Quarles v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia
Filed 8/24/06 Quarles v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
| JOSEPH QUARLES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF PHILADELPHIA, Defendant and Respondent. | B180208 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC308175) |
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jane L. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of David J. Weiss, David J. Weiss, Harry J. McKee and Peter M. Bollinger for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, Elizabeth G. Chilton; Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young and William R. Sasso for Defendant and Respondent.
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We affirm an order granting a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction in this state. In his underlying lawsuit, the appellant, Joseph Quarles, alleged acts of sexual molestation in Pennsylvania by priests serving in the respondent Archdiocese of Philadelphia. The molestation is alleged to have occurred over 40 years ago, while Quarles was a resident of Pennsylvania. He has been a resident of California for most of the time since it ended. The Archdiocese moved to quash. At the time its motion was heard, the second amended complaint--the charging pleading--was based on the molestation. Quarles had filed a motion to further amend in a manner that shifted the gist of the action to tortious refusal by the Archdiocese to continue paying for Quarles's treatment and therapy in California. The trial court granted the motion to quash and, later, denied the motion to file a third amended complaint. Quarles appeals from the order quashing service for want of jurisdiction. His arguments on appeal are based on allegations in the proposed further amended pleading.
Quarles's theories in the trial court and in this court have placed him in a procedural morass from which we cannot properly afford him rescue. He essentially has abandoned the theory of the charging pleading and has based his argument, in the trial court and here, on a pleading that is not filed. He did not seek to have his motion to file that pleading heard before the motion to quash. Nor does he argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to amend. Instead, he argues that we should reverse the trial court based on arguments unsupported by the charging pleading. We shall affirm the order.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Quarles's first pleading was filed on December 22, 2003. It was designed to take advantage of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, which provides a limited revival for suits, otherwise barred, that are based on claims of sexual abuse inflicted while the plaintiff was a minor. Among the several restrictions in that statute is one that requires that the lawsuit be commenced â€
