PEOPLE v. COX
Filed 8/10/10
CERTIFIED
FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JAMIE D. COX et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
B207285
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. TA088018)
APPEAL from
judgments of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles
County, Allen Joseph Webster, Judge.
Affirmed with modifications.
Thomas T.
Ono, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant
Jamie D. Cox.
John A.
Colucci, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant
Freddie Jones.
Law Offices
of Chris R. Redburn and Chris R. Redburn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Shawney D. Jackson.
Edmund G.
Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D.
Martynec and Lance E. Winters, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants, Freddie Howard Jones,
Shawney Jackson, and Jamie Cox, appeal from their convictions for murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and the jurors' findings
that a principal personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
and death (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)) and the murder was committed
for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
Ms. Cox and Mr. Jackson were convicted of first degree
murder. Mr. Jones was convicted of
second degree murder. We affirm the
judgments with modifications.
In the published portion of this
opinion, we discuss defendants' arguments that the trial court failed to
discharge the jury panel after the prosecutor exercised nine peremptory
challenges against African-American jurors.
We conclude the trial court complied with its constitutional obligation to engage in a
sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications
provided by the deputy district attorney.
Thus, no constitutional error occurred during the jury selection
process.
[Part
II is not to be published. See
where
publication is to resume.]
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the judgment. (
13 Cal.4th 622, 690; Taylor v.
908-909.) On Father's Day, June 15, 2003, Ms. Cox, a
cousin, Shelnesha Cox[2],
Mr. Jones, Mr. Jackson, Christopher Johnson, and Nakiea Larkin
gathered near the Douglas apartments at Rosecrans and Culver. Ms. Larkin was dating
Mr. Jones. The group was watching
two women fight behind a liquor store.
The Douglas apartment complex was a â€
| Description | Defendants, Freddie Howard Jones, Shawney Jackson, and Jamie Cox, appeal from their convictions for murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and the jurors' findings that a principal personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)) and the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) Ms. Cox and Mr. Jackson were convicted of first degree murder. Mr. Jones was convicted of second degree murder. We affirm the judgments with modifications. In the published portion of this opinion, we discuss defendants' arguments that the trial court failed to discharge the jury panel after the prosecutor exercised nine peremptory challenges against African-American jurors. Court conclude the trial court complied with its constitutional obligation to engage in a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications provided by the deputy district attorney. Thus, no constitutional error occurred during the jury selection process. |
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