Filed 4/20/17 Ramirez v. Rusich Brothers Enterprises CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



GUADALUPE RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RUSICH BROTHERS ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.


E064185

(Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1309561)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Sachs, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Dumbeck & Dumbeck and Jason D. Dumbeck for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Vivian L. Schwartz, Vivian L. Schwartz, Kevin B. Bevins; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robert A. Olson, Gary J. Wax and Jonathan H. Eisenman for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Guadalupe Ramirez sued defendant and respondent Valley Kia (Kia) and others for (1) fraud; (2) “violation of Penal Code”; (3) misappropriation of identity; (4) rescission and restitution; and (5) violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The trial court granted a motion for nonsuit on the misappropriation of identity cause of action. A jury found in favor of Ramirez on the fraud and debt collection causes of action. The jury awarded Ramirez $2,500 for noneconomic damages, and $58,000 in punitive damages. The trial court reduced the punitive damages to $8,400. The trial court granted Kia’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the fraud cause of action. As a result, punitive damages were eliminated, leaving Ramirez with $2,500 in noneconomic damages.
Ramirez raises three issues on appeal. First, Ramirez contends the trial court erred by granting the motion for nonsuit on the misappropriation cause of action. Second, Ramirez contends the trial court erred by granting the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the fraud cause of action. Third, Ramirez contends the trial court erred by reducing the punitive damages from $58,000 to $8,400. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. PURCHASING VEHICLES
Ramirez purchased a Honda from Kia on April 25, 2012. In November 2012, Ramirez’s husband, Juan Ramirez (Husband), went to Kia to purchase another car. Ramirez was at work while Husband was at the dealership. Ramirez stopped by the dealership when she finished work, and heard Husband discussing interest rates with a Kia employee. Ramirez left to run errands, while Husband stayed at the dealership. When Ramirez returned, Husband was still discussing financing with a Kia employee. Ramirez had a higher credit rating than Husband, so the new loans would be in Ramirez’s name. Husband completed a credit application for Ramirez. Kia used the information on the customer-completed one-page credit application to fill in a three-page typed credit application that was sent to financial institutions. The customer signed the three-page typed application.
Ramirez did not participate in the financing conversation, but she listened to it. Husband understood English better than Ramirez, who primarily spoke Spanish. Ramirez understood the financing terms to be as follows: Husband and Ramirez would trade in the Honda. Kia would pay all the debt on the Honda. The loan on the Honda was for $14,400, but the Honda was worth $7,000. Ramirez expected Kia to absorb a $7,400 loss on the Honda. Ramirez would purchase two cars: an Xterra and an Altima. The loans for the Xterra and the Altima would take six years to pay. The total down payment would be $500. The contracts concerning the purchase of the Xterra and Altima were in English, which Ramirez does not understand.
The contract Ramirez signed had the following terms: The payments would take seven years; and the debt owed on the Honda that exceeded the Honda’s worth—$7,400—was rolled into the new loan for the Xterra. Also, according to Kia, a $500 down payment was owed for both cars, for a total of $1,000, but the second $500 down payment was deferred for two weeks. The document on which Husband’s negotiations with Kia were recorded, known as a FourSquare, was not retained in Kia’s files.
Kia contacted Ramirez at work, and she rejected all but one of their calls. A Kia employee went to Ramirez’s house to talk about collecting the deferred $500 down payment for the Altima. Ramirez asked one of her sons to read the contract. Husband then called Kia to ask about the second $500 down payment.
Ramirez received a letter in June 2013, indicating Kia intended to sue her. Ramirez was worried and fearful that her credit rating would be negatively affected. Ramirez obtained a copy of the credit application that was sent to Wells Fargo by Kia. The credit application reflected Ramirez had a monthly income of $5,400. Ramirez’s actual monthly income was $1,600. Husband’s income was $1,500 per month. The credit application listed Ramirez’s job as “director” at a factory, but her actual occupation was “lead.” The third page/signature page of the credit application was marked with a print date of October 29—approximately one week prior to Ramirez purchasing the Altima and Xterra. The first two pages of the credit application, which contained the false information, were marked as printed on November 7—the day after Ramirez purchased the Altima and Xterra. The second page of the application reflected the Altima had leather seats and a power driver’s seat, but it was not equipped with either. The credit application for the Honda reflected Ramirez had a monthly income of $2,700, when her actual income at that time was approximately $1,300.
