ROE v.DOE






Filed 1/20/11





CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

JOHN ROE 58 et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEFENDANT DOE 1 et al., Defendants and Respondents.

B215948 (Judicial Council Coordinated Proceedings No. JCCP 4297)

STORY CONTINUE FROM PART I….


The next example cited by appellants comes from an eight-page analysis of the 2002 amendment prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee. Under the subheading “Extending limitations period past age 26 and reviving time-barred actions for one-year window period has precedent,” the report states: “In other words, this bill would provide those victims who discovered that adulthood trauma after age 26, whose action has been barred by the current statute of limitations, a one-year window to bring a case against a third party that otherwise would be time-barred.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1779, as amended May 2, 2002.) Appellants read this to mean that only victims who made discovery before January 1, 2003, were required to sue during the one-year revival window.
However, this passage appears immediately after the following: “This bill would provide that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, any action for damages against a third party (as provided above) which is barred as of the effective date of this bill solely because the applicable statute of limitations has expired, is revived and a cause of action thereupon may be brought if commenced within one year of the effective date of this bill.” As set forth above, among the claims barred by the previous limitations period were those of victims who had turned 26 and had not yet made discovery. In fact, the plight of such victims was described as one of the key reasons the 2002 amendment was required. In the same report, under the heading “Stated need for legislation,” the report notes that the then-current version of section 340.1 cut off all claims once a victim turned 26 even though “for many victims their adulthood trauma does not manifest itself until well after their 26^th birthday . . . .” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1779, as amended May 2, 2002.)
In short, the Legislature knew that victims who had not yet made discovery were barred under the then-existing limitations period, but elected to revive for only one year “any claim” falling under subdivision (b)(2) that had been barred by the previous statute of limitations.
The language quoted by appellants also appears elsewhere in the legislative history. A 12-page analysis by the Assembly Judiciary Committee states: “This bill applies retroactively and provides victims of childhood sexual abuse a one-year window to bring an action against a third party when that claim would otherwise be barred solely because the statute of limitations has or had expired and when the third party knew of prior claims of abuse but failed to act to prevent future abuse. [¶] Under the measure, such a claim would be revived and a cause of action may be brought if commenced within one year of January 1, 2003. . . . In other words, this bill would provide those victims who discovered their adulthood trauma after age 26, whose action has been barred by the current statute of limitations, a one-year window to bring a case against a third party that otherwise would be time-barred.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1779 (2002-2003 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 6, 2002, p. 7, italics added.) When read in full, this portion of the legislative history simply mirrors the language of subdivision (c): claims that would otherwise be time-barred under the previous limitations period were revived for one year only. No exception is made for plaintiffs who had not yet discovered that adult-onset psychological harm was linked to a childhood molestation incident. Indeed the proximity of the word “retroactively” to the one-year revival period demonstrates the limited nature of the retroactive effect of the legislation, not the broad retroactivity suggested by appellants.
The final piece of legislative history cited by appellants comes from an undated analysis that gives no indication by whom, or for whom, it was prepared, or that otherwise shows it is a proper subject of judicial notice. (Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062 [views of individual legislators not judicially noticeable]; State Compensation Ins. Fund. V. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 5, 10, fn. 3 [judicial notice improper if documents not properly identified]; Kaufman Broad Communities, Inc. v Performance Plastering Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 30-31.) Appearing under the heading “WHO CAN SUE AFTER THE BILL PASSES, AND WHEN,” the report states: “People who discover their adulthood trauma from the molestation after the effective date of the bill will have three years from the date the victim discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the adulthood trauma was caused by the childhood abuse.”
According to appellants, this definitively shows that plaintiffs whose claims were time-barred under the old statute of limitations because they had turned 26, even though they had not yet made discovery, could bring their actions after the one-year revival window closed. A full reading of the document shows otherwise. The quoted language is under the subheading “Prospective application,” which falls under the general subject heading “WHO CAN SUE AFTER THE BILL PASSES, AND WHEN.” As mentioned earlier, amendments to statutes of limitation apply prospectively from the date they take effect. (City of Bellflower v. Bellflower County Water Dist., supra, 247 Cal.App.2d at p. 350.) Therefore, the language appellants rely on does not concern the amendment’s retroactive effect.
Instead, immediately under that general heading, and immediately before the subheading and discussion concerning prospective application, is the subheading “Retroactive application and revival of lawsuits.” Within that subheading, the document states: “Like the Northridge Earthquake bill, this bill would create a one-year window for victims to bring a lawsuit that would otherwise be barred by the age 26 limitation.” (Italics added.) When both subsections are read together and in context, they also show that discovery made after the revival window closed would make timely only those actions that were not time-barred before the 2002 amendments took effect. As to those that were time-barred, if not brought during the revival period, they were thereafter precluded.[1]

