Filed 5/22/18 Romo Productions v. Paradise Sewing CA4/3





NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


ROMO PRODUCTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PARADISE SEWING, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.


G052624 (consol. with G053005)

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2013-00659977)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Randall J. Sherman, Judge. Affirmed. Motion for imposition of sanctions. Denied.
J. Grant Kennedy for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rutan & Tucker, Bradley A. Chapin and Kathryn D.Z. Domin for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
Romo Productions, Inc. (Romo) is a manufacturer of apparel, including military apparel. Paradise Sewing, Inc. (Paradise) was a sewing subcontractor for Romo. This case grew out of a dispute in which Romo accused Paradise of breaching their contract and stealing Romo’s clients and property. The trial court granted a nonsuit on most of Romo’s causes of action and denied a motion to reopen. We affirm the judgment.
Romo failed to prove necessary elements of its causes of action for breach of contract and trade libel, and its offer of proof did not show Romo could have done so if the trial court had granted the motion to reopen. The contract on which Romo sued was an unenforceable noncompetition, nonsolicitation, and nondisclosure agreement. Only if Romo could prove misappropriation of trade secrets by Paradise (a theory that was never pled) could it enforce any portion of the contract. Assuming for purposes of this appeal that Romo could have established the existence of a trade secret, it could not have established Paradise’s misappropriation thereof. Further, Romo could not establish any causal connection between Paradise’s alleged trade libel and Romo’s loss of any business to Paradise.
Romo also challenges the trial court’s pretrial orders granting evidentiary sanctions and granting motions in limine excluding evidence regarding damages. The court did not err in granting the evidentiary sanctions based on Romo’s failure to provide discovery responses. The orders granting the motions in limine merely precluded Romo from offering documents and testimony at trial encompassed by the evidentiary sanctions order.

BACKGROUND
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Romo was a garment manufacturing business; Rhonda Valles was the president and owner of Romo. Much of Romo’s business was in manufacturing military training apparel for the United States government. One of Romo’s major clients was Drifire, a military supply company in Chicago, Illinois.
Paradise is a sewing manufacturer; Mai Linh Purdy and Prayune Torpipat are its owners. Starting in 2008, Romo contracted with Paradise to perform sewing services on garments Romo had agreed to produce for its customers. Romo would supply Paradise with fabric and trim to fulfill orders from Drifire; Paradise would deliver the completed clothing items to Romo, which would then ship them to Drifire.
In March 2013, Paradise and Romo entered a confidentiality, nonsolicitation, and noncompetition agreement. The agreement provided that Romo would only continue their business relationship if Paradise signed the agreement. The agreement provided that Romo would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees in the event it instituted litigation to enforce the agreement’s terms.
In June 2013, Paradise advised Romo it would not deliver pending orders until Romo paid its outstanding invoices. Paradise claimed that immediately before this, Valles had informed Paradise that Romo was out of money, had used the money owed to Paradise to pay off another contractor, and would be going out of business. Valles denied making these statements. Romo had previously been late in making payments to Paradise, had stopped payment on checks to Paradise, and had offered the transfer of equipment to pay off its debts to Paradise.
At the time Paradise terminated its business relationship with Romo, it had two pending orders from Romo, both of which were for Drifire. Romo and Paradise agreed that Paradise would complete these orders, and Drifire would pay Paradise directly. Because the amount Drifire paid Paradise was in excess of the amount it was owed by Romo, Paradise applied the excess to Romo’s outstanding debt to Paradise.
In September 2013, Drifire contacted Paradise to inquire whether Paradise would be interested in working directly with Drifire. Sonya Monroe of Drifire told Paradise: “I wouldn’t have called you unless [Valles] suggested, because I know you don’t want any involvement with Romo.”
One of Paradise’s former employees testified that boxes of zippers provided by Romo to Paradise to complete orders had been shipped from Paradise to Purdy’s aunt in Canada, and then resold. Purdy, however, testified that she had sent one box containing no more than 50 unused zippers to a relative in Canada in 2009. Purdy further testified that these zippers had been provided to her by Romo to be used in military sewing projects, but that these particular zippers were no longer being used by that customer. A Romo employee advised Purdy to get rid of the old zippers in order to avoid mixing them up with the new zippers being used. Purdy testified Paradise never gave away any zippers that were supposed to be used for Romo’s military contracts.

