Sanchez v. Courtesy Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc.
Filed 10/12/07 Sanchez v. Courtesy Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SUSAN SANCHEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COURTESY OLDSMOBILE CADILLAC, INC., Defendant and Respondent. | F050490 (Super. Ct. No. 145680) OPINION |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Frank Dougherty, Judge.
Shaw, Terhar, & LaMontagne LLP, Eric A. Amador, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Mason, Robbins, Browning & Godwin, Corbett J. Browning, for Defendant and Respondent.
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Plaintiffs Leonard and Susan Sanchez (plaintiffs) signed a contract with defendant Courtesy Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc. (defendant) to lease a truck for use in plaintiffs air conditioning and heating business. Defendant hired a third-party, Stahl/Scott Fetzer Company (Stahl), to install a 12-foot stake bed on the truck. When Stahl was unable to attach a 12-foot stake bed to the subject vehicle, it requested authorization from defendant to install a 14-foot bed instead. Defendants salesman allegedly contacted plaintiff, Mr. Sanchez, and obtained oral approval for the installation of a 14-foot truck bed. However, Mr. Sanchez denied that such approval was ever given, and he stressed that a truck with a 14-foot bed would be too long for his secure garage. After the truck was completed with a 14-foot bed and experienced electrical problems during a test drive, plaintiffs gave written notice of rescission to defendant. Plaintiffs continued to make payments under the lease to protect their good credit. The case was tried by the court on a rescission cause of action only and after a three-day trial, the matter was taken under submission. Sometime later, without any explanation and without issuing a tentative decision or statement of decision, the trial court simply entered judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiffs now appeal, contending the trial court erred in entering judgment without rendering a tentative decision or statement of decision. We agree, and will reverse with instructions that the trial court comply with this statutory process by issuing a proper statement of decision.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action on February 6, 2002. The plaintiffs alleged therein that on November 11, 2000, they contracted with defendant for the lease of a truck with a stake bed of a particular length, but defendant sold them a vehicle that was not equipped to carry a bed of that length. The complaint listed several causes of action, including rescission of contract. According to a notice of rescission attached to the original complaint, defendant promised that the vehicle would have a 12-foot stake bed, but the truck did not conform to that promise.[1]
The case was tried by the court on February 7-9, 2006. During trial, plaintiffs dismissed all of their causes of action except for rescission of contract. At close of oral argument, the parties were directed to submit posttrial briefs and proposed judgments. Approximately two months later, the trial court executed and filed the proposed judgment that defendant had submitted. The court did not announce a tentative decision and it did not issue a written statement of decision. The judgment in favor of defendant was filed on April 24, 2006.
Shortly after judgment was entered, plaintiffs filed a curative request for a statement of decision. Defendant opposed the request. The trial court did not issue any statement of decision. Plaintiffs timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Trial Courts Failure to Announce a Tentative Decision or Issue a Statement of Decision Constituted Reversible Error
Plaintiffs contend the trial court prejudicially erred by entering judgment without first issuing a tentative decision or statement of decision. Plaintiffs are correct.
We begin with a brief review of the established procedures for the announcement and issuance of decisions following a court trial of factual issues. On the trial of a question of fact by the court, the court must announce a tentative decision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(a) [formerly rule 232(a)].) Once this is done, the parties have a brief window of time in which to request a written statement of decision. (Code Civ. Proc., 632.) The request must be made within 10 days after the court announces a tentative decision unless the trial is concluded within one calendar day or in less than eight hours over more than one day in which event the request must be made prior to the submission of the matter for decision. (Code Civ. Proc., 632.) Thus, in trials which last more than one full day (as here), the critical event which begins the 10-day time period for the parties to request a statement of decision is the courts announcement of a tentative decision.
If a statement of decision is timely requested, it is mandatory for the trial court to issue one. (Miramar Hotel Corp. v. Frank B. Hall & Co. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1126, 1129.) The court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the request of any party appearing at the trial. (Code Civ. Proc., 632, italics added.) The statement is intended to serve as a touchstone to determine whether or not the trial courts decision is supported by the facts and the law. (Slavin v. Borinstein (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 713, 718.) The importance of the statement is underscored by the rule that a trial courts failure to render a statement of decision is reversible error. (In re Marriage of Sellers (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1010.)
The important purposes served by these procedural requirements are explained in Miramar Hotel Corp. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at pages 1128-1129: The Legislature, by its enactment of section 632, and the Judicial Council, by its adoption of California Rules of Court, rule 232 [now rule 3.1590] have created a comprehensive method for informing the parties and ultimately the appellate courts of the factual and legal basis for the trial courts decision. [] A statement of decision prepared in conformity to the established procedure may be vitally important to the litigants in framing the issues, if any, that need to be considered or reviewed on appeal. Parenthetically, such a statement may render obvious the futility of an appeal. Eventually, a careful issue identification and delineation may also be of considerable assistance to the appellate court. [] Another equally important aspect of the orderly procedure ordained for eliciting and originating a statement of decision is the parties opportunity to make proposals as to its content. Rule 232(b) provides that proposals as to the content of the statement of decision shall be made within 10 days of the request for the statement. Rule 232(d) provides that any party affected by a proposed judgment may serve and file objections to the proposed statement of decision within 15 days after the proposed statement and judgment have been served.[2]
In the present case, we conclude that plaintiffs were deprived of their right to request and obtain a statement of decision when the trial court filed a judgment without first announcing a tentative decision. Plaintiffs statutory 10-day period to request a statement of decision prior to judgment was thereby eliminated, and when plaintiffs sought a statement of decision thereafter, the trial court declined.[3] We find reversible error. As stated in Charlton Co. v. Aerfab Corp. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 808 at page 813: when disputed issues of fact are involved, the trial court must announce an intended decision rather than making a final order or judgment which does not give a party an opportunity to request written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Notwithstanding this error, the parties have invited us to address the merits of the case.[4] We decline to do so. The appropriate disposition is to reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court to issue a proper statement of decision in compliance with the statutory process. (Karlsen v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1531; Miramar Hotel Corp. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 1130; Social Service Union v. County of Monterey (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 676, 681; Wagner et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials & Evidence (The Rutter Group 2006) 16:201, p. 16-44.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions that it issue a proper statement of decision in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 632. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs on appeal.
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Kane, J.
WE CONCUR:
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Harris, Acting P.J.
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Dawson, J.
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[1] Plaintiffs moved to amend at trial to conform to the proof because the complaint had an obvious typographic error. That is, the complaint referred to the promised truck bed size as being 14-feet, not 12-feet. Plaintiffs attorney claimed the two numbers were inadvertently reversed.
[2] Former rule 232(b) of California Rules of Court is now rule 3.1590(d); and former rule 232(d) is now rule 3.1590(f). Although renumbered, there is no substantive change in these provisions.
[3] Since the trial judge erroneously prevented plaintiffs from exercising their right to request a statement of decision prior to judgment, we hold that plaintiffs prompt postjudgment request was timely.
[4] Plaintiffs request that we not only remand for issuance of a statement of decision, but also require the trial court to find that their rescission claim was established as a matter of law. Defendant urges us to hold any failure to issue a statement of decision was nonprejudicial because, allegedly, plaintiffs could not prevail on the merits of their rescission claim as a matter of law. As noted, we do not believe it is appropriate to reach the merits at this time.
