Roberts v. McCahill
Filed 5/10/06 Roberts v. McCahill CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
STEPHANIE L. ROBERTS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JAMES PATRICK McCAHILL, Defendant and Respondent. | D046441 (Super. Ct. No. GIN029343) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael M. Anello, Judge. Affirmed.
Plaintiff and appellant, Stephanie L. Roberts, sued defendant and respondent, James Patrick McCahill, for damages arising out of an automobile accident. McCahill admitted negligence, but disputed the scope and severity of the injuries suffered by Roberts, resulting in a jury trial. Ultimately, the jury awarded Roberts $3,000 in special and general damages, but due to the offer of judgment filed by McCahill for $25,000, the court awarded $20,420.22 in costs to McCahill. Roberts now appeals, claiming the trial court abused its discretion in granting a motion in limine and in sustaining certain evidentiary objections, all with regard to Roberts's efforts to impeach McCahill's expert witness. McCahill responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making those evidentiary rulings because the court has a duty to monitor the evidence presented to the jury in order to ensure that such evidence is relevant and that its presentation does not consume an undue amount of time. (Evid. Code,[1] § 352.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and there were reasonable justifications for each of the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, we affirm.
I
INTRODUCTION
Before impaneling a jury, the trial court granted McCahill's motion in limine to prevent Roberts from attempting to impeach one of McCahill's expert witnesses, Eugene Vander Pol, based upon his prior curriculum vitae, finding that any potential relevance was outweighed by undue expenditure of time and potential confusion, per section 352. As the trial unfolded, the trial court sustained McCahill's objections to Roberts's attempts to impeach Vander Pol regarding his opinions on the mechanisms for injury to the human body. The trial court also sustained McCahill's objections to Roberts's attempts to impeach Vander Pol regarding specific courses he completed while earning his bachelor's degree. In sustaining these objections the trial court again based its rulings on section 352, finding that each line of questioning was minimally relevant and would consume an undue amount of time.
Rather than include the usual factual background, we instead recite the pertinent facts for each issue with its discussion. We do not include the facts of the underlying accident because McCahill admitted negligence and they are not relevant to the evidentiary arguments Roberts advances here.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Roberts cites Huffman v. Lindquist (1951) 37 Cal.2d 465 as controlling for the standard of review, yet that case addresses the trial court's discretion to determine the competency and qualifications of an expert witness. According to Roberts, her inquiries at issue here were not targeted towards impeaching Vander Pol's qualifications as an expert, but rather went towards impeaching his credibility. (" [Roberts's] line of questioning was an attempt to highlight Mr. Vander Pol's credibility not his qualifications." ) These inquiries, all regarding credibility, were analyzed by the trial court under the discretion granted to it pursuant to section 352, thus the standards set out in Huffman are not applicable.
Instead, we review rulings by the trial court on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. " 'Broadly speaking, an appellate court reviews any ruling by a trial court as to the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.' [Citation.]" (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 619, 639.) As long as there exists a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification under the law for the action taken by the trial court, it will not be disturbed on appeal, even if, as a matter of first impression, the appellate court might have taken different views of the issue. (Gonzales v. Nork (1978) 20 Cal.3d 500, 507.) Consequently, we will interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion only when we conclude that under all of the circumstances, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court's action, no judge could have reasonably reached the challenged result. (Smith v. Smith (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 952, 958.)
Based on this standard of review, we examine the three challenged evidentiary rulings at issue here.
B. Motion in Limine
Roberts first argues the trial court abused its discretion when it granted McCahill's motion in limine, precluding Roberts from attempting to impeach Vander Pol's credibility based upon his prior curriculum vitae. McCahill's motion was based on section 352, which states, " The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." In general, cross-examination of expert witnesses may be expanded as indicated by section 721, but a trial court's discretion under section 352 still remains in effect. (See People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 92-93 [latitude in the cross-examination of experts in order to test their credibility is subject to trial court's discretion pursuant to section 352 in order to limit the evidence to its proper uses].)
From the record, it appears that a previous version of Vander Pol's curriculum vitae stated that Vander Pol graduated cum laude from San Diego State University, although San Diego State University did not bestow such distinctions on its graduates. Notably, this alleged error in Vander Pol's curriculum vitae was corrected prior to the commencement of this action; in other words the current curriculum vitae used by Vander Pol in this action did not contain the error. Roberts opposed McCahill's motion in limine, arguing that the alleged false statement on Vander Pol's prior curriculum vitae was nevertheless relevant regarding Vander Pol's credibility in this action.
At the hearing on in limine motions, the trial court stated that it planned to grant this motion because, " It appears that whatever minimum potential relevance there might be is far outweighed under Evidence Code section 352 by an undue expenditure of time that might be necessary to have a separate trial on that issue, whether it was or was not true, or the reasons for it." Roberts then argued that it would only take two minutes to impeach Vander Pol and there would not be any separate trial. Ultimately, the trial court granted the motion for the reasons stated.