II.
PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
In June 2013, Romo sued Paradise, Purdy, and Torpipat for breach of contract, conversion, common counts, intentional interference with prospective business advantage, trade libel, unfair competition, accounting, and declaratory relief. Paradise filed a cross-complaint against Romo for breach of contract, account stated, and quantum meruit.
In response to Paradise’s written discovery requests regarding Romo’s damages, Romo produced, inter alia, spreadsheets identifying its damages and provided summary responses to the form interrogatories regarding damages. Paradise then served a second set of discovery requests for (1) documents used to prepare the spreadsheets and (2) documents that were identified in or used to prepare the responses to the form interrogatories regarding damages. Romo failed to respond to the second set of discovery requests and failed to respond to Paradise’s attempts to meet and confer. Paradise filed a motion to compel responses, which Romo did not oppose. The trial court granted the motion, and ordered Romo to provide responses without objections and to pay monetary sanctions to Paradise.
When Romo failed to comply with the trial court’s discovery order, Paradise filed a motion for evidentiary sanctions. The court granted the motion and ordered: “At trial, neither [Romo] nor its experts may introduce or rely on any evidence that [Romo] was required to provide by virtue of the Court’s . . . discovery order but did not provide before the hearing.”
After the evidentiary sanctions order was issued, Valles testified as Romo’s person most knowledgeable regarding damages. At the deposition, Valles identified the documents and other evidence used to prepare the damage summary spreadsheets produced earlier in discovery; many of the documents Valles identified at her deposition had not been produced in discovery.
Romo designated Christopher Donoghue as its expert witness on damages. At his deposition, Donoghue produced several documents that had not been produced by Romo in discovery. Donoghue testified that he relied on these documents in forming his opinions and in preparing his expert witness report. Several of the documents were also listed on Romo’s trial exhibit list.
Before trial, both parties filed motions in limine. Paradise’s motion in limine No. 3 sought to exclude certain documents from trial because they were subject to the evidentiary sanctions order and/or were never produced in response to proper discovery requests. The trial court granted the motion and excluded Romo’s trial exhibit Nos. 48 and 49, and portions of trial exhibit No. 89, and Donoghue deposition exhibit Nos. 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 25.
Paradise’s motion in limine No. 4 sought to exclude Donoghue’s testimony and his expert report on the ground that Donoghue relied on documents excluded by the evidentiary sanctions order in forming his opinions and in preparing his report. Before trial, the court granted the motion to exclude the expert report as hearsay. During trial, the court granted the motion to exclude Donoghue’s expert testimony: “[T]he expert’s testimony is tainted by reliance on information that was requested in discovery and not produced in discovery.”

III.
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A jury trial began in June 2015. After Romo rested its case-in-chief, Paradise moved for a nonsuit on all causes of action. The trial court heard argument from Romo, and then granted the motion on all causes of action except the cause of action for conversion against Paradise and Purdy. Romo voluntarily dismissed its causes of action for common counts and unfair business practices.
Romo then made a motion to reopen its case. The trial court denied the motion to reopen. The trial continued on Paradise and Purdy’s defense to the remaining cause of action for conversion and on Paradise’s cross-complaint.
After deliberating, the jury returned its special verdict form in which it found (1) neither Paradise nor Purdy had intentionally interfered with Romo’s property by keeping or refusing to return zippers and (2) Romo had failed to pay Paradise $27,000 for completed work. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Paradise. Romo appealed from the judgment.
After a hearing on an unopposed motion for attorney fees, the trial court entered an amended judgment awarding Paradise $350,000 in fees and $21,083.58 in costs. Romo filed a separate appeal from the amended judgment. This court consolidated the appeals for all purposes.