In August 2013, Ramirez sued Kia. The causes of action included: (1) fraud; (2) “violation of Penal Code”; (3) misappropriation of identity; (4) rescission and restitution; and (5) violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Ramirez sought rescission, restitution, incidental damages, consequential damages, actual damages, economic damages, noneconomic damages, declaratory relief, punitive damages (Civ. Code, § 3294), treble damages (Pen. Code, § 496), statutory penalties (Civ. Code, §§ 334, 1788.30, subd. (b)), attorney’s fees, costs, prejudgment interest, and other relief the trial court deemed proper.
Sammy Dominguez was the general manager at Kia. Upon receiving notice of Ramirez’s lawsuit, Dominguez examined the records related to the Xterra and Altima sale. Dominguez discovered the deferred $500 down payment was not reflected on the purchase paperwork. As a result of that error, Kia offered Ramirez a refund of all the money she had paid for the two cars, including the negative equity for the Honda, in exchange for Ramirez returning the two cars. Ramirez and her family had driven the Altima and Xterra for one year. Ramirez returned both vehicles to Kia. All of Ramirez’s money was refunded by Kia, and the loans were paid in full, including the $14,400 for the Honda. Ramirez was not charged for the vehicles’ depreciation.
Ramirez was not upset when she completed the purchase of the Xterra and Altima. Ramirez did not see a doctor for emotional distress issues. Ramirez did not suffer emotional damage from purchasing the vehicles. Ramirez’s credit rating likely would have benefitted from the situation because it would reflect three paid-in-full vehicles—the Honda, Altima, and Xterra.
B. NONSUIT
Ramirez’s case went to trial. At the close of Ramirez’s case, Kia moved for nonsuit on all five causes of action. The trial court found the lawsuit triggered Kia’s rescission of the contracts, and therefore Ramirez was the prevailing party on that issue. However, the trial court granted nonsuit on the restitution aspect of the case.
The court granted the motion for nonsuit on the misappropriation of identity cause of action. The court said, “[I]t is not a misappropriation of identity case, it is not a right to privacy case. [¶] Typically when we are talking about right to privacy we are talking about a situation where somebody’s identity is used for the purposes of obtaining money for the person who is appropriating the identity. Here assuming the worst case scenario for the defendants, it is not an identity that was appropriated, it was allegedly a fraudulent number put in an application to get her a loan and so again it is something that I am struggling with.” The court concluded the issues in the case were “all covered by the fraud causes of action.”
The court denied the motion for nonsuit as to the fraud cause of action and debt collection cause of action. The court bifurcated the “Penal Code” cause of action from the rest of the lawsuit.
C. JURY VERDICT
During closing arguments, while arguing the fraud by concealment cause of action, Ramirez asserted Kia falsified her credit application On that cause of action, the jury found in favor of Ramirez. The jury found Ramirez suffered noneconomic damages in the amount of $2,500. On the debt collection cause of action, the jury found in favor of Ramirez. The jury found Ramirez suffered noneconomic damages in the amount of $2,500. The parties agreed only one award of $2,500 would be appropriate, so the court clarified Ramirez was awarded a total of $2,500. The court scheduled the punitive damages phase of the trial for a later date.
Kia moved for nonsuit, or in the alternative, a directed verdict. Kia argued there was no evidence of malice or that Ramirez sustained any damages, either monetary or emotional. The court explained the jury could have relied on Ramirez’s testimony that she was concerned about her credit rating. The trial court denied Kia’s motion without prejudice. The court said Kia could renew its motion after Ramirez had an opportunity to present more evidence.
D. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Ramirez offered evidence reflecting Kia’s net worth was $4,600,000. During argument to the jury, Ramirez asserted Kia engaged in multiple wrongful acts: (1) falsifying credit applications; (2) falsifying contracts by adding features that cars do not have, such as leather seats, which causes banks to lend more money than cars are worth; (3) extending the payments on cars for longer than agreed upon so as to increase the profit on the car; (4) telling customers Kia will pay the negative equity for a trade-in, but then charging the negative equity to the customer; (5) including non-agreed upon extras in the contract, such as gap insurance or extended warranties; (6) attempting to collect non-agreed upon down payments; and (7) not giving customers copies of their credit applications.
Ramirez asserted Kia is a “corrupt” institution and therefore should suffer higher punitive damages. Ramirez argued that she was vulnerable because she did not have a high income and did not speak English. In regard to harm, Ramirez asserted the jury should “look at potential harm” that could have occurred. Ramirez pointed to the credit application that warns of criminal prosecution for false information. Ramirez also pointed to the portion of the application that provides Ramirez’s employer can be contacted to verify her income, and asserted Ramirez’s employer had no tolerance for dishonesty. Additionally, Ramirez asserted the false credit application put her in immediate breach of the purchase contract because the contract requires the application be true; therefore, the banks could have repossessed the Altima and Xterra. Ramirez requested a minimum of $250,000 in punitive damages. The jury awarded $58,000 in punitive damages.
Kia moved to reduce the punitive damage award. At the beginning of the hearing on the motion, the trial court said, “I need to let you know I have some basic problems with this verdict, period, based on my view of the evidence. It does not appear to me that Ms. Ramirez—any representation was made to Ms. Ramirez. My recollection regarding the evidence is she wasn’t even there during the transaction. That her husband was the one who negotiated the deal. That she was only asked to return and sign documents. Nevertheless, there is a verdict, and I’m dealing with that verdict.”
The trial court announced its tentative ruling in which it found the punitive damages were excessive and reduced them to $8,400. The court arrived at $8,400 because the evidence reflected Kia earns approximately $4,200 in profit on each vehicle sold, and the court concluded it would be an appropriate punitive amount for Kia to disgorge the profit it made on the sale of the two cars, i.e., $4,200 plus $4,200 equals $8,400. Additionally, the trial court tentatively concluded the jury did not find Kia misrepresented Ramirez’s income on the credit application. The court explained Husband did not testify and it was unclear who, whether Husband or a Kia employee, wrote that Ramirez’s monthly income was $5,400.
Ramirez asserted it could reasonably be inferred from the evidence that Kia wrote the false income information on the credit application. The trial court explained that because Ramirez was not present during the negotiations, and Husband did not testify, Ramirez could not establish who wrote the false income information on the credit application. The trial court made its tentative decision its final decision and reduced the punitive damages to $8,400.
E. JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
Kia moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The court went through the jury’s special findings and took issue with one finding in particular. The question posed to the jury was “‘Did Guadalupe Ramirez reasonably rely on . . . Kia’s deception?’” The jury responded, “Yes.”
The court explained the following instructions were given to the jury: “‘Ramirez relied on [Kia’s] concealment if, Number one, the concealment substantially influenced her to purchase the vehicles. And Number two, she would probably not have purchased without the concealment.’ [¶] The other part of the instruction reads, ‘It is not necessary for a concealment to be the only reason for Guadalupe Ramirez’s conduct.’”
As to the first factor, the trial court found the concealment of false information on the credit application did not influence Ramirez’s purchasing decision because there was no testimony from Ramirez that she relied on that information when deciding to purchase the cars. The trial court explained, there was no evidence indicating what Ramirez would have done if she had been aware of the false information on the credit application—whether she still would have purchased the vehicles or left the dealership without the vehicles. Additionally, the court expressed concern that the evidence reflected the credit application was given to banks to allow the banks to make a decision about lending money—it was not a form Kia gave to Ramirez for her to rely upon in making a decision. The court stated the victims of any fraud in the case were the banks—not Ramirez.
