)
In one capital case, the court rejected a relevance challenge to the admission of a videotape recording that was used to demonstrate a particular skill for which a victim was nationally recognized. (Whittlesey v. State (Md. 1995) 665 A.2d 223.) In Whittlesey, the court approved the admission of a 90-second videotape of a murder victim playing the piano. The court agreed with the trial court that the tape could illustrate the victims talent better than any photograph. (Id. at p. 251.) In response to defense objections that testimony provided by the victims parents rendered such evidence cumulative, the court stated that [i]n reviewing objections based on relevance, great deference is afforded the trial judge in regulating the conduct of a trial. (Ibid.)
Another court permitted introduction of a videotape recording that had been condensed to three minutes, determining that the evidence fell within the accepted category of a quick glimpse of the life which [the defendant] chose to extinguish. (State v. Allen (N.M. 1999) 994 P.2d 728, 751.) The court in that capital case also noted that a photograph from the same videotaped event had been presented to the jury without objection. (Ibid.; see also State v. Gray (Mo. 1994) 887 SW2d 369, 389 [videotape of victims family at Christmas held admissible].)
On the other hand, two courts were particularly reluctant to allow videotape evidence that served as a memorial to the victim, finding that the probative value of such evidence was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. (See U.S. v. Sampson (D.Mass. 2004) 335 F.Supp.2d 166; Salazar v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) 90 S.W.3d 330.) In Sampson, the court excluded a 27-minute videotape that consisted of 200 still photographs depicting the victim at various stages of life from birth until death, set to evocative contemporary music. (U.S. v. Sampson, supra, 335 F.Supp. at p. 191.)
Reviewing facts that we characterized as extreme (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 652), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disapproved of similar videotape evidence in Salazar v. State, supra, 90 S.W.3d 330, finding that in this noncapital case the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting a 17-minute videotape tribute to a murder victim. In remanding for an assessment of prejudice, the court stated in Salazar that the punishment phase of a criminal trial is not a memorial service for the victim (id. at pp. 335-336) and that [w]hat may be entirely appropriate eulogies to celebrate the life and accomplishments of a unique individual are not necessarily admissible in a criminal trial. (Id. at p. 336.) The court complained that the trial court had not seen the videotape before it was played to the jury and consequently was unable to weigh the probative value of the tape against its prejudicial impact. (Id. at pp. 336-337.) The reviewing court emphasized the risk of unfair prejudice, noting the video contained many images from the adult victims infancy and childhood. (Id. at pp. 337-338.)
Courts must exercise great caution in permitting the prosecution to present victim-impact evidence in the form of a lengthy videotaped or filmed tribute to the victim. Particularly if the presentation lasts beyond a few moments, or emphasizes the childhood of an adult victim, or is accompanied by stirring music, the medium itself may assist in creating an emotional impact upon the jury that goes beyond what the jury might experience by viewing still photographs of the victim or listening to the victims bereaved parents. The trial court in the present case clearly understood the power of this type of evidence, commenting early in the proceedings that I have a great deal of concern about the medium of a videotape creating a situation of grave prejudice, and that there is a qualitative difference between a videotape and a still photograph from an emotional standpoint. In order to combat this strong possibility, courts must strictly analyze evidence of this type and, if such evidence is admitted, courts must monitor the jurors reactions to ensure that the proceedings do not become injected with a legally impermissible level of emotion.