1. The Reenactment of Subdivision (u) Did Not Restore Appellants’ Claims

Appellants contend the Legislature’s reenactment of subdivision (u) as part of the 2003 amendments shows their claims could still be brought because they were filed after 1999 and because they did not make discovery until after the expanded limitations period took effect in January 2003. In order to understand this argument, we must first recount the applicable statutory history.
As discussed, until 1998 the limitations period for childhood molestation claims against nonabuser entities was one year, extended to the victim’s 19^th birthday by section 352. In 1998, the Legislature for the first time provided in section 340.1 for an extended limitations period against nonabusers up until the plaintiff’s 26^th birthday. This limitations period applied in two instances: (1) to negligent nonabusers; and (2) to intentional nonabusers. (§ 340.1, subd. (a)(2), (3).) The longer limitations period of the later of age 26 or three years from discovery that applied to those who actually committed the molestation was set forth in subdivision (a)(1).
In 1999, the Legislature enacted subdivision (s) (now subdivision (u)), which clarified that the 1998 amendments “shall apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1999, and to any action filed prior to January 1, 1999, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999. Nothing in this subdivision is intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there has been a final adjudication prior to January 1, 1999.”[2]
When the Legislature passed the 2002 amendments at issue here, it did not repeal or delete subdivision (s). Instead, it retained that provision and reenacted it as subdivision (u). Appellants contend that because subdivision (u) conferred retroactive effect on subdivision (a)(2) (negligent nonabuser) and (a)(3) (intentional nonabuser) cases that were then pending, its reenactment in 2003 along with the newly-enacted subdivision (b)(2) (negligent nonabusers who knew of the perpetrator’s potential to molest and failed to take reasonable safeguards) shows that the Legislature intended subdivision (u) to apply to subdivision (b)(2) cases filed after January 1, 1999. Thus, according to appellants, the plain language of the entire statute shows their claims were timely. If not interpreted in this manner, they contend, subdivision (u) is surplusage because it serves no other purpose.
Appellants overlook that the 1998 amendments imposed an age 26 cap on all claims against nonabusers, without regard to when discovery occurred. If appellants are correct, then even though in 2002, the Legislature expressly revived all lapsed subdivision (b)(2) claims for one year pursuant to subdivision (c), it also chose to silently revive a limited subcategory of those claims – where plaintiffs were over 26 but had not yet discovered the link between the molestation and their adulthood emotional harm – by way of reenacting a then three-year-old provision that was designed to clarify the prospective reach of the 1998 amendments that set an age 26 limit on claims against all nonabusers. We do not believe the Legislature would take such a convoluted approach.
Instead, the Legislature has demonstrated that when it wants to make amendments to section 340.1 retroactive, it will do so clearly and expressly. In 1994, the Legislature added what is now subdivision (r), which states that the 1990 amendments applied to “any action commenced on or after January 1, 1991, including any action otherwise barred by the period of limitations in effect prior to January 1, 1991, thereby reviving those causes of action which had lapsed or technically expired under the law existing prior to January 1, 1991.” (Stats. 1994, ch. 288, § 1.) Subdivision (c) is just as clear.
Had the Legislature intended to permit appellants’ claims, it should have, and we believe it would have, done so in equally clear and unmistakable terms. For instance, the Legislature could have written subdivision (c) to state that any subdivision (b)(2) claims of those plaintiffs 26 or older who had not yet made discovery were revived and the new limitations period did not begin to run until discovery occurred.
Appellants rely on Bouley v. Long Beach Memorial Medical Center (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 601 (Bouley) to support their contention that the Legislature’s retention of subdivision (u) shows that it intended to make the new limitations period of subdivision (b)(2) retroactive. As set forth below, Bouley is inapplicable.
At issue in Bouley was a 2002 amendment to section 377.60 that conferred standing in wrongful death actions to domestic partners of a decedent. (§ 377.60, subd. (a); Bouley, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 606.) After that amendment took effect, plaintiff sued for the 2001 wrongful death of his domestic partner. Defendants’ demurrers were sustained, and the action was dismissed, when the trial court ruled the plaintiff lacked standing to sue under the law in effect when his partner died. The Bouley court reversed, relying in part on a 1997 amendment to section 377.60 that gave parents standing to sue for the wrongful death of their children, and which stated that “this section” (§ 377.60) applied to any cause of action arising on or after January 1, 1993. (§ 377.60, subd. (d).) When the Legislature reenacted subdivision (d) along with the amendment giving standing to domestic partners, it must have intended to apply that retroactivity provision to the domestic partner amendment, the Bouley court held. (Bouley, at p. 607.)
Based on this language from Bouley, appellants contend the same should be true for subdivision (u) of section 340.1. We disagree. First, Bouley relied on People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467 (Bouley, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 607), which only noted the well-established rule that legislative reenactment of a statute that has been judicially construed without change is deemed to be legislative adoption of that construction. (Bouzas, at p. 475.) That is not the issue raised as to subdivision (u).
Next, the statutory language involved in Bouley is critically different. The 1997 amendment at issue in Bouley was a blanket statement that section 377.60 in its entirety applied to any cause of action arising on or after January 1993. (§ 377.60, subd. (d).) As discussed above, subdivision (u) of section 340.1 applies solely to the 1998 amendment that imposed an age 26 cap on all claims against nonabuser entities without the distinction created four years later by subdivision (b)(2). Because subdivision (c) is section 340.1’s lone express indicator of retroactive effect, subdivision (u) cannot logically be read as plaintiffs contend.[3]

