Roldan v. Castro
Filed 3/22/06 Roldan v. Castro CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
| CELENA A. ROLDAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RYAN FRANCISCO CASTRO, Defendant and Appellant. | D046800 (Super. Ct. No. DV019670) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Federico Castro, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Diego Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed and remanded with directions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8).
The parties have submitted a stipulated joint application to have the judgment in this matter reversed. We accept the stipulation pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 128, subdivision (a)(8), and grant the parties' request for a stipulated reversal. (Union Bank of California v. Braille Institute of America (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1328 (Union Bank); In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 381.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Restraining Order
On April 21, 2005, Celena A. Roldan applied for a domestic violence restraining order against her ex-boyfriend Ryan Francisco Castro. In her supporting declaration, Roldan described three incidents.
On March 17, 2005, Castro refused to talk to Roldan while the two were attending a bar. During the drive home, Castro got "really angry" with her and "got in [Roldan's] face" while she was driving. Roldan asked Castro to calm down and when he refused, she punched Castro in the face. In response, Castro punched her in the chin, causing her to temporarily black out and swerve off the road. This left a bruise "the size of a silver dollar" on her chin.
On April 15, 2005, Castro threatened Roldan that if she did not return to him, he would shoot himself. He further stated that if any of her family members tried to talk to him, he would kill them.
On April 18, 2005, Castro called Roldan approximately 20 times within one hour. Despite Roldan's request that he stay away, he went to her house and told her that he would never leave her and that they would live together forever. She asked him to leave and then went to dinner with her uncle. Her uncle convinced her to call the police.
Castro also applied for a restraining order against Roldan. In his supporting declaration, he stated that on March 17, 2005, Roldan "used her finger nails to tear the skin on [his] left forearm" and that a few hours later, she punched him on the left side of the head.
Castro responded to Roldan's request for a restraining order. In his supporting declaration, Castro denied most of what Roldan stated in her declaration filed in support of her request for a restraining order.
Concerning the April 15 incident, Castro declared that he never threatened to kill Roldan's family members if they tried to talk to him. Instead, he stated that he would defend himself if Roldan's family members tried to hurt him.
Concerning the March 17 incident, Castro declared that he did not get "in" Roldan's face during the drive home. Rather, Roldan became insulted and punched Castro on the left side of his head and face. Castro argued that the physical characteristics of the scene meant that Castro could not be "in her face" when she punched him. The fact that Roldan's punch landed on the left side of Castro's face and head demonstrates that at that time Castro was facing the front of the car, with his left profile towards Roldan. Castro further substantiated his position with an alleged excerpt from a police report taken that evening. According to Castro, the report stated that " . . . [Roldan] felt insulted at one point and she punched [Castro's] face on the left side with her fist."
Castro also referred to an alleged report in which a social worker wrote that she called Roldan on April 20, 2005, and Roldan told the social worker that she did not feel threatened by Castro.
On May 11, 2005, the Honorable Federico Castro conducted a hearing on the parties' requested restraining orders. At the hearing, Roldan's attorney presented her case. In addition to the matters set forth in Roldan's application, her counsel indicated that he had photographs of Roldan's injuries when Castro punched her in the face, as well as recordings of voice mail messages that he had left for her. With regard to the voice mail messages, counsel stated that "[t]hey were coming in at the rate of almost 20 an hour, alternating from name-calling, to crying, to despondency."
In response to this statement, the court had the following exchange with Castro:
"The Court: When are you going to let go?
"[Castro]: I'm prepared to let go, sir.
"The Court: There comes a time when you're going through all these things, and people we think we love, and people we think love us, and when they say no, then no is no.
"[Castro]: I understand that."
Judge Castro then asked counsel for Roldan whether he wanted a two- or three-year restraining order. Judge Castro then granted Roldan a three-year restraining order.
Castro asked the court about his request for a restraining order, and the court responded that it was finding that he was the initial aggressor. Castro responded that as to the March 17, 2005 incident, Roldan was the initial aggressor. The court responded, "Thank you. That's my order."
B. The Application To Vacate the Judgment
In January 2006 Castro filed a "Joint Application and Stipulation for Reversal of Judgment" in this matter, asking that this court, at the request of both he and Roldan, reverse the judgment in this matter. The original application was supported only by the declaration of Castro's counsel. However, in February 2006, at the request of this court, Castro and Roldan submitted declarations in support of the application.
1. Castro's declaration
In his declaration, Castro declares that after he filed his opening brief on appeal, he "reached an agreement with [Roldan]. The Agreement is contingent upon this Court's reversal of the lower court's ruling."[2] Castro also declares that (1) the case "does not involve a public interest or otherwise affect the public"; (2) the case "does not involve important public rights or unfair, illegal, or corrupt practices, or torts affecting a significant number of persons"; (3) he does not "work in a field or practice a profession that requires state licensure"; and (4) the underlying dispute does not affect the rights of the public or third parties.