Although we caution courts against the routine admission of videotapes featuring the victim, we do not believe that prejudicial error occurred under the circumstances of the present case. The videotaped evidence did not constitute irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that divert[ed] the jurys attention from its proper role or invite[ed] an irrational, purely subjective response. (People v.Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 836.) Unlike the material presented in the Sampson and Salazar cases, as we have explained the videotaped interview of Holly Tarr did not constitute an emotional memorial tribute to the victim. There was no music, emotional or otherwise. The tape did not, as the trial court in the present case initially feared it might, display the victim in her home or with her family, nor were there images of the victim as an infant or young child. The setting was a neutral television studio, where an interviewer politely asked questions concerning the victims accomplishments on the stage and as a musician and the difficulty she experienced in balancing her many commitments, touching only briefly upon her plan to attend college in the fall and follow the stage as a profession. If not for the circumstances of her subsequent murder, the videotape admitted at trial likely would be of modest interest to anyone apart from Tarr and her friends and family. The loss of such a talented and accomplished person is poignant even for a stranger to contemplate, but the straightforward, dry interview depicted on the videotaped recording was not of the nature to stir strong emotions that might overcome the restraints of reason.
Significantly, the record on appeal also establishes that the trial court not only excluded portions of the interview displaying Tarr in performance, it also closely observed the jury for signs of emotional distress and made a careful record of its observations. During the numerous hearings on the admissibility of the videotaped evidence, the trial court repeatedly commented that it would not be allowing the proceedings to be hijacked by an emotional setting of pathos. The court scrutinized the jury for evidence of emotional response during the playing of the tape, focusing on not only the jurors but on all members of the spectating audience. At the completion of the interview, the court allowed only a few more minutes of testimony from Tarrs mother before dismissing the jury for the remainder of the day. When the session resumed the following morning, the court entertained further objections by defense counsel to the playing of the videotape. The court addressed each of defense counsels contentions, ultimately concluding that although there was in fact an emotional response from certain members of the jury, the court didnt see emotion running roughshod over judgment. The court assured both the prosecution and defense counsel that if it had observed an overly emotional response, it would not have hesitated to declare a mistrial, but that such a response simply did not occur.
The trial court concluded that although jurors exhibited sadness, their response was no stronger than they had displayed during the testimony given by members of the victims families. According to the observations made by the court, no one on the jury broke down and cried or appeared overcome by emotion. The prosecutor did not exploit the emotional impact of the videotape, but instead refrained from any mention of the taped interview in closing argument. Based upon the nature of the evidence and the courts close observation of the jury, we conclude that defendants claims are without merit.
Defendant also contends his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses was violated by the introduction of the videotaped interview. He argues the admission of the videotaped interview effectively amounted to having the victim return from the grave to testify to legally irrelevant matters, with no opportunity for the defense to confront and cross-examine this witness.
The trial court found no merit in defendants argument, reasoning that the videotaped interview was not being admitted for the truth of its recorded statements. Rather, it was admitted to demonstrate to the jury Tarrs reactions to the questions, her demeanor and, the court further stated, the content of the tape is secondary. The court surmised there would be no significant factual revelations stemming from the playing of the videotape because much of the information pertaining to Tarrs interests and plans already had been presented to the jury via testimony from the victims family members.
We agree with the trial court that the videotape recording was not offered primarily for the truth of the statements it contained and that even if it was offered in part for the truth of those statements, the information conveyed was cumulative to other testimony as to which defendant did have an opportunity for cross-examination. In addition, as we have explained, we are confidant that the admission of the tape recording was not prejudicial under the circumstances of the present case.
4. Instruction on and jurys consideration of the burglaries not directly related to the murders
Defendant argued at trial that the jury should not be permitted to consider certain guilt phase evidence as a circumstance in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b). Specifically, he asserted that the jury should not be permitted to consider guilt phase evidence concerning the burglaries and attempted burglaries that were not directly connected with the capital offenses. He argued that these assertedly unrelated offenses did not come within section 190.3, factor (b), because they did not involve force or violence.
The trial court disagreed with defendant. The court instructed the jury that the burglaries and attempted burglaries may have involved the use of force or violence or the express or implied threat of violence, but that it was for the jurors to decide whether they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed those acts, whether they involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence, and whether the acts were criminal. (The court instructed the jury that, as a matter of law, perjury (one of the charged offenses) does not involve force or violence and could not be considered under section 190.3, factor (b).)