Ramirez asserted there was evidence reflecting she would not have signed the credit application if she had known of the false information it contained. Ramirez asserted that it could be inferred Ramirez would not have bought the vehicles if she had known of the false information because she would not have wanted to be guilty of the crime of providing false information on a credit application. Kia agreed with the trial court and asserted that, if there were fraud victims, then the banks were the victims. Kia asserted Ramirez suffered no damage as the result of any false information on the credit application.
The trial court issued a written ruling. The court found the evidence showed the credit application was typed by a Kia employee and then sent to financial institutions. The court found no evidence reflected the false information on the credit application caused Ramirez to purchase the vehicles. The court determined the evidence reflected Husband decided to purchase the vehicles following the negotiations with Kia; but there was no evidence regarding what caused Ramirez to purchase the vehicles.
The court granted the motion for JNOV as to the fraud cause of action. The court entered judgment in favor of Kia on the fraud cause of action and punitive damages, which eliminated the punitive damages. The judgment on the collections cause of action for $2,500 remained in favor of Ramirez.
DISCUSSION
A. MISAPPROPRIATION OF IDENTITY
Ramirez contends the trial court erred by granting Kia’s motion for nonsuit on the misappropriation of identity cause of action.
“On review of a judgment of nonsuit, as here, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. ‘[C]ourts traditionally have taken a very restrictive view of the circumstances under which nonsuit is proper. The rule is that a trial court may not grant a defendant’s motion for nonsuit if plaintiff’s evidence would support a jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor. [Citations.] [¶] In determining whether plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to plaintiff must be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded. The court must give “to the plaintiff[‘s] evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, . . . indulging every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence in plaintiff[‘s] favor . . . .”‘ [Citation.] The same rule applies on appeal from the grant of a nonsuit.” (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1214-1215.)
“The right of publicity protects an individual’s right to profit from the commercial value of his or her identity. [Citations.] California recognizes both a common law and statutory right of publicity. [Citation.] The common law cause of action may be stated by pleading the defendant’s unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s identity; the appropriation of the plaintiff’s name, voice, likeness, signature, or photograph to the defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; and resulting injury. [Citations.] The statutory right, enacted in 1971, was intended to complement this common law right of publicity. [Citations.] It provides, in pertinent part: ‘Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.’ (Civ. Code, § 3344, subd. (a).)” (Ross v. Roberts (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 677, 684-685.)
The first element of misappropriation is “any person.” (Civ. Code, § 3344, subd. (a).) The evidence reflects Husband completed a one-page credit application. Kia then typed a three-page credit application that was submitted to the bank. On the application that was submitted to the bank, there was false information. Thus, the jury could find the “person” was Kia based upon Kia creating and sending the false information.
The second element is “knowingly.” (Civ. Code, § 3344, subd. (a).) Ramirez’s son Alfred purchased a truck at Kia approximately one year before Ramirez. At the time of the purchase, Alfred earned approximately $1,600 per month. On the credit application for Alfred’s car purchase, his income was listed as $3,000 per month. When Ramirez purchased the Honda, her monthly income was approximately $1,300. The credit application for the Honda reflected a monthly income of $2,700. When Ramirez purchased the Altima and Xterra, her monthly income was approximately $1,600. The credit application for the Altima and Xterra reflected a monthly income of $5,400.
The jury could conclude the raising of Ramirez’s income level on the credit application for the Altima and Xterra was knowingly done because Kia had made similar changes on the application for the Honda and Alfred’s truck. The Honda application included an income of $2,700; $5,400 is exactly double $2,700. Thus, it can be inferred Kia knew a minimum income level would be needed for Ramirez to qualify for a loan: $2,700 for one car and $5,400 for two cars. Therefore, the jury could infer the false income information was knowingly generated by Kia, and Kia knew Ramirez’s signature would be placed on the inaccurate documents because the first two pages of the credit application were printed after the signature page.