DISCUSSION
I.
NONSUIT
“A defendant is entitled to a nonsuit if the trial court determines that, as a matter of law, the evidence presented by plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to find in his favor. [Citation.] ‘In determining whether plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to plaintiff must be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded. The court must give “to the plaintiff[’s] evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, . . . indulging every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence in plaintiff[’s] favor.”’ [Citation.] A mere ‘scintilla of evidence’ does not create a conflict for the jury’s resolution; ‘there must be substantial evidence to create the necessary conflict.’ [Citation.] [¶] In reviewing a grant of nonsuit, we are ‘guided by the same rule requiring evaluation of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’ [Citation.] We will not sustain the judgment ‘“unless interpreting the evidence most favorably to plaintiff’s case and most strongly against the defendant and resolving all presumptions, inferences and doubts in favor of the plaintiff a judgment for the defendant is required as a matter of law.”’” (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 291.) We may not, however, only consider the supporting evidence in isolation, and disregard any contradictory evidence; rather, we must review the entire record. (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581.)

A.
BREACH OF CONTRACT
The trial court ruled as follows in nonsuiting the breach of contract cause of action: “So on the breach of contact claim, we’ve got three claimed breaches of contract, don’t contact, don’t solicit, don’t compete.
“All right. The don’t compete part violates Business and Professions Code [section] 16600, so that’s not going to be a viable claim.
“Don’t solicit, that’s in paragraph 2(B). It says that, ‘Paradise shall not directly or indirectly solicit any customer to leave Romo.’ That language basically means don’t compete. So it’s basically the same thing. So the court concludes that’s also subject to the [Business and Professions Code section] 16600 rule prohibiting covenants not to compete. [¶] . . . [¶]
“Confidential information, paragraph 1 and 1(A). So to establish a breach of contract for violating that c[l]ause of the contract would require the plaintiff to show violation of trade secrets law, because otherwise we’re talking about [Business and Professions Code section] 16600, since that clause not to use confidential information is a contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade or business. So paragraph 1 does come down to trade secrets. And even if we could conform pleading to proof and say that . . . would be the cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets, we’ve got the CACI [S]eries 4400, which governs trade secrets, which provides the law that applies. And it doesn’t appear that the evidence has established the existence of a trade secret as defined in the law, that information was secret, that it had actual or potential independent economic value because it was secret, and the plaintiff made reasonable efforts to keep the information secret with regard to any specific piece of information.
“As far as misappropriation, there doesn’t appear to be substantial evidence to go to the jury, that any trade secret that did exist on behalf of Romo was misappropriated by defendants, or that any such misappropriation was a substantial factor in causing harm to Romo or causing Paradise to be unjustly enriched, as set forth in CACI [No.] 4401, requirement 5. So the court concludes that the plaintiff has not presented enough evidence to go to the jury on breach of contract.”
Under California law, covenants not to compete are generally unenforceable: “Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16600.) A judicially-created exception to Business and Professions Code section 16600 permits covenants not to compete that are narrowly drawn to protect an employer’s trade secrets. (See Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 239, 242.)
A trade secret is (1) information, including formulas, patterns, compilations, programs, devices, methods, techniques, or processes that (2) has independent economic value, either actual or potential, that derives from (3) the fact that it is not generally known in the industry, to the public, or to others who could realize economic value from its disclosure or use and (4) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. (Civ. Code, § 3426.1, subd. (d); see DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 874.)
A claimed trade secret must be identified with sufficient specificity. (Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1452-1454.) In granting the nonsuit motion, the trial court stated: “I remember hearing the phrase method, process, and system a few times, but has there been any evidence as to the specifics of those conclusionary words?” Romo directs us to its 30-page statement of the case in the opening appellate brief as proof that “clearly sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to find trade secrets.” It is Romo’s obligation to identify specific information that its claims should be afforded trade secret protection. Our job as a reviewing court is not to review the full trial transcript in an attempt to determine which of Romo’s methods, techniques, processes, etc., may have been sufficiently described so as to constitute trade secrets.
For purposes of this appeal, however, we will assume that Romo could have identified a particular trade secret at issue, and turn to the question of whether Romo made a prima facie case of misappropriation of that trade secret. “A trade secret is misappropriated if a person (1) acquires a trade secret knowing or having reason to know that the trade secret has been acquired by ‘improper means,’ (2) discloses or uses a trade secret the person has acquired by ‘improper means’ or in violation of a nondisclosure obligation, (3) discloses or uses a trade secret the person knew or should have known was derived from another who had acquired it by improper means or who had a nondisclosure obligation or (4) discloses or uses a trade secret after learning that it is a trade secret but before a material change of position.” (Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Group Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 21, 66.)
Purdy testified that Paradise did not receive any methods, techniques, or training from Romo. Romo offered no evidence that Paradise had received or used any claimed trade secrets. On appeal, Romo contends that Paradise could not have obtained Drifire’s business without Romo’s processes, methods, or techniques, but does not cite to any evidence supporting that contention. To the contrary, Purdy’s husband, Robert Purdy, testified that Paradise obtained business from Drifire when Drifire contacted Paradise directly due to Romo’s inability to complete Drifire’s work, and Romo’s suggestion that Paradise might be able to assist Drifire. Robert Purdy testified that on September 23, 2013, he received a phone call from Sonya Monroe of Drifire, who said: “‘“Hi, Bob, we have a cut that we have a problem with and we really need it. The troops are getting ready to rotate out to Afghanistan and we need this cut finished. I know you’re not working with Romo anymore, but I talked to Rhonda [Valles]. Rhonda told me she had no ability to find someone to do that particular cut, and she suggested—Rhonda suggested that I call you directly and ask if you would do the work.”’” (Italics added.) Robert Purdy further testified that in that telephone conversation Monroe said: “‘“I wouldn’t have called you unless Rhonda suggested, because I know you don’t want any involvement with Romo.”’” (Italics added.) Robert Purdy confirmed to Monroe that Paradise would not have anything further to do with Romo, but that he would speak with Purdy about Monroe’s request.
There was no evidence that Paradise obtained business from Drifire by misappropriating Romo’s alleged trade secrets; to the contrary, the only evidence on this topic was that Romo suggested to Drifire that it contact Paradise directly.
We conclude the trial court did not err in granting the nonsuit motion as to the breach of contract cause of action.

