PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT OF
DIEGO
Filed
1/4/07
COURT
OF APPEAL - FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO
COUNTY,
Respondent;
D049026
(San Diego County
Super. Ct. No. SCD196196)
SEAN CURTIS EDWARDS,
Real Party in
Interest.
Petition for writ of mandate after the superior
court issued an order placing the defendant on probation for
offenses. David J. Danielson, Judge. Petition denied.
Bonnie M. Dumanis, District
Fisher, and Richard D. Huffman II, Deputy District Attorneys, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Timothy A. Chandler, Alternate Public Defender
and Matthew A. Mohun, Deputy Public Defender for Real Party in Interest.
The issue presented in this
defendant who is found to have committed a nonviolent drug possession offense
(NDPO) is ineligible to be placed on probation and ordered to drug treatment in
accordance with the mandatory provisions
of Proposition 36 if, at the time of the commission of the NDPO, he was on
probation for other, non-qualifying
offenses. We answer this question in the negative and deny the People's
petition to set aside the superior court's order placing the defendant on
probation.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2006,
Sean Curtis Edwards was charged with one count each of
possession of drug paraphernalia. He pleaded guilty to the current charges
after being told by the court that it would place him on probation under
Proposition 36 or, if he was ineligible therefor, on probation with any custody
time to be served locally. At that time, Edwards was on probation for
disobeying a domestic violence restraining
order and battery on a peace officer.
After briefing and argument on the eligibility issue, the court placed Edwards
on probation conditioned on his participation in drug treatment in accordance
with Proposition 36.
The People filed this proceeding, seeking relief
based on the contention that, under the California Supreme Court's recent
decision in People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577 (Guzman),
Edwards was ineligible for treatment under Proposition 36 and thus the court
was required to sentence him for the current offenses.
DISCUSSION
Proposition 36
(which is also known as the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000
(the Act)) was passed by California voters on November 7, 2000 and took effect on July 1, 2001; it is codified in Penal Code sections 1210, 1210.1, and
3063.1, and in division 10.8 (commencing with § 11999.4) of the Health and
Safety Code. (People v. Murillo (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1417.)
Its provisions amended state law to create an alternative sentencing scheme for
persons convicted of certain drug offenses; it requires that qualifying
offenders receive probation, conditioned on participation in and completion of
an appropriate drug treatment program, rather than a prison term or probation
without drug treatment, thus eliminating the court's traditional discretion to
determine whether such offenders are suitable for probation. (People v.
Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 183, citing Pen. Code, § 1210.1; People
v. Thurman (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1461.)
The purposes underlying Proposition 36 were to
"enhance public safety by reducing drug-related crime and preserving jails
and prison cells for serious and violent offenders, and to improve public
health by reducing drug abuse and drug dependence through proven and effective
drug treatment strategies." (People v. Goldberg (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 1202, 1208; People v. Johnson (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 284,
293-294.) When a defendant is eligible for Proposition 36 treatment, probation
is mandatory unless he or she is disqualified in accordance with specified
statutory exceptions. (People v. Esparza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 691,
699.)
Whether a defendant is eligible for treatment
under Proposition 36 is generally governed by Penal Code section 1210.1, which
provides in relevant part:
"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
and except as provided in subdivision (b), any person convicted of a nonviolent
drug possession offense shall receive probation. As a condition of probation
the court shall require participation in and completion of an appropriate drug
treatment program. . . . A court may not impose incarceration
as an additional condition of probation. . . .
". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"(b) Subdivision (a) does not apply to . . . .
"(1) Any defendant who previously has been
convicted of one or more serious or violent felonies in violation of
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or Section 1192.7, [subject to certain
exceptions] . . . .
"(2) Any defendant who, in addition to one or more
nonviolent drug possession offenses, has been convicted in the same proceeding
of a misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs or any felony.
"(3) Any defendant who:
"(A) While using a firearm, unlawfully possesses
any amount of (i) a substance containing either cocaine base, cocaine, heroin,
methamphetamine, or (ii) a liquid, nonliquid, plant substance, or hand-rolled
cigarette, containing phencyclidine.