The third element is another’s signature. (Civ. Code, § 3344, subd. (a).) The evidence reflects Ramirez signed the credit application that was submitted to the banks. Thus, the jury could find Ramirez’s signature was on the finalized applications.
The fourth element is used for the purpose of selling products, goods, or services. (Civ. Code, § 3344, subd. (a).) The record reflects the credit application was used to obtain loans from banks, and the higher the available loan amount, the more money the customer can spend on a car. From this evidence, the jury could find Kia used Ramirez’s signature on the credit application with a false income amount for the purpose of selling Ramirez a car.
The fifth element is a lack of consent. (Civ. Code, § 3344, subd. (a).) Ramirez testified that she would not have signed the credit application if she had been aware it included false information. It can be inferred from this evidence that Ramirez did not consent to the use of her signature on the false application.
The sixth element is damages. (Civ. Code, § 3344, subd. (a).) “Although ‘emotional distress may consist of any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as fright, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment or worry’ [citation], to make out a claim, the plaintiff must prove that emotional distress was severe and not trivial or transient.” (Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1376.) “[J]urors are best situated to determine whether and to what extent the defendant’s conduct caused emotional distress, by referring to their own experience.” (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 930.)
When Ramirez learned of the false credit application, she felt defrauded. Ramirez lived three blocks from Kia. Seeing Kia’s name on car license plate frames caused Ramirez to feel disappointed. It is unclear from this evidence whether a jury would find Ramirez’s emotional suffering to be severe. However, we must indulge every legitimate inference that may be drawn from the evidence in Ramirez’s favor. There is some evidence Ramirez experienced emotional suffering. It is possible the jury would have concluded that suffering was severe, and therefore, the matter should have been submitted to the jury for evaluation.
Because there is evidence from which the jury could have found in favor of Ramirez on the cause of action for misappropriation of identity, the trial court erred by granting Kia’s motion for nonsuit.
Kia contends that because Ramirez accepted the $2,500 noneconomic damages award for the debt collection violation, she cannot seek further emotional distress damages and therefore has no compensable damages. “Regardless of the nature or number of legal theories advanced by the plaintiff, [s]he is not entitled to more than a single recovery for each distinct item of compensable damage supported by the evidence. [Citation.] Double or duplicative recovery for the same items of damage amounts to overcompensation and is therefore prohibited. [Citation.] [¶] Thus, for example, in a case in which the plaintiff’s only item of damage was loss of commissions, two awards of damages identical in amount—one for breach of contract and the other for bad faith denial of the same contract—could not be added together in computing the judgment. Plaintiff was entitled to only one of the awards.” (Tavaglione v. Billings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1150, 1158-1159.)
As to the debt collection cause of action, the jury found Kia threatened to take an illegal action while trying to collect money from Ramirez. The jury awarded Ramirez $2,500 in noneconomic damages for that harm. For the misappropriation cause of action, the alleged bad act occurred at the dealership, during the purchasing of the car—not during the debt collection process. Thus, the bad acts occurred at different times. Ramirez became aware of the wrongful credit application around the time the debt collection violation occurred, but the two harms occurred separately. Ramirez stated the debt collection caused her to feel worried, and the false credit application caused her to feel defrauded. The jury could find Ramirez suffered emotionally due to the debt collection violation, and that she suffered again when she discovered the misappropriation of her identity. Accordingly, we find Kia’s argument that Ramirez was already compensated for the harm to be unpersuasive.
Kia contends the trial court did not err because misappropriation of identity is a “right-of-publicity” cause of action—not an identity theft cause of action. Kia delves into the “Legislature’s purpose” in enacting the tort and asserts the tort was created to prevent misuse of celebrities’ likenesses. This court cannot reach legislative history when the plain language of a statute is clear. (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 738.)
