RONALD MCLEAN vs. STATE OF FLORIDA
Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC03-1732
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RONALD MCLEAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[July 6, 2006]
PARIENTE, J.
In this case we address a certified question of great public importance:
Does section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), violate due process when applied in a case in which identity is not an issue?
McLean v. State, 854 So. 2d 796, 803-04 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer this question in the negative and hold that section 90.404(2)(b) comports with the requirements of due process of law when used as a conduit for evidence that corroborates the victim's testimony that the crime occurred rather than to prove the identity of the alleged perpetrator. In so holding, we conclude that due process is satisfied by weighing the probative value of the evidence of prior acts of child molestation against its potential for unfair prejudice, which is compelled by section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2005). Application of section 90.403 in determining admissibility ensures that section 90.404(2)(b) does not open the door to introduction of any and all propensity evidence in sexual molestation cases. Where necessary to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial, the trial court should either exclude the evidence or substantially limit its presentation so that it does not become a feature of trial. Further, under section 90.404(2)(c)(2), Florida Statues (2005), when such evidence is admitted, the trial court shall, if requested, give an appropriate cautionary instruction and shall repeat the instruction in its final charge to the jury. Because the trial court in this case carefully and conscientiously followed these steps, we agree with the Second District that the defendant was not denied due process of law. Accordingly, we approve the Second District's decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ronald McLean was charged with capital sexual battery and lewd molestation based on events that occurred on October 19, 2000, when McLean was visiting his brother, Gerald McLean. On that night, Gerald McLean's eight-year-old grandson, J.N., was also visiting.
J.N. and his grandfather regularly watched wrestling on television on Thursday nights and J.N. would stay over at his grandparents' home. On October 19, J.N.'s grandmother put him to bed around 9 p.m. Shortly thereafter, both grandparents went to bed.
At approximately 11 p.m., J.N. awoke his grandmother and announced that he wanted to go home. He was fully dressed and had his knapsack packed. He seemed nervous, but he did not say anything to his grandmother. She drove J.N. home about 11:15 p.m.
McLean, 854 So. 2d at 798. The following day, J.N.'s mother asked J.N. why he had come home early. J.N.'s mother did not relate what J.N. told her but stated that the conversation caused her to report the matter to law enforcement.
Amy Wilkins, a case coordinator for the Children's Home Society who interviewed J.N., testified at trial that J.N. told her that he woke up during the night at his grandparents' house and that his â€