"(B) While using a firearm, is unlawfully under
the influence of cocaine base, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine or
phencyclidine.
"(4) Any defendant who refuses drug treatment as a
condition of probation.
"(5) Any defendant who (A) has two separate
convictions for nonviolent drug possession offenses, (B) has participated in
two separate courses of drug treatment pursuant to subdivision (a), and (C) is
found by the court, by clear and convincing evidence, to be unamenable to any
and all forms of available drug treatment. Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the trial court shall sentence such defendants to 30 days in
jail."
Although the People admit that Edwards does not fall within
any of the foregoing statutory exceptions, they contend that Guzman
created an additional exception to the applicability of Proposition 36's
mandatory probation provisions.
In Guzman, the defendant was arrested for
possession and being under the influence of a controlled substance; at the time
he was on probation for prior charges of inflicting corporal punishment on a
cohabitant and committing misdemeanor battery upon a peace officer engaged in
his duties. After the defendant pleaded guilty to the NDPOs, the trial
court placed him on probation conditioned on his participation in drug
treatment in accordance with the provisions of Proposition 36 set forth above.
Based on those same NDPO convictions, however, the court in separate
proceedings relating to the prior non-NDPO offenses subsequently revoked
the defendant's probation for those offenses; at the sentencing hearing in
the non-NDPO action, the defendant argued that he should be re-released on
probation for drug treatment under the Act. He pointed out that when a person
is on parole for a non-qualifying offense and commits an NDPO, he or she is
eligible under the Act for parole conditioned on drug treatment (see Pen. Code,
§ 3063.1, subd. (a)) and contended that the Act should be similarly
applied to persons on probation for a non-NDPO. The trial court disagreed and
sentenced defendant to two years in prison. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding
that the Act's disparate treatment of probationers and parolees violated the
defendant's right to equal protection.
The California Supreme Court granted review and
reversed. It held that, in accordance with the express language of the
statutes, an offender who is on probation for non-qualifying offenses is not
eligible for Proposition 36 treatment as to those offenses. (Guzman,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 585.) It also rejected the defendant's equal
protection argument, finding that an offender who commits an NDPO while on
probation for non-qualifying offenses is not similarly situated to someone who
commits an NDPO while on parole for previous convictions of similar
non-qualifying offenses. (Id. at pp. 584-591.) The high court reasoned
"[p]robationers . . . have had imposition or execution
of sentence suspended and have been given an opportunity to avoid serving their
time in prison by completing a period of conditional release in the community
in lieu of the prison terms prescribed by law for their underlying
convictions. . . . Moreover, probationers who are still on
probation have not completed the period of conditional release that substitutes
for the prison terms they otherwise would be serving." (Id. at p.
593; People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1275.) Based on these
differences between probationers and parolees, the court concluded that the
defendant had not made the threshold showing of a meritorious equal protection
claim.
The People nonetheless point to certain language
in Guzman and argue that the high court interpreted Proposition 36 as
inapplicable to any offender who committed an NDPO while on probation for a
non-qualifying offense, even in the proceedings relating solely to the current
NDPOs. (See Guzman, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 583.) However, the
procedural circumstances involved in Guzman belie the People's
interpretation of this language. The issue in Guzman was whether the
defendant could have his probation revoked and be sent to prison on the prior
offenses of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant and battery on a peace
officer, neither of which was an NDPO. Here, the issue is whether Edwards is
eligible for Proposition 36 treatment as to the NDPOs for which the trial court
was sentencing him. Notably, in Guzman, the trial court in the criminal
proceedings arising out of the defendant's current NDPOs placed Guzman for
treatment in accordance with Proposition 36, just as the court did here.
No issue about the propriety of such treatment was raised in Guzman, nor
did the opinion express any concern about the trial court's application of
Proposition 36 as to the NDPOs.
Although none of the
statutory exceptions to mandatory treatment applied to Edwards, the People also
cite a few published appellate decisions holding that certain defendants who
were not within the express statutory exceptions to section 1210.1 were
nonetheless ineligible for probation under Proposition 36. In People v.