There is nothing in the language of the statute that reflects it is directed at mass publication or limited to public personalities. The elements of the statute are (1) a person; (2) knowingly; (3) uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness; (4) “in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services”; (5) without the victim’s consent; and (6) the victim suffers damages. (Civ. Code, § 3344.) The plain language of the statute is clear. A jury could find the use of Ramirez’s signature on the credit application that contained false information was done to obtain more money to be spent on two cars—thus, Ramirez’s signature was used without her consent for the purpose of selling products. The elements are simple and can be understood without referencing legislative history. Accordingly, we find Kia’s reliance on “legislative purpose” to be unpersuasive.
At oral argument in this court, Kia asserted Civil Code section 3344 (section 3344), subdivision (a), should not be interpreted in isolation; rather, section 3344 should be interpreted as a whole, with all of its subdivisions, as well as with Civil Code section 3344.1 (section 3344.1).
When interpreting statutory language, we examine the language “‘in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.’” (Burns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724.)
Section 3344, subdivision (b), explains what the term “photograph” means. Subdivision (c) sets forth a rebuttable presumption concerning employees in photographs. Subdivision (d) provides that news, public affairs, and sports broadcasts are not the type of “use” for which consent is required. Subdivision (e) reflects that content which is commercially sponsored or which includes paid advertising does not automatically equate with a “use for which consent is required.” Subdivision (f) limits liability for publishers and distributors who are unaware of the unauthorized use of the victim’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness. Nothing in our interpretation of subdivision (a) contradicts the language in these subdivisions or otherwise diminishes the law set forth in these subdivisions.
Section 3344.1, subdivision (a), concerns the use of “a deceased personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness.” Section 3344, subdivision (a), concerns the use of “another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness.” Notably, section 3344.1 uses the term “personality,” while section 3344 uses the term “another.” When the two statutes are read together, it appears the Legislature intended section 3344 to have a broader application, i.e., to the public in general, while section 3344.1 was meant to have a limited application, i.e., to public “personalities.” Given the different terms used in the statutes, our interpretation of section 3344 does not conflict with section 3344.1.
B. FRAUD BY CONCEALMENT
Ramirez contends the trial court erred by granting Kia’s motion for JNOV on the fraud by concealment cause of action.
“On an appeal from a JNOV, we ordinarily use the same standard the trial court used in granting the JNOV. We independently determine whether the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, contains any substantial evidence to support the verdict. If substantial evidence supports the verdict, the trial court erred in granting the JNOV and we reverse.” (Mason v. Lake Dolores Group, LLC (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 822, 829-830.)
The elements of fraud are (1) deception, e.g. concealment, of a material fact; (2) the defendant had a duty to disclose the material fact; (3) intent to defraud; (4) reliance—the plaintiff was unaware of the concealed fact and would have acted differently if she had knowledge of the concealed fact; and (5) damages. (Marketing West, Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher (USA) Corp. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 603, 612-613.)
The trial court focused on the element of reliance, and we will as well. Ramirez was required to prove actual reliance. Reliance can be thought of as causation, in the sense that the alleged concealment must have caused the harm Ramirez suffered. (Mirkin v. Wasserman (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1082, 1092.)
There is nothing indicating Ramirez relied on the false information in the credit application. The evidence reflects Ramirez was unaware of the false information until Kia tried to collect money from her and she then sought paperwork from the banks reflecting the false information. Therefore, the misrepresentation—the false income and false job title—were not relied upon by Ramirez. Rather, the misrepresentation was relied upon by the banks who loaned Ramirez money. Ramirez may have relied on a misrepresentation that Kia would deal with her honestly in the transaction, but she did not rely on the misrepresentation in the credit application. Given the lack of evidence supporting the element of reliance, we conclude the trial court did not err by granting Kia’s motion for JNOV.
Ramirez contends the trial court erred because she provided sufficient evidence of reliance via her testimony that she would not have signed the credit application if she had known of the false information. The fact that Ramirez would not have signed the credit application if she knew of the false information shows that she is an honest person. However, it does not show that she somehow used the false information or was affected by the false information such that it caused her to change her mind in reliance on the falsity. For example, if there were evidence of what the car loan terms would have been with Ramirez’s true income and job title, and then evidence that Ramirez would not have accepted the terms of those car loans or that Ramirez could not make payments on the car loans she received because they were based on her having a higher salary, then Ramirez’s reliance on the false information could maybe be shown because that evidence demonstrates her decision making was detrimentally affected by the misrepresentation. However, there is no such evidence in this record. In sum, the evidence that Ramirez would not have signed the credit application had she known of the misrepresentation is not sufficient proof of reliance.
