PEOPLE v. MICAH BENJAMIN MINOR

































Filed 9/8/10



















CERTIFIED
FOR PUBLICATION





IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT

(Butte)

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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICAH BENJAMIN MINOR, Defendant and Appellant.

C057609 (Super. Ct. No. CM020547)

APPEAL
from a judgment (order extending probation) of the Superior
Court of Butte County,
James F. Reilley, Judge. Affirmed.



Robert
D. McGhie for Defendant and Appellant.



Edmund
G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles A.
French, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Peter H. Smith, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.







In this appeal, we
consider the question of how much process is due a probationer in a probation
extension proceeding. Defendant appeals
an order granting a probation officer's request to extend by two years a
three-year period of probation imposed following defendant's no contest plea to
unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor.
(Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (c).)[1] The request was made in a probation progress
report to the court, which detailed defendant's failure to make progress in a
sex offender therapy program mandated as a condition of probation. Defendant argues that a probationer in an
extension proceeding is entitled to the same rights that obtain in a probation
revocation proceeding and asserts that his federal due process rights of
notice, confrontation, and factual findings were violated. We disagree with his initial premise and
shall conclude that defendant was provided adequate notice and an opportunity
to be heard prior to the extension of his probation, and that his rights of
procedural due process were not
violated in any respect. We also find
adequate support in the record for the court's order extending probation. We affirm.

I. Factual background

The underlying
facts of the offense are only marginally relevant to the issues on appeal. Suffice it to say that based on his
interactions with a female acquaintance, defendant was charged with forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)),
penetration by foreign object by the use of force and violence (§ 289,
subd. (a)(1)), and sexual penetration by a foreign object of a victim
under the age of 18 years (§ 289, subd. (h)).
In August 2004 defendant entered a no contest plea to unlawful
sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (c)) and was placed on formal
probation for 36 months. A condition of
his probation required him to â€