P.v . McIntyre

Filed 9/26/07 P.v . McIntyre CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Richard M. King, Judge. Affirmed.

James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf, and Robert M. Foster, Deputies Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I

INTRODUCTION

Michael Robert McIntyre was convicted by a jury on August 14, 2006 of one count of grand theft, one count of misdemeanor theft from a pawnbroker, and one count of vandalism causing $10,000 or more in damage. (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (a), 484.1, subd. (a), 594, subds. (a), (b)(1).)[1] McIntyre challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jurys verdict with respect to the grand theft conviction, alleging the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the value of the stolen goods was equal to or greater than the statutorily required minimum amount of $400. ( 487, subd. (a).)

In reviewing cases claiming insufficiency of the evidence, this court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 117-118; quoting People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) Generally, the reasonable and fair market value is used to determine the value of the property wrongfully obtained in violation of section 487, subdivision (a). ( 484, subd. (a).) However, the testimony of the rightful owner of stolen property may also be sufficient evidence of the propertys value to establish the statutory amount. (Evid. Code 813, subd. (a)(2).) Based on our review of the record, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish the wrongfully appropriated property that McIntyre possessed and attempted to pawn was worth more than $400. For this reason, the judgment is affirmed.

II

Facts

On November 29, 2005, McIntyre entered Costa Mesa Jewelers to pawn several pieces of jewelry belonging to Ann Marie Spence. The jewelry, an assortment of rings, earrings, and one tennis bracelet, had been gifts to Spence from her estranged husband, Doug Spence. McIntyre and Spence had essentially been living together since September of that year, and they had just spent Thanksgiving weekend with McIntyres family.

Spence testified that she believed the value of jewelry to be approximately $10,000, based in part upon prices she observed while shopping for the jewelry with her estranged husband. According to the pawnbroker, McIntyre said he had broken up with his girlfriend and she had given some jewelry back to him, which he now wanted to pawn. The pawnbroker believed McIntyre and proceeded to calculate the price he would pay for the jewelry by weighing the gold, applying the raw price of gold that day, and estimating the value of the diamonds if he were to sell them to another jeweler. Based on his calculations, the pawnbroker gave McIntyre $200 for all of the jewelry. At trial, the pawnbroker testified the retail markup of the jewelry purchased from McIntyre would probably amount to four to five times the amount he paid for the items.

III

Discussion

As stated above, the sole issue in this appeal is the valuation of the jewelry stolen by McIntyre and sold to a pawnbroker. Under general rules of evidence, the value of property may be established by the opinion of the owner of the property goods. (Evid. Code 813, subd. (a)(2).) Spence testified to the value of each of the pieces of jewelry during the trial and stated that the value of all her jewelry was $10,000, an amount well over the statutory minimum of $400. We note that in each instance Spences opinion was based on what she had perceived the value to be and her perception was rationally based on familiarity with market values. (See Evid. Code 800.)

In addition to the statutory provision permitting the owner of property to testify as to its value, California case law has examined the issue as well. In Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, the California Supreme Court stated, The opinion of an owner of personal property is in itself competent evidence of the value of that property, and sufficient to support a judgment based on that value. [Citations.] The credit and weight to be given such evidence and its effect . . . is for the trier of fact. [Citation.] (Id. at p. 921.)

McIntyre contends that the value of the jewelry was not properly ascertained at the trial, and that the only reliable estimate of value was the $200 he received from the pawnshop owner. However, the California Evidence Code and relevant case law do not support his argument. We acknowledge that pawnbrokers hold an iconic place in literature and film. From Charlie Chaplins portrayal as an employee in The Pawnshop (Delta Mutual Film Corporation 1916), to Ron Steigers stunning performance as a Holocaust survivor who emigrated to New York in the aptly named, The Pawnbroker (Allied Artists Pictures Corporation 1964), the image of the pawnshop and those involved in the business have been cast in a myriad of ways. But the question here is whether the price paid by a pawnbroker establishes the fair market value of stolen goods that an individual sought to pawn as a source of quick cash. We conclude it does not.

Generally, a pawnshop owner will pay 5 to 20 percent of the value of any given item and lend only a fraction of its market value. (Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending? (2002) 87 Minn. L.Rev. 1, 102, fn. 544.) Because pawnbrokers provide a service to high risk credit customers, it is reasonable to conclude he or she plans to recoup the investment by reselling goods at a profit. Consistent with this reality, the pawnbroker of Costa Mesa Jewelers testified the retail value of the jewelry McIntyre pawned was four or five times the $200 McIntyre received, and the pawnbroker acknowledged he paid less than the retail value of the goods. In this case, the jury reasonably concluded the $200 McIntyre received represented only a fraction of the jewelrys retail value. Instead, the jury believed the pawnbrokers estimation of its worth on resale and Spences testimony on the subject. Consequently, there is sufficient evidence to support the jurys verdict.

IV

disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

SILLS, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

RYLAARSDAM, J.

FYBEL, J.

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[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.