Defendant contends on appeal that noncapital crimes of which a defendant was convicted in the same proceeding never may be considered at the penalty phase as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), whether the crimes are violent or not. In support he cites People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57 (disapproved on another point in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907), in which we declared that factor (b) pertains only to criminal activity other than the crimes for which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding. (People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 106.) The quoted language does not carry the meaning that defendant attributes to it, because the issue in the Miranda decision involved the danger that a jury would double-count evidence under section 190.3, factor (a) (circumstances of the crime) and factor (b) (other criminal activity involving violence) ― not whether convictions in the same proceeding that were unrelated to the capital crimes could be considered under factor (b). Evidence presented at the guilt phase may be considered at the penalty phase of the trial ( 190.4, subd. (d)), and defendant offers no logical reason to support the conclusion that evidence that otherwise would be admissible under factor (b) would become inadmissible because of a joinder with capital offenses.
Defendant contends the charged burglaries and attempted burglaries that were unconnected temporally with the capital offenses did not all involve violence or the threat of violence. Defendant claims that thirteen of the fifteen present factor (b) burglaries and attempted burglaries did not involve any evidence of arming or knife movement [sic] at all. He contends the jury instructions on the burglary and attempted burglary charges improperly permitted the jury to rely upon the offenses as aggravating evidence even though they did not involve the use or threat of force or violence, in violation of section 190.3, factor (b).
We disagree with defendant and agree with the trial court that, under the circumstances of the present case, the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the burglaries and attempted burglaries involved at least an implied threat of violence. (See People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 672-673 [stating standard].) We base our determination on all the evidence concerning defendants use of violence in the burglaries that culminated in the capital murders; his possession of knives (either his own or those that originated in the home he was burglarizing) in various of the capital and noncapital crimes; his stalking behavior in most of the noncapital burglaries and attempted burglaries; his repeated attempts to burglarize residences knowing that their young female inhabitants were at home and possibly were showering; his violence during the Hughes-Webb burglary; his statement to his accomplice Moheshea Beasley that if the resident of an apartment had appeared unexpectedly during a burglary, he would have slit her throat; and Shirley Beasleys testimony that during one of their joint burglaries, defendant took a knife from the kitchen of the burglarized residence and instructed Beasley that if the resident returned, Beasley should step aside and defendant would handle it. Shirley Beasley also testified that defendant told him that if a resident returned to a house defendant was burglarizing, defendant would stab the person in the heart or the neck. (See People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 536 [illegal possession of weapons along with evidence defendant used those or similar weapons in other crimes could be considered under section 190.3, factor (b)]; see also People v. Monteil (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 936 [actual or threatened violence in burglary]; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589 [illegal possession of weapon in custody constitutes implied threat of violence]; People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 676-677 [evidence that defendant picked up a knife during a burglary to avoid apprehension and make good his escape could be an implied threat to use the knife against anyone who might interfere].)
Defendant contends the courts instructions were inadequate to inform the jury of its responsibilities, and he surmises that the standard instructions on section 190.3, factor (b) would permit a juror to conclude that any residential burglary is a crime of violence, even if no force was used in making entry.[2]
Defendants principal contention seems to be that the court should have afforded additional guidance on the meaning of the terms force and violence ― terms he claimed involve technical legal distinctions not a matter of common knowledge. We previously have rejected the identical claim, and defendant offers no persuasive reason for us to reconsider our holding. (People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 922 [rejecting state law and Eighth Amendment claims].)[3]
5. Prosecutorial misconduct
Petitioner contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during his questioning of defense expert James Park and during argument to the jury.