B.
TRADE LIBEL
In granting the nonsuit as to Romo’s cause of action for trade libel, the trial court stated: “On the trade libel claim, there’s a difference between circumstantial evidence and speculation. So the court sees that all we have in this case is speculation. There’s been no testimony by anybody from Drifire that—or any evidence from Drifire as to the reason they left Romo and went to Paradise. And so the court concludes that the plaintiff has not met its burden of proof to establish the existence of each of the elements of trade libel. And not necessarily that one component.”
To establish liability for trade libel, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the defendant published a statement; (2) the statement tended to disparage the plaintiff’s product or service; (3) the statement was provably false; (4) the defendant acted with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard for its falsity; and (5) the statement caused specific pecuniary damage to the plaintiff. (Melaleuca, Inc. v. Clark (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1360-1361; see CACI No. 1731.)
Robert Purdy testified that he had told a Drifire employee: “‘We have a serious problem between Paradise and Romo. Romo’s told us that she’s going out of business and she has no money to pay us. We have work in process. We need to talk to Drifire about getting paid for this and delivering the goods that you have ordered to Drifire.’” This admission meets the first two elements of the trade libel cause of action. Valles’s testimony that Romo was not going out of business, while counter to Purdy’s testimony that Valles had told her directly that Romo was going out of business, would be sufficient to overcome a nonsuit motion on the element of the falsity of the statement, and perhaps even the element of Paradise’s reckless disregard for its truth.
However, Romo failed to produce any evidence that the statement caused it pecuniary harm, i.e., that Drifire stopped doing business with Romo because Robert Purdy told Drifire that Romo was going out of business. On appeal, Romo argues there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting its trade libel claim to avoid nonsuit.
Valles testified she did not know why Drifire had cancelled its business relationship with Romo, and could not remember if she had asked Drifire about it. Valles also testified she believed Drifire would continue providing business to Romo after the allegedly libelous statements made by Paradise.
Romo offered no testimony or written evidence from Drifire explaining why it stopped doing business with Romo. Romo contends it offered “circumstantial evidence” that because it received work from Drifire before the statement was made by Robert Purdy to Drifire, and did not receive work from Drifire after the statement was made, the statement was the cause of the loss of work.
“Although a finding of causation may not be based on mere speculation or conjecture, such finding may be predicated on reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.” (Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co. (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 774, 780.) Here, the evidence actually before the court does not support a reasonable inference of causation. Valles was unable to offer any admissible evidence regarding the reason Drifire stopped doing business with her company. Robert Purdy’s testimony, cited ante in section I.A., was that Paradise obtained business from Drifire due to Romo’s inability to complete the work, and Romo’s recommendation of Paradise to Drifire as a company that could complete the work. Lacking any direct evidence from Drifire, either testimony or written evidence, a finding that Robert Purdy’s statement in June caused Drifire to stop doing business with Romo, despite continuing to work with Romo through September and promising more work in 2014, would be rank speculation.
We conclude the trial court did not err in granting nonsuit of Romo’s cause of action for trade libel.

