Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of
Filed 7/29/13 Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
QUALIFIED PATIENTS ASSOCIATION et al.,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
CITY OF ANAHEIM,
Defendant and
Respondent.
G046875
(Super. Ct.
No. 07CC09524)
O P I N I O
N
Appeal from an order of the Superior
Court of
County, David R. Chaffee, Judge. Affirmed.
Anthony
Curiale for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Cristina
L. Talley, City Attorney, and Moses W. Johnson IV, Assistant
City Attorney, for Defendant and
Respondent.
* * *
Qualified Patients
Association, a former medical marijuana dispensary, and its owner and operator,
Lance Mowdy, (collectively, Qualified Patients) appeal from the trial court’s
order denying them attorney fees as private attorneys general under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
(All further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Because they were not successful in their
underlying declaratory judgment action
to prevent the City of Anaheim (the
city) from closing their medical marijuana dispensary, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Qualified Patients’ attorney fee request. We therefore affirm the ruling.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The
relevant background needs little discussion.
Seeking a declaratory judgment, Qualified Patients challenged the city’s
ordinance barring ownership or operation of a medical marijuana
dispensary. The trial court sustained
the city’s demurrer, concluding Qualified Patients’ claim in its first cause of
action that state medical marijuana law preempted the city’s ordinance was
itself preempted by federal law. We
reversed the demurrer, explaining that federal law did not preempt state law
because under basic federalism principles, federal authorities could not compel
state criminalization of
Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734,
756-765 (Qualified Patients I).) We affirmed the trial court’s ruling
rejecting plaintiffs’ second cause of action asserting the ordinance violated
their civil rights under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51), and
we remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, the matter proceeded to trial and
Mowdy testified, claiming to be cultivating and distributing marijuana as part
of nonprofit collective, lawful under state law. The trial court, however, found Qualified
Patients was unlawfully distributing marijuana for profit to hundreds of
patients in a “mass distribution†scheme.
The trial court concluded the city’s ordinance did not completely ban
medical marijuana distribution lawful under state law because its ban applied
only to entities consisting of more than two people, as stated in the ordinance
defining a dispensary as “any facility where medical marijuana is made
available to and/or distributed by or to
three or more of the following: a
qualified patient, a person with [a county-issued medical marijuana]
identification card, or a primary caregiver.â€
As the court phrased it, “Anaheim’s
ordinance does not completely ban medical marijuana distribution; but it does
proscribe mass distribution of medical marijuana.†The court found the virtual ban constituted a
lawful exercise of the city’s police power, not preempted by state medical
marijuana law. Qualified Patients has
appealed the ruling, which is pending in this court.
But
even before Qualified Patients appealed following its loss at trial, it filed
the attorney fee motion now under review.
The city opposed the motion on grounds that Qualified Patients was not a
“successful party†within the meaning of section 1021.5, the trial court
agreed and denied the fee motion, and plaintiffs now appeal.
II
DISCUSSION
This
appeal has nothing to do with medical marijuana, preemption, or other topics,
but rather turns solely on the requirements of section 1021.5. Section 1021.5 authorizes fees for “a
opposing parties,†when the action “has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest,†provided certain criteria are
met. (§ 1021.5, italics
added.) Those criteria include: (1) a significant benefit conferred on
the general public or a large class of persons; (2) the necessity and
financial burden of enforcement, particularly private enforcement, must make
the award appropriate; (3) and the interest of justice precludes payment of
fees out of the successful party’s recovery, if any. (Ibid.) In any event, the party seeking fees must be
“‘“successful,â€â€™â€ which is synonymous with “‘“prevailingâ€â€™â€ or otherwise
achieving its litigation objectives. (
34 Cal.4th 553, 570-571 (Graham).)
The
burden is on the claimant to demonstrate it is entitled to fees, including that
its litigation costs transcend its personal interest in the litigation and
should be shifted in the public’s interest to the other parties. (Save
Open Space Santa Monica Mountains v. Superior Court (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 235, 246.) On
appeal, we review a trial court’s award or denial of attorney fees for abuse of
discretion, and we must presume the trial court acted within its discretion. (Collins
v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140, 152-153.)
Qualified
Patients argues it is entitled to attorney fees because it was successful on
its initial appeal in overturning the demurrer.
Qualified Patients characterizes our holding in the first appeal that
federal law did not trump state medical marijuana law as a “landmark†decision
worthy of attorney fees for its efforts in pursuing the appeal. But as we noted in the opinion, we were not
even the first California court to do so.
(See County of San Diego v. San
Diego NORML (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 798, 822-823.)
More
importantly, however, the Supreme Court, has expressly cautioned that
“[a]ttorney fees should not be awarded for a lawsuit that lacks merit, even if
its pleadings would survive a demurrer.â€
(Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 576.) We only determined in Qualified Patients I that the pleadings were sufficient to survive
demurrer, and only because the city obtained demurrer by invoking federal law,
which did not suffice. Such interim
success does not serve as a basis for attorney fees under
section 1021.5. (
Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th
376, 387-388 [“regardless of the expansion of the law, [plaintiffs] did not
have a factually meritorious lawsuit and, when the dust settled, their only
victory was in a statement of the lawâ€]; accord, Karuk Tribe of Northern California v. California Regional Water Quality
Control Bd., North Coast Region (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 330, 334-335
[interim success on writ of mandate insufficient].) In Miller
v. California Com. on Status of Women (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 454, 455,
the appellate court described as “an amazing display of chutzpah†the losing
party’s request for attorney fees because it enjoyed interim success in having summary
judgment overturned, only to lose the case at trial. Whether the characterization is apt here or
not, it remains true that the party requesting fees must ultimately gain its
litigation objectives, which Qualified Patients manifestly failed to do when it
sought attorney fees.
Qualified
Patients mistakenly relies on Maria P. v.
Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281 (Maria P.)
and similar cases for the proposition that “‘an attorney fee award may be
justified even when plaintiff’s legal
action does not result in a favorable final
judgment.’†(Boldface added to
quoted italics.) In Maria P., the plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction and
only dismissed their case because intervening legislation in their favor
rendered their claims moot.
Specifically, they filed suit to prevent a school district from
reporting student immigration status to federal authorities, and the trial
court granted their request for a preliminary injunction, which became moot
with repeal of the statute requiring the district to report the
information. Because they had obtained
all the relief they sought, the trial court properly granted their fee
request. (Maria P., at p. 1291.)
That is not the case here.
Qualified Patients failed in its primary litigation objective of
preventing the city from closing its dispensary, and therefore the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the fee motion.
III
DISPOSITION
The
trial court’s order denying attorney fees is affirmed. The city is entitled to its
ARONSON,
J.
WE CONCUR:
RYLAARSDAM,
ACTING P. J.
FYBEL, J.