Esparza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 691, the Third District Court of Appeal
considered whether a defendant who was convicted of an NDPO offense while on
probation for felony vandalism was nonetheless eligible for a Proposition 36
drug treatment program after being sentenced to prison for three years for
violating probation in the vandalism case. Noting that Proposition 36 includes
"extensive requirements for participation in outpatient drug treatment
programs and rehabilitative probation conditions," the court concluded
that because the defendant's existing incarceration precluded him from
participating in the treatment programs and complying with other probation
conditions required by Proposition 36 (see Pen. Code, § 1210, subds. (b),
(c)) , it "defie[d] common sense and the letter of the law" to place
him on probation under Proposition 36 for the drug offense. (Id. at p.
698, fn omitted.)
Although the court tacitly acknowledged that the
defendant otherwise met the statutory criteria for Proposition 36 eligibility,
it relied on the rule of statutory construction that a statute should not be
interpreted in a manner leads to absurd results and held that the trial court
was not required to engage in the superfluous act of placing the incarcerated
defendant on Proposition 36 probation. (People v. Esparza, supra, 107
Cal.App.4th at p. 698.) It found that an incarcerated defendant who is
unavailable to participate in Proposition 36 programs within the statutory time
periods because of his prison sentence is essentially unamenable for drug
treatment under the statutory scheme. (Id. at p. 699; see Pen. Code,
§ 1210.1, subd. (b)(5)(C).)
The same court reached the same conclusion in People
v. Wandick (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 131. There, a defendant who was awaiting
trial on an NDPO committed grand theft. He was convicted of the theft offense
and sentenced to two years in prison before being sentenced on the drug
offense. Like the defendant in Esparza, Wandick stood convicted of a
Proposition-36-qualifying offense and "literally did not fit within any of
the exceptions set forth in section 1210.1, subdivision (b)[.]" (Id.
at p. 134.) Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's refusal
to grant the defendant probation under Proposition 36 on the drug offense,
"apply[ing] Esparza's reasoning" and holding the defendant was
"not amenable to drug treatment within the meaning of the statute because
he was unavailable to participate in the specified drug treatment
programs." (Id. at p. 135.)
The court also concluded that the defendant's
commission of a nondrug felony while awaiting trial on his drug charge
"took him out of the class of nonviolent substance abusers for whom the
voters intended rehabilitative treatment when they passed Proposition 36,"
noting that at the time he committed the drug offense, he was already on
informal probation for no fewer than five additional crimes. It noted that
"[t]he purpose of the initiative was to get immediate help for nonviolent
drug addicts, not to provide a 'Get Out of Jail Free' card to career criminals
who also happen to partake of drugs" and that the trial court was not
required to apply Proposition 36 literally where such application would plainly
conflict with the intent of the statute. (People v. Wandick, supra, 115
Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)
The People assert Esparza and Wandick
establish that a defendant who is on probation for non-NDPO crimes is
ineligible for probation and treatment under Proposition 36. However, in each
of those cases the defendant was incarcerated for a non-qualifying offense at
the time he was sentenced for the NDPO and, as a result of being
incarcerated, neither of them was capable of complying with the strict
treatment requirements imposed by Proposition 36. Here, Edwards was not
incarcerated at the time of his sentencing on the qualifying offenses and the
People apparently had not sought to have the court revoke probation in his
prior non-NDPO cases. Although the situation would be different if the People
successfully sought to revoke probation for the prior offenses, under these
circumstances, it is not inevitable, as in Esparza and Wandick,
that Edwards would be unable to comply with the applicable conditions of
probation under Proposition 36.
Because Edwards is not subject to one of the
Proposition 36 exceptions to mandatory probation and drug treatment and not
legally incapable of complying with the conditions of probation under the
statutory scheme, we conclude that the trial court properly placed him on such
probation. Accordingly, we deny the
DISPOSITION
The People's petition is denied.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
McINTYRE,
Acting P.J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE,
J.
IRION,
J.
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