Petitioner Bryan Perez-Montiel was charged on May 31, 2018, with two misdemeanor violations of the Vehicle Code stemming from an incident on September 17, 2017, in which he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Petitioner was not arraigned until February 22, 2021.

Petitioner brought a motion to dismiss, asserting violations of his state and federal constitutional speedy trial rights. After the superior court denied petitioner’s motion, petitioner unsuccessfully sought relief in the superior court appellate division. Petitioner now appropriately seeks writ relief from this court. (See Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239, 263-264.)

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that petitioner is plainly entitled to writ relief concerning his federal constitutional speedy trial claim, insofar as the petition contends that the superior court failed to make appropriate factual findings and “expressly to weigh all factors listed in Barker v. Wingo [(1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530-533].” (Ogle v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1022, 1023.) Tellingly, we solicited an informal opposition from the People and gave the parties notice that we might choose to act by issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance pursuant to Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177-180, and no opposition was filed.

In accordance with our notification to the parties that we might do so, we will direct issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance. Petitioner’s right to relief is obvious, and no useful purpose would be served by issuance of an alternative writ, further briefing, and oral argument. (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; see also Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1236-1237, 1240-1241.)

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court appellate division to vacate its June 23, 2022 order denying petitioner’s petition for writ of mandate, and to instead issue a new and different order granting the petition and directing the superior court to (1) vacate its order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss insofar as that motion raised a federal constitutional speedy trial issue, (2) conduct a new hearing on that motion, and (3) make appropriate factual findings and expressly apply the balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at pp. 530-533. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (b).)

The stay previously imposed shall dissolve upon the issuance of the remittitur. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(d).)

In all other respects, the petition before this Court is denied.

This decision shall be final as to this court within ten (10) court days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

Perez-Montiel v. Superior Court (A165618)