In further support of his application, Castro states that imposition of the restraining order (1) is harming his reputation in the community; (2) is harming his chances of gaining promotions at his employment at Cubic Corporation, where he works as a software engineer, because of the need for a special governmental security clearance to work on federal government contracts; and (3) pursuant to the prohibition on firearms in the restraining order, he is being forced to part with an heirloom gun that he inherited from his father.
2. Roldan's declaration
In Roldan's declaration, she states that she agrees with Castro that there are sound legal reasons for reversal of the judgment. She further declares that Castro states valid reasons for wanting a stipulated reversal, and his reasons for wanting a reversal will not result in an erosion of public trust that might result from a nullification of the lower court's judgment. Roldan also states that she "[does] not see the need for a court ordered restraining order." On these bases, she requests that the court grant the stipulated reversal.
DISCUSSION
"(a) Every court shall have the power to do all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (8) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice. An appellate court shall not reverse or vacate a duly entered judgment upon an agreement or stipulation of the parties unless the court finds both of the following: [¶] (A) There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal. [¶] (B) The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement." (Italics added.)
Thus, in determining whether a stipulated reversal will be accepted, an appellate court must find: "[T]here is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected; the reasons for the requested reversal do not outweigh the erosion of public trust resulting from such an action; and the stipulated reversal does not reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement." (Union Bank, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1328; In re Rashad H., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 380-381.) We make this determination on a case-by-case basis based on the papers submitted by the parties and our own review of the record. (Hardisty v. Hinton & Alfert (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 999, 1007 (Hardisty).) Further, although reversible error is relevant to the determination of whether the stipulation will be accepted, its absence does not preclude acceptance of a stipulated reversal. (Union Bank, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1330-1331.) We also look to see if there are issues involving regulated or licensed persons or entities. (See Hardisty, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1010-1011 [rejecting stipulated reversal in appeal involving professional conduct of state-licensed attorneys because "'[i]t would be unconscionable to make it possible for a [state licensee] who may have acted unethically to purchase disciplinary immunity from one of the consequences of his impropriety'"].)
After examining the appellate record and the stipulation for reversal of the judgment, we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties will be adversely affected by the proposed reversal. (§ 128, subd. (a)(8)(A); Union Bank, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329; In re Rashad H., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 380-381.) This is a private dispute between two individuals. There is no evidence that there are any interests of nonparties involved. Also, acceptance of the stipulated reversal will not result in an erosion of public trust, nor will it reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement. Roldan has stated under oath that she believes that the restraining order was wrong and she does not feel the need for a restraining order at the present time. (§ 128, subd. (a)(8)(B); In re Rashad H., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 381.)
Further, although not necessary to our decision, we conclude that there is a very real possibility that if decided on the merits, the court's order might be reversed. At the hearing on the parties' mutual requests for restraining orders, the court denied Castro's request for a restraining order, reasoning that Castro was the aggressor. However, in Roldan's own supporting papers she stated under oath that she was the initial aggressor when she punched Castro in the face, after which he retaliated and hit her back. There is a strong likelihood that at least that portion of the order denying Castro's request for a restraining order would be reversed if this appeal were heard on the merits. As the Court of Appeal stated in Union Bank, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pages 1330-1331: "Surely, the presence of reversible error is pertinent to the first two section 128, subdivision (a)(8) factors. For example, section 128, subdivision (a)(8)(A) refers to the interests of the public being adversely affected by the stipulated reversal. If there is reversible error, prompt resolution of the appeal without the considerable expense to the parties of briefing and taxpayer incurred costs of the internal decisionmaking process within the court certainly serves the public interest. Also, section 128, subdivision (a)(8)(B) requires an appellate court to conclude that the reasons for the reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment before accepting a stipulated reversal. If there is reversible error present, whatever public trust is eroded when a judgment is reversed, the purported erosion of our citizens' faith in the courts is materially mitigated when the reversal would have occurred in any event and the parties agree to accept the inevitable."
Finally, there is no issue regarding licensed or regulated individuals that would militate against reversing the judgment in this matter. (Hardisty, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1010-1011.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed pursuant to the parties' stipulation. On remand, the superior court is directed to enter an order in accordance with this opinion and to dismiss the action with prejudice. The parties shall bear their own costs and fees on appeal.
NARES, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
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[1] All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
[2] At oral argument the court questioned counsel for Castro concerning this statement and asked if there was any agreement between him and Roldan, separate from the stipulation, that was contingent upon a reversal of the judgment. Counsel represented to the court that there was no agreement between the parties except the stipulation that the judgment would be reversed.