Ramirez contends the evidence that she rescinded the contracts upon learning of the misrepresentations in the credit application support a finding that she would not have proceeded with the purchases had she been aware of the falsities. Ramirez provides no record citation to support this assertion. Our reading of the record reflects the contracts were rescinded because Kia, upon receiving notice of the lawsuit, wanted to undo the errors it had made, and Ramirez accepted that offer. It is unclear exactly what motivated Ramirez to accept that offer. For example, Ramirez could have accepted the offer because it resulted in the debt for the Honda being paid. Because we do not see evidence in the record reflecting Ramirez rescinded the contracts due to the misrepresentation, and Ramirez provides no citations to such evidence, we find her argument to be unpersuasive.
Ramirez contends the concealed information was that Ramirez would have to pay the $7,400 debt for the Honda. If the Honda debt is the misrepresentation, then evidentiary issues arise on the element of deception and intent.
The contract Ramirez signed for the Xterra reads, “Prior Credit or Lease Balance paid by Seller to Alaska [Credit Union] $6,900” ($7,400 minus the $500 down payment equals $6,900). The “Seller” is Kia. This line item is in the section of the contract entitled “Itemization of the Amount Financed,” subtitle “Total Cash Price.” In other words, the contract reflects the $6,900 for the Honda is being rolled into the Xterra loan, and when the car loan money is wired to Kia they will use $6,900 of that money to pay off the Honda loan.
Thus, the contract Ramirez signed for the Xterra included the Honda debt on the face of the contract. Ramirez testified she did not read the contract before signing it. Ramirez also testified that she was present only briefly during the negotiations. When Ramirez was present, her impression of the negotiations was that 100 percent of the Honda debt would be paid by Kia. Because Husband, who did the negotiating, did not testify, there is no way to know if Kia placed a term in the contract that was not agreed upon; or if the agreed upon terms of the contract changed while Ramirez was away from the dealership; or if Ramirez misunderstood the negotiations she witnessed while at the dealership. Because the Honda debt appeared on the contract, the inference is Kia did not intend to deceive Ramirez. Further, because Husband did not testify as to what was agreed upon in negotiations, it cannot be determined if Kia concealed or misrepresented anything in drafting the contract.
Ramirez asserts there is evidence reflecting misrepresentations about the Honda debt were made directly to her. It may be the case that at some point in the negotiations the Honda was going to be fully paid by Kia; however, it is unclear what the final agreed-upon terms of the contracts were. The Honda debt was plainly included in the Xterra contract, which Ramirez said she did not read. Without more evidence about what the final agreed-upon terms of the negotiations were, it cannot be concluded that Kia defrauded Ramirez and intended to defraud Ramirez.
Ramirez contends the trial court erred by granting the JNOV motion because the court incorrectly focused on the misrepresentations in the credit application, when there were other misrepresentations throughout the transaction. Ramirez does not provide a successful alternate theory on which she believes the trial court should have focused. Accordingly, we find Ramirez’s contention to be unpersuasive.
C. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Ramirez contends the trial court erred by reducing the punitive damages from $58,000 to $8,400. We have concluded, ante, that the trial court did not err by entering judgment in favor of Kia on the fraud cause of action. The punitive damages were associated with the fraud cause of action. Because Ramirez lost the fraud cause of action, there are no punitive damages. Therefore, this issue is moot because we can provide Ramirez no effective relief. (See Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78 [issue is moot when no effective relief can be granted].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment of nonsuit on the misappropriation of identity cause of action is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


MILLER
J.


We concur:


McKINSTER
Acting P. J.


SLOUGH
J.