2. Common Law Equitable Delayed Discovery No Longer Applies

Because appellants allege they only recently came to recognize the wrongful nature of Father Koerner’s actions, they contend that their claims did not accrue until that time, pursuant to the common law doctrine of equitable delayed discovery. (See Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397-398.) Earlier versions of section 340.1 expressly permitted the use of that doctrine. (See former subdivision (d) of the 1986 version and former subdivision (l) of the 1990 version of section 340.1.) In 1994, however, those provisions were removed when the statute was amended and a statutory delayed discovery rule was first put in place as to perpetrators. (See Historical and Statutory Notes, 13C West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2006 ed.) foll. § 340.1, pp. 172-173.) We therefore presume the Legislature intended to supplant common law delayed discovery with the statutory rule it put in place as of 1994. (City of Irvine v. Southern California Ass’n of Governments (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 506, 522 [when the Legislature deletes an express provision in a later amendment related to the same subject matter, that deliberate omission indicates a different intention that may not be changed by judicial construction]; K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1242 [§ 340.1 codified the delayed discovery rule].)
Appellants cite Evans v. Eckelman (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1609, 1616-1617 for the proposition that common law delayed discovery applies to sex abuse claims governed by section 340.1. Because that decision concerned the pre-1994 version of the statute, which still expressly permitted use of that doctrine, it is inapplicable. Likewise, appellants err by relying on California Assn. of Health Facilities v. Department of Health Services (1997) 16 Cal.4th 284, 297 and Goodman v. Zimmerman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1667, 1676 for the proposition that statutes should not be interpreted to alter the common law unless it is expressly provided. Both decisions dealt with the interpretation of statutory language that was deemed to track or be consistent with long-standing common law principles. Neither concerns the rule upon which we rely – that when the Legislature deletes a provision, we presume the Legislature intended to change the existing law.

3. Perpetrator Liability Theories

Finally, appellants contend they may take advantage of the longer three years from discovery limitations period provided by subdivision (a)(1) because respondents are allegedly liable as perpetrators. They base this on two theories: (1) vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior; and (2) because respondents allegedly procured them as victims for Koerner in violation of Penal Code section 266j. (See § 340.1, subd (e), which defines childhood sexual abuse to include violations of Penal Code section 266j.)
As to both contentions, the longer limitations period applicable to actions against direct perpetrators is expressly limited to actions “against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse.” (§ 340.1, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) Because the liability of entities for wrongful or intentional acts is separately provided for by subdivision (a)(2) and (3), we hold that appellants may not invoke the longer limitations period of subdivision (a)(1) against respondents.
Furthermore, respondeat superior liability is not available because the alleged abuse was committed outside the scope of Koerner’s employment. (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1004-1005, citing Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718, 721 [church not liable under respondeat superior theory for minor’s sexual abuse by religious school teacher]; Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 218, fn. 11; Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 603, 609.)[4]
As to the procurement charge, even if the longer perpetrator limitations period of subdivision (a)(1) applied to entities, and even if an entity could be subject to criminal liability for violating Penal Code section 266j, appellants have not alleged a violation of that section. Criminal procurement of a child occurs when someone “intentionally gives, transports, provides, or makes available, or who offers [to do so] to another person, a child under the age of 16 for the purpose of any lewd or lascivious act as defined in [Penal Code] Section 288, or who causes, induces, or persuades a child under the age of 16 to engage in such an act with another person . . . .” Appellants contend, without elaboration, that they alleged a violation of this statute. Although they cite to the record for the location of their allegations, they do not recite their allegations or discuss and analyze how they might show a violation of Penal Code section 266j. Accordingly, the issue is waived. (Landry v, Berryessa Union School Dist., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 699-700.)
Alternatively, we hold that their allegations are inadequate to state a violation of Penal Code section 266j. The statute is violated when a defendant intentionally causes or induces a child to engage in sex acts with another, or when the defendant intentionally provides or makes a child available for those purposes. However, the first amended complaint does not allege that respondents acted with that intent. Instead, it alleges that respondents: created an environment where children were encouraged to trust Koerner; caused and induced appellants to take part in church activities with Koerner; and, despite their knowledge that Koerner was molesting children, continued to foster that trust and encourage appellants and others to spend time alone with Koerner. Although such allegations, if true, show an inexcusable indifference to the safety of children attending Koerner’s parish, they do not show that respondents actually intended for Koerner to have sex with appellants.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their appellate costs.