C.
MOTION TO REOPEN
“In response to a motion for nonsuit, a plaintiff has the right, upon request, to reopen its case to remedy defects raised by the nonsuit motion. [Citations.] However, the right to present further evidence is waived unless the plaintiff also makes an offer of proof, describing the evidence and explaining how it would cure the deficiencies. [Citation.] [¶] If an offer of proof is made, the denial of the motion to reopen ‘will not be overturned when the additional evidence sought to be produced by the plaintiff is either irrelevant to the issues involved in the action (no error) or would not be sufficient to render defendants liable as a matter of law (no prejudice).’” (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 886-887.)
In the motion to reopen, Romo’s trial counsel made an extensive offer of proof regarding testimony he would elicit from Valles regarding the identification of trade secrets and the means Valles used to ensure their secrecy. Counsel did not make an offer of proof regarding any other witness.
As to the cause of action for breach of contract based on misappropriation of trade secrets, Romo did not make an offer of proof regarding Paradise’s use or misappropriation of any of the alleged trade secrets. In its appellate briefs, Romo continues to argue that it could have proven the existence of trade secrets and Romo’s attempts to maintain their secrecy. What it never addresses is how it could have proven Paradise used, much less appropriated, any of the alleged trade secrets.
As to the cause of action for trade libel, Romo did not make an offer of proof regarding the key missing element—causation. Romo did not claim it could prove it lost Drifire’s business as a result of Paradise’s statement to Drifire that Romo was going out of business. Romo does not address the motion to reopen this cause of action in its appellate briefs.
Romo also notes in its appellate briefs that the trial court cut off its offer of proof in the motion to reopen. Romo does not indicate what else it would have included in its offer of proof if the court had not limited its time.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Romo’s motion to reopen its case following the nonsuit.

II.
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
We review the trial court’s order imposing discovery sanctions for abuse of discretion. (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604; Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Brown, Leifer, Slatkin & Berns (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 27, 36.) The trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1555; Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493.)

A.
Motion for Evidentiary Sanctions
“‘The power to impose discovery sanctions is a broad discretion subject to reversal only for arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical action. [Citations.] Only two facts are absolutely prerequisite to imposition of the sanction: (1) there must be a failure to comply . . . and (2) the failure must be wilful [citation].’” (Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Brown, Leifer, Slatkin & Berns, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 36.) The motion established these two facts; neither in the trial court nor on appeal does Romo contend otherwise.
Romo challenges the order granting the motion for evidentiary sanctions because (1) the motion did not include a separate statement and (2) the order was too vague. While a separate statement is generally required for a motion for evidentiary sanctions (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(7)), “[a] separate statement is not required when no response has been provided to the request for discovery” (id., rule 3.1345(b)). Romo failed to respond to the second set of discovery; that failure ultimately led to the motion for evidentiary sanctions, meaning a separate statement was not required.
As to its alleged vagueness, the evidentiary sanctions order provides: “At trial, neither [Romo] nor its experts may introduce or rely on any evidence that [Romo] was required to provide by virtue of the Court’s April 17, 2014 discovery order but did not provide before the hearing.” The April 17, 2014 discovery order, in turn, provides: “Defendants’ Motions to Compel (a) Responses to Special Interrogatories Set Two, (b) Responses to Document Requests Set Two and for Sanctions came on regularly as scheduled. [¶] There are no appearances by any party. [¶] Ruling: Moving party having telephonically waived oral argument, and no opposition having been filed, the court now rules as follows: Motions granted in their entirety. All further responses shall be made in writing, under oath within 10 days hereof.” The document requests and interrogatories requested identification and production of, inter alia, documents used to prepare damage summaries already produced by Romo and supporting damage claims.
The evidentiary sanctions order precluded Romo from offering as an exhibit or providing any testimony relying on any document that supported the damage summaries or otherwise supported the claim for damages, but that had not been produced. Romo fails to explain how the order was vague or what it could not understand about the order’s limits.