With respect to the role and duty of the trial court when evidence is challenged under section 352, courts have been instructed that, " impeachment evidence other than felony convictions entails problems of proof, unfair surprise, and moral turpitude evaluation which felony convictions do not present. Hence, courts may and should consider with particular care whether the admission of such evidence might involve undue time, confusion, or prejudice which outweighs its probative value." (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 296-297, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448.) While it is true that wide latitude is allowed in testing the credibility of a witness (Newman v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 685, 691), it is equally true that the scope of cross-examination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (Garcia v. Hoffman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 530, 536; see also People v. Coleman, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 92-93.)
From the record, it is clear that the trial court appropriately considered whether the admission of the proposed impeachment evidence, in the form of Vander Pol's prior curriculum vitae, might involve an undue consumption of time, which outweighed its minimal probative value. In granting the motion the court found that any potential relevance was low, and that it was " far outweighed under Evidence Code section 352 by an undue expenditure of time," because proving whether a misrepresentation happened, and why it happened, would require a minitrial on those issues.
The court, in a proper exercise of its discretion, determined that the time required to lay the foundation, to impeach Vander Pol, and then to attempt to rehabilitate him was not worth the effort to show the minimally relevant factual proposition that Vander Pol had made an error on his prior curriculum vitae. As long as there exists a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification under the law for the action taken by the trial court, it will not be disturbed on appeal, even if, as a matter of first impression, we might have taken a different view of the issue from that of the trial court. (Gonzales v. Nork, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 507.)
C. Vander Pol's Opinions on Mechanisms for Injury
Next, Roberts argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained McCahill's objections to Roberts's attempts to impeach Vander Pol regarding his opinions on the mechanisms for injury to the human body. In framing this argument, Roberts asserts that Vander Pol gave a lecture or seminar in 1999, wherein he allegedly stated that, " there is a mechanism for injury from a soft summer breeze, a sneeze, or a bowel movement." It appears that Roberts wished to use that alleged statement to impeach Vander Pol's credibility by offering it as a prior inconsistent statement. (§§ 770, 780, 1235.) Indeed, Roberts claims in her brief that, " in the instant case, [Vander Pol] told the jury there was no mechanism for injury to [Roberts's] lower back in this accident. [Roberts] attempted to cross-examine Mr. Vander Pol with his own words as to why a soft summer breeze, sneeze or bowel movement could cause a mechanism for injury, but the instant accident . . . would not result in a mechanism for injury to [Roberts's] back."
This claim, however, is belied by the record. In the passage Roberts points us to, Vander Pol did not testify that there was no mechanism for injury to Roberts's back, he merely testified it was " virtually impossible" for Roberts " to have been injured in this accident to the degree that is being contended." To put it another way, the record shows Vander Pol testified there was a potential mechanism for injury to Roberts's back as a result of this accident, but that in his expert opinion, such a mechanism for injury could not cause the serious injuries which Roberts claims it did. Because Roberts's argument is based on a misstatement of the relevant testimony, it lacks any tenable basis for support in the record, and we therefore do not find it to be persuasive.
At any rate, the record reflects the trial court performed its required role under section 352 in sustaining this objection. As the trial court stated, " We'll be here forever. . . . We're not going to spend, you know, hours going through the things he may have done years ago. Let's talk about this case." As Roberts continued to ask Vander Pol about the opinions he allegedly expressed at the 1999 seminar, McCahill continued to object and the court continued to sustain the objections under section 352. Ultimately, the court stated, " It's got nothing, that I can tell, to do with this case. [¶] Let's talk to him about the assignment . . . in general, if you think that is probative of something." It was reasonable for the trial court to cut off and redirect this line of questioning because it was minimally relevant to the material issues and was consuming an undue amount of time. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sustained McCahill's objections to Roberts's attempts to impeach Vander Pol regarding his opinions on the mechanisms for injury to the human body.
D. Vander Pol's Undergraduate Coursework
Finally, Roberts argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained McCahill's objections, under section 352, to Roberts's attempts to impeach Vander Pol regarding specific courses the expert had been enrolled in while earning his undergraduate degree. In framing this argument on appeal, Roberts asserts as follows: " [Vander Pol] had been deposed in a prior case where he admitted that a summer session of only four units in biomechanics out of 161 units taken for his undergraduate degree was the extent of his undergraduate emphasis in biomechanics. [Citation.] The court precluded [Roberts] from impeaching [Vander Pol] with his prior sworn deposition testimony or his San Diego State University transcript. [Citation.] . . . [Roberts] argued that she should be allowed to question [Vander Pol] about his education so that [Roberts] could competently attack [Vander Pol's] credibility."
Turning to the record itself, at trial Roberts asked Vander Pol this question: " Okay. Special summer session, Biomechanics human movement, three units. That's biomechanics. Show me any other biomechanical courses on here. Not engineering courses, not mechanical engineering that has to do with metals. Biomechanical courses. [¶] You said you emphasized your undergraduate degree in biomechanics." In response, Vander Pol corrected Roberts's mistake: " The courses, or the one course that you mentioned, was about four years, five years following my masters."