RUBIN, ACTING P. J.
I CONCUR:



FLIER, J.

Grimes, J., Dissenting

I respectfully dissent.
This case requires the court to construe the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims, specifically, claims against nonabuser entities who failed to take steps to safeguard minors from known or suspected molesters. The majority holds, as it did in Hightower v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 759, that the delayed discovery provision of the statute does not apply to any victim who reached his 26th birthday before January 1, 2003, and who did not sue during the one-year revival period provided by the statute -- whether or not the victim had discovered or should have discovered the cause of his injuries. I cannot agree with the majority and would hold that the statute bars only those claims of persons age 26 or older who had discovered the cause of their injuries but did not sue during the one-year revival period.
The majority has ably described the many permutations through which the statute reached its current state. But our concern here is only with the 2002 amendment and its application to claims against a third party nonabuser on notice of sexual abuse (a defendant who knew or had reason to know of unlawful sexual conduct by an employee and who failed to take reasonable steps to avoid such conduct by that person in the future). (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subds. (a) & (b).)[5] Before the 2002 amendment, which became effective on January 1, 2003, claims against such defendants (to whom I will refer as nonabusers on notice) were barred after a plaintiff’s 26th birthday. But as of January 1, 2003, a plaintiff claiming damages against a nonabuser on notice must sue before his 26th birthday or within three years of the date he discovers (or reasonably should have discovered) that psychological injury occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever is later.[6] (Ibid.) The 2002 amendment, to the details of which I now turn, also provided for the revival, for one year only, of claims against nonabusers on notice that would otherwise have been time-barred. (Id., subd. (c).) It is the construction of this provision that is at the heart of my disagreement with the majority.
1. The 2002 Amendment
The 2002 amendment is “a remedial statute that the Legislature intended to be construed broadly to effectuate the intent that illuminates section 340.1 as a whole; to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold to account individuals and entities responsible for their injuries.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 536.) The 2002 amendment, as relevant here, did two things.
First, as already noted, the 2002 amendment extended the statute of limitations in actions against a third party nonabuser beyond the plaintiff’s 26th birthday, if the nonabuser “knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person . . . .” (§ 340.1, subd. (b)(2), added by Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1.) As of January 1, 2003, claims against third party nonabusers on notice of unlawful sexual conduct by an employee may be brought “within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse . . . .” (§ 340.1, subd. (a).)
Second, the 2002 amendment revived, for calendar year 2003 only, causes of action against such nonabusers on notice that “would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired . . . .” (§ 340.1, subd. (c), italics and boldface added (the revival clause).) The revival clause provides, in its entirety:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages [against nonabusers on notice such as the Doe entities] that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within one year of January 1, 2003. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to alter the applicable statute of limitations period of an action that is not time barred as of January 1, 2003.” (§ 340.1, subd. (c), italics and boldface added.)
Thus the revival clause by its terms revives for one year claims that would otherwise be barred “as of January 1, 2003 . . . .”
2. This Case
The question in this case is the proper application of the 2002 amendment to actions filed after 2003 by plaintiffs who are 26 or older. The Doe entities say, and the majority agrees, that plaintiffs (who were well over the age of 26 on January 1, 2003, when the 2002 amendment became effective) were required to bring their suit during the 2003 revival period, because their claims had lapsed under former statutes of limitations in effect through December 31, 2002. Thus, the Doe entities say, John Roe 61’s claim lapsed forever in 1979 (when he was 19), and John Roe 58’s claim first lapsed in 1992 (when he was 19) and lapsed again and forever in 1999 (when he was 26 and did not take advantage of the expanded age limit enacted in 1998).
I believe the majority misreads the plain language of the revival clause. I do not agree that under the language of that clause, a claim that has not yet been discovered may be considered to have been barred “as of January 1, 2003,” even though the new statute of limitations, effective on that date, expressly allows such undiscovered claims. Undiscovered claims are governed by the statute of limitations in effect “as of January 1, 2003,” which allows such claims to be filed within three years of discovery. My conclusion flows from the plain language of the statute and is confirmed by the legislative history of the 2002 amendment.
a. The plain language of the statute