B.
Motion in Limine No. 3
Paradise’s motion in limine No. 3 sought to exclude documents from trial that were subject to the court’s earlier evidentiary sanctions order. The motion was made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 128, subdivision (a)(2) through (4), and 187. The trial court was authorized to exclude from trial documents that were subject to its earlier evidentiary sanctions order, and testimony based on those documents, as a means of enforcing its orders.
In its opposition to motion in limine No. 3, Romo argued that Paradise had failed to submit a declaration stating that “subject discovery was not in fact produced.” To the contrary, motion in limine No. 3 specified which documents should be excluded at trial by identifying their trial exhibit number and/or their exhibit number at Donoghue’s deposition, and included a declaration from Paradise’s counsel stating that those documents had not been produced in discovery. At that point, the burden shifted to Romo to show the documents in question had been produced in discovery, either by identifying their discovery production numbers, or providing a declaration that the particular documents at issue had been provided. The general declarations from Romo’s former counsel that several hundred documents had been produced by Romo in discovery were insufficient.
On appeal, Romo argues that the trial court erred in granting motion in limine No. 3 by improperly interpreting the word “used” in the discovery requests for documents used in making damage calculations. The April 2014 discovery order, however, ruled that Romo’s objections to the requests were waived; whether there was any uncertainty in the use of the term “used” is no longer an issue in this case.
Having reviewed the record, we reject Romo’s counsel’s contention that the trial court simply rubberstamped Paradise’s counsel’s requests to exclude evidence. The court did not err in granting motion in limine No. 3.