Thus, this claim of abuse of discretion is also belied by the record. While the alleged prior deposition is not found in the record provided to us by Roberts, the university transcript is included in the record. As Vander Pol testified, the university transcript shows he enrolled in the specific course Roberts mentioned during the summer of 1999. Vander Pol earned his undergraduate degree in December of 1991. He earned his master's degree in December of 1993. Roberts's evident inability to read and understand the contents of Vander Pol's complete university transcript is the source of his inability to effectively impeach Vander Pol on his testimony of having earned his undergraduate degree with an " emphasis" in biomechanics. Despite Vander Pol's efforts to correct this error, Roberts nevertheless advances this argument on appeal. However, it is based on a misstatement of the facts, it lacks any tenable basis for support in the record, and we cannot find it persuasive.
Moreover, the record reflects that the trial court performed its required role under section 352 in sustaining this objection. After it cut off this line of questioning and excused the jurors for a break, the trial court entertained Roberts's offer of proof on this issue. The trial court then stated, " Even if there is some potential impeachment in there somewhere, it is collateral. We'll spend more time -- we'll have a mini-trial. We'll call the professors in and have a mini-trial . . . ." Thus, the court expressly determined this was minimally relevant, and that it constituted an undue consumption of time. (§ 352.) The court explained that the amount of time required to establish how many courses/units equate to an " emphasis," and then to establish the content of each course Vander Pol took as an undergraduate, was simply not worth it. The trial court finished by closing the door to Roberts's attempted impeachment via deposition, reminding Roberts of the best way to cross-examine an expert witness: " It's not going to happen. We're talking about this case, and I think what you need to do is get in tune with the science and the physics, and see if you can talk him out of his opinion, or test his opinion somehow, and forget the personal attacks and the -- the collateral impeachment. [¶] It's just not worth the time and trouble, for the reasons stated." The record as a whole shows the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sustained McCahill's objections to Roberts's attempts to impeach Vander Pol regarding specific courses the expert enrolled in while earning his undergraduate degree and thereafter.
E. There Was No Miscarriage of Justice
Even if we were to assume that Roberts's arguments on appeal somehow evidenced an abuse of discretion, Roberts has failed to show that it resulted in any miscarriage of justice. A judgment may not be reversed on appeal unless the reviewing court, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, concludes that the error caused a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) The judgment will be affirmed unless the reviewing court concludes there is a reasonable probability that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached in the absence of the error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) It is appellant's burden to overcome the presumption of correctness, thus appellant must demonstrate prejudice from the error. (In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.) It is beyond question that appellant is responsible for providing an adequate record demonstrating error. (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132.)
The reporter's transcripts of the trial provided by Roberts on appeal only cover the motions in limine and the testimony from two of McCahill's expert witnesses, Vander Pol and Richard Greenfield, M.D. They do not include any testimony from any of Roberts's witnesses, whether expert or percipient, and thus they lack any substantive support for Roberts's claim that the trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The appellant's appendix provided by Roberts includes her original complaint, the answer of McCahill, a few jury instructions, the moving and opposing papers regarding the motion in limine at issue, Vander Pol's university transcript, Roberts's property damage estimate, and assorted posttrial motions and notices. This record does not include any documents which would tend to support Roberts's claim that the trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Even if we were to eliminate all of Vander Pol's expert testimony, the record provided by Roberts does not supply any testimony in support of her theory of the case. Indeed, Dr. Greenfield's testimony, which is included in the record, supports McCahill's theory of the case. Faced with this entire lack of support in the record, it is all but impossible for us to find a miscarriage of justice because we cannot find any reasonable probability that a result more favorable to Roberts would have been reached in the absence of the alleged errors.
Nevertheless, Roberts urges us to find a miscarriage of justice under the reasoning of Fost v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 724 (Fost). Fost tells us, " 'Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them. [Citations.] To say that prejudice can be established only by showing that the cross-examination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending to discredit the testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right and withdraw one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 734.) But Fost involved a journalist who refused to answer questions on cross-examination, a situation quite different from here, where the trial court heard arguments and exercised its discretion under section 352 by limiting cross-examination of an expert witness in a reasonable manner.
Moreover, the right to cross-examine does not necessarily make admissible every effort to impeach a witness; discretion to limit cross-examination is afforded under section 352. (People v. Benjamin (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1042.) Fost also tells us that, " denial or undue restriction [of cross-examination] may be reversible error. [Citation.]" (Fost, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 733.) Fost in no way creates a per se reversal rule that would overcome the well-established standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836. Because Roberts did not show that the trial court committed a manifest abuse of its discretion under section 352, we do not disturb its evidentiary determinations.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to the respondent.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD, J.
McINTYRE, J.
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[1] All further statutory citations are to the Evidence Code unless noted.