James Park, a former associate warden at San Quentin prison, testified on defendants behalf. Park described prison conditions and the daily life experienced by persons sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. He described the generally stabilizing influence of life prisoners upon prisoners serving shorter terms. During cross-examination, the court sustained defendants objection to the prosecutors question whether the witness previously had personalized his testimony. The prosecutor then asked whether the witness was predicting how hes [defendant] going to do. The witness stated he had not testified to that effect. The prosecutor then asked: But in the past, youve talked about a specific defendant doing well in prison? You predicted that, havent you? The defense successfully objected on relevance grounds.
According to defendant, the prosecutors questions insinuated that the witness would not speak of defendant personally because the witness knew there was nothing good that could be said about him. According to defendant, the questions undermined important defense evidence in mitigation, and [n]o admonition could have undone the harm caused by this misconduct. Defendant alleges this purported misconduct rendered the penalty trial fundamentally unfair and thereby constituted a denial of the right to due process of law under the United States Constitution. In addition, once the prosecutor used improper leading questions to imply evidence that did not exist and would not have been relevant if it did exist, there was no realistic manner in which the defense could have confronted the improper implication. This deprived [defendant] of his federal 6th and 14th Amendment rights to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him . . . [and] effectively deprived [defendant] of his right to present witnesses in his own behalf. Defendant also claims denial of his constitutional right to a reliable penalty phase determination and his constitutional right to have the jury consider his evidence in mitigation.
The witness never answered the prosecutors questions. Defendant did not seek an admonition to the jury to disregard the prosecutors questions, a circumstance that ordinarily causes the forfeiture of a claim. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct ordinarily are forfeited for the purpose of appeal unless the defendant objects to the asserted misconduct at trial and requests an admonition to the jury, or an admonition would not have cured the harm. (People v.Fiereo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 211.)
Moreover, the jury was instructed that the attorneys questions do not constitute evidence, and that it should not speculate concerning the answer that might have been given to a question or assume the truth of any insinuation suggested by a question as to which an objection was sustained. As a general matter, we may presume that the jury followed the instructions it was given (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1014), and defendant has failed to supply any persuasive reason to suppose the jury instead would have accepted as evidence the insinuation allegedly implicit in the prosecutors questions.
Defendant also argues that in closing argument, the prosecutor improperly appealed to the passions of the jury and invited the jury to engage in a mechanical weighing process, in violation of various constitutional rights. Defendant points to the prosecutors argument that the defense was inviting the jury to impose the same penalty life in prison without possibility of parole that would have been the minimum punishment had defendant committed only the offenses against Janene Weinhold. The prosecutor pointed to the additional aggravating factors of defendants five other murders. He suggested that defense counsel essentially would be arguing that the other five murder victims did not count that these women are freebies. Lets throw these bodies in. And we are not going to exact one more day, one more ounce of punishment against [defendant] for killing six than we would the one.
Defendant did not object to the argument, nor did he seek an admonition to the jury. Under the circumstances, he forfeited any claim based on the principles stated above. In addition, contrary to defendants claim, we do not believe that the prosecutor told the jury that all multiple murders automatically warrant the death penalty, nor do we believe his argument was an improper appeal to passion or invited the jury to engage in a mechanical weighing process. The circumstances of the charged capital crimes are appropriate factors in aggravation, and it is not improper to suggest that a defendant who murders six persons is more culpable and therefore should receive a more severe sentence than a defendant who murders only one victim.
Defendant cites a decision filed by a majority of the Illinois Supreme Court holding that a similar argument constituted reversible error at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial. (People v. Kuntu (Ill. 2001) 752 N.E.2d 380, 403.) The decision held that the prosecutors argument was a call to the jury to act on the basis of passion and prejudice and also amounted to an argument that all multiple murders automatically must be punished by death. (Ibid.) The prosecutors reference to five free murders, the majority maintained, was simply an inflammatory statement with no basis in either law or fact; it is tantamount to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, a person who kills more than two persons should be sentenced to death. (Ibid.) The decision concluded that standard jury instructions informing the jury that the prosecutors argument does not constitute evidence did not, under the particular facts of the case, cure the prosecutors asserted misconduct. The court concluded that [i]n light of the closely balanced evidence presented at the penalty phase of the death sentencing hearing, the risk is simply too great that the prosecutors comments improperly influenced the jurys sentencing decision. (Id. at p. 404.)