C.
Motion in Limine No. 4
In motion in limine No. 4, Paradise sought to exclude testimony from Romo’s designated expert witness on damages—Donoghue—as well as his written report on the grounds that, in reaching his opinions, he relied on material that was excluded by the evidentiary sanctions order. Because, as discussed ante, the court did not err in granting the nonsuit motion and the jury found against Romo on the only remaining claim of conversion, any error in excluding testimony and a written report from Donoghue on damages would be moot.
In opposition, Romo made the same argument as in opposition to motion in limine No. 3, namely, that Paradise had failed to serve a “declaration under penalty of perjury that says the subject document was not within the items previously timely produced.” As explained ante in connection with motion in limine No. 3, this argument lacks merit. Further, during argument in the trial court regarding this motion in limine, Paradise’s counsel specifically identified the requests in the second set of discovery to which the documents they were then seeking to exclude had been requested.
Romo also argued that Donoghue, at his deposition, produced all documents related to Romo that were in his possession, and not only the documents on which he relied in forming his opinions and preparing his report. Donoghue did not identify under oath in opposition to the motion in limine what documents he relied on or state that he did not rely on any documents not produced.
The trial court granted motion in limine No. 4 to exclude Donoghue’s report as hearsay. Romo does not make any argument regarding this ruling on appeal.
The court later granted motion in limine No. 4 to exclude Donoghue’s testimony. The court concluded that Donoghue could not testify regarding any damages caused by the alleged conversion of zippers because at his deposition, that topic of expert testimony was removed by Romo’s then counsel. Neither in the trial court nor on appeal does Romo challenge this decision. (Because the conversion cause of action was decided against Romo by the jury, this issue is in any event moot.) The court also concluded that because Donoghue relied on documents that had not been produced in response to proper discovery in making his calculations, his opinion was tainted. Therefore, the court excluded all of Donoghue’s testimony.
On appeal, Romo does not provide any specific argument regarding the exclusion of Donoghue’s testimony. For the same reasons we set forth ante in connection with motion in limine No. 3, the trial court did not err in granting motion in limine No. 4.
D.
Objections to Evidence
Romo argues that the trial court committed reversible error and violated Romo’s rights of due process and fundamental fairness by improperly sustaining objections throughout trial. In particular, Romo argues the court “repeatedly sustain[ed] ‘foundation’ and ‘relevance’ objections for the defendants.”
On several occasions during the trial, the court explained its process for evidentiary objections. During the questioning of the very first witness at trial, the court advised Romo’s counsel: “You need to stop arguing in front of the jury, but just state grounds for objections.” The court further advised counsel that objections based on lack of foundation, hearsay, or leading the witness would be addressed during breaks without the jury present. Again, the court made the following statement to counsel during trial: “And just to be clear on what’s fair game to say in front of the jury, on objections the court expects that counsel’s only going to state the legal grounds of the objection, and then the court rules. And if counsel wants to argue it they ask for a side bar, which basically the court will have the side bar at the recess, assuming we can defer the issue until the next break, which we certainly can if it’s a witness that’s been testifying for a lengthy period. And the jury’s not supposed to hear all kinds of this extraneous argument, just grounds. They’re supposed to hear the evidence, questions and answers, and not all of this stuff.”
In its appellate briefs, Romo points to a few specific instances where it claims the trial court improperly sustained foundational or hearsay objections to evidence. At one point, in addressing Paradise’s objections to the admission of Romo’s trial exhibits, Romo’s counsel argued, “it’s incumbent upon the attorney [making the objection], they have to state the grounds for foundation, it’s not incumbent upon the attorney raising the question to guess and read minds,” to which the court replied, “[t]hat runs afoul of every rule about objecting in front of a jury, that attorneys are supposed to state the grounds only and not specifics with arguments.”
Specifically arguing the foundation for Valles’s testimony regarding damages, Romo’s counsel and the trial court engaged in the following colloquy:
“Mr. Kennedy: We’ve identified everything. She’s gone over her business records, she’s gone over—it’s not a requirement under law that she brings in all those books, those 50 books. She can calculate, she can do a calculation. That’s the best evidence, that’s her evidence. Now if he doesn’t believe it, he can challenge that, but that’s her testimony. She can’t be precluded from giving her testimony, in my opinion, as to her calculation. Now, if they want to doubt it, if they want to challenge it, they can do that, but she’s explained a very detailed process of how she arrived at those numbers.
“The Court: No, she hasn’t. She hasn’t said what documents she relied on.
“Mr. Kennedy: Your honor, that’s just where I’m missing. Maybe it’s just because I’m tired. To me I recall her saying she checked her computer and she checked these 50 volumes. She checked the items that had been sent, she checked the documents reflecting that it had been signed, and she checked the documents showing what garments have come back. I’m not sure what other documents there would be. That’s her business record and accounting.
“The Court: How about exhibit 48 that’s excluded by virtue of the ruling in limine, maybe she relied on that, and that’s your real problem-maker.
“Mr. Kennedy: Oh, that’s what you think, I’m trying to get around that? No, your honor, I’m not—number one, the document was excluded for hearsay.
“The Court: No, it wasn’t. It was excluded because it wasn’t produced when it was obligated to be produced. Hearsay is beside the point. [¶] . . . [¶]
“Mr. Kennedy: If I can clarify that issue, your honor, I think here’s where we’re not on the same page, I think [it’s] important, . . . you can exclude the document. I mean, if you’re talking one produced you can exclude it, but that is not a preclusion of her testimony. If her testimony is, ‘I went back and did that and here’s the number I got,’ we’re not moving the document into evidence, but you’re precluding her testimony based on the fact that you precluded the document. She doesn’t need that document. She went back and did the calculation. She knows what it was.
“The Court: She doesn’t get to testify as to what documents show without having the documents here.
“Mr. Kennedy: She’s not telling what the document shows, your honor, she’s showing what her calculation was.
“The Court: From documents.
“Mr. Kennedy: Okay, let’s clarify that. Because what we’re really doing is fundamentally you’re precluding a document—
“The Court: I’m done with this argument. Do you have any other topics to address?”
An objection has no special form, but must state the specific ground on which it is based. While “lack of foundation” might lack the specificity necessary to be reviewed on appeal (People v. Modell (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 724, 729), it is not improper to sustain such an objection if the lack of foundation is obvious. Based on the foregoing exchange between the court and counsel, the lack of foundation for the excluded testimony was obvious. The testimony was based on documents that had been excluded by the ruling on a motion in limine.
Again, during Romo’s counsel’s questioning of Valles, the following occurred:
“Q Okay. Using your brains, your eyes and your fingers to use a calculator, did all three of those processes lead you to a calculation of what these [damages] are?
“A Yes.
“Q Okay. And that was a truthful and accurate number; correct?
“A Yes.
“Q Okay. And what was that number?
“Mr. Chapin: Lacks foundation, hearsay.
“The Court: Sustained.
“Mr. Kennedy: Your honor, I have a question as to what’s missing in the foundation.
“The Court: If you want to argue it, you’ll skip over this and we’ll argue it outside the presence of the jury.” The testimony counsel was seeking from Valles was lacking in foundation because her damage calculations were based on documents that had been excluded or that Romo had failed to produce in discovery. The additional examples Romo provides as to which it claims objections based on hearsay or lack of foundation were improperly sustained were also attempts to have Valles testify as to the damages caused by the loss of the Drifire business using Valles’s calculations from the documents that were excluded.

III.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY ROMO ARE DEEMED FORFEITED
“‘Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal authority for the positions taken. “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”’ [Citation.] ‘We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.’” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)
Romo raises several other issues in its appellate briefs, but fails to develop any argument regarding them. We deem the following issues to have been forfeited by Romo on appeal: (1) the denial of Romo’s motions for continuance of the trial; (2) the trial court’s orders granting motion in limine Nos. 2 and 5; (3) the nonsuit of Romo’s causes of action for intentional interference, declaratory relief, an accounting, and conversion as to Torpipat; (4) the denial of Romo’s request to call Paradise’s trial counsel as a witness; and (5) the award of attorney fees and costs to Paradise.

IV.
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
After briefing was complete, Paradise filed a motion for monetary sanctions in the amount of at least $47,000 against both Romo and its counsel, J. Grant Kennedy. Paradise argues sanctions are permitted under California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(2) and (4) because Romo included matters not reasonably material to the appeal’s determination in the record, and committed unreasonable violations of the rules of court. Notably, Paradise does not argue that Romo’s appeal was frivolous pursuant to rule 8.276(a)(1).
Paradise argues that Romo’s opening brief violates California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) and (2)(C) because it fails to support references to the record by proper record citations and fails to provide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record. Romo’s opening brief summarizes multiple factual statements with a single citation to multiple pages from the transcript. In addition, many factual statements are without any citation to the record. Under rule 8.204(e)(2), this court has the discretion to order a noncomplying appellate brief returned for corrections and refiling, stricken with leave to file a new brief, or simply to disregard the noncompliance. We opted to disregard Romo’s briefs’ noncompliance.
“We may impose monetary sanctions for ‘“any unreasonable infraction of the rules governing appeals . . . as the circumstances of the case and the discouragement of like conduct in the future may require.”’” (Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 29.) The court in Pierotti sanctioned the appellant not only because of the deficiencies in its appellate briefs, but also because the appeal was frivolous, a claim Paradise does not raise here.
We do not condone the failure of Romo’s counsel to ensure the briefs’ compliance with the California Rules of Court. An experienced appellate attorney knows that, especially when the issues on appeal are fact-intensive, it is in the appealing party’s best interest to set forth the facts, with citations to the record, clearly and specifically. And we express our displeasure with the repeated, unfounded attacks on the integrity of the trial court and Paradise’s counsel that permeate Romo’s briefs, and especially Romo’s opposition to the sanctions motion. However, we do not believe that sanctions under California Rules of Court, rule 8.276 are appropriate in addition to any attorney fees that may be awarded by the trial court. The motion for sanctions is denied.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on appeal, including but not limited to attorney fees pursuant to contract.



FYBEL, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:



THOMPSON, J.



GOETHALS, J.