The language of the one-year revival clause quoted above is unambiguous: it revives “any claim for damages [against nonabusers on notice] that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003 . . . .” And the revival clause clearly states it is not to be interpreted “to alter the applicable statute of limitations period of an action that is not time barred as of January 1, 2003.” (§ 340.1, subd. (c), italics and boldface added.) This means that on and after January 1, 2003, the statute of limitations allows a plaintiff to file suit within three years of discovering that his adulthood injuries were caused by sexual abuse, no matter how old he is when he makes the discovery. The one-year revival of actions that are time-barred “as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired” applies only to plaintiffs who do not meet the terms of the newly extended statute of limitations, specifically, people who on January 1, 2003, were 26 or older and who discovered or reasonably should have discovered their injuries were caused by sexual abuse more than three years before filing suit.
In short, the 2002 amendment to the statute of limitations on its face extended the statute beyond age 26, for the first time, for plaintiffs who have not yet discovered their claims. The revival clause says in so many words it is not to be read to bar undiscovered claims, because it applies only to claims that are time-barred “as of January 1, 2003,” and “as of January 1, 2003,” undiscovered claims are not time-barred until three years after discovery. This, I believe, is the only reasonable interpretation of the 2002 amendment. It applies the extended statute of limitations according to its terms and it is congruent with the plain language of the revival clause.[7] In addition, my interpretation is consonant with the clearly expressed intent of the Legislature. I briefly address the latter point.
b. The legislative history
In my view the unambiguous language of the statute dictates the result in this case, but even so a court may look to legislative history for additional authority. (Barratt American, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2005) 37 Cal.4th 685, 697.) The legislative history of the 2002 amendment entirely dispels any ambiguity concerning the meaning of the words, “any claim for damages . . . that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003.”
The purpose of the 2002 amendment was to eliminate the absolute time bar of a victim’s 26th birthday in a suit against a nonabuser on notice of a perpetrator’s previous sexual misconduct who took no action to protect children from future abuse by the perpetrator. The author of the amendment described the age 26 time bar as an “arbitrary limitation [that] unfairly deprives a victim from seeking redress, and unfairly and unjustifiably protects responsible third parties from being held accountable for their actions that caused injury to victims.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1779 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 17, 2002, p. 4.) Further:
“Unfortunately for many victims, their adulthood trauma does not manifest itself until well after their 26th birthday, when some event in their current life triggers remembrance of the past abuse and brings on new trauma. [¶] For example, a 35-year old man with a 13-year old son involved in many community and sporting events, may begin to relive his nightmare of being molested by an older authoritarian figure when he was 13 years old and about to enter puberty.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1779 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 17, 2002, pp. 3-4.)
The entire point of the 2002 amendment was to eliminate an arbitrary age bar that prevented abuse victims from recovering against highly culpable third parties -- those who knew of previous misconduct and took no steps to protect other children from future abuse. The very example given -- which appears repeatedly in legislative reports on the 2002 amendment -- shows that the Legislature intended the amendments to apply to “a 35-year old man” who “begin[s] to relive his nightmare . . . .” Yet under the majority’s reading of the statute, a person who was 26 or older when the 2002 amendment went into effect, and who does not discover the cause of his injuries until he is 35, is time-barred by the very statute whose purpose was to eliminate the bar. In my view, this cannot be, and is not, the case.
Other documents in the legislative history are to like effect. The discussion in another report for the Senate Judiciary Committee, after explaining that the bill would eliminate the age 26 limitation and apply a broader statute of limitations to suits against third party nonabusers on notice, described the one-year revival clause as follows: “In other words, this bill would provide those victims who discovered their adulthood trauma after age 26, whose action has been barred by the current statute of limitations, a one-year window to bring a case against a third party that otherwise would be time-barred.”[8] (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1779 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 2, 2002, p. 5, italics and boldface added.) This report makes clear the revival clause applied only to claims discovered before the new statute became effective.[9]
In sum, I would hold that the claims of plaintiffs who were age 26 or older as of January 1, 2003, but who had not yet discovered the causal link between their childhood abuse and their adulthood injuries, are not barred by the statute of limitations.




GRIMES, J.



Publication courtesy of California free legal advice.
Analysis and review provided by Carlsbad Property line Lawyers.
San Diego Case Information provided by www.fearnotlaw.com

---