We believe that the three dissenting justices in Kuntu took the better view. As the dissent pointed out, and as we believe is true in the present case as well, the prosecutor at no time argued that the death penalty should always be imposed when more than two persons are killed. Instead, the State implied, through its comments, that the offense was particularly egregious and especially deserving of the death penalty. The State commented, as it has a right to do, that defendants crime was an atrocious crime that resulted in the senseless death of seven victims . . . . Thus, the States comments, although inartful, were not misstatements of the death penalty law and should not be construed in such a fashion. (People v. Kuntu, supra, 752 N.E.2d at p. 409 (dis. opn. of Fitzgerald, J.).)
6. Failure to exclude evidence of defendants possession of a weapon while he was in custody
Defendant contends the trial court erred in determining that it lacked the discretion ordinarily afforded by Evidence Code section 352 which acknowledges the courts discretion to exclude evidence that is more prejudicial than probative to exclude evidence of defendants possession of a weapon in jail as a factor in aggravation under factor (b).
In People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1201, we declared that the trial court retains its traditional discretion to exclude particular items of [section 190.3, factors (a) or (b)] evidence that are to be used in a manner that is misleading, cumulative, or unduly inflammatory. In addition, factor (b) evidence, even if it depicts the moral blameworthiness of the defendant, may nonetheless be excludable under Evidence Code section 352 insofar as it unfairly persuades jurors to find the defendant guilty of the crimes commission. (Ibid.) Even assuming error under Box in the present case, any error could not have been prejudicial. Defendant presents no reason for us to conclude that the evidence in question was unduly inflammatory or prejudicial. He contends the evidence might demonstrate that defendant was likely to be dangerous in the future, but such an inference was proper.[4]
7. Challenges to the California death penalty scheme
Defendant raises various constitutional challenges to the California death penalty statute, but we reject them as we have done in prior cases.
a. Admitting evidence of prior unadjudicated crimes in aggravation does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of fair trial, trial by an impartial jury, speedy trial, and reliability, or the prohibition on placing persons twice in jeopardy for the same offense. (People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1217.)
b. Failure to require that the jury unanimously find the aggravating circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt, to find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, or to require a unanimous finding beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty does not violate the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process and a reliable penalty determination. (People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1217.)
The California death penalty statute is not unconstitutional in failing to require the jury to make written findings concerning the aggravating circumstances it relied upon, nor does the failure to require written findings preclude meaningful appellate review. (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730-731.) Neither Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, nor Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, nor Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 affects California death penalty law or otherwise justifies reconsideration of the foregoing decisions. (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 731.) At oral argument in the present case, defense counsel filed a letter that added a citation to the high courts recent, related decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. __ [127 S.Ct. 856]. The Cunningham decision involves merely an extension of the Apprendi and Blakely analyses to Californias determinate sentencing law and has no apparent application to the states capital sentencing scheme. In Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, the high court found a constitutional requirement that any fact, other than a prior conviction, which increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be formally charged, submitted to the fact finder, treated as a criminal element and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] But under the California death penalty scheme, once the defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and one or more special circumstances has been found true beyond a reasonable doubt, death is no more than the prescribed statutory maximum for the offense; the only alternative is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589-590, fn. 14.) Defendants failure to supply any discussion or analysis of the Cunningham decision leaves us with no basis to conclude that it should cause us to alter our views.
c. The California death penalty statute does not fail to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty as required by the Eighth Amendment and article 1, section 17 of the California Constitution. (People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 237; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1017.)
d. Contrary to defendants claim, comparative intercase proportionality review is not required by the United States Constitution. (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126, 127), but intracase proportionality review is available. (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 511.)
e. The use of the terms extreme or substantial does not improperly limit the jurys consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 642.)
f. Nor does the prosecutorial discretion to charge special circumstances or seek the death penalty under the [California death penalty] statute violate the federal Constitution. (People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1217.)
g. Delay in the appointment of counsel on appeal and in processing the appeal does not inflict cruel or unusual punishment within the meaning of the state or United States Constitutions. (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1131.)
h. Contrary to defendants claim, the statutory sentencing factors are not so arbitrary, broad, or contradictory that they provide inadequate guidance to the jury. (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 729.
i. There is no constitutional requirement of a presumption in favor of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 440.)
j. Appellate review of death judgments is not impermissibly influenced by political considerations in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1140-1141.)
k. Defendant contends that the various violations of state and federal law he has asserted also constitute a violation of international law, but he fail[s] to establish the premise that his trial involved violations of state and federal constitutional law. (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1055.) Further, [t]o the extent defendant alleges violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . . . his claim lacks merit, even assuming he has standing to invoke this covenant. (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 106; People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 404.)
8. Cumulative prejudice
Defendant contends that guilt phase errors that may have been harmless at the guilt phase were prejudicial at the penalty phase. He cites (1) asserted error in admitting evidence of the knives discovered in his automobile at the time of his arrest; and (2) admission of evidence of ambiguous statements made by [defendant] which were not sufficiently tied to the present crimes, but which nonetheless portrayed [defendant] as having a negative attitude toward females. Defendant contends this assertedly improperly admitted character evidence affected the penalty determination and also might have caused the jury to dismiss any lingering doubts they had concerning defendants guilt. Defendant also contends the prejudicial impact of any guilt phase error on the penalty determination is subject to review under the Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, standard for review of federal constitutional error, rather than the Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432 test for state law error at the penalty phase. But [w]e have explained that Browns reasonable possibility standard and Chapmans reasonable doubt test . . . are the same in substance and effect. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, (38 Cal.4th at p. 961, fn. omitted.) As we have concluded, the admission of the evidence of the knives was harmless under the most exacting standard of review (see People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 655), and we have rejected defendants claim concerning the admission of his statements.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed in its entirety.
GEORGE, C. J.
WE CONCUR:
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Prince
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal XXX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S036105
Date Filed: April 30, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: San Diego
Judge: Charles R. Hayes
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Mark E. Cutler, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood, John T. Swan and Quisteen S. Shum, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Mark E. Cutler
Post Office Box 172
Cool, CA 95614-0172
(530) 885-7718
Quisteen S. Shum
Deputy Attorney General
110 West A Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92186-5266
(619) 645-2211
Publication Courtesy of San Diego County Legal Resource Directory.
Analysis and review provided by El Cajon Property line Lawyers.
[1] Defendant contends that this courts decision in People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, limits victim impact evidence to evidence that logically shows the harm caused by the defendant. (Id. at p. 835.) He suggests that victim impact evidence must be such as to portray the victim as he or she was when the defendant confronted the victim and that the videotape showed far more than what she was like when her killer saw her, thereby going well beyond showing the harm caused by the killer. We reject the assertion, as we have rejected similar claims in other cases, that our law disallows evidence of the victims characteristics that were unknown to his killer at the time of the crime. (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 732, and cases cited, fn. omitted.)
[2] Defendant also complains that the court never communicated to the jury its view that the burglaries were not part of an overall scheme that included the murders. The courts point in making this declaration was to explain why it rejected the prosecutors argument that all the noncapital burglaries and attempted burglaries could be considered under section 190.3, factor (a), the circumstances of the crime.
[3] Having found no error, we also reject defendants claim that the asserted error denied him various state and federal constitutional rights.
[4] For the same reason that we rejected defendants state law claim, we reject his claim that he suffered an arbitrary deprivation of the benefit of state law (Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. 343) and that he was deprived of the right to a reliable penalty determination. (Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. 280.)
