Filed 3/29/18 Rogers v. Merced County Dept. of Child Support Services CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE

SHELLY ROGERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MERCED COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES,
Defendant and Respondent.

A149057
(San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. PRO126272)


Shelly Rogers, the trustee of a family trust, appeals from an order enforcing a money judgment for delinquent child support against one of the trust beneficiaries. Rogers primarily contends the court failed to consider the beneficiary’s needs and the cash available in the trust to pay the judgment, failed to make findings, and failed to instruct her how to satisfy the judgment. Petitioner and respondent the Merced County Department of Child Support Services (Department) has declined to file a respondent’s brief. Rogers’s contentions are without merit, so we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Maxine Wilkin created a revocable family trust in 1998. The trust assets included real property in Brisbane and Coulterville, California, as well as funds held in a credit union account. Pursuant to the trust provisions, upon Maxine Wilkin’s death the corpus was to be distributed equally among the beneficiaries.
She died in January 2015. In January 2016 the Department petitioned under Probate Code section 15305 to enforce a child support judgment against beneficiary Gordon Wilkin (Wilkin) from his interest in the trust. At that time Wilkin owed $42,159.80 in accrued child support and interest on a 1999 child support judgment.
Rogers opposed the petition. She contended the full amount of Wilkin’s share of the trust assets was necessary for his support, and that he would be left destitute without it. Wilkin was 61 years old, had not worked since 2001 (although he did not qualify for disability benefits), received $194 a month in general assistance and food stamps, and expected to receive only minimal Social Security when he became eligible. Rogers said his share of the trust consisted of a cash distribution of about $17,700 and the house in Coulterville, which she valued at $100,000. Wilkin had lived in the house rent-free since 1995 and “has no other housing arrangements/possibilities.”
Rogers acknowledged that she had executed, but not recorded, a deed transferring the Coulterville property to Wilkin in January 2016. With the exception of recording the deed and distributing the $17,700 to Wilkin, Rogers had distributed all of the trust assets among the various beneficiaries “well before the trustee first became aware of the judgment lien of the County of Merced.” She asked the court to find the full remaining distribution due to Wilkin necessary for his support. Alternatively, she asked for an order confirming that she could record the deed transferring to Wilkin ownership of the Coulterville property.
In reply, the Department provided a Zillow estimate of $195,000 for the Coulterville property, $95,000 higher than Rogers’s valuation. “Either way,” it noted, “the outstanding balance on Mr. Wilkin’s Child Support Judgment, at just over $40,000, is considerably less than the value of the Coulterville property, not to mention his share of the overall trust.” The Brisbane property had been sold for $625,000, but the Department did not know what disbursements Rogers had made from the proceeds. The Department refuted Rogers’s claim that she only learned about the County’s judgment lien after she distributed most of the trust assets and executed the deed for the Coulterville property by providing documentation to show it notified her about it in August 2015.
The court granted the petition. Rogers filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Rogers contends the court erred when it allowed the Department to satisfy the child support judgment in full from Wilkin’s beneficial interest in the trust. She maintains the court should have restricted its order to the $17,700 in cash due to Wilkin under the trust because section 15305 refers to satisfying support judgments out of the trustee’s “payments” to the beneficiary, and “payment,” by common sense and general statutory law, means a payment of money. The argument is meritless. Section 15305 uses the word “payment” because it addresses situations where a trustee may be required to apply current or future trust payments to satisfy a support judgment against a trust beneficiary. (See § 15305, subds. (b), (c); Cal Law Revision Com. com., 54 West’s Ann. Prob. Code (1991 ed.) foll. § 15305, p. 556.) Nothing in the statutory language or relevant case law exempts non-cash trust assets from claims by support judgment creditors.
This case concerns a trustee’s responsibility to satisfy a trust beneficiary’s support obligations out of the beneficiary’s distributions of trust assets following the settlor’s death. There is no doubt that the Coulterville property is an asset of the trust to be distributed to Wilkin. Rogers can hardly assert—although her argument implies it—that making real property the corpus of a revocable trust shields it from claims from a beneficiary’s support creditors. “After all, if a will cannot insulate property from child support claims, a living trust should not either. The rule cannot be in California that if you make a will your property will be subject to an existing child support order but if you put everything in a living trust your property will be immune. That would be, to paraphrase a famous aphorism, the estate planning equivalent of a free lunch. [¶] If there remains any doubt as a matter of family law, the clincher is to be found under the law governing living trusts themselves. Probate Code section 19001, subdivision (a) (which uses the word “settlor” instead of “trustor”) provides: ‘Upon the death of a settlor, the property of the deceased settlor that was subject to the power of revocation at the time of the settlor’s death is subject to the claims of creditors of the deceased settlor’s estate . . . to the extent that the deceased settlor’s estate is inadequate to satisfy those claims and expenses.’ In the context of an existing child support order, the statute is a clear statement of legislative intent that property put into a living trust (i.e., subject to the trustor’s power of revocation) must be available to satisfy a valid child support obligation, no matter what the trust’s terms of distribution.’ ” (In re Marriage of Perry (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1109, italics omitted.)
Rogers argues the trial court abused or failed to exercise its discretion by disregarding Wilkin’s financial needs or refusing to balance them against those of the support judgment creditor. “[T]here is nothing in the record that shows that [Wilkin’s] situation was even considered. The Petition was simply granted en toto.” Rogers has it the wrong way around. “ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principal of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; In re Marriage of Bower (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 893, 898 (Marriage of Bower).)
Here the trial court was presented with Rogers’s written arguments and supporting documentation. It held a hearing at which Rogers’s counsel and Wilkin appeared and argued. Nothing in the record indicates the court failed to consider Rogers’s position, other than, in her view, its conclusion that Rogers did not win the day. Nor on this record can it be said that the court abused its discretion when it required the trust to satisfy a $42,000 support obligation out of a beneficial interest valued at $100,000. “ ‘An abuse of discretion occurs “where, considering all the relevant circumstances, the court has exceeded the bounds of reason or it can fairly be said that no judge would reasonably make the same order under the same circumstances.” ’ ” (Marriage of Bower, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 898–899.) No abuse of discretion occurred here.
Rogers’s remaining contentions may be briefly addressed. She concedes the court was not required to issue findings or a statement of decision, but asserts findings “should” be required “because the Probate Code requires consideration of the equities of the beneficiary’s situation and the reasonableness of the enforcement of the support judgment.” It is for the Legislature, not this court, to impose a requirement for written findings, and the Legislature has not chosen to do so. Beyond that, the record contains no indication that Rogers requested findings in the trial court.
Nor are we persuaded that the court erred by declining to instruct Rogers how to apply Wilkin’s share of the trust to satisfy the judgment, e.g., whether by selling the Coulterville property, borrowing against it, or through other means. The probate court has the discretion to direct the trustee on the means of satisfying a judgment from a judgment debtor’s beneficial interest (Code Civ. Proc. § 709.010; Pratt v. Ferguson (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 102, 116), but Rogers cites no authority suggesting it was required to exercise such discretion here rather than leave it to Rogers, as trustee, to decide how to proceed.
Rogers next asserts she is not personally liable for any part of the judgment, but this question is not before us because the trial court granted relief only against Wilkin. Her final argument, that two of the other beneficiaries were not properly served with notice of the Department’s petition, was not raised before the trial court. Accordingly, Rogers cannot raise the alleged defect in service as a ground for reversal before this court. Moreover, she has not shown she was prejudiced by the alleged defect.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.


_________________________
Siggins, J.


We concur:


_________________________
McGuiness, Acting P.J. *


_________________________
Jenkins, J.