RV World v. National RV

Filed 10/17/07 RV World v. National RV CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

RV World and Margaret Rudolph appeal from a judgment of dismissal after an order granting summary judgment against them disposed of all causes of action against National RV, Inc. (National). RV World contends the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply to bar its claims because the issue adjudicated in a prior administrative hearing was not identical to any dispositive issue in this case. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

RV World is a dealer of new motor vehicles. Margaret Rudolph is its president and principal. National is a manufacturer of new motor vehicles.

In a prior administrative action, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked RV World's dealership license based on the DMV's determination that RV World failed to disclose to a consumer the chassis model year of a National Tropi-Cal motor home ("housecar"). The DMV decision was based in part on a finding that RV World knew or should have known that the chassis was manufactured in 2000, not in 2001.

At the administrative hearing, RV World argued that its license should not be revoked because it was unaware that the chassis of the housecar was manufactured in 2000. Ms. Rudolph testified that neither she nor anyone at the dealership knew or had reason to know that the chassis was manufactured in 2000. On the other hand, the DMV introduced a 2000 Owner's Guide and 2000 Floor Plan Specifications that were delivered with the housecar. The DMV also offered the testimony of its investigator that the chassis model year can be determined from the Vehicle Identification Number.

The administrative law judge found "[i]t is simply not reasonable to believe [RV World's] claim that no one at [RV World] inspected vehicle or the paperwork to confirm what respondent was selling and that it was what the Purchasers had ordered and were paying for." The administrative law judge found, "Mrs. Rudolph's credibility is also questionable . . ." and that "[h]ad respondent made any reasonable effort to carefully inspect the vehicle or the paperwork that came with it, respondent would have known [the vehicle had a 2000 chassis]." The decision was adopted by the DMV and became final on October 2, 2003. RV World filed, but dismissed, a petition for writ of administrative mandamus.

After its license was revoked, RV World filed this action against National. RV World contends that National's failure to complete a chassis model year disclosure form caused RV World to lose its license. RV World contends that if it had actually known the chassis model year, it would have disclosed that information to the consumer and would not have lost its license. RV World asserted three causes of action against National: (1) violation of Vehicle Code section 11726,^[1]negligent interference with economic relations, and (3) intentional interference with economic relations.^[2] Each cause of action was premised upon failure to disclose the chassis model year.

National moved for summary judgment or adjudication. The trial court granted summary judgment on the grounds that the complaint and each cause of action were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, because the administrative action determined that RV World knew or should have known the chassis model year of the vehicle.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

On appeal, we independently review an order granting summary judgment. (Jenkins v. County of Riverside(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 601.) Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no material issue of fact or where the record establishes as a matter of law that a cause of action cannot prevail. (Code Civ. Proc., 437c.) A defendant meets the burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the defendant shows that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established by plaintiff, or if there is a complete defense to the cause. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law which we review de novo. (Jenkins, p. 604.)

Applicability of Vehicle Code Section 11713.5

We first address National's contention that it was not under a statutory duty to disclose the chassis year model to RV World. Section 11713.5 requires licensees to disclose the fact that a housecar has been manufactured in two stages. The disclosure must include the date of chassis and engine manufacture and the date and model year of other stages of the vehicle. Section 11726 authorizes a cause of action by one licensee against another for damages and reasonable attorneys fees based on willful failure to comply with section 11713.5.

National contends that section 11713.5, subdivision (c) only applies to transactions between dealers and buyers, and does not apply to transactions between manufacturers and dealers. Our task is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. (Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 910.) "'We begin by examining the statutory language, giving words their usual and ordinary meaning.' [Citations.] If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs." (Id. at p. 911.) The plain language of section 11713.5, subdivision (c) requires disclosure by manufacturers, as well as dealers. The subdivision applies to "the holder of any license issued under this article to display for sale, offer for sale, or sell" housecars which have been manufactured in two stages. The article requires manufacturers, as well as dealers, to be licensed. ( 11700.) We presume the legislature meant what it said, and that any licensee who offers a housecar for sale must provide the disclosure required by section 11713.5.

We therefore conclude that section 11713.5, subdivision (c) did impose upon National a duty to disclose the chassis model year to RV World. The question remains whether RV World can prove that it suffered any harm as a result of National's alleged failure to disclose, in view of the prior administrative determination that RV World had sufficient information available to it that it knew or should have known the chassis model year.

Collateral Estoppel

Collateral estoppel prevents a party or that party's privy from relitigating in a second proceeding an issue that was already fully and fairly litigated against it to a final adjudication on the merits in a prior proceeding. (Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 828.) The doctrine applies only if the issues are identical. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.) The doctrine may be applied to findings made in a prior administrative hearing. (Kelly v. Vons Companies, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1335-1337.)

The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies here to consclusively establish that RV World knew or should have known the chassis model year at the time it sold the housecar to the consumer. The administrative hearing officer found against RV World on the issue after a full and fair evidentiary hearing. Resolution of the issue was necessary to the determination. The DMV adopted the officer's proposed findings on the issue, and the decision became final when RV World dismissed its petition for writ of administrative mandate.

As a result, RV World cannot prevail in this case. RV World contends that National failed to disclose the chassis model year, and that the failure was a cause of harm to RV World. Given the fact that RV World knew or should have known the chassis model year, no reasonable juror could find that National's failure to disclose that same information to RV World was a cause of any harm to RV World. RV World cannot prove causation as a matter of law, and National was entitled to summary judgment in its favor.

The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

COFFEE, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P.J.

PERREN, J.

Zel Canter, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Law Offices of Michael M. Sieving and Michael M. Sieving, Manish Parikh, Christopher J. Wrabel, for Plaintiffs and Appellants RV World and Margaret Rudolph..

Gates, O'Doherty, Gonter & Guy, LLP, Vincent J. Axelson; Richard H. Benes, for Defendant and Respondent National RV, Inc..

Publication courtesy of San Diego pro bono legal advice.

Analysis and review provided by Poway Property line attorney.

^[1]All statutory references are to the Vehicle code unless otherwise stated.

^[2]In earlier proceedings, the court dismissed causes of action against TIG and a cause of action for fraud against National. Neither decision is the subject